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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-6407

The Gentlemen Ransomware Gang Claims NVIDIA Breach on Leak Site (Unverified)

mediumTRACKING

The Gentlemen, a double-extortion ransomware-as-a-service group active since 2025, listed NVIDIA on its leak site on 2026-11-18 with a countdown timer of roughly 10 days. No sample files, IOCs or CVEs were published and NVIDIA has not confirmed a breach, so the claim remains unverified.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6407
Also known asThe Gentlemen Ransomware, Gentlemen RaaS, NVIDIA Gentlemen leak-site claim
SeverityMEDIUM
First disclosed
Affected productsNVIDIA Unspecified (claimed victim organization; no systems or data identified)
AttributionThe Gentlemen (medium confidence)
MalwareAnyDesk, GentleKiller, MimiKatz, SystemBC - S9001
ToolsChisel, Cloudflared, NVDA (Non-Visual Desktop Access), PSEXEC, Rclone - S1040, WinSCP
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, T1018 Remote System Discovery, T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1074.001 Local Data Staging, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1090 Proxy, T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing and 13 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstechnology, manufacturing
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6407 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 38 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: The Gentlemen - Backdoor Admin Account on FortiGate Edge Device (Initial Access)

Flags creation or change of FortiGate administrator objects named support_fortinet, badmin, forti-api or MicrosoftSupporte, the backdoor and decoy account names Group-IB documents on Fortinet devices compromised by The Gentlemen affiliates (initial access via exposed FortiGate or CVE-2024-55591 per third-party reporting). Behaviour-first: it keys on the admin-object change, not on a specific exploit. Note the NVIDIA leak-site listing is an unverified claim and these indicators come from prior intrusions.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1190, T1078, T1133
  • Data sources: fortigate, index=network sourcetype=fgt_event, CommonSecurityLog (Fortinet CEF)
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

```TL-2026-6407 The Gentlemen: backdoor FortiGate admin accounts created after edge-device compromise (Group-IB)```
index=network sourcetype=fgt_event earliest=-24h cfgpath="system.admin" (cfgobj="support_fortinet" OR cfgobj="badmin" OR cfgobj="forti-api" OR cfgobj="MicrosoftSupporte")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(logdesc) as logdesc values(action) as action values(user) as changed_by values(srcip) as srcip by devname cfgobj
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| sort - last_seen

Microsoft KQL

let gentlemen_accounts = @"(?i)(support_fortinet|badmin|forti-api|MicrosoftSupporte)";
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where DeviceVendor =~ "Fortinet"
| where Message contains "system.admin" or AdditionalExtensions contains "system.admin"
| extend Blob = strcat(Message, " ", AdditionalExtensions, " ", SourceUserName, " ", DestinationUserName)
| where Blob matches regex gentlemen_accounts
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, SourceIP, SourceUserName, DeviceAction, Activity, Message
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Sigma

title: "FortiGate Backdoor Admin Account Created - The Gentlemen Ransomware"
id: 3f0a6c52-6407-4b1e-9a01-0d7c2e5b8a11
status: experimental
description: "Detects creation or modification of FortiGate admin objects named support_fortinet, badmin, forti-api or MicrosoftSupporte, backdoor account names documented by Group-IB for The Gentlemen ransomware affiliates after compromising Fortinet edge devices."
references:
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/hastalamuerte-gentlemen-raas-ttps
    - https://www.sophos.com/blog/ungentlemanly-behavior-insights-into-a-ransomware-operation
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-19
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1133
    - cve.2024.55591
logsource:
    product: fortinet
    service: fortigate
detection:
    selection:
        cfgpath: 'system.admin'
        cfgobj:
            - 'support_fortinet'
            - 'badmin'
            - 'forti-api'
            - 'MicrosoftSupporte'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrators who happen to use an account called forti-api for automation
    - Vendor support sessions that create a temporary support account
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate administrators using an automation account named forti-api
  • Fortinet or MSSP support personnel creating a temporary support account

Tuning notes: Confirm your FortiGate logs reach Splunk with the Fortinet FortiGate add-on (index and sourcetype may differ, adjust index=network). Allowlist change-managed admin creations by user and srcip. Extend the account list with any new names from threat-intel updates.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • The Gentlemen - VPN Password Guessing Followed by Successful Tunnel (Initial Access) · unlock with TL Creds
  • The Gentlemen - Pre-Encryption Service Disable, Recovery Inhibition and Log Clearing (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • The Gentlemen - PsExec, NETLOGON Deployment and RDP Fan-Out (Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
  • The Gentlemen - Network Discovery Tooling (Advanced IP Scanner, SoftPerfect, Nmap, NetExec) · unlock with TL Creds
  • The Gentlemen - LSASS Credential Dumping and Credential Tooling · unlock with TL Creds
  • The Gentlemen - Ransom Note [indicator] and Encrypted File Artifacts (Impact) · unlock with TL Creds
  • The Gentlemen - BYOVD Driver and EDR Killer Activity (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • The Gentlemen - Rclone Exfiltration, Tunnelling and Remote Access Tooling (C2 / Exfiltration) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 38 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6407.

