Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-6194
8-Digits Team (INC / Lynx ransomware affiliate) member Roman Khlynovskiy extradited from Italy over data extortion campaign against U.S. hospitals, healthcare entities and schools
On 2026-11-16 the U.S. DOJ announced the extradition from Italy of Roman Khlynovskiy, 43, a Kazakh national and alleged member of the '8-Digits Team', a group affiliated with INC and Lynx ransomware. The campaign hit schools, hospitals and healthcare entities in at least six states, with conspirators claiming over 50 TB stolen (including more than 70 million confidential health records) and over $500 million in total ransom demands.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6194 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | 8-Digits Team extortion campaign, INC Ransom / Lynx healthcare data extortion |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Multiple U.S. healthcare and education organization networks (hospitals, healthcare entities, schools) |
| Attribution | 8-Digits Team (medium confidence) |
| Malware | AnyDesk, Cobalt Strike, INC, INC Ransomware - S1139, Lynx, TeamViewer, inc ransom, sinobi |
| Tools | AnyDesk, Cobalt Strike, PSEXEC, Rclone - S1040 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping, T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, T1021.002 Remote Services, T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1110 Brute Force, T1133 External Remote Services, T1135 Network Share Discovery and 13 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | health, education |
| Target regions | North America |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 7 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6194 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 46 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: TL-2026-6194 INC Ransom Edge Application Server Spawning Shell (Fortinet EMS / SimpleHelp / SQL Server) - Exploitation
TL-2026-6194 behaviour-first detection of the INC Ransom / Lynx (8-Digits Team affiliate) exploitation pattern: SQL Server, Fortinet EMS or SimpleHelp server processes spawning cmd, PowerShell, certutil, curl or other LOLBins after exploitation of public-facing applications (CVE-2023-48788, CVE-2024-57727, ATT&CK T1190). Family-level context, not specific to the indicted individual.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1190, T1059.003, T1059.001, T1105
- Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
```TL-2026-6194 T1190 server application spawning a shell is the INC Ransom and Lynx affiliate exploitation pattern for Fortinet EMS CVE-2023-48788 and SimpleHelp CVE-2024-57727```
(ParentImage="*\\sqlservr.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\FcmDaemon.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\FortiClientEMS*" OR ParentImage="*\\SimpleHelp*" OR (ParentImage="*\\java.exe" AND ParentCommandLine="*SimpleHelp*"))
(Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\certutil.exe" OR Image="*\\bitsadmin.exe" OR Image="*\\mshta.exe" OR Image="*\\curl.exe" OR Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR Image="*\\wmic.exe")
| eval attack_context="TL-2026-6194 INC Ransom edge application exploitation"
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as child_commands values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_commands by host, User, ParentImage, Image, attack_context
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
let childShells = dynamic(["cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","certutil.exe","bitsadmin.exe","mshta.exe","curl.exe","rundll32.exe","wmic.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("sqlservr.exe","FcmDaemon.exe","FortiClientEMS.exe")
or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (@"\FortiClientEMS", @"\SimpleHelp")
or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "java.exe" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "SimpleHelp")
| where FileName in~ (childShells)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Server Application Spawning Shell - Fortinet EMS SimpleHelp SQL Server (INC Ransom Exploitation)
id: 7c3e1a52-4b9d-4f06-8a21-d5e90b1c6f37
status: experimental
description: Detects SQL Server, Fortinet EMS or SimpleHelp server processes spawning a command shell or LOLBin, the post-exploitation pattern of CVE-2023-48788 and CVE-2024-57727 abuse reported for INC Ransom and Lynx affiliates.
references:
- https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alleged-member-8-digits-team-ransomware-group-extradited-italy-role-major-data-extortion
- https://www.cyber.gov.au/advisory/inc-ransom-affiliate-model-enabling-targeting-of-critical-networks
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1032/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.execution
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1105
- cve.2023-48788
- cve.2024-57727
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\sqlservr.exe'
- '\FcmDaemon.exe'
- '\FortiClientEMS.exe'
selection_parent_path:
ParentImage|contains:
- '\FortiClientEMS\'
- '\SimpleHelp\'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\curl.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
condition: 1 of selection_parent* and selection_child
falsepositives:
- SQL Server Agent jobs or DBAs using xp_cmdshell
- Fortinet EMS or SimpleHelp upgrade and maintenance scripts
level: high
Known false positives:
- DBAs or SQL Server Agent jobs legitimately using xp_cmdshell
- Fortinet EMS or SimpleHelp upgrade and maintenance scripts launching cmd.exe or powershell.exe
Tuning notes: Allow-list known maintenance command lines by ParentCommandLine for sqlservr.exe jobs. Restrict to Fortinet EMS and SimpleHelp servers via host groups to raise fidelity. Add other internet-facing application parents as needed.
- Phishing Initial Access - Mail Client or Office Application Spawning Script Host (INC Ransom / Lynx) · unlock with TL Creds
- Veeam Credential Dumper - VeeamBackup Credentials Table Query (INC Ransom Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Lateral Movement and C2 - RDP Fan-Out, PsExec Service Execution and Cobalt Strike Named Pipes (INC Ransom) · unlock with TL Creds
- Citrix NetScaler Exploitation Requests - CVE-2023-3519 gwtest formssso / CVE-2025-5777 doAuthentication (INC Ransom Initial Access) · unlock with TL Creds
- INC Ransom Rust Encryptor ESXi Mode - --esxi Argument and esxcli VM Kill · unlock with TL Creds
- Rclone Exfiltration to Cloud Storage and Password-Protected Archive Staging (INC Ransom) · unlock with TL Creds
- INC Ransom BYOVD Driver Activity - [indicator] / [indicator] / [indicator] Defense Impairment · unlock with TL Creds
- Unapproved Remote Access Tools and Community-Observed C2 Infrastructure (AnyDesk / ScreenConnect / TeamViewer / Cobalt Strike) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 46 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6194.
Sample indicators (3 of 46)
- IP address:
213.111.185[.]108 - Domain:
lynxblog[.]net - File hash:
571f5de9dd0d509ed7e5242b9b7473c2b2cbb36ba64d38b32122a0a337d6cf8b
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 46 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
According to DOJ Office of Public Affairs release 26-1363 (2026-11-16), Roman Khlynovskiy, a 43-year-old Kazakh national, was extradited from Italy and made his initial appearance in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee in Knoxville. The indictment alleges he was a member of the '8-Digits Team', a group affiliated with the INC and Lynx ransomware operations. The group is alleged to have gained access to victim networks, exfiltrated data, and then demanded payment in exchange for not releasing it, threatening to publicize sensitive medical information to pressure victims. Targets were schools, hospitals and healthcare entities in at least six states. The conspirators claimed to have stolen more than 50 terabytes of data, including more than 70 million confidential health records, and demanded over $500 million in total ransom. Assistant Attorney General A. Tysen Duva described it as 'one of the largest healthcare data breaches in decades'.
Charges: conspiracy to commit computer fraud and identity theft; conspiracy to commit wire fraud; computer-related extortion; conspiracy to commit money laundering; and threats to disclose nonconsensual intimate images under the TAKE IT DOWN Act. The maximum penalty is 27 years in prison. The DOJ notes an indictment is only an allegation and the defendant is presumed innocent. The investigation was led by the FBI with DOJ CCIPS, the Office of International Affairs and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Tennessee, supported by Italian law enforcement, Ukraine's State Bureau of Investigation and Prosecutor General's Office, and Lithuanian authorities. The release does not state indictment, arrest or extradition dates, and gives no IOCs, infrastructure, hashes or detailed TTPs.
Technical context (INC/Lynx family, not specific to this defendant): public reporting on INC Ransom (MITRE G1032) describes a RaaS affiliate model. Initial access comes from spear-phishing, credentials bought from initial access brokers, and exploitation of public-facing applications (Citrix NetScaler CVE-2023-3519 and CVE-2025-5777, Fortinet EMS CVE-2023-48788, SimpleHelp CVE-2024-57727). Affiliates dump credentials (including an updated Veeam credential dumper), move laterally with RDP, PsExec and LOLBins, disable defenses using BYOVD drivers (filwfp.sys, filnk.sys, fildds.sys), establish remote access with Cobalt Strike, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect and TeamViewer, stage data in password-protected archives and exfiltrate with Rclone, then deploy Rust-based Windows and Linux/ESXi encryptors (the '--esxi' argument attempts to shut down VMs). INC's Windows and Linux encryptors were offered for sale in May 2024, and the related families Lynx and Sinobi show significant code overlap. The ACSC/NCSC-NZ advisory notes INC TTPs overlap with other RaaS operations, including Lynx. Defenders should not assume the same personnel operate INC and Lynx, and should treat the technique mapping as family-level context rather than evidence about this defendant's specific intrusions.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping; T1110 Brute Force; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Lateral Movement
T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol; T1021.002 Remote Services
Defense Evasion
T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Discovery
T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1135 Network Share Discovery
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1136.001 Create Account
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1566 Phishing
Command and Control
Impact
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1489 Service Stop; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1657 Financial Theft
Collection
T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
Exfiltration
T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
defense-impairment
Remediation
Patches
- Apply vendor fixes for CVE-2023-3519, CVE-2025-5777, CVE-2023-48788 and CVE-2024-57727
Immediate actions
- Patch or mitigate internet-facing edge devices exploited by INC affiliates (Citrix NetScaler CVE-2023-3519 / CVE-2025-5777, Fortinet EMS CVE-2023-48788, SimpleHelp CVE-2024-57727)
- Hunt for unauthorized remote access tools (AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, TeamViewer) and Cobalt Strike activity
- Alert on Rclone usage and large outbound transfers of password-protected archives
- Alert on loading of the BYOVD drivers filwfp.sys, filnk.sys and fildds.sys
Workarounds
- Restrict management interfaces of edge devices from the internet
- Allow-list approved remote monitoring and management tools only
Longer-term hardening
- Segment backup infrastructure and protect Veeam credentials
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on remote access and email
- Restrict RDP and PsExec lateral movement and monitor LOLBin usage
- Maintain offline immutable backups and test ESXi recovery
- Enable driver blocklisting (vulnerable driver blocklist / WDAC)
Affected and fixed versions
- Multiple — U.S. healthcare and education organization networks (hospitals, healthcare entities, schools)
Timeline
Last updated · 3 updates · revalidated 3× · latest source
- INC Ransom begins claiming victims (approximately August 2023, per ransomware.live as cited by The Hacker News); 830+ claimed victims by June 2026.
- INC ransomware source code reported (Unit 42) to be on sale on criminal forums as early as March 2024 (month-level date).
- INC's Windows and Linux/ESXi encryptor variants are sold on the cybercrime underground (May 2024), leading to related families Lynx and Sinobi with significant code overlap.
- BleepingComputer, citing KELA, reports INC encryptor source code (Windows and Linux/ESXi) offered for $300,000 by actor 'salfetka' on Exploit and XSS forums; KELA noted the sale might be a scam.
- Lynx ransomware first discovered and first victim listed on its leak site, roughly July 2024 (month-level date; Unit 42, Sophos).
- Lynx operators recruit affiliates on an underground forum offering 80% of ransom payments (Sophos; month-level date).
- IT and phone systems at McLaren hospitals (Michigan) disrupted; ransom note reportedly points to the INC leak site (reported 2024-08-07).
- Palo Alto Unit 42 publishes analysis showing Lynx shares substantial code with INC (48% of functions matched overall, 70.8% among common functions).
- TAKE IT DOWN Act signed into law (month-level date); later used as a charge basis (threats to disclose nonconsensual intimate images) in this case.
- Roman Khlynovskiy arrested in Rimini, Italy while on vacation with his family (month-level date, per BleepingComputer). DOJ itself does not state arrest or extradition dates.
- INC ranked fourth among ransomware groups in Q1 2026 with 120+ incidents (ZeroFox, as cited by The Hacker News).
- The Hacker News reports INC's Rust-based encryptors, updated Veeam credential dumper and BYOVD drivers.
- DOJ Office of Public Affairs publishes release 26-1363 announcing the extradition and charges (maximum 27 years); DataBreaches.net reports the same day.
- Roman Khlynovskiy, extradited from Italy, makes his initial appearance in U.S. District Court in Knoxville, Tennessee (E.D. Tenn.). Indictment, arrest and extradition dates are not stated by DOJ.
- BleepingComputer reports the extradition and 27-year maximum penalty; INC leak site tally reported at over 1,000 victims and Lynx at over 400.
- The Cyber Express reports the extradition, including claims of 50+ TB stolen, 70M+ health records and $500M+ in ransom demands.
Update history
- 2026-11-17 — 8-Digits Team (INC / Lynx Ransomware Affiliate) Member Roman Khlynovskiy Extradited from Italy to Face US Charges in Healthcare and School Extortion Case: What changed No severity, exploitability, status or attribution-confidence change.
- 2026-11-17 — INC Ransom / Lynx ransomware affiliate (8-Digits Team) Roman Khlynovskiy extradited to US from Italy; healthcare and school targeting: What changed No severity, exploitability or status change (already HIGH / ACTIVE). Additive enrichment only. New indicators (15) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-11-17 — 8-Digits Team Ransomware (INC/Lynx-affiliated): Alleged Member Extradited to US Over Healthcare and Education Extortion: What changed No change to severity, exploitability, status or attribution confidence; the existing record already reflects HIGH / ACTIVE / MEDIUM. New indicators (12) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- Alleged Member of '8-Digits Team' Ransomware Group Extradited from Italy for Role in Major Data Extortion Campaign (DOJ Press Release 26-1363) justice.gov · Advisory · 2026-11-16
- INC Ransom Affiliate Model Enabling Targeting of Critical Networks (ACSC) cyber.gov.au · Advisory
- INC Ransom Affiliate Model Enabling Targeting of Critical Networks (NCSC New Zealand) ncsc.govt.nz · Advisory
- MITRE ATT&CK: INC Ransom (G1032) MITRE · Research
- Lynx Ransomware: A Deep Dive into the Successor of INC Ransomware (Xcitium) threatlabsnews.xcitium.com · Blog
- Roman Khlynovskiy, Alleged Member of '8-Digits Team' Ransomware Group Extradited (DataBreaches.net) databreaches.net · News · 2026-11-16
- INC Ransomware Claims 830 Victims Since 2023 (The Hacker News) The Hacker News · News · 2026-06-18
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated .