Skip to navigation

Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-6198

DragonForce Ransomware Cartel Windows Payload Analysis (.df_win, ChaCha20/RSA-4096, ARP/SMB Discovery)

highACTIVE

Seqrite Labs traces a 32-bit Windows DragonForce ransomware sample from process start to completion: security/backup process termination, WMIC shadow-copy deletion, ARP-cache-based SMB target discovery, 16-worker parallel ChaCha20 encryption with RSA-4096-protected per-file keys, and .df_win renaming. DragonForce is a RaaS operation (first observed August 2023) that moved to a white-label 'ransomware cartel' model on 2025-03-19; its payloads derive from leaked LockBit 3.0 code and later a customized Conti v3 codebase. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6198, CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, CVE-2024-21893, CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2024-57728, CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2024-21412
Also known asDragonForce ransomware cartel, .df_win payload
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2023-46805 (added ), CVE-2024-21887 (added ), CVE-2024-21893 (added ), CVE-2024-57726 (added ), CVE-2024-57727 (added ), CVE-2024-57728 (added ) and 2 more
EPSSCVE-2024-21887: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2024-21893: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2021-44228: 99.9% (99.9th percentile)
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (32-bit payload on 64-bit hosts; local drives and SMB shares); VMware ESXi (Linux/ESXi DragonForce variant)
AttributionDragonForce (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusMalaysia
MalwareDEVMAN, DragonForce, LockBit 3.0 - S1202, mamona
ToolsArp - S0099, ScreenConnect, SimpleHelp
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1018 Remote System Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1106 Native API, T1112 Modify Registry, T1135 Network Share Discovery, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1489 Service Stop and 5 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsretail, manufacturing, construction, information-technology, professional-services, insurance, aviation, managed-service-providers
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, australia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6198 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: DragonForce Ransomware Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC (T1490)

Detects the pre-encryption recovery-inhibition step of the DragonForce ransomware payload (TL-2026-6198): WMIC.exe 'shadowcopy where ID=... delete' launched via cmd.exe once per Win32_ShadowCopy instance, plus the vssadmin 'delete shadows' equivalent. Seqrite traced this command before file encryption starts, so it is an early, high-fidelity warning.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1490, T1047, T1059.003
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security_4688, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=windows sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ((Image="*wmic.exe" CommandLine="*shadowcopy*" CommandLine="*delete*") OR (Image="*vssadmin.exe" CommandLine="*delete*" CommandLine="*shadows*"))
| eval spawned_by_cmd=if(like(ParentImage,"%cmd.exe"),"yes","no")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host User ParentImage spawned_by_cmd
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ 'wmic.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'shadowcopy' and ProcessCommandLine has 'delete')
    or (FileName =~ 'vssadmin.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has_all ('delete', 'shadows'))
| extend SpawnedByCmd = InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'cmd.exe'
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SpawnedByCmd, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName

Sigma

title: DragonForce Ransomware Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC or VSSAdmin
id: 6f1c2a84-3b7e-4d59-9a10-5c8e2f7b4d01
status: experimental
description: Detects deletion of Volume Shadow Copies with WMIC.exe 'shadowcopy ... delete' (as issued by the DragonForce ransomware payload, TL-2026-6198, via cmd.exe /c) or 'vssadmin delete shadows'. Precursor to mass file encryption.
references:
  - https://www.seqrite.com/blog/inside-dragonforce-how-a-ransomware-cartels-payload-actually-runs/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1047
  - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_wmic:
    Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'shadowcopy'
      - 'delete'
  selection_vssadmin:
    Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'delete'
      - 'shadows'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Backup or storage-management software that prunes shadow copies
  - Administrators reclaiming disk space
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Backup agents or storage-management tools that legitimately delete shadow copies
  • Administrators manually reclaiming disk space with vssadmin or WMIC

Tuning notes: Allowlist approved backup service accounts and management hosts by User/AccountName. Raise priority when several deletions occur within one minute from the same host, or when followed by .df_win file creation (see TL-2026-6198-SPL-002).