Sample indicators (3 of 38)

  • IP address: 194.87.31[.]69
  • File hash: 51b9f246d6da85631131fcd1fabf0a67937d4bdde33625a44f7ee6a3a7baebd2
  • IP address: 91.107.247[.]163

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 38 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

38 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

On 2026-11-18 the ransomware group The Gentlemen (tracked by Sophos CTU as GOLD SHERWOOD and by Microsoft as Storm-2697) added NVIDIA to its dark-web leak site. Per Cyber Security News, the listing shows NVIDIA's logo, the NVDA ticker, a revenue figure of $303 billion with no reporting period, a countdown of 237h 50m 39s, the text 'DATA INFO - SOON', and a reference to Tox for ransom talks. It includes no sample files and does not say which systems were reached, what data is held, or when any intrusion occurred. Ransomware tracker Breach House indexed the listing on 2026-11-18 with leak status 'pending'. NVIDIA has not publicly confirmed a breach, and there is no verified evidence of data theft or encryption. It is also unclear whether the claim concerns NVIDIA systems, a third party, or neither. Severity is held at MEDIUM pending verification; escalate if NVIDIA confirms, or if sample data or IOCs are published.

Background on the actor (describes the group's past operations, NOT confirmed activity against NVIDIA): The Gentlemen is a RaaS brand active since at least July 2025 (first Windows sample on VirusTotal 2025-07-17). Group-IB reports about 20 members, a Russian-speaking administrator using the handle 'hastalamuerte', and links to the earlier ArmCorp group, a Qilin affiliate. Unit 42 reports a 90% affiliate payout and a May 2026 BreachForums partnership to recruit affiliates, pentesters and initial access brokers. A May 2026 leak of the group's internal backend database was analyzed by Check Point Research, which also tied a SystemBC proxy botnet of more than 1,570 hosts to a Gentlemen affiliate; that figure comes from SystemBC C2 telemetry and is not a confirmed ransomware victim count. Provendata reported 1,081 publicly claimed leak-site victims as of 2026-11-09.

Observed TTPs from prior intrusions (Sophos CTU review of 15 incidents, Trend Micro, Group-IB, Unit 42): initial access via exposed or compromised Fortinet/FortiGate edge devices and VPN credentials (including use of CVE-2024-55591 per third-party reporting; Sophos saw Fortinet artifacts but could not confirm exploitation), brute-forced or stolen VPN credentials without MFA, and initial access brokers. Post-compromise activity includes discovery with Advanced IP Scanner/SoftPerfect/Nmap, credential theft (Mimikatz per third-party research, DPAPI tooling, NetExec), lateral movement with RDP and PsExec, tunnelling via Cloudflared and Chisel, persistence via AnyDesk and Datto RMM, and exfiltration with Rclone (also Restic, MinIO Client, FileZilla, MEGAsync, WinSCP). Defenders should expect EDR killers (GentleKiller variants, Havoc, Xkpsm-Killer) and bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver abuse (ThrottleBlood.sys, xkpsm.sys, nogbc.sys, G11.sys, dmx.sys, viragt64.sys), disabling of Defender and over 200 service-disable commands (Veeam, SQLWriter, BackupExec), event-log clearing, shadow-copy deletion, and Go-based lockers deployed from NETLOGON shares or via PsExec, producing README-GENTLEMEN.txt and a six-character file extension (.7mtzhh in documented samples). Median time from first observed post-compromise activity to ransomware deployment was about two days, with the shortest under 24 hours. Windows, Linux and ESXi lockers exist; only the Windows variant was seen deployed by Sophos.

Defensive guidance: treat the NVIDIA listing as a claim to monitor, not a confirmed incident. NVIDIA-related organizations and their suppliers should review Fortinet/VPN exposure and authentication logs, hunt for the documented tooling and artifacts below, and watch for NVIDIA statements or published sample data. Note that the IOCs below are drawn from the group's past intrusions and are not evidence of compromise at NVIDIA.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory; T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing

Discovery

T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1046 Network Service Discovery

Lateral Movement

T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol; T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution

Privilege Escalation

T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation; T1484.001 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification

Collection

T1074.001 Local Data Staging

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Command and Control

T1090 Proxy; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1572 Protocol Tunneling

Impact

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1489 Service Stop; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1657 Financial Theft

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools; T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs

Remediation

Patches

  • Patch Fortinet FortiOS/FortiProxy against CVE-2024-55591 (cited in third-party reporting of Gentlemen initial access)

Immediate actions

  • Treat the NVIDIA leak-site listing as an unverified claim: monitor for an NVIDIA statement, published sample data or IOCs, and escalate if any appear
  • Audit Fortinet/FortiGate and other edge-device management interfaces for internet exposure, unauthorized admin accounts (e.g. support_fortinet, badmin, forti-api) and unusual VPN logins
  • Enforce MFA on all VPN and remote access and reset credentials for any exposed VPN accounts
  • Hunt for Rclone, Restic, MinIO Client, WinSCP, Cloudflared, AnyDesk and Datto RMM running outside approved use, and for staging in C:\PerfLogs

Workarounds

  • Restrict management interfaces of edge devices to trusted internal networks
  • Block outbound access to the known Rclone SFTP endpoint 194.87.31.69 as a precaution

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with tamper protection and block vulnerable signed drivers (ThrottleBlood.sys, xkpsm.sys, nogbc.sys, G11.sys, dmx.sys, viragt64.sys) via driver blocklists
  • Keep offline, immutable backups and protect backup service accounts and Veeam servers
  • Alert on mass 'sc config ... start= disabled' activity, Defender exclusion changes, shadow-copy deletion and event-log clearing
  • Restrict write access to NETLOGON/SYSVOL and monitor GPO changes
  • Apply egress controls and monitor for bulk data transfer to cloud storage or unknown SFTP endpoints

Affected and fixed versions

  • NVIDIA — Unspecified (claimed victim organization; no systems or data identified)

Timeline

Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source

  • First Gentlemen Windows locker sample seen on VirusTotal, already containing the group's leak site URL (Group-IB).
  • Public arbitration thread opened on the RAMP forum against Qilin by the operator, a former Qilin affiliate (Group-IB).
  • Trend Micro publishes analysis of an August 2025 Gentlemen intrusion (FortiGate entry, locked-ioc-15, AnyDesk, WinSCP, NETLOGON deployment).
  • ESXi locker variant observed that kills host processes, removes snapshots and stops VMware services (Group-IB).
  • Windows locker updated with a delayed-execution timer and WMI-based spread (Group-IB).
  • Cobalt Strike C2 at locked-ioc-16 flagged by Silent Push; later identified by Check Point as C2 in a Gentlemen RaaS intrusion.
  • Group-IB publishes 'Hasta la vista, Hastalamuerte' TTP overview, linking the group to ArmCorp/Qilin affiliates and detailing a list of compromised FortiGate devices.
  • Check Point Research DFIR report describes an affiliate deploying SystemBC and a proxy botnet of more than 1,570 hosts.
  • Group administrator acknowledges on underground forums that the internal backend database was compromised and leaked.
  • Provendata reports 1,081 publicly claimed leak-site victims, 118 in the prior 30 days.
  • The Gentlemen lists NVIDIA on its leak site with a countdown of about 237 hours and no sample files; Breach House indexes it with status 'pending'; Cyber Security News reports no NVIDIA confirmation.
  • BleepingComputer reports NVIDIA is investigating an incident that may have affected a third-party partner and has found no indication its own systems or networks were affected; the Gentlemen have published no proof.
  • Leak-site countdown for NVIDIA expires; the group threatens to publish data (scheduled, not yet occurred).

Update history

Sources cited

More from The Gentlemen

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated .

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