Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-6403
Incransom (INC Ransom) ransomware group lists CENTERED CO., LTD. (Japan) as victim
ransomware.live lists CENTERED CO., LTD. (centered.co.jp), a Japanese digital marketing and web development agency, as a victim of the Incransom RaaS group, discovered 2026-11-19 with an estimated attack date of 2026-11-18. The listing itself contains no ransom note, negotiation, data-volume or leak-site details; the TTPs documented here are group-level (INC Ransom / GOLD IONIC) and are not confirmed for this specific intrusion.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6403 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Incransom CENTERED CO., LTD. listing |
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | CENTERED CO., LTD. Corporate IT environment (centered.co.jp) |
| Attribution | Incransom, INC Ransom (medium confidence) |
| Malware | Lynx, Meterpreter (Android), MimiKatz, inc ransom |
| Tools | 7-Zip, AdFind - S0552, MEGAsync, Metasploit/Meterpreter, Mimikatz, PSEXEC, WinRAR |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003 OS Credential Dumping, T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1087.002 Domain Account, T1133 External Remote Services, T1136 Create Account, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery, T1491.001 Internal Defacement, T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material, T1560.001 Archive via Utility and 4 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | professional services, health, manufacturing, technology, education, marketing and advertising |
| Target regions | japan, North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6403 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 17 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Incransom External RDP Logon With Valid Accounts — Initial Access
TL-2026-6403: Detects successful RDP (Logon Type 10) logons to Windows hosts from public, non-RFC1918 source addresses. Incransom (INC Ransom / GOLD IONIC) is documented gaining initial access through compromised credentials on external remote services such as RDP (T1078, T1133, T1021.001). Source addresses matching community-observed Incransom-related infrastructure (45.227.254.45, 45.227.254.128) are flagged. Group-level tradecraft; not confirmed for the CENTERED CO., LTD. intrusion.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1078, T1133, T1021.001
- Data sources: windows_security
- Severity: high
- Confidence: medium
Splunk SPL
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=10 earliest=-24h
| eval src=Source_Network_Address, target_user=mvindex(Account_Name,-1)
| where isnotnull(src) AND src!="-" AND like(src,"%.%.%.%")
| eval is_private=if(cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8",src) OR cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12",src) OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16",src) OR cidrmatch("127.0.0.0/8",src) OR cidrmatch("169.254.0.0/16",src),1,0)
| where is_private=0
| eval community_ioc=if(in(src,"45.227.254.45","45.227.254.128"),"yes","no")
| stats count as logons dc(ComputerName) as dest_host_count values(ComputerName) as dest_hosts min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by target_user src community_ioc
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| sort - community_ioc - dest_host_countMicrosoft KQL
let CommunityIPs = dynamic(['45.227.254.45','45.227.254.128']);
DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == 'LogonSuccess' and LogonType == 'RemoteInteractive'
| where isnotempty(RemoteIP) and not(ipv4_is_private(RemoteIP)) and RemoteIP !in ('127.0.0.1','::1')
| extend CommunityIOC = RemoteIP in (CommunityIPs)
| summarize Logons = count(), Devices = dcount(DeviceName), DeviceList = make_set(DeviceName, 20), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp) by AccountName, RemoteIP, CommunityIOC
| order by CommunityIOC desc, Devices descSigma
title: Incransom External RDP Logon With Valid Accounts (TL-2026-6403)
id: 6f1c3a52-8d47-4b0e-9a1d-2c7e5b9f4a01
status: experimental
description: Detects successful RemoteInteractive (RDP) logons from non-private source addresses, a documented INC Ransom (GOLD IONIC) initial access path via valid accounts on external remote services.
references:
- https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-profiles/gold-ionic
- https://blackpointcyber.com/threat-profile/inc-ransom-ransomware/
- https://www.ransomware.live/group/incransom
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/19
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1078
- attack.t1133
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 10
filter_private:
IpAddress|cidr:
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
- '127.0.0.0/8'
- '169.254.0.0/16'
filter_local:
IpAddress:
- '-'
- '::1'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Administrators or vendors using RDP directly over the internet or from a known NAT egress
- VPN or RD Gateway concentrators that present a public address as the source
level: medium
Known false positives:
- Administrators or third-party vendors legitimately using RDP from public addresses
- RD Gateway or VPN egress addresses appearing as the logon source
Tuning notes: Exclude sanctioned RD Gateway/VPN egress IPs and known vendor ranges with a lookup. Prioritise results where community_ioc=yes or the same account logs on to many hosts. Ideally RDP should not be internet-exposed; any hit outside allowed ranges deserves review.
- Incransom External Remote Service Brute Force Followed By Successful Logon · unlock with TL Creds
- Incransom Persistence Via Scheduled Task And Account Creation · unlock with TL Creds
- Incransom Data Staging With 7-Zip/WinRAR And Exfiltration To MEGA Cloud Storage · unlock with TL Creds
- Citrix NetScaler Exploitation Request Patterns Linked to INC Ransom Initial Access · unlock with TL Creds
- Incransom Inhibit System Recovery — Shadow Copy And Backup Deletion · unlock with TL Creds
- Incransom Ransom Note INC-README Creation And [indicator] Encrypted File Activity · unlock with TL Creds
- Incransom Post-Compromise AdFind Enumeration And Mimikatz Credential Dumping · unlock with TL Creds
- Incransom PsExec Lateral Execution, [indicator] Meterpreter Dropper And Community-Observed C2 IPs · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 17 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6403.
Sample indicators (2 of 17)
- Domain:
centered[.]co[.]jp - URL:
hxxps://www[.]ransomware[.]live/id/Q0VOVEVSRUQgQ08uLCBMVEQuQGluY3JhbnNvbQ
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 17 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
On 2026-11-19 at 01:56 UTC, ransomware.live recorded CENTERED CO., LTD. (centered.co.jp), a Japanese digital marketing and web development agency focused on advertising campaign performance and search engine promotion, as a victim of the Incransom group. The estimated attack date is 2026-11-18. The listing page (last updated 2026-11-19 02:20 UTC) shows no sector, screenshots, data volume, file counts, leak-site URL or negotiation details, and the victim has not publicly confirmed an incident in any source reviewed. A web search for the company name alongside the group returned no corroborating reporting.
Incransom (INC Ransom, tracked by Sophos as GOLD IONIC) is a ransomware-as-a-service operation active since mid-2023; ransomware.live dates its first listed victim to 2023-08-06 and counts 1,054 victims in total (31 in November 2026), ranking it 7th of 389 tracked groups. Its victims skew to professional services, healthcare, manufacturing, technology and education, with the United States the most common country. ransomware.live reports an average of 41 days between attack and claim and that 35% of victims with a domain were linked to infostealer activity. Recent listings in the same week include Pulsar (US), Chin Fong Machine Industrial (TW), pilotcat.com (US), BHIC Bofors Asia (MY) and Sarimelati Kencana Tbk PT (ID).
Published group-level tradecraft (not confirmed for this victim): initial access through compromised credentials on external remote services such as RDP, social engineering/spear-phishing, and exploitation of public-facing applications. Sophos reports one case where Citrix Bleed (CVE-2023-4966) may have provided initial access, and other secondary sources cite CVE-2023-3519; these are group history and not tied to CENTERED, so cve_list is left empty. Post-compromise activity documented by Sophos includes a Meterpreter payload (p443x64.exe), AdFind for Active Directory enumeration, WinRAR archiving, MEGAsync exfiltration (70+ GB in one case) and PsExec to deploy the ransomware binary to 500+ hosts. Blackpoint adds valid-account abuse, scheduled-task/account/service persistence, lateral movement via remote services and alternate authentication material, and Mimikatz and 7-Zip use.
The ransomware is double-extortion: it deletes shadow copies, uses multithreaded partial encryption, appends the .inc extension, drops INC-README.txt and INC-README.html in each encrypted directory with a Tor portal link and personal ID, changes the desktop wallpaper, and can print the note on network printers. Victims are told to make contact within 72 hours or data is published on the leak site. The INC source code was reportedly offered for sale in 2024 for USD 300,000, and several vendors link the Lynx ransomware to INC (shared strings and encryption methods); whether Lynx is a successor or a source-code purchaser is unverified.
Severity MEDIUM is an analyst assignment reflecting the limited detail on this listing, not a source statement. Defenders at the victim and its clients/partners should treat the claim as unverified, review remote-access and VPN credentials, hunt for the group-level behaviors above, and monitor the leak site for data publication.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
Lateral Movement
T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol; T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1136 Create Account
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1566 Phishing
Discovery
Impact
T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1491.001 Internal Defacement
Collection
Exfiltration
T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Execution
Remediation
Patches
- Keep internet-facing appliances patched (e.g., Citrix NetScaler CVE-2023-3519 and CVE-2023-4966), as these have been associated with the group in secondary reporting
Immediate actions
- Treat the claim as unverified; centered.co.jp should confirm or rule out an incident and review RDP/VPN/remote-access logs from 2026-11-01 onward
- Reset credentials and enforce MFA on all externally exposed remote-access services; revoke sessions and tokens for accounts seen in infostealer logs
- Hunt for INC-README.txt / INC-README.html, .inc file extensions, PsExec service execution, AdFind and Mimikatz use, and archive tools staging data
- Monitor the Incransom leak site and ransomware.live for data publication and notify affected clients and partners if confirmed
Workarounds
- Disable or restrict RDP exposure to the internet; require VPN with MFA
- Block execution of unapproved remote-management and file-sync tools
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for shadow-copy deletion, mass file modification and credential dumping
- Maintain offline/immutable backups and test restoration
- Restrict outbound traffic to cloud-storage exfiltration services (e.g., MEGA) and alert on large uploads
- Segment networks and restrict PsExec/admin-share and RDP lateral movement
Affected and fixed versions
- CENTERED CO., LTD. — Corporate IT environment (centered.co.jp)
Vulnerable versions: Not disclosed
Timeline
- Earliest Incransom victim listed on ransomware.live (estimated attack date); group emerged mid-2023 as a RaaS operation
- Blackpoint Cyber publishes its INC Ransom threat profile documenting initial access, persistence, lateral movement, double extortion and partial encryption
- Incransom lists Sarimelati Kencana Tbk PT (ID); further listings follow on 2026-11-16 (pilotcat.com, BHIC Bofors Asia) and 2026-11-17 (Chin Fong Machine Industrial), showing ongoing campaign tempo
- Estimated attack date for CENTERED CO., LTD. per ransomware.live; no technical details of the intrusion are published
- Incransom also lists Pulsar (US) the same day; group stands at 1,054 total victims with 31 posted in November 2026
- ransomware.live discovers the Incransom listing for CENTERED CO., LTD. at 01:56 UTC; the listing is last updated at 02:20 UTC with no data samples or negotiation details
Sources cited
- ransomware.live victim listing: CENTERED CO., LTD. (Incransom) ransomware.live · Research · 2026-11-19
- ransomware.live group profile: Incransom ransomware.live · Research · 2026-11-19
- Blackpoint Cyber threat profile: INC Ransom blackpointcyber.com · Vendor report · 2026-03-16
- Sophos threat profile: GOLD IONIC (INC Ransom) Sophos · Vendor report
- Trend Micro: INC ransomware under the microscope Trend Micro · Research
- Hivepro TA2025033: Lynx ransomware hivepro.com · Research · 2025-02-01
- Cyble threat actor profile: INC Ransom cyble.com · Research
- Sophos/Secureworks: GOLD IONIC deploys INC ransomware Sophos · Blog
More from INC Ransom
- Ransomware Leak-Site Cadence Analysis: INCRANSOM, TheGentlemen and Audit Team Run Active Intrusion Pipelines Amid Group Consolidation
- Incransom ransomware group claims Aidon Oy (Gridspertise / Enel Group) smart meter platform breach
- INC Ransomware: Evolution into a Top-Tier RaaS Operation (Rust Windows/ESXi payloads, edge-device exploitation CVE-2023-3519/CVE-2023-48788/CVE-2024-57727/CVE-2025-5777, modified Veeam credential dumper)
- Team Cymru Infrastructure Analysis: Seven Active Ransomware Gangs (Akira, DragonForce, Clop, MedusaLocker, Qilin, INC Ransom, Lynx) Abuse Dual-Use Tools and Exploit SonicWall, Gladinet CentreStack, and FortiGate Devices
- 2026 Ransomware Surge Targeting US Organizations: Identity-First Compromise, BYOVD, and Living-Off-the-Cloud Exfiltration (Qilin, Akira, Clop, INC Ransom, Play, DragonForce, Sinobi)
- FortiBleed: Mass Credential Compromise Campaign Against Internet-Exposed Fortinet FortiGate Devices (86,644 Devices, 194 Countries)
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.