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • DragonForce Affiliate Initial Access: Ivanti Connect Secure and SimpleHelp Path-Traversal Requests · unlock with TL Creds
  • DragonForce BYOVD Vulnerable Driver [indicator] / [indicator] Load or Drop · unlock with TL Creds
  • DragonForce Mamona Builder Panel IP and Onion Leak-Site Connections · unlock with TL Creds
  • DragonForce Affiliate RMM Tool Execution (ScreenConnect, SimpleHelp, AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Splashtop) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DragonForce [indicator] File Association Registry Key and Ransom Wallpaper/Icon Drop · unlock with TL Creds
  • DragonForce Affiliate Exfiltration to MEGA or Amazon S3 by Non-Browser Process · unlock with TL Creds
  • DragonForce Encrypted File Extensions, Ransom Note and Runtime Log Creation (T1486) · unlock with TL Creds
  • DragonForce SMB Administrative Share (C$) Fan-Out Across Many Hosts (T1135) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 27 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6198.

Sample indicators (3 of 27)

  • IP address: 185.158.113[.]114
  • Domain: 3pktcrcbmssvrnwe5skburdwe2h3v6ibdnn5kbjqihsg6eu6s6b7ryqd[.]onion
  • File hash: 4db090498a57b85411417160747ffd8d4875f98b3ca2b83736a68900b7304d2b

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 27 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

27 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

DragonForce is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation first observed in August 2023 (Trend Micro) using a variant of the leaked LockBit 3.0 builder. An affiliate program offering 80% of proceeds launched on 2024-06-26, and its own encryptor, reportedly based on Conti v3, appeared around July 2024. A Linux/ESXi variant followed in November 2024. On 2025-03-19 the operators announced a 'ransomware cartel' model: affiliates may white-label the payload and run their own brand on DragonForce tooling and infrastructure. Related builds include the Devman (.devman) and Mamona variants. Seqrite's article, published 2026-10-01, says the leak site had claimed several hundred victims across dozens of countries by mid-2026. Trend Micro tracks the group as Water Tambanakua.

Seqrite's payload walkthrough covers a 32-bit sample running elevated on 64-bit Windows. Two TLS callbacks run before DragonForce_Main(). The sample manually resolves LoadLibraryA from kernel32 and loads eleven DLLs using decrypted names, although the APIs remain visible in the import table. Paths, registry keys, DLL/API/process names and switches are stored encoded with E(x) = (7x + 0x6A) mod 127. A single ChaCha20-encrypted, pipe-delimited configuration blob drives behavior. A log at C:\Users\Public\log.log starts with 16 plaintext bytes (build_key and instance_key, 8 bytes each), and later entries are ChaCha20-encrypted. The sample collects the user SID, token elevation and WOW64 state, then kills processes from a configurable list of 38 security, backup, database and productivity process names. In the trace, opening MsMpEng.exe failed with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED and Firefox.exe was terminated.

Before touching files, it initializes COM/WMI, queries Win32_ShadowCopy, and runs `cmd.exe /c C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WMIC.exe shadowcopy where "ID='<id>'" delete` for each shadow copy. Locked files are handled through the Windows Restart Manager. Local drives come from GetLogicalDriveStringsW(). Network targets come from the IPv4 ARP cache (GetIpNetTable), filtered against embedded prefixes, followed by NetShareEnum(), with no active subnet scan. The observed run logged 17 share discoveries, mostly C$. Sixteen workers run in two batches of eight, one for the local-drive queue and one for the network-share queue, and they start before discovery finishes.

Each file gets a 32-byte key and 8-byte ChaCha20 state from CryptGenRandom(). That material is encrypted with an embedded RSA-4096 public key (PUBLICKEYBLOB, exponent 65537) and appended as a 0x20C-byte record plus a 0x0D-byte footer holding the encryption percentage and original size. Recovered thresholds are full encryption below 2 MB, header-only encryption (3 MB) above 10 MB, and 20% chunk encryption for the over 200 hardcoded database and virtualization extensions. Files containing the DLOGFILE0001 marker and the configured readme.txt are skipped. Files are renamed to a random alphabetic name plus .df_win. The sample writes readme.txt in each directory ('The DragonForce Ransomware Cartel'), drops C:\Users\Public\icon.ico and wallpaper_white.png, creates HKCR\.df_win\DefaultIcon, and sets the wallpaper. The note claims data theft, but the analyzed run showed no exfiltration channel, so the claim is unverified from that trace.

Acronis (via BleepingComputer, 2025-12-03) reports a MinGW-built sample carrying Conti-derived InitializeApiModule/DisableHooks routines. Builder options include extension, skip lists, process kill list and an optional use_sys flag for BYOVD with truesight.sys and rentdrv2.sys, and the encryption scheme was revised to address flaws publicly documented for Akira. Affiliate intrusion TTPs reported by Acronis and Google GTIG include Scattered Spider-style social engineering, MFA fatigue, SIM swapping, RMM tool abuse (ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Splashtop) and exfiltration to MEGA or Amazon S3. The group deployed DragonForce on Windows, Linux and ESXi in the Marks & Spencer incident. Trend Micro additionally lists affiliate exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure (CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, CVE-2024-21893), SimpleHelp (CVE-2024-57726/57727/57728), Log4Shell and CVE-2024-21412; these are affiliate-side initial-access vectors, not flaws in the payload. The Scattered Spider link is reported as likely, not confirmed. BeaconBeagle returned HTTP 404 (no record) for the Mamona builder panel IP 185.158.113.114.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1135 Network Share Discovery

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

Execution

T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell; T1106 Native API

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Command and Control

T1219 Remote Access Tools

Impact

T1489 Service Stop; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1491.001 Defacement: Internal Defacement

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Credential Access

T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation

Remediation

Patches

  • Patch Ivanti Connect Secure (CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-21887, CVE-2024-21893)
  • Patch SimpleHelp (CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2024-57728)
  • Patch Log4j (CVE-2021-44228) and Windows SmartScreen bypass CVE-2024-21412

Immediate actions

  • Hunt for .df_win, .DragonForce_encrypted, .dragonforce_encrypted and .devman files and readme.txt / Contact Us.txt ransom notes
  • Alert on creation of C:\Users\Public\log.log, icon.ico and wallpaper_white.png together, and on HKCR\.df_win\DefaultIcon
  • Alert on cmd.exe/WMIC.exe 'shadowcopy ... delete' executed by non-administrative tooling
  • Block the published SHA-256 hashes and leak-site onion addresses at EDR and DNS/proxy layers
  • Isolate hosts showing mass ARP-cache reads followed by SMB share enumeration and burst file renames

Workarounds

  • Enable Microsoft Defender tamper protection and attack surface reduction rules
  • Restrict WMIC and Volume Shadow Copy deletion to approved administrative accounts

Longer-term hardening

  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA and harden help-desk password-reset and MFA re-enrollment procedures
  • Alert on unapproved RMM tools (ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Splashtop, SimpleHelp)
  • Deploy EDR with tamper protection and block vulnerable drivers (truesight.sys, rentdrv2.sys) via driver blocklists / HVCI
  • Maintain offline, immutable backups and restrict administrative C$ share access between hosts
  • Harden ESXi/vCenter and segment backup infrastructure

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (32-bit payload on 64-bit hosts; local drives and SMB shares)
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific
  • VMware — ESXi (Linux/ESXi DragonForce variant)
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific

Timeline

  • DragonForce ransomware operations first observed using a variant of the leaked LockBit 3.0 builder (Trend Micro gives the month only; day approximate).
  • DragonForce launches its affiliate program offering 80% of ransom proceeds.
  • Own variant reportedly based on Conti v3 released (month-level source; day approximate).
  • Linux variant of DragonForce discovered (month-level source; day approximate).
  • Operators announce a shift to a 'ransomware cartel' model; affiliates may run their own brands on DragonForce tooling and infrastructure.
  • UK retail intrusions (Marks & Spencer, Co-op, Harrods) linked to DragonForce affiliates and Scattered Spider; the link is reported as likely, not confirmed (month-level date).
  • DragonForce launches a 'data analysis service' for affiliates (0-23% of ransom payments; targets victims with revenue of at least US$15 million).
  • Ransom note in a newly observed sample sets a publication deadline of 2 September 2025 (a second sample sets 22 September 2025).
  • Acronis TRU report published via BleepingComputer detailing the Conti v3 lineage, BYOVD use (locked-ioc-18, locked-ioc-19) and Scattered Spider tradecraft.
  • Seqrite Labs publishes a full execution trace of the 32-bit Windows .df_win payload; leak site reported to claim several hundred victims.

Sources cited

More from DragonForce

Other reports on CVE-2023-46805

Other reports on CVE-2024-21887

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats