Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-6389
Initial access brokers shift ransomware access sales to private channels (ZeroFox analysis)
ZeroFox data reported by Help Net Security shows ransomware/extortion activity at record levels (at least 2,381 incidents in Q3 2026; 852 in October 2026) while public initial-access listings fell from about 620 per quarter (early 2025) to about 370 (early 2026) as brokers moved deals to private channels such as Tox.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6389 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Salesforce Salesforce CRM with connected third-party OAuth apps (Salesloft Drift, Gainsight, Klue Battlecards); Microsoft Microsoft Teams (external tenant communication) and Quick Assist |
| Malware | AgendaCrypt, Icarus |
| Tools | PetitPotam, Quick Assist |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1069.002 Domain Groups, T1078.004 Cloud Accounts, T1187 Forced Authentication, T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1213 Data from Information Repositories, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1550.001 Application Access Token and 5 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | technology, software-as-a-service, cross-sector |
| Target regions | North America, Asia-Pacific, 005 - South America, Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6389 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Quick Assist Launch Followed by PowerShell Staging or Domain Enumeration (Teams Vishing / Spring Ring)
TL-2026-6389: Detects the post-vishing chain reported by Unit 42 (Spring Ring) and Microsoft DART: a victim launches Quick Assist after an external-tenant Teams 'help desk' call, then the operator runs obfuscated PowerShell (AMSI bypass via amsiInitFailed, encoded or download-cradle commands, san-sid.com staging) and domain enumeration (whoami /groups, net group /dom). Correlates the signals per host in 30-minute windows so a lone Quick Assist session by IT does not alert. Initial-access brokers and ransomware affiliates use this chain to obtain hands-on-keyboard access.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1566.004, T1219, T1059.001, T1033, T1069.002
- Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, windows_security
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h (Image="*quickassist.exe" OR Image="*powershell.exe" OR Image="*pwsh.exe" OR Image="*whoami.exe" OR Image="*net.exe" OR Image="*net1.exe")
| eval cmd=lower(CommandLine)
| eval qa=if(like(lower(Image),"%quickassist.exe"),1,0)
| eval ps=if((like(lower(Image),"%powershell.exe") OR like(lower(Image),"%pwsh.exe")) AND (like(cmd,"%amsiinitfailed%") OR like(cmd,"%-enc%") OR like(cmd,"%downloadstring%") OR like(cmd,"%san-sid.com%")),1,0)
| eval enum=if(like(cmd,"%whoami /groups%") OR like(cmd,"%group /dom%"),1,0)
| bin _time span=30m
| stats sum(qa) as quick_assist_launches sum(ps) as suspicious_powershell sum(enum) as enum_cmds values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host, _time
| where quick_assist_launches>0 AND (suspicious_powershell>0 OR enum_cmds>0)Microsoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("quickassist.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "whoami.exe", "net.exe", "net1.exe")
| extend Cmd = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend QA = FileName =~ "quickassist.exe",
PS = FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and Cmd matches regex "amsiinitfailed|-enc|downloadstring|san-sid[.]com",
Enum = Cmd contains "whoami /groups" or Cmd contains "group /dom"
| summarize QuickAssistLaunches = countif(QA), SuspiciousPowerShell = countif(PS), EnumCommands = countif(Enum), Commands = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 20) by DeviceName, Window = bin(Timestamp, 30m)
| where QuickAssistLaunches > 0 and (SuspiciousPowerShell > 0 or EnumCommands > 0)
| project Window, DeviceName, QuickAssistLaunches, SuspiciousPowerShell, EnumCommands, CommandsSigma
title: Quick Assist Launch or Post-Vishing Staging and Enumeration (TL-2026-6389)
id: 6f3b1c2e-8a41-4d7b-9c55-2e1a7d0b4f61
status: experimental
description: Detects Quick Assist execution and the follow-on activity reported in Spring Ring Teams vishing intrusions - AMSI bypass via amsiInitFailed, staging from san-sid.com, and domain enumeration with whoami /groups and net group /dom. Single-event form; correlate Quick Assist with the other selections per host for higher fidelity.
references:
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/spring-ring-voice-phishing-campaigns/
- https://microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/16/help-on-the-line-how-a-microsoft-teams-support-call-led-to-compromise
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.004
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1033
- attack.t1069.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_quick_assist:
Image|endswith: '\quickassist.exe'
selection_enum_whoami:
Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '/groups'
selection_enum_net:
Image|endswith:
- '\net.exe'
- '\net1.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'group /dom'
selection_powershell:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'amsiInitFailed'
- 'san-sid.com'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Help desk staff legitimately using Quick Assist
- Administrators running whoami /groups or net group /dom during troubleshooting
level: mediumKnown false positives:
- Help desk staff legitimately using Quick Assist alongside PowerShell troubleshooting on the same host
- Administrators running whoami /groups or net group /dom during support sessions
Tuning notes: Exclude known help desk jump hosts and service accounts, or allow-list Quick Assist on IT-owned devices. Raise the correlation window or require suspicious_powershell>0 to cut noise further. If Quick Assist is blocked by policy, alert on any single launch. Adjust the Sysmon index name to your environment.
- Microsoft Teams Contact from Help Desk-Themed External onmicrosoft.com Tenant · unlock with TL Creds
- Spring Ring Host Artifacts: IntegrityData Python, vhlp-/scnr- Executables and Scheduled Task Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
- Low-Prevalence DLL Side-Loading from User-Writable Directory · unlock with TL Creds
- Entra ID Sign-in or Token Use from Spring Ring Vishing Proxy IPs · unlock with TL Creds
- PowerShell AMSI Tampering via amsiInitFailed (Spring Ring Stager) · unlock with TL Creds
- PetitPotam-Style NTLM Coercion via Anonymous IPC$ Access on Domain Controller · unlock with TL Creds
- Salesforce Bulk Data Access via OAuth Connected App (Drift / Gainsight / Klue Pattern) · unlock with TL Creds
- Endpoint Connection or DNS Lookup to Spring Ring Vishing Infrastructure ([indicator] and Proxy IPs) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6389.
Sample indicators (3 of 28)
- IP address:
193.32.248[.]251 - Domain:
san-sid[.]com - File hash:
24ab9fe5d5be62d3bf055a0ca4508e8bca2996b6d78649dce8145d8a27bc1c5b
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Reported access vectors include session token theft, OAuth token compromise of SaaS vendors, Microsoft Teams voice phishing and help desk password-reset social engineering.
ZeroFox data summarized by Help Net Security on 2026-11-19 indicates that ransomware and extortion gangs claimed about 718 victims per month through October 2026, up from about 573 per month in 2025. Q3 2026 saw at least 2,381 incidents, the highest quarter on record and about 14% above the previous high of 2,091 (late 2025); October 2026 alone saw 852. By the end of October 2026 the annual total had already passed all of 2025, and 7,239 incidents had been logged through 2026-11-02. Qilin was the most active group with at least 1,104 incidents (about 15% of the total), followed by The Gentlemen with 935. North America remained the most targeted region but its share fell from about 59% (H2 2025) to 46-48% monthly since July 2026, while Asia-Pacific and South America reached their highest shares since at least early 2024.
Public dark web initial-access listings fell from about 620 per quarter (early 2025) to about 370 per quarter (early 2026). ZeroFox researchers interpret this as a shift to private channels rather than reduced criminal activity. The reported drivers are law-enforcement takedowns of broker storefronts - the XSS forum (seized July 2025), RAMP (seized January 2026) and LeakBase (down March 2026, Europol takedown) - pushing deals to the encrypted messenger Tox. Some ransomware groups also appear to handle initial access themselves. Basic access averaged about $1,427 in early 2023 and fell below $500 by Q3 2026, while domain administrator credentials averaged about $8,000. ZeroFox expects more session-token listings (which bypass login and MFA), premium pricing for access to vendors and integration providers, and a growing volume of unverified or exaggerated leak-site claims in 2027.
The article cites access vectors that bypass conventional controls. ShinyHunters-named actors compromised OAuth tokens at Salesloft Drift, Gainsight and Klue (Aug 2025 - Jun 2026) and used authorized sessions to reach customers' Salesforce data, which sign-in monitoring did not flag. Supporting reporting: UNC6395 used stolen Drift OAuth/refresh tokens in Aug 2025 (Salesloft and Salesforce revoked all Drift tokens on 2025-08-20); Salesforce disabled Gainsight-published apps in Nov 2025; and in June 2026 attackers used a dormant Klue API credential from an abandoned integration prototype (2026-06-11), pushed a malicious code update to harvest customer OAuth tokens, and queried customer CRM data, with extortion emails from a group Huntress calls 'Icarus'. Malicious voice phishing over Microsoft Teams reached nearly 10 times its mid-2025 weekly level by mid-2026; Unit 42's 'Spring Ring' reporting (Jan-Apr 2026) describes attackers using external .onmicrosoft.com tenants to pose as IT help desk, guiding victims to Quick Assist or other RMM tools, followed by PowerShell staging, AMSI tampering and a PetitPotam NTLM-relay attempt. Microsoft DART (2026-03-16) documented a similar Teams vishing case involving Quick Assist, a spoofed credential form and a disguised MSI that sideloaded a DLL. Help desk password-reset social engineering is cited as a tested vector.
Caveats: the headline statistics originate from ZeroFox and are single-source; the article links only to a ZeroFox tag page, not a specific report. The source states no CVEs, malware names or IOCs. Network and file IOCs recorded here come from the separately cited Unit 42 Spring Ring report (a Teams vishing campaign), are not tied by sources to a specific ransomware group, and a BeaconBeagle lookup returned no C2 match for the sampled IP or domain. Victim counts for the OAuth campaigns differ across sources (Drift >700 organizations per GTIG; Gainsight >200 instances; Klue 195 customer organizations; ShinyHunters claims close to 1,000 overall, unverified).
