Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6118
Retadup USB worm delivering new CoffeeLoader variant (Armoury packer, OpenGL-based)
Kaspersky detected a new CoffeeLoader variant in August 2026 delivered via the Retadup USB worm, whose old C2 domains were re-registered around 2024 and began serving SmokeLoader and then, from early 2025, CoffeeLoader. The variant uses an NSIS installer dropping a patched 7z.dll run via rundll32.exe, packed with a new Armoury variant that decrypts on the GPU via OpenGL. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6118 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows |
| Malware | CoffeeLoader, Rakhni, Retadup, Rhadamanthys, Smoke Loader - S0226 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing, T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1055 Process Injection, T1059.010 Command and Scripting Interpreter: AutoHotKey & AutoIT, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1091 Replication Through Removable Media, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1112 Modify Registry, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 and 6 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | general |
| Target regions | 005 - South America, Africa, 151 - Eastern Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6118 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 40 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: CoffeeLoader Rundll32 Execution of Patched 7z.dll / SetCodecs Persistence DLL — Exploitation Phase
Behaviour-first detection of the CoffeeLoader (Retadup-delivered, TL-2026-6118) execution chain: an NSIS installer drops a patched 7z.dll that rundll32.exe runs from a temp or ProgramData path, and the persistent copy b79faace.dll (eight hex digits derived from volume information) is launched through the SetCodecs export. Also flags ArmouryAIOSDK.dll, the typical Armoury-packed filename.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1218.011, T1027.002, T1036.005, T1204.002
- Data sources: sysmon (EventCode 1), windows_security (4688 with command line), microsoft_defender_for_endpoint (DeviceProcessEvents)
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h (Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR OriginalFileName="RUNDLL32.EXE")
| eval cl=lower(CommandLine)
| where (like(cl,"%7z.dll%") AND match(cl,"\\\\(temp|appdata|programdata)\\\\")) OR match(cl,"\\\\[0-9a-f]{8}\\\\[0-9a-f]{8}\.dll") OR like(cl,"%,setcodecs%") OR like(cl,"%armouryaiosdk.dll%")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_images by host User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| eval threat="TL-2026-6118 CoffeeLoader/Retadup rundll32 patched 7z.dll or SetCodecs persistence DLL"Microsoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "rundll32.exe"
| where (ProcessCommandLine has "7z.dll" and ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\(temp|appdata|programdata)\\")
or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)\\[0-9a-f]{8}\\[0-9a-f]{8}\.dll"
or ProcessCommandLine has ",SetCodecs"
or ProcessCommandLine has "ArmouryAIOSDK.dll"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256Sigma
title: CoffeeLoader Rundll32 Execution of Patched 7z.dll or Hex-Named Persistence DLL
id: 6f1c2a9e-3b7d-4e58-9a41-0c5d7e8b1a21
status: experimental
description: Detects rundll32.exe executing a patched 7z.dll from a user-writable path, the SetCodecs export used by the CoffeeLoader persistence DLL (b79faace.dll style), an eight-hex-digit named DLL in an eight-hex-digit folder, or ArmouryAIOSDK.dll as delivered by Retadup (TL-2026-6118).
references:
- https://securelist.com/retadup-delivers-coffeeloader/121908/
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/coffeeloader-brew-stealthy-techniques
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1218.011
- attack.t1027.002
- attack.t1036.005
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'RUNDLL32.EXE'
selection_7z_name:
CommandLine|contains: '7z.dll'
selection_7z_path:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Temp\'
- '\AppData\'
- '\ProgramData\'
selection_setcodecs:
CommandLine|contains: ',SetCodecs'
selection_hexdir:
CommandLine|re: '(?i)\\[0-9a-f]{8}\\[0-9a-f]{8}\.dll'
selection_armoury:
CommandLine|contains: 'ArmouryAIOSDK.dll'
condition: selection_img and ((selection_7z_name and selection_7z_path) or selection_setcodecs or selection_hexdir or selection_armoury)
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software that runs a DLL from an eight-hex-digit folder via rundll32
- Portable archiver tooling invoking 7z.dll from a temp folder
level: high
Known false positives:
- Legitimate installers or admin scripts that run a DLL export from a hex-named folder via rundll32
- Portable archive utilities that load 7z.dll from a temp directory
Tuning notes: Allow-list known software-deployment paths and signed publishers. Raise priority when the parent is an unsigned NSIS installer or the DLL sits in ProgramData or AppData\Local. The hex-directory regex does not enforce that folder and file names match; add that comparison if volume is high.
- Retadup USB Worm Execution from Removable Drive and Hidden File Staging — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- CoffeeLoader Process Injection Targets Spawned by Rundll32 — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- CoffeeLoader Injected Process Network Activity and C2 Hosts — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- CoffeeLoader NSIS Dropper File Writes ([indicator] and Hex-Named DLL) — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- Armoury Packer GPU Decryption via Rundll32 OpenGL/OpenCL Load — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Retadup Check-in and CoffeeLoader /payload?md5= Requests in Web Proxy Logs — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- CoffeeLoader Run Key and StartupApproved Persistence — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Retadup / CoffeeLoader C2 Domain and DGA Lookups — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 40 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6118.
Sample indicators (3 of 40)
- Domain:
alphanoob[.]com - File hash:
2272dde17925d6179bea6fcf4d543d20 - Domain:
newblackage[.]com
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 40 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Kaspersky blocked Retadup infection attempts on about 15,000 systems in Q1-Q3 2026, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia.
Retadup is a worm first discovered in 2017, originally written in AutoIt and AutoHotkey. In July 2019 French law enforcement took control of its C2 servers and disinfected more than 850,000 machines. Around 2024 someone re-registered the old Retadup C2 domains and began issuing download commands to still-infected hosts, first serving SmokeLoader packed with the 32-bit Armoury packer and, from early 2025, CoffeeLoader.
Retadup spreads through USB and external drives by copying itself as hidden files and LNK shortcuts; when a user opens the shortcut on another PC, that machine is infected. Infected hosts poll the C2 (for example GET /FD0C7EE872277F33E3335530299B836A/1/4/1/0/empty to noobminer.newblackage.com with User-Agent WinHttp/1.6.4.0). Replies are plaintext commands encoded in Base64 and then hex, such as 'sleep-600000-sleep' and 'download-http://rurjfvn.rs/update.exe:!:update.exe-download'.
The downloaded payload is an NSIS installer that drops a patched copy of 7z.dll into a temporary directory and runs it with rundll32.exe. Part of the 7-Zip code is replaced with self-decrypting shellcode, a new variant of the Armoury packer. Earlier Armoury versions ran the decryption routine on the GPU through OpenCL; the new variant uses OpenGL (compute shader XOR). The unpacked DLL holds a dropper shellcode, a stager shellcode and a further shellcode. The stager creates a dllhost.exe process and injects the main body. The CoffeeLoader downloader combines dropper, stager and downloader functions and fetches the main module from C2 with GET /payload?md5= over HTTPS (32 zeros on the first request, then the hash of the previous payload).
Responses are XOR-encrypted shellcode whose first 16 bytes are the key. The trojan verifies an X-Signature header against an embedded public key and an X-Content-MD5 header against the decrypted body, replacing certificate validation with signature checks. If both pass, the shellcode is written to executable memory in the trojan's own process and run. The new version uses new request/response keys (A21251838432306F2CD2540593656B9E and 2026F751079659CF71C7BA64B345C12A) and a new protocol magic constant 0xD1D57871, abandoning 0xC0FFEE42, which gave CoffeeLoader its name. The main module accepts three commands from C2: inject into a process, save and run an EXE, or save and run a DLL via rundll32.exe. The downloader injects into one of dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe or AtBroker.exe.
Persistence copies the DLL to C:\ProgramData\b79faace\b79faace.dll and C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\b79faace\b79faace.dll (the eight hex digits are derived from system volume information) and sets an HKCU Run value b79faace.dll to rundll32.exe "C:\ProgramData\b79faace\b79faace.dll",SetCodecs. A StartupApproved\Run value of 080000000000000000000000 prevents the entry being disabled from Task Manager.
Zscaler ThreatLabz documented CoffeeLoader in March 2025 (appeared around September 2024): call stack spoofing, indirect syscalls, RC4 sleep obfuscation via SystemFunction032, CFG exceptions, optional Windows fibers, a scheduled task such as AsusUpdateServiceUA, UAC bypass via the CMSTPLUA COM interface, a daily .com DGA fallback, and Rhadamanthys shellcode delivery. Those details describe the earlier CoffeeLoader generation and are not all confirmed for the 2026 variant. No threat actor is attributed in the sources. A BeaconBeagle domain search for internet-speed-check.com returned no matches.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing; T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1055 Process Injection; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32; T1564.001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Execution
T1059.010 Command and Scripting Interpreter: AutoHotKey & AutoIT; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1568.002 Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms; T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
Initial Access
T1091 Replication Through Removable Media
defense-impairment
Privilege Escalation
T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
Resource Development
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block the Retadup and CoffeeLoader C2 domains and payload hosts listed in the IOCs at DNS, proxy and firewall
- Hunt for HKCU Run value b79faace.dll and the C:\ProgramData\b79faace\ and %LOCALAPPDATA%\b79faace\ folders
- Hunt for rundll32.exe loading 7z.dll or b79faace.dll from temp or ProgramData paths
- Isolate hosts that show hidden files plus LNK shortcuts on removable drives and re-image if infected
Workarounds
- Show file extensions and hidden files on removable drives so disguised LNK shortcuts are recognizable
- Block execution from USB drives via application control
Longer-term hardening
- Restrict or scan removable media (USB policy / device control) and disable autorun
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for process injection into dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, svchost.exe, OpenWith.exe and AtBroker.exe
- Alert on non-graphics processes using OpenGL/OpenCL compute for decryption
- Monitor for polling to re-registered legacy Retadup domains
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints exposed to removable media; no specific version stated in sources
Timeline
Last updated · 2 updates · revalidated 2× · latest source
- Retadup worm first discovered (written in AutoIt and AutoHotkey). Only the year is stated in the source; the day is a placeholder.
- French law enforcement took control of Retadup C2 servers and disinfected more than 850,000 machines. Only the month is stated in the source; the day is a placeholder.
- Avast and the French Gendarmerie publicly announced the Retadup disruption and disinfection of about 850,000 machines.
- Retadup's old C2 domains were re-registered around 2024 and began issuing download commands, first serving SmokeLoader packed with the 32-bit Armoury packer. Only the year is stated; the day is a placeholder.
- Zscaler ThreatLabz reports CoffeeLoader appeared around September 2024, distributed via SmokeLoader and protected by the Armoury packer. Day is a placeholder.
- In early 2025 the revived Retadup servers began serving CoffeeLoader. Only the period is stated; the day is a placeholder.
- Zscaler ThreatLabz published 'CoffeeLoader: A Brew of Stealthy Techniques' documenting the Armoury packer (OpenCL) and CoffeeLoader internals.
- Start of the Q1-Q3 2026 window in which Kaspersky blocked about 15,000 Retadup infection attempts, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia.
- Kaspersky detected the new CoffeeLoader variant (OpenGL-based Armoury packer, new keys, magic constant 0xD1D57871) in August 2026. Day is a placeholder.
- Example Retadup C2 check-in traffic observed (6 Aug 2026; further traffic 10 Aug 2026).
- Example CoffeeLoader payload response from C2 observed on 29 Sep 2026.
- Kaspersky Securelist published its analysis; about 15,000 systems with blocked Retadup infection attempts in Q1-Q3 2026, mostly in Peru, Angola, Russia and Bolivia.
Update history
- 2026-11-16 — Retadup USB Worm Resurfaces 7 Years After Takedown, Delivering CoffeeLoader via Armoury Packer: What changed No severity, exploitability, status or attribution change. HIGH / ACTIVE / Unattributed (LOW confidence) remain correct per the newer report. New indicators (2) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-11-16 — Revived Retadup USB Worm Botnet Delivers CoffeeLoader (and SmokeLoader): What changed No field escalation. Severity HIGH, exploitability ACTIVE and status ACTIVE are unchanged. New indicators (9) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- A USB worm's second life: Retadup spreading CoffeeLoader Kaspersky Securelist · Research · 2026-11-16
- CoffeeLoader: A Brew of Stealthy Techniques (Zscaler ThreatLabz) zscaler.com · Research · 2025-03-26
- Securelist (Russian version): Retadup delivers CoffeeLoader securelist.ru · Research
- Securelist LATAM (Spanish version): Retadup delivers CoffeeLoader Kaspersky Securelist · Research
- CoffeeLoader related families: SmokeLoader, Rhadamanthys (PolySwarm) blog.polyswarm.io · Blog
- CoffeeLoader Detection (SOC Prime) socprime.com · Blog
- CoffeeLoader is a sophisticated malware (Security Affairs) securityaffairs.com · News
- Dangerous new CoffeeLoader malware executes on your GPU to get past security tools (TechRadar) techradar.com · News
Previous and next in malware
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated .