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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-4689

Microsoft to Retire SMS and Voice Authentication in Entra ID Workforce Tenants (Feb 1, 2027); Admins Urged to Migrate to Passkeys

lowMONITORING

Microsoft will retire Microsoft-provided SMS and voice authentication for Entra ID workforce tenants starting February 1, 2027, and is urging administrators to move users to phishing-resistant methods such as passkeys, QR code authentication and FIDO2 security keys. Microsoft states SMS and voice are vulnerable to phishing and SIM-swap attacks. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-4689
Also known asEntra ID SMS and voice authentication retirement, MC1426371
SeverityLOW
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Microsoft Entra ID (workforce tenants)
ToolsEntra SMS/Voice Policy Scanner
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1078 Valid Accounts, T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, T1451 SIM Card Swap, T1566 Phishing, T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
MotivationUNKNOWN
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-4689 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 11 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Phone/SMS Security Info Registered or Changed by Admin or Self-Service (T1556.006)

TL-2026-4689: an attacker with a valid cloud account (T1078.004) can add or swap a phone authentication method to keep SMS/voice MFA under their control (T1556.006), and the same audit event can follow a SIM swap (T1451) or helpdesk social engineering. Detects Entra ID audit events for security-info registration or default-method changes that reference phone, mobile, SMS or voice.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1556.006, T1078.004, T1451
  • Data sources: entra_id_audit_logs, index=azure sourcetype=azure:monitor:aad category=AuditLogs, AuditLogs
  • Severity: medium
  • Confidence: medium

Splunk SPL

index=azure sourcetype="azure:monitor:aad" category=AuditLogs earliest=-24h operationName IN ("Admin registered security info", "Admin updated security info", "User changed default security info", "User registered security info")
| eval initiator=lower(coalesce('properties.initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName', 'properties.initiatedBy.app.displayName')), target=lower(mvindex('properties.targetResources{}.userPrincipalName', 0)), reason='properties.resultReason', src_ip='properties.initiatedBy.user.ipAddress'
| where match(lower(reason), "phone|mobile|sms|voice")
| eval actor_type=if(initiator!=target, "admin_or_third_party", "self_service")
| stats count, values(operationName) as operations, values(src_ip) as src_ips, values(reason) as reasons by initiator, target, actor_type
| sort - count

Microsoft KQL

AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where OperationName in ("Admin registered security info", "Admin updated security info", "User changed default security info", "User registered security info")
| where ResultReason has_any ("phone", "mobile", "SMS", "voice") or tostring(TargetResources) has_any ("phone", "mobile", "SMS", "voice")
| extend Initiator = tolower(coalesce(tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName), tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)))
| extend Target = tolower(tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)), SrcIP = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
| extend ActorType = iff(Initiator != Target, "admin_or_third_party", "self_service")
| project TimeGenerated, OperationName, Initiator, Target, ActorType, SrcIP, ResultReason

Sigma

title: Entra ID Phone Authentication Method Registered or Changed
id: 2e9b7d10-6c4a-4a83-b5f2-81d3a09c6e47
status: experimental
description: Detects Entra ID audit events where security info (including a phone, SMS or voice method) is registered or changed, particularly by an administrator on behalf of a user. Can indicate MFA method takeover following account compromise or SIM-swap-driven recovery. Related to TL-2026-4689.
references:
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/authentication/concept-sms-voice-retirement
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-29
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1556.006
    - attack.t1078.004
    - attack.t1451
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: auditlogs
detection:
    selection:
        properties.message:
            - 'Admin registered security info'
            - 'Admin updated security info'
            - 'User changed default security info'
            - 'User registered security info'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Helpdesk-assisted MFA enrollment and phone-number updates
    - Planned migration campaigns that re-register users to new methods
level: medium

Known false positives:

  • Helpdesk-assisted MFA enrollment and phone-number updates
  • Planned passkey or telecom-provider migration campaigns that cause mass re-registration

Tuning notes: Allowlist helpdesk and authentication administrator accounts, or alert only on actor_type=admin_or_third_party. Suppress during announced migration windows ahead of 2027-02-01. Verify the phone-related text appears in resultReason or targetResources for your tenant; adjust field paths if not.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • SMS/Voice MFA Success From Previously Unseen IP Address (T1078.004) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra ID Authentication Methods Policy Changed for SMS/Voice/Passkey (T1556.006) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Passkey/FIDO2 User Downgraded to SMS/Voice MFA Sign-in (T1111) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra ID Identity Protection Token/AiTM Risk Detection (T1566, T1078.004) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra SMS/Voice Policy Scanner or Graph Policy.Read.All Reconnaissance (T1087.004, T1526) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra ID MFA Fraud Report by User (T1621, T1111) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Entra ID MFA Fatigue Against SMS/Voice Authentication (T1621) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SIM-Swap Indicator: Phone Method Change Followed by SMS/Voice Sign-in (T1451) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-29, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 11 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-4689.

Sample indicators (1 of 11)

  • URL: hxxps://mc[.]merill[.]net/message/MC1426371

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 11 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

11 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

This is a defensive hardening advisory, not an active threat campaign. No CVE, exploitation, PoC, threat actor or malicious infrastructure is associated with it. BleepingComputer (2026-10-28) reports that Microsoft is reminding Microsoft Entra ID administrators to migrate users off SMS and voice authentication before the retirement of the Microsoft-provided telephony service begins on February 1, 2027. Microsoft's stated rationale is that SMS and voice are vulnerable to phishing and SIM-swap attacks.

Per Microsoft message center post MC1426371, passkeys became the default authentication method starting September 1, 2026: passkeys are automatically enabled for eligible users and the passkey Registration Campaign is set to the Microsoft Managed state. Users are prompted to register a passkey at sign-in but can skip the prompt. Review of telecom providers in the Microsoft Security Store was scheduled from September 18, 2026, and customers can select a telecom provider for continued SMS/voice use from October 30, 2026. Microsoft-provided SMS and voice retire for most users on February 1, 2027, after which only customer-configured telecom providers will deliver SMS/voice. Retirement for Global Administrators and external users follows on July 1, 2027. A temporary opt-out is available between September 1, 2026 and February 1, 2027. Per BleepingComputer, SMS first-factor sign-in was retired for Free tenants in August 2026.

Scope: the change applies to Microsoft Entra ID workforce tenants and excludes Azure AD B2C and Microsoft Entra External ID scenarios. Approved alternatives are passkeys (the default), QR code authentication, FIDO2 security keys, and customer-managed telecom providers selected via the Microsoft Security Store. Organizations that rely solely on Microsoft-provided telephony and take no action will see sign-in disruption after the retirement date.

Microsoft published the Entra SMS/Voice Policy Scanner, a PowerShell script (github.com/microsoft/entra-sms-voice-usage-analyzer) that uses Microsoft Graph modules (Microsoft.Graph.Authentication, Microsoft.Graph.Identity.SignIns, Microsoft.Graph.Groups) with Policy.Read.All and Group.Read.All scopes to report registration campaign state, SMS/Voice policy configuration and targets (exported to CSV), and an impact summary. Minimum roles are Authentication Policy Administrator, Global Reader or Security Reader. For defenders, the relevant risk is that SMS/voice MFA remains exposed to phishing and SIM-swap abuse until users are migrated; sources do not describe any specific attack or actor.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1078 Valid Accounts

Credential Access

T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception; T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation

initial-access

T1451 SIM Card Swap

Initial Access

T1566 Phishing

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Run the Entra SMS/Voice Policy Scanner (microsoft/entra-sms-voice-usage-analyzer) to identify users and groups still targeted by SMS/voice policies
  • Determine whether SMS/voice remains a business requirement and, if so, configure a customer-managed telecom provider via the Microsoft Security Store (recommended at least 4 weeks before February 1, 2027)

Workarounds

  • Use the temporary opt-out available between September 1, 2026 and February 1, 2027 while completing transition activities
  • Use customer-managed telecom providers for continued SMS/voice if required

Longer-term hardening

  • Migrate users to phishing-resistant methods: passkeys, QR code authentication or FIDO2 security keys
  • Plan user communication and passkey registration campaigns before the retirement date

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Microsoft Entra ID (workforce tenants)
    Vulnerable versions: Tenants using Microsoft-provided SMS or voice authentication
    Fixed in: Tenants migrated to passkeys, QR code authentication, FIDO2 security keys, or a customer-managed telecom provider

Timeline

  • SMS first-factor sign-in retired for Entra Free tenants (August 2026, per BleepingComputer)
  • Passkeys become the default authentication method; passkeys auto-enabled for eligible users and the passkey Registration Campaign set to Microsoft Managed (MC1426371)
  • Telecom providers available to review in Microsoft Security Store (MC1426371)
  • BleepingComputer reports Microsoft reminding Entra ID admins to migrate users to passkeys before SMS/voice retirement
  • Customers can select customer-managed telecom providers for continued SMS/voice use (MC1426371)
  • Microsoft-provided SMS and voice authentication retire for most Entra ID workforce users; only customer-configured providers remain; temporary opt-out window ends
  • Microsoft-provided SMS/voice retire for Global Administrators and external users (MC1426371)

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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