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Discovery
T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1069.002 Domain Groups
Persistence
Execution
Initial Access
T1078.004 Cloud Accounts; T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service; T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice
Credential Access
T1187 Forced Authentication; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
Collection
T1213 Data from Information Repositories
Command and Control
lateral-movement
T1550.001 Application Access Token
Defense Evasion
Impact
defense-impairment
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Inventory all OAuth-connected apps and vendors holding standing tokens into SaaS tools (Salesforce in particular), including abandoned pilot or proof-of-concept integrations
- Revoke and reissue tokens for integrations active during known incident windows (Salesloft Drift, Gainsight, Klue) and review Salesforce export/bulk-query logs
- Restrict inbound Microsoft Teams messages and calls from unmanaged external tenants; move to an allowlist of trusted external domains
- Verify caller identity out-of-band for every help desk password-reset or MFA-reset request
Workarounds
- Remove or disable Quick Assist and unneeded remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools where not required
- Train staff to recognize urgency and pressure from callers claiming to be IT or support
Longer-term hardening
- Enable Salesforce event monitoring and CASB/Defender for Cloud Apps tooling that attributes API activity to specific connected apps rather than only user sessions
- Scope connected-app permissions to least privilege, separate read and write access, and shorten token lifetimes for apps that do not need persistent access
- Build detection for anomalous session and token use (session token theft bypasses login and MFA) rather than relying only on sign-in monitoring
- Do not rely solely on dark web monitoring for early breach detection, since access sales are moving to private channels such as Tox
Affected and fixed versions
- Salesforce — Salesforce CRM with connected third-party OAuth apps (Salesloft Drift, Gainsight, Klue Battlecards)
Vulnerable versions: Instances with OAuth-connected integrations holding standing tokens - Microsoft — Microsoft Teams (external tenant communication) and Quick Assist
Vulnerable versions: Tenants permitting inbound external chats/calls from unmanaged accounts
Timeline
- XSS cybercrime forum seized (July 2025), removing a major public initial-access marketplace (exact day not stated in source).
- UNC6395 begins using stolen Salesloft Drift OAuth and refresh tokens to query and export Salesforce data (activity ran Aug 8-18, 2025).
- Salesloft and Salesforce revoke all active Drift tokens; Salesforce removes Drift from AppExchange.
- Salesforce detects unusual API activity from Gainsight-published apps and disables them (reported Nov 2025), echoing the Salesloft Drift compromise.
- RAMP forum seized (January 2026); Spring Ring Teams vishing activity also observed Jan-Apr 2026 per Unit 42 (exact day not stated).
- Europol takedown of LeakBase forum reported (down March 2026).
- Microsoft DART publishes a Teams vishing case where a third targeted user granted Quick Assist access, leading to a spoofed credential form, DLL sideloading and C2.
- Attackers use a long-dormant Klue API credential from an abandoned integration prototype, push a malicious code update to harvest customer OAuth tokens and query customer CRM data; Klue detects the intrusion June 12.
- Huntress staff receive extortion emails from the 'Icarus' group demanding contact within 48 hours; Salesforce disables the Klue Battlecards connection on June 17.
- ZeroFox records 852 ransomware/extortion incidents in October 2026 after a record Q3 (at least 2,381 incidents); the 2026 total already exceeds all of 2025.
- Help Net Security publishes ZeroFox analysis showing public IAB listings down from about 620 to about 370 per quarter as brokers move deals to private channels such as Tox.
Sources cited
- ShinyHunters' OAuth Pivot: A Year of SaaS Supply-Chain Breaches (CSA research note) labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org · Research · 2026-07-16
- Spring Ring: voice phishing campaigns via Microsoft Teams (Unit 42) Unit 42 · Research · 2026-08-31
- Help on the line: how a Microsoft Teams support call led to compromise (Microsoft) Microsoft · Vendor report · 2026-03-16
- The role of initial access brokers in ransomware operations (ZeroFox) zerofox.com · Research
- Ransomware access brokers are moving their deals off public forums Help Net Security · News · 2026-11-19
- Klue breach: Salesforce data theft and extortion of Huntress (Help Net Security) Help Net Security · News · 2026-06-19
- Salesforce investigates new incident echoing Salesloft Drift compromise (Help Net Security) Help Net Security · News · 2025-11-20
- Europol LeakBase forum takedown (Help Net Security) Help Net Security · News · 2026-03-05
- ShinyHunters 'does not like Salesforce at all,' claims the crew accessed Gainsight 3 months ago (The Register) The Register · News · 2025-11-21
Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —. Reviewed .