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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-6388

Ukraine, FBI arrest ransomware gang members tied to $40.5M in ransoms (Chaos/BlackSuit-linked, ex-Conti network, AI voice-phishing + remote-access abuse)

highACTIVE

Ukraine's National Police and the FBI arrested four suspected key members of an international ransomware organization (at least 27 core members, 60+ in the wider network incl. former Conti members) after 66 searches in Kyiv and 11 regions.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6388
Also known asUkraine/FBI Conti-linked ransomware takedown, Chaos ransomware arrests
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMultiple Corporate networks and employees targeted via social engineering (oil and gas, pharma, manufacturing, logistics, financial, critical infrastructure); TeamViewer / AnyDesk / Microsoft (Quick Assist) Legitimate remote-access tools abused for initial access and persistence
MalwareAnyDesk, Black Basta - S1070, Chaos, Conti, TeamViewer, black suit
ToolsAnyDesk, GoodSync, Impacket atexec, Quick Assist, ScreenConnect, TeamViewer
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, T1204 User Execution, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery, T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link, T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage, T1572 Protocol Tunneling, T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information, T1591 Gather Victim Org Information and 4 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsoil-and-gas, pharmacy, manufacturing, logistics, finance, critical-infrastructure
Target regionsNorth America, Europe
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6388 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 18 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Vishing-Driven Remote Access Tool Launch (Quick Assist / AnyDesk / TeamViewer / ScreenConnect) - TL-2026-6388

Behaviour-first detection for the initial-access step of the TL-2026-6388 ransomware network: after an AI-generated help-desk vishing call, the employee starts Quick Assist, AnyDesk, TeamViewer or ScreenConnect so the operators can work inside the host. Flags the tool, user, parent process and whether the binary runs outside Program Files.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1219, T1204, T1656
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, sysmon_eventcode_1
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
    (Image="*\\QuickAssist.exe" OR Image="*\\AnyDesk.exe" OR Image="*\\TeamViewer.exe" OR Image="*\\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe" OR Image="*\\ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe")
```TL-2026-6388 vishing-to-RMM: employee coaxed into starting a remote-access tool```
| eval tool=case(like(lower(Image),"%quickassist.exe"),"Quick Assist", like(lower(Image),"%anydesk.exe"),"AnyDesk", like(lower(Image),"%teamviewer.exe"),"TeamViewer", true(),"ScreenConnect")
| eval outside_program_files=if(match(lower(Image),"^c:.program files"),0,1)
| stats earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen count values(ParentImage) as parent_image values(CommandLine) as command_line max(outside_program_files) as outside_program_files by host User tool
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")
| table first_seen last_seen host User tool count parent_image command_line outside_program_files

Microsoft KQL

// TL-2026-6388: remote-access tool started on an endpoint (vishing / help-desk impersonation, T1219/T1204)
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("QuickAssist.exe", "AnyDesk.exe", "TeamViewer.exe", "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe", "ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe")
| extend Tool = case(FileName =~ "QuickAssist.exe", "Quick Assist", FileName =~ "AnyDesk.exe", "AnyDesk", FileName =~ "TeamViewer.exe", "TeamViewer", "ScreenConnect")
| extend OutsideProgramFiles = tolower(FolderPath) !startswith @"c:\program files"
| summarize FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Executions = count(), ParentProcesses = make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName, 10), CommandLines = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 10), OutsideProgramFiles = max(toint(OutsideProgramFiles)) by DeviceName, AccountName, Tool
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, DeviceName, AccountName, Tool, Executions, ParentProcesses, CommandLines, OutsideProgramFiles
| order by FirstSeen desc

Sigma

title: Remote Access Tool Launched - Vishing RMM Abuse (TL-2026-6388)
id: b3a1c5e2-7d41-4c8a-9e12-6f0a2d8b4c11
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of Quick Assist, AnyDesk, TeamViewer or ScreenConnect client binaries, the tools employees are talked into starting during AI or help-desk vishing calls attributed to the Chaos and BlackSuit-linked ransomware network.
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ukraine-fbi-arrest-ransomware-gang-members-tied-to-40m-in-ransoms/
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/new-chaos-ransomware/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1219
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1656
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\QuickAssist.exe'
            - '\AnyDesk.exe'
            - '\TeamViewer.exe'
            - '\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe'
            - '\ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Approved IT help-desk remote support sessions
    - Administrators using sanctioned RMM tooling
level: medium

Known false positives:

  • Approved IT help-desk remote support sessions
  • Administrators using sanctioned RMM tooling

Tuning notes: Allowlist approved RMM tools by signer, hash or install path and approved hosts or users; prioritise hits where outside_program_files=1 or the parent is a browser, Office or script host; alert on Quick Assist wherever it is not part of your support process.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • MFA Success From a New IP After Lookalike VPN Phishing - TL-2026-6388 · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Masquerade Outside System32 (GoodSync) - TL-2026-6388 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Domain Discovery, Impacket atexec and RDP Lateral Movement - TL-2026-6388 · unlock with TL Creds
  • WMIC Product Uninstall of MFA or Security Software and Hidden-Account Registry Key - TL-2026-6388 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Chaos Ransom Note [indicator] and [indicator] Files - TL-2026-6388 · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoodSync Execution for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage - TL-2026-6388 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Chaos Encryptor WMI Launch, Encryption Arguments and Recovery Inhibition - TL-2026-6388 · unlock with TL Creds
  • OpenSSH Reverse Tunnel to Chaos RaaS C2 [indicator] - TL-2026-6388 · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 18 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6388.

Sample indicators (2 of 18)

  • IP address: 45.61.134[.]36
  • Domain: thesecure[.]biz

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 18 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

18 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The group allegedly extracted over $40.5M from at least 28 companies using AI-generated voice vishing, fake corporate VPN login pages and TeamViewer/AnyDesk remote access, followed by double extortion; court records name Chaos ransomware, but authorities have not confirmed ties to Conti, BlackSuit or Chaos.

On 2026-11-18 Ukraine's National Police (Cyber Police Department and Main Investigation Department, with the Prosecutor General's Office and TacTeam units) announced, together with the US FBI, the arrest of four suspected key members of an international ransomware organization after an investigation lasting more than two years. 66 simultaneous searches were conducted in Kyiv and 11 Ukrainian regions; investigators seized computer equipment, phones, bank cards, about $370,000 and EUR 20,000 in cash. Charges are Part 2 of Article 255 (participation in a criminal organization) and Part 5 of Article 361 (unauthorized interference with information systems) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, with up to 15 years' imprisonment. The investigation is ongoing and other network members are still being identified.

Police say the organization comprises at least 27 people from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia, within a wider network of more than 60 participants across eight jurisdictions that includes former Conti members. At least 28 companies paid more than $40.5M (about UAH 1.8 billion) in ransoms. Targets included oil and gas, pharmaceutical, industrial/manufacturing, logistics, financial and critical-infrastructure organizations. In one case 1.4 TB was stolen from a US company; an initial $10M demand was settled for $5M. Ukrainian court records (as reported by LeMagIT and BleepingComputer) name Warren Oil Company (1.4 TB copied, 84.5 BTC / ~$5M paid, August 2024), Newpark Resources ($1.5M, December 2024), Quantum Health ($5M after a $15M demand, June 2026) and Maxxis International-USA (claimed by BlackSuit in November 2024).

Tradecraft per police and the press: pre-attack reconnaissance of the target's finances, assets, employees and IT weaknesses; a custom platform that places automated AI-generated voice calls (vishing) impersonating IT support with spoofed phone numbers; phishing pages imitating corporate VPN logins, with capture of the victim's two-factor code (Warren Oil case); persuading employees to install TeamViewer or AnyDesk under false pretenses, with one attacker keeping the employee on the phone while another worked in the systems; then data theft, encryption (Chaos per court records) and threats to publish stolen data (double extortion), with ransoms paid in cryptocurrency (BTC referenced).

Attribution caveat: authorities did not confirm that the four arrestees are former Conti members or are affiliated with BlackSuit/Chaos. LeMagIT links the helpdesk-impersonation activity to the BazarCall subgroup that supplied initial access to two Conti teams (one evolving Quantum -> Royal -> BlackSuit, the other Black Basta), a link that is analyst inference. Separately, Cisco Talos (2025-07-24) assessed with moderate confidence that the 2025 Chaos RaaS (unrelated to the older Chaos builder variants) is a BlackSuit/Royal rebrand or formed by ex-members, and documented its tradecraft (spam flooding + vishing to Quick Assist, RMM tools, GoodSync exfiltration, OpenSSH reverse tunnel, partial ECDH/AES encryption, .chaos extension). Talos-derived techniques and indicators here are tagged as Chaos RaaS tradecraft and are not confirmed as the exact arrested cell's tooling. No IOCs were published in the arrest announcements; BeaconBeagle returned HTTP 404 (no record) for the Talos-reported C2 IP 45.61.134.36 at research time.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Lateral Movement

T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Defense Evasion

T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1684.001 Impersonation

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

Credential Access

T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception

Execution

T1204 User Execution

Command and Control

T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1572 Protocol Tunneling

Impact

T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1657 Financial Theft

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Reconnaissance

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1591 Gather Victim Org Information; T1598.004 Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Voice

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Brief help desk and staff that IT support will never cold-call to request credentials, MFA codes or remote-access installation; verify callers via a known internal number
  • Block or allowlist remote-access tools (TeamViewer, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, Syncro, Quick Assist) and alert on unapproved installs or sessions
  • Hunt for sudden spam floods followed by remote-session starts, WMIC MFA-app uninstalls, GoodSync or OpenSSH reverse-tunnel activity, and .chaos / readme.chaos.txt artifacts
  • Reset credentials and revoke sessions for any user who entered credentials on a lookalike VPN portal or read out an MFA code

Workarounds

  • Disable user ability to install software and block Quick Assist where not required
  • Require call-back verification and a ticket number for any help-desk-initiated remote session

Longer-term hardening

  • Move to phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) so captured one-time codes cannot be replayed
  • Restrict RMM software to approved, centrally managed tools via application control and egress filtering
  • Maintain offline/immutable backups and test restore of virtualization and file-server estates
  • Monitor for lookalike VPN/SSO domains and takedown brand-impersonating pages
  • Segment networks and restrict SMB/RDP/WMI lateral movement; limit outbound SSH and cloud-sync traffic

Affected and fixed versions

  • Multiple — Corporate networks and employees targeted via social engineering (oil and gas, pharma, manufacturing, logistics, financial, critical infrastructure)
    Vulnerable versions: Organizations without phishing-resistant MFA or remote-access tool controls
  • TeamViewer / AnyDesk / Microsoft (Quick Assist) — Legitimate remote-access tools abused for initial access and persistence
    Vulnerable versions: Abuse of legitimate functionality; not a product vulnerability

Timeline

  • Quantum ransomware operation starts (January 2022; day not stated), later becoming Royal and then BlackSuit - one of the Conti-derived lineages LeMagIT ties to the BazarCall helpdesk-impersonation activity.
  • Conti ransomware shuts down its brand and members disperse into smaller groups (BleepingComputer, May 2022).
  • Royal ransomware rebrands/adds the BlackSuit encryptor (June 2023).
  • Warren Oil Company hit (August 2024): 1.4 TB copied, 84.5 BTC (~$5M) paid; victim entered credentials on a fake VPN page and the attackers obtained the 2FA code.
  • Maxxis International-USA claimed by BlackSuit (November 2024) per LeMagIT-cited court records.
  • Newpark Resources pays $1.5M ransom (December 2024).
  • Chaos RaaS emerges (about February 2025) and recruits affiliates on RAMP; Talos assesses it as a likely BlackSuit/Royal rebrand (moderate confidence).
  • Cisco Talos publishes analysis of Chaos RaaS: spam flooding plus vishing to Quick Assist, RMM abuse, GoodSync exfiltration, OpenSSH reverse tunnel, .chaos encryptor.
  • Quantum Health pays $5M after a $15M initial demand (June 2026).
  • Ukraine's National Police and FBI announce four arrests after 66 searches in Kyiv and 11 regions; $370,000 and EUR 20,000 seized; charges under Articles 255(2) and 361(5); investigation ongoing.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —. Reviewed .

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