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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-6270

Ransomware Ecosystem Professionalization: Akira, Qilin, Play Business-Style Operations and Sicarii AI-Assembled Variant Lacking Working Decryptor

mediumACTIVE

Halcyon (Cynthia Kaiser) describes Akira, Qilin and Play operating like businesses (HR processes, victim customer-service lines, promotional discounts) inside a fragmented, supply-chain-style ecosystem of separate malware, initial-access, infrastructure and laundering providers. The Sicarii RaaS released an AI-assisted variant whose key-handling defect left paying victims without a working decryptor. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6270, CVE-2020-3259, CVE-2023-20269, CVE-2020-3580, CVE-2023-28252, CVE-2024-37085, CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711, CVE-2024-40766, CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, CVE-2022-41040, CVE-2022-41082, CVE-2024-57727
Also known asRansomware adversary has an HR department, Sicarii vibe-coded ransomware
SeverityMEDIUM
First disclosed
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2020-3259 (added ), CVE-2023-20269 (added ), CVE-2020-3580 (added ), CVE-2023-28252 (added ), CVE-2024-37085 (added ), CVE-2023-27532 (added ) and 7 more
EPSSCVE-2018-13379: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2022-41082: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2022-41040: 99.9% (99.9th percentile)
Affected productsSonicWall SonicOS SSL VPN; Veeam Backup & Replication; Fortinet FortiOS; Microsoft Exchange Server; SimpleHelp SimpleHelp RMM; Broadcom/VMware ESXi
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-200, CWE-284, CWE-288, CWE-306, CWE-502
AttributionAkira, Qilin, Play - G1040, Sicarii (low confidence)
MalwareAgendaCrypt, Akira, Cobalt Strike, MimiKatz, Playcrypt - S1162, Sicarii, SystemBC - S9001
ToolsCobalt Strike, PSEXEC, Rclone - S1040, SystemBC
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1133 External Remote Services, T1136.002 Create Account: Domain Account, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1482 Domain Trust Discovery, T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery and 5 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorscritical infrastructure, law firms, government administration, health, manufacturing, general enterprise
Target regionsNorth America, 005 - South America, Europe, australia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6270 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Ransomware Defense Evasion and Impact — EDR Killer Driver (dark.sys, PowerTool, HRsword), Shadow Copy Deletion, Log Clearing

Detects the pre-encryption hygiene shared by Akira, Qilin and Play. Qilin installs the DarkKill driver via 'sc create dark type= kernel', Akira and Play use BYOVD or EDR-disabling tools (PowerTool, HRsword, GMER, IObit Unlocker, POORTRY), and all three delete volume shadow copies (vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet) and clear event logs before encryption.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1562.001, T1490, T1070.001
  • Data sources: sysmon, index=sysmon sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational, DeviceProcessEvents, sigma:process_creation/windows
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h ((OriginalFileName="sc.exe" CommandLine="*create*" CommandLine="*kernel*") OR CommandLine="*dark.sys*" OR Image IN ("*PowerTool*.exe","*HRsword.exe","*gmer*.exe","*IObitUnlocker.exe") OR (OriginalFileName="vssadmin.exe" CommandLine="*delete*" CommandLine="*shadows*") OR (OriginalFileName="wmic.exe" CommandLine="*shadowcopy*" CommandLine="*delete*") OR (OriginalFileName="wevtutil.exe" (CommandLine="* cl *" OR CommandLine="* clear-log *"))) | eval technique=case(match(CommandLine,"(?i)(shadows|shadowcopy)"),"T1490 Inhibit System Recovery",match(CommandLine,"(?i)wevtutil"),"T1070.001 Clear Windows Event Logs",true(),"T1562.001 EDR killer or BYOVD tooling") | stats count values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(User) as users by host Image ParentImage technique

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ 'sc.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'create' and ProcessCommandLine has 'kernel')
    or ProcessCommandLine has 'dark.sys'
    or FileName in~ ('PowerTool.exe','PowerTool64.exe','HRsword.exe','gmer.exe','IObitUnlocker.exe')
    or (FileName =~ 'vssadmin.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'delete' and ProcessCommandLine has 'shadows')
    or (FileName =~ 'wmic.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'shadowcopy' and ProcessCommandLine has 'delete')
    or (FileName =~ 'wevtutil.exe' and (ProcessCommandLine contains ' cl ' or ProcessCommandLine contains 'clear-log'))
| extend Technique = case(ProcessCommandLine has_any ('shadows','shadowcopy'), 'T1490 Inhibit System Recovery', FileName =~ 'wevtutil.exe', 'T1070.001 Clear Windows Event Logs', 'T1562.001 EDR killer or BYOVD tooling')
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, Technique
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Ransomware EDR Killer Driver, Shadow Copy Deletion and Log Clearing (TL-2026-6270)
id: 7a2d3b5f-9c4e-4f82-8b66-3d1e8f2c7b02
status: experimental
description: Detects kernel driver installation for DarkKill (dark.sys), known EDR-disabling tools used by Akira, Qilin and Play (PowerTool, HRsword, GMER, IObit Unlocker), shadow copy deletion and event log clearing, the typical pre-encryption sequence.
references:
  - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uncovering-qilin-attack-methods-exposed-through-multiple-cases/
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-352a
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1562.001
  - attack.t1070.001
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_driver_install:
    Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'create'
      - 'kernel'
  selection_darkkill_file:
    CommandLine|contains: 'dark.sys'
  selection_edr_tools:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\PowerTool.exe'
      - '\PowerTool64.exe'
      - '\HRsword.exe'
      - '\gmer.exe'
      - '\IObitUnlocker.exe'
  selection_vssadmin:
    Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'delete'
      - 'shadows'
  selection_wmic:
    Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'shadowcopy'
      - 'delete'
  selection_wevtutil:
    Image|endswith: '\wevtutil.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' cl '
      - 'clear-log'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Backup or disk-management software that manages shadow copies
  - Legitimate kernel driver installation by vendor installers
  - Administrators clearing logs during troubleshooting
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Backup agents that create or delete VSS shadow copies
  • Vendor installers that register kernel-mode drivers through sc.exe
  • Administrators clearing event logs during maintenance

Tuning notes: Exclude the service accounts and parent processes of your backup software for the shadow-copy branch. Treat any sc.exe kernel-driver creation or dark.sys reference as high priority on servers. Pair with a Sysmon EventCode=6 (driver load) hunt for unsigned or vulnerable drivers.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Ransomware Initial Access — Successful RDP Logon From Public IP (Valid Accounts / Remote Services) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ransomware Persistence — SYSTEM ONLOGON Scheduled Task (TVInstallRestore) and Domain Account Creation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ransomware Data Theft — Rclone, WinSCP, Cyberduck, MEGA Exfiltration and Password-Protected Archiving · unlock with TL Creds
  • VMware ESXi Authentication Bypass — 'ESX Admins' Group Created or Modified (CVE-2024-37085) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ransomware Credential Theft — LSASS Dumping via Mimikatz, comsvcs MiniDump, ProcDump and Qilin [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ransomware Impact Artifacts — Sicarii, Akira and Play Encrypted Extensions, Ransom Notes and [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ransomware Initial Access — Veeam, SimpleHelp and Exchange Service Spawning Shell (CVE-2024-40711, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2022-41082) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Ransomware Affiliate C2 and Tunnel Egress — Community Sibling Infrastructure, Ngrok and Cloudflare Tunnel · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 27 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6270.

Sample indicators (3 of 27)

  • File hash: 6DE8DD5757F9A3AC5E2AC28E8A77682D7A29BE25C106F785A061DCF582A20DC6
  • File hash: 47B7B2DD88959CD7224A5542AE8D5BCE928BFC986BF0D0321532A7515C244A1E
  • File hash: C59F3C8D61D940B56436C14BC148C1FE98862921B8F7BAD97FBC96B31D71193C

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 27 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

27 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Halcyon's 17 November 2026 post "Your Ransomware Adversary Has an HR Department" argues that ransomware crews now run like businesses. Akira, Qilin and Play are described as having HR processes, customer-service lines that help victims negotiate, promotional discounts and holiday schedules for members. Attacks are assembled like a supply chain, with malware, initial access, infrastructure and money laundering sourced from different providers. Halcyon says a few large groups dominated at the start of 2024, and law-enforcement takedowns then scattered them into smaller, more closed groups, which makes attribution harder because of fragmentation and overlapping signatures. Halcyon logged 70 brand-new ransomware variants in the prior year (citing an April 21, 2026 U.S. House Homeland Security hearing document), and reports that only about 60 percent of organizations that pay recover any data, with the decryptor failing outright or corrupting files in roughly one in five cases.

The article's technical content is behavioral: abuse of an organization's own legitimate tools, privilege escalation, data theft and file encryption. Halcyon recommends detecting behavior rather than signatures, planning for recovery instead of negotiation, and raising ransomware risk at board level. The article itself lists no CVEs, hashes, IPs or domains.

Sicarii is a ransomware-as-a-service operation first reported in December 2025. Halcyon's alert and blog (February 2026) found that the encryptor generates a new RSA key pair on each run, encrypts with it and discards the private key, so even a decryptor supplied by the operators cannot restore files. Halcyon assesses the poor integration of components as a strong indicator of AI-assisted development; Kaiser believes AI was used at every stage but the pieces were not integrated properly. Encrypted files receive a .sicarii extension, and the encryptor collects PowerPoint, PDF and Zip files into collected_data.zip for exfiltration. Halcyon notes later encryptor versions appear to fix the bug and that its key-material capture recovered files from both variants. According to the Nov 2026 article, after the Iran conflict began the group's leader reportedly said the ransomware did not work and told affiliates to encrypt everything anyway.

The named business-style groups are documented in primary advisories. CISA AA24-109A (updated 13 Nov 2025) describes Akira's use of VPN/remote-service initial access, exploitation of SonicWall, Cisco and Veeam flaws, BYOVD tooling (POORTRY, PowerTool/Zemana), RClone/WinSCP/MEGA exfiltration, Cloudflare Tunnel/Ngrok tunneling and .akira/.powerranges/.akiranew encryption. CISA AA23-352A (updated 4 Jun 2025) describes Play (Playcrypt), active since June 2022, using FortiOS, ProxyNotShell and SimpleHelp flaws, Cobalt Strike, SystemBC, Grixba, GMER/IOBit/PowerTool/HRsword defense evasion and .PLAY encryption with unique @gmx.de/@web.de contact addresses and phone calls to victims. Cisco Talos (Oct 2025) documents Qilin intrusions using leaked VPN admin credentials, dual encryptors (PsExec spread and network-share), the DarkKill/dark.sys EDR killer, Cobalt Strike, SystemBC, Cyberduck exfiltration and ESXi-focused impact actions.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

Lateral Movement

T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1136.002 Create Account: Domain Account

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Command and Control

T1219 Remote Access Tools

Discovery

T1482 Domain Trust Discovery

defense-impairment

T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools; T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs

Impact

T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1657 Financial Theft

Collection

T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Remediation

Patches

  • CVE-2024-40766 (SonicWall)
  • CVE-2024-40711 and CVE-2023-27532 (Veeam)
  • CVE-2024-37085 (VMware ESXi)
  • CVE-2024-57727 (SimpleHelp)
  • CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082 (Exchange)
  • CVE-2018-13379 and CVE-2020-12812 (FortiOS)

Immediate actions

  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all VPN, RDP and remote-access services (Qilin VPN intrusion lacked MFA)
  • Patch internet-facing VPN, firewall, backup and RMM products exploited by these groups (SonicWall, Cisco, Fortinet, Veeam, SimpleHelp, Exchange)
  • Alert on EDR-tampering drivers and tools (PowerTool, HRsword, POORTRY, dark.sys/DarkKill, GMER)
  • Monitor for unauthorized domain/local account creation and unexpected remote-access tools (AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, RustDesk, Level.io)

Workarounds

  • Do not pay a Sicarii ransom: the original encryptor discards the private key, so restore from backups instead
  • Restrict outbound traffic to cloud-storage and tunneling services (MEGA, Backblaze, Ngrok, Cloudflare Tunnel) where not business-required

Longer-term hardening

  • Detect ransomware behavior (privilege escalation, data staging, mass encryption, shadow-copy deletion) rather than relying on signatures
  • Plan for recovery instead of negotiation: immutable offline backups and tested restoration, including ESXi/hypervisor hosts
  • Segment networks and restrict lateral-movement protocols (RDP, SMB, SSH, PsExec)
  • Brief board and leadership on ransomware risk

Affected and fixed versions

  • SonicWall — SonicOS SSL VPN
    Vulnerable versions: CVE-2024-40766 affected versions
    Fixed in: Vendor-patched releases
  • Veeam — Backup & Replication
    Vulnerable versions: CVE-2023-27532; CVE-2024-40711 affected versions
    Fixed in: Vendor-patched releases
  • Fortinet — FortiOS
    Vulnerable versions: CVE-2018-13379; CVE-2020-12812 affected versions
    Fixed in: Vendor-patched releases
  • Microsoft — Exchange Server
    Vulnerable versions: CVE-2022-41040; CVE-2022-41082 affected versions
    Fixed in: Vendor-patched releases
  • SimpleHelp — SimpleHelp RMM
    Vulnerable versions: CVE-2024-57727 affected versions
    Fixed in: Vendor-patched releases
  • Broadcom/VMware — ESXi
    Vulnerable versions: CVE-2024-37085 affected versions
    Fixed in: Vendor-patched releases

Timeline

  • Play (Playcrypt) ransomware activity begins, per CISA AA23-352A (Qilin/Agenda also active from about July 2022).
  • Akira ransomware activity begins; Linux/ESXi variant follows in April 2023, per CISA AA24-109A.
  • CISA, FBI and ASD's ACSC publish joint advisory AA23-352A on Play ransomware.
  • CISA, FBI and partners publish original #StopRansomware advisory AA24-109A on Akira.
  • AA23-352A revised with new Play TTPs and IOCs; FBI aware of about 900 affected entities as of May 2025.
  • Cisco Talos publishes analysis of Qilin intrusions: leaked VPN credentials, dual encryptors, DarkKill EDR killer, Cobalt Strike/SystemBC.
  • AA24-109A updated with new Akira IOCs, TTPs and detection methods; approximately $244.17M in claimed proceeds by late September 2025.
  • Sicarii RaaS first appears in public reporting (December 2025).
  • Halcyon publishes analysis showing the Sicarii encryptor discards its RSA private key (key-handling defect) and that later versions appear to fix it; Halcyon recovers files via key-material capture.
  • U.S. House Homeland Security hearing document cited by Halcyon for 70 new ransomware variants logged in the prior year.
  • Halcyon (Cynthia Kaiser) publishes 'Your Ransomware Adversary Has an HR Department' describing business-style operations of Akira, Qilin and Play and the AI-assembled Sicarii variant.

Sources cited

More from Akira

Other reports on CVE-2020-3259

Other reports on CVE-2023-20269

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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