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Threat reportThreat IntelligenceTL-2026-6142

Kaspersky ICS CERT: APT and Financial Attacks on Industrial Organizations in Q2 2026 (DAEMON Tools Supply Chain, Iran-Linked PLC Attacks, ZionSiphon, INC Ransomware)

highACTIVE

Kaspersky ICS CERT's Q2 2026 quarterly report aggregates APT and financially motivated activity against industrial organizations: Russia-focused, Chinese-speaking and Iran-linked clusters, INC ransomware and wipers, the trojanized DAEMON Tools supply-chain compromise, and OT-targeting activity including Rockwell PLC attacks, Modbus scanning campaigns and the ZionSiphon malware. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6142, CVE-2025-54068, CVE-2025-52691, CVE-2025-68613, CVE-2025-9316, CVE-2025-34291, CVE-2026-21509, CVE-2024-26229, CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082, CVE-2023-3519, CVE-2025-5777, CVE-2023-48788, CVE-2024-57727
Also known asKaspersky ICS CERT Q2 2026 APT and financial attacks report, DAEMON Tools supply chain attack, ZionSiphon
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2025-54068 (added ), CVE-2025-52691 (added ), CVE-2025-68613 (added ), CVE-2025-34291 (added ), CVE-2026-21509 (added ), CVE-2022-41040 (added ) and 5 more
EPSSCVE-2025-5777: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2022-41082: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2022-41040: 99.9% (99.9th percentile)
Affected productsDisc Soft DAEMON Tools Lite (Windows); Rockwell Automation CompactLogix and Micro850 PLCs; Schneider Electric Modicon M340 (BMX P34); Siemens SIMATIC S7-1200; Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway; Fortinet FortiClient EMS; SimpleHelp SimpleHelp RMM; Microsoft Exchange Server
MalwareINC Ransomware - S1139, QUIC RAT, ShadowPad, ZionSiphon
ToolsCobalt Strike, ShadowPad, SimpleHelp, Sliver - S0633
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003 OS Credential Dumping, T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol, T1036 Masquerading, T1059.005 Visual Basic, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1091 Replication Through Removable Media, T1110.003 Password Spraying, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1219 Remote Access Tools and 6 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorsindustrial, manufacturing, energy, water and wastewater, government administration, aviation, oil and gas, defense, telecoms, logistics, education
Target regionsrussia, belarus, united states of america, israel, Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe, ukraine, Global
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6142 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Trojanized DAEMON Tools Helper Binaries Beaconing, Dropping or Spawning Payloads (TL-2026-6142)

Behaviour-first detection of the DAEMON Tools supply-chain backdoor (installers 12.5.0.2421-12.5.0.2434, trojanized from 2026-04-08). Fires when DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe or DTShellHlp.exe contact the typosquatted C2 env-check.daemontools.cc / 38.180.107.76 (community-corroborated by 2 sightings), write imp.tmp or piyu.exe (or any EXE) into C:\Windows\Temp, or spawn piyu.exe or a shell. Covers Kaspersky ICS CERT Q2 2026 reporting.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1195.002, T1204.002, T1071.001
  • Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=3 OR EventCode=11 OR EventCode=22)
| eval proc=lower(coalesce(Image,"")), par=lower(coalesce(ParentImage,"")), tgt=lower(coalesce(TargetFilename,"")), dhost=lower(coalesce(DestinationHostname,QueryName,"")), dip=coalesce(DestinationIp,"")
| eval dt_proc=if(like(proc,"%dthelper.exe") OR like(proc,"%discsoftbusservicelite.exe") OR like(proc,"%dtshellhlp.exe"),1,0)
| eval dt_parent=if(like(par,"%dthelper.exe") OR like(par,"%discsoftbusservicelite.exe") OR like(par,"%dtshellhlp.exe"),1,0)
| eval signal=case(dt_proc=1 AND (like(dhost,"%daemontools.cc") OR dip="38.180.107.76"),"c2_beacon_to_typosquat_domain", dt_proc=1 AND EventCode=11 AND (like(tgt,"%windows%temp%imp.tmp") OR like(tgt,"%windows%temp%piyu.exe")),"backdoor_payload_drop", dt_proc=1 AND EventCode=11 AND like(tgt,"%windows%temp%.exe"),"exe_written_to_windows_temp", dt_parent=1 AND EventCode=1 AND (like(proc,"%piyu.exe") OR like(proc,"%cmd.exe") OR like(proc,"%powershell.exe") OR like(proc,"%wscript.exe")),"helper_spawned_payload_or_shell", true(),null())
| where isnotnull(signal)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(signal) as signals values(Image) as images values(TargetFilename) as dropped_files values(DestinationIp) as dest_ips values(CommandLine) as cmdlines by host
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let dt_bins = dynamic(["dthelper.exe","discsoftbusservicelite.exe","dtshellhlp.exe"]);
let c2_ips = dynamic(["38.180.107.76"]);
let net = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (dt_bins)
| where RemoteUrl endswith "daemontools.cc" or RemoteIP in (c2_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Signal="c2_beacon_to_typosquat_domain", Process=InitiatingProcessFileName, Detail=strcat(RemoteUrl, " ", RemoteIP), CommandLine=InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
let files = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (dt_bins)
| where FolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows\Temp"
| where FileName in~ ("imp.tmp", "piyu.exe") or FileName endswith ".exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Signal="payload_drop_in_windows_temp", Process=InitiatingProcessFileName, Detail=FolderPath, CommandLine=InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
let procs = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (dt_bins)
| where FileName in~ ("piyu.exe", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Signal="helper_spawned_payload_or_shell", Process=InitiatingProcessFileName, Detail=FileName, CommandLine=ProcessCommandLine;
union net, files, procs
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: DAEMON Tools Trojanized Helper Spawning Payload or Shell
id: 3f6c1a52-8d47-4b0e-9a1c-5e2b7d90a143
status: experimental
description: Detects the DAEMON Tools Lite helper binaries (DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, DTShellHlp.exe) from the trojanized 12.5.0.2421-12.5.0.2434 installers spawning piyu.exe or a command interpreter, or piyu.exe executing from C:\Windows\Temp.
references:
    - https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/publications/reports/2026/08/03/apt-and-financial-attacks-on-industrial-organizations-in-q2-2026/
    - https://securelist.com/daemon-tools-backdoor/119654/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/16
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1195.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\DTHelper.exe'
            - '\DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe'
            - '\DTShellHlp.exe'
    selection_child:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\piyu.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
    selection_payload:
        Image|endswith: '\Windows\Temp\piyu.exe'
    condition: (selection_parent and selection_child) or selection_payload
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate DAEMON Tools components launching a command shell during troubleshooting or custom scripted installs
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate DAEMON Tools components launching cmd.exe or PowerShell during update or repair routines
  • Authorised sandbox or malware-analysis hosts that deliberately detonate the trojanized installer

Tuning notes: Change index=sysmon to the index that holds Sysmon in your environment. Pair with an inventory search for DAEMON Tools versions 12.5.0.2421-12.5.0.2434 and the SHA1 9ccd769624de98eeeb12714ff1707ec4f5bf196d. Once clean build 12.6.0.2445 is deployed, the c2_beacon and payload_drop signals should be treated as confirmed compromise; the shell-spawn signal can be tuned against known admin scripts.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • ProxyNotShell Exchange Exploitation (CVE-2022-41040/41082) and IIS Worker Shell Spawn — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Veeam Backup Credential Dumping via SQL/PowerShell (INC Ransomware) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Service or Contractor Account RDP Fan-Out to Multiple Hosts — Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
  • CapFix [indicator] Unsigned DLL Sideloading — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • SimpleHelp RMM and PsExec Service Execution (INC Ransomware Tooling) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • External Access to PLC/ICS Ports and CISA AA26-097A Infrastructure Contact — C2 / OT Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • svchost.exe Masquerade Outside System32 (ZionSiphon USB Spread) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • DAEMON Tools Backdoor C2 Domains and Community-Observed Sibling Infrastructure — C2 · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 27 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6142.

Sample indicators (3 of 27)

  • IP address: 38.180.107[.]76
  • Domain: env-check[.]daemontools[.]cc
  • File hash: 9ccd769624de98eeeb12714ff1707ec4f5bf196d

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 27 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

27 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

Many attributions in the report are stated as tentative.

The report is a quarterly aggregate rather than a single campaign. It covers Russia-focused clusters (Geo Likho, BO Team, PhantomCore, Eagle Werewolf, Cloud Atlas, Unicorn, CapFix, Fluffy Wolf, HeartlessSoul, Paper Werewolf, 4BID, Clubfoot Wolf), China-linked or Chinese-speaking activity (Silver Fox, a ShadowPad intrusion at a Russian manufacturer via a contractor service account on Check Point VPN, SHADOW-EARTH-053, FamousSparrow using ProxyNotShell against an Azerbaijani oil and gas firm, TencShell, Mustang Panda, CL-STA-1062) and Iran-linked activity (an unnamed APT hitting Rockwell PLCs, Nimbus Manticore, MuddyWater, Cyber Isnaad Front). It also covers Andariel, OceanLotus, Sednit, Sandworm wipers and the INC ransomware operation.

DAEMON Tools supply-chain compromise: from 2026-04-08 the official site served signed, trojanized Windows installers (versions 12.5.0.2421 to 12.5.0.2434). The backdoor beaconed over HTTP GET, including the computer name, to the typosquatted domain env-check.daemontools[.]cc. Thousands of payload deployments were seen in 100+ countries, with about 10% of affected systems belonging to businesses. A minimal backdoor reached about a dozen organizations in Russia, Belarus and Thailand, and a QUIC RAT reached a Russian education entity. The actor is unknown; artifacts suggest a Chinese-speaking actor. Disc Soft confirmed the issue on 2026-05-06 and shipped a clean build in under 12 hours.

OT-targeting activity: CISA advisory AA26-097A describes an Iranian-affiliated APT attacking internet-exposed PLCs (Rockwell CompactLogix and Micro850; also Schneider Modicon M340 and Siemens S7-1200 per the advisory) since at least March 2026, using leased third-party infrastructure and vendor programming software (Studio 5000, EcoStruxure Control Expert, TIA Portal) to extract project files and manipulate HMI/SCADA displays; a July 2026 update describes a malicious project file that kept normal ladder logic but overrode safety-maintaining instructions. ZionSiphon (Darktrace) targets Israeli water treatment and desalination, with USB propagation, ICS scanning (Modbus, DNP3, S7comm) and chlorine-configuration tampering, but is unfinished and self-deletes because of an XOR error in its Israeli-IP check. A Cato Networks-reported Modbus campaign (Sep-Nov 2025) targeted 14,426 unique IPs in 70 countries. A reported AI-assisted intrusion against a Mexican water utility showed no observed OT impact.

INC ransomware (Acronis TRU): 800+ claimed victims since 2023, over 65% in the US; initial access through Citrix NetScaler (CVE-2023-3519, CVE-2025-5777), Fortinet EMS (CVE-2023-48788) and SimpleHelp (CVE-2024-57727), phishing and initial access broker credentials; post-compromise Veeam credential dumping, RDP, PsExec and RMM tools. The Kaspersky page contains no hashes or IP lists; those are in the linked PDF. Network IOCs here come from CISA AA26-097A and public DAEMON Tools reporting.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003 OS Credential Dumping; T1110.003 Password Spraying

Lateral Movement

T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol; T1091 Replication Through Removable Media

Defense Evasion

T1036 Masquerading; T1574.001 DLL

Execution

T1059.005 Visual Basic; T1204.002 Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1219 Remote Access Tools

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain; T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

Impact

T1485 Data Destruction; T1565 Data Manipulation

Persistence

T1505.003 Web Shell

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains

Remediation

Patches

  • Update DAEMON Tools Lite to the clean release (12.6.0.2445 per Kaspersky reporting)
  • Patch Citrix NetScaler (CVE-2023-3519, CVE-2025-5777), Fortinet EMS (CVE-2023-48788), SimpleHelp (CVE-2024-57727) and Exchange (CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082)

Immediate actions

  • Block env-check.daemontools.cc and 38.180.107.76 at DNS, proxy and egress and hunt historical logs for DAEMON Tools 12.5.0.2421-12.5.0.2434
  • Disconnect PLCs from the public internet and block hosting-provider IPs listed in CISA AA26-097A (vet before blocking); watch ports 44818, 2222, 102, 502 and 22
  • Keep Rockwell controllers in RUN mode and validate project files before returning from PROGRAM or REMOTE

Workarounds

  • Enable programming protection in TIA Portal
  • Disable unused services (Telnet, FTP, RDP, VNC, web) on OT devices and modems
  • Use private APNs, ZTNA or site-to-site VPN for cellular modems

Longer-term hardening

  • Route remote OT access through a secure gateway or jump host with MFA
  • Compare running PLC logic against known-good versions and keep tested offline backups of PLC logic and configuration
  • Monitor for unexpected protocols and controller mode or program changes

Affected and fixed versions

  • Disc Soft — DAEMON Tools Lite (Windows)
    Vulnerable versions: 12.5.0.2421-12.5.0.2434
    Fixed in: 12.6.0.2445
  • Rockwell Automation — CompactLogix and Micro850 PLCs
    Vulnerable versions: Internet-exposed, misconfigured devices
  • Schneider Electric — Modicon M340 (BMX P34)
    Vulnerable versions: Internet-exposed, misconfigured devices
  • Siemens — SIMATIC S7-1200
    Vulnerable versions: Internet-exposed, misconfigured devices
  • Citrix — NetScaler ADC/Gateway
    Vulnerable versions: CVE-2023-3519; CVE-2025-5777
  • Fortinet — FortiClient EMS
    Vulnerable versions: CVE-2023-48788
  • SimpleHelp — SimpleHelp RMM
    Vulnerable versions: CVE-2024-57727
  • Microsoft — Exchange Server
    Vulnerable versions: CVE-2022-41040; CVE-2022-41082

Timeline

  • Start of the Modbus scanning campaign reported by Cato Networks (September-November 2025): 14,426 unique IPs in 70 countries targeted, 235,000+ holding-register reads, 3,000+ write requests from one source IP.
  • Intrusion into a UAE defense firm via SmartOffice CRM begins (CVE-2024-26229 and Koshka tooling referenced).
  • Iranian-affiliated APT activity against Rockwell CompactLogix and Micro850 PLCs observed since at least March 2026 (CISA AA26-097A).
  • Typosquatted C2 domain locked-ioc-3 reportedly registered (dates vary across reports).
  • CISA, FBI, NSA and partners publish AA26-097A on Iranian-affiliated actors exploiting PLCs in US critical infrastructure.
  • Official DAEMON Tools site begins serving signed, trojanized installers (12.5.0.2421-12.5.0.2434). PhantomCore also attacks a Russian industrial company the same day.
  • CPU-Z/HWMonitor watering-hole window (2026-04-09 15:00 UTC to 2026-04-10 10:00 UTC) delivering STX RAT.
  • Darktrace publishes analysis of ZionSiphon, OT malware aimed at Israeli water treatment and desalination.
  • Disc Soft confirms DAEMON Tools Lite was affected and releases a clean build in under 12 hours.
  • AA26-097A updated with new IP indicators and a malicious project file that overrode safe-operating logic at one victim.
  • Kaspersky ICS CERT publishes the Q2 2026 APT and financial attacks report.

Sources cited

Other reports on CVE-2025-54068

Other reports on CVE-2025-52691

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Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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