Threat reportAPTTL-2026-6487
Turla Cereal Exchange Toolset (CerealLoader, CerealNeuron, CerealBox): 12 Related Loader Files and Hunting Guidance
ESET disclosed on 2026-11-10 that the Russia-aligned Turla group used Cereal, a modular .NET espionage toolset, on Microsoft Exchange servers at two government organizations (Kazakhstan and Romania). ReversingLabs correlated 12 related CerealLoader files and published hunting guidance; it does not establish additional victims or a new initial-access method. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6487 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Cereal, CerealLoader, BlankPage, CerealMood |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Exchange Server (on-premises; EdgeTransport.exe transport service, OWA/Autodiscover/ActiveSync endpoints) |
| Attribution | Turla (high confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Russia |
| Malware | CerealBox, CerealLoader, CerealNeuron, LightNeuron - S0395, Neuron |
| Tools | Turla |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003.004 LSA Secrets, T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1049 System Network Connections Discovery, T1055 Process Injection, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1074.001 Local Data Staging, T1087.002 Domain Account, T1114 Email Collection, T1119 Automated Collection and 6 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government administration, diplomatic, defense |
| Target regions | kazakhstan, romania, 143 - Central Asia, Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 10 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6487 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 32 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Turla CerealLoader - Unsigned ncobjapi.dll / wbemcomn.dll Loaded from System32\wbem (WMI DLL Hijack)
Detects the CerealLoader DLL-hijack technique used by Turla's Cereal toolset (TL-2026-6487): a malicious managed proxy DLL named ncobjapi.dll or wbemcomn.dll placed in C:\Windows\System32\wbem and loaded by the WMI service / WmiPrvSE.exe. Genuine copies are Microsoft-signed, so an image load of either name from that folder that is unsigned or has an invalid signature is high-fidelity evidence of CerealLoader on an Exchange server (T1574.001, T1036.005).
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1574.001, T1036.005
- Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_endpoint, windows_image_load
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7 earliest=-24h
(ImageLoaded="C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\ncobjapi.dll" OR ImageLoaded="C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\wbemcomn.dll")
```TL-2026-6487 CerealLoader wbem hijack - genuine copies are Microsoft signed```
| eval signed_state=lower(coalesce(Signed,"unknown")), sig_status=lower(coalesce(SignatureStatus,"unknown"))
| where signed_state!="true" OR sig_status!="valid"
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Hashes) as hashes values(Company) as company values(sig_status) as signature_status by host Image ImageLoaded
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
// TL-2026-6487 CerealLoader: ncobjapi.dll / wbemcomn.dll written into System32\wbem by a non-servicing process
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
| where tolower(FolderPath) startswith @"c:\windows\system32\wbem\"
| where tolower(FileName) in ("ncobjapi.dll", "wbemcomn.dll")
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) !in ("trustedinstaller.exe", "tiworker.exe", "msiexec.exe", "wusa.exe", "dism.exe", "dismhost.exe", "poqexec.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Turla CerealLoader Unsigned DLL Loaded From System32 WBEM Folder
id: 3f6c1a52-8b4e-4d27-9a31-c5e0b7d2f401
status: experimental
description: Detects an unsigned or invalidly signed ncobjapi.dll or wbemcomn.dll loaded from C:\Windows\System32\wbem, the WMI service DLL hijack used by Turla CerealLoader (Cereal toolset) on Exchange servers.
references:
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/exchange-for-breakfast-turlas-cereal-tricks-are-not-for-kids/
- https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/inside-turlas-cereal-12-exchange-loaders-older-traces-and-new-ways-to-hunt
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-19
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1574.001
- attack.t1036.005
- attack.g0010
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\'
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\ncobjapi.dll'
- '\wbemcomn.dll'
filter_signed:
Signed: 'true'
SignatureStatus: 'Valid'
condition: selection and not filter_signed
falsepositives:
- Servicing or hotfix activity replacing WMI components while Sysmon signature lookups are incomplete
- Third-party WMI providers that legitimately ship a re-signed copy
level: high
Known false positives:
- Windows servicing (TrustedInstaller / TiWorker) replacing WMI repository DLLs
- Third-party WMI providers shipping their own wbem component DLLs
Tuning notes: Sysmon must log EventCode 7 (ImageLoad) for the wbem folder. Baseline signed hashes of ncobjapi.dll and wbemcomn.dll per OS build and allow-list them; add the SHA256 values from the research IOC list as a direct-match leg. Scope to Exchange servers first, then widen.
- Turla CerealLoader - Proxy DLL Side-Loading (version/WTSAPI32/SensApi/dbghelp) and Known SHA256 Hits on Exchange Hosts · unlock with TL Creds
- Turla CerealBox - EdgeTransport.exe Staging Files Outside Exchange Directories · unlock with TL Creds
- Turla CerealNeuron - Listener Paths Seen at Reverse Proxy / WAF / Load Balancer · unlock with TL Creds
- Turla Cereal - .NET Native Image Cache Tampering (Microsoft.Exchange.*.ni.dll Written by Non-NGEN Process) · unlock with TL Creds
- Turla Cereal - LSA Secrets Registry Access by Exchange or WMI Host Process · unlock with TL Creds
- Turla Cereal - Loopback / Self-Originated EWS Requests on Exchange (Mailbox Retrieval Task) · unlock with TL Creds
- Turla CerealIron / CerealBox - Injection and Unexpected Modules in EdgeTransport.exe · unlock with TL Creds
- Turla CerealNeuron - Passive Backdoor Listener Paths in Exchange IIS Logs · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 32 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6487.
Sample indicators (3 of 32)
- File hash:
13fe1eb9b182b076a815f84d34b66365809d0cff32df6f5b85aa7ef4deee98e0 - File hash:
12e2060236a9b2a2933dfdb92b571949f7595fbe884642de83fea2817f17b94f - File hash:
41164eb06adc72b187edaf90d73ca73be729d4ebfdecf57d7398561136941651
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 32 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Cereal is a modular espionage toolset that ESET attributes to Turla (aka Snake, Secret Blizzard, Waterbug) with high confidence, based on concurrent use of another component publicly linked to Turla and conceptual similarities to older Turla malware. ESET first detected it on a Kazakhstan government Exchange server on 2025-11-28, then found a Romanian government organization compromised on 2025-12-23 after improving detection. In Romania, the collection module was configured to target mail to or from NATO and EU institutional addresses. No CVE is associated and the initial-access vector is not established in the sources.
The toolset uses the compromised Exchange server itself as the control point. ESET observed no external C2 infrastructure and could not identify operator ingress IPs. CerealLoader is the only component written to disk as a recognizable unencrypted .NET file; it decrypts and runs other assemblies. CerealRunner carries encrypted .NET programs and arguments and executes them in memory, and CerealSprinter loads other components. CerealNeuron is a passive backdoor with no built-in commands that listens for encrypted HTTPS requests on paths resembling OWA, Autodiscover and ActiveSync (/owa/sdds/, /AUTODISCOVER/PROXYSERVICE/, /AUTODISCOVER/MICROSOFT.EXCHANGE.PROXYSERVICE/, /AUTODISCOVER/INTEGRATED/API/, /MICROSOFT-SERVER-ACTIVESYNC/INTEGRATED/API/). Requests must be correctly encrypted and pass integrity checks; malformed requests get a legitimate-looking Exchange error page. CerealHermit is a CerealNeuron variant with network functions removed that reads encrypted command files from disk. CerealIron injects .NET assemblies into non-.NET processes, and CerealMoth runs a named method from a loaded assembly. Each operator task is a separate small compiled .NET program: observed tasks include retrieving mailboxes via Exchange Web Services, Active Directory queries (computers, users, groups, DNS), WMI queries (processes, TCP connections), LSA Secrets extraction, listing volume snapshots, and listing/reading/deleting files.
CerealBox is the most distinctive component. It is delivered through a nested chain of Cereal components ending with CerealIron injecting it into EdgeTransport.exe. It locates already-registered transport agents in memory and wraps their handlers (its logic runs, then control returns to the original code), so no new agent appears in Exchange configuration and mail delivery is unaffected. It selects messages with .doc, .docx or .pdf attachments that match hardcoded sender, recipient, subject or attachment-name lists and not the ignore lists; matches are compressed, encrypted and staged on disk for later exfiltration.
Loading and evasion tradecraft includes proxy-DLL side-loading (loaders impersonate version.dll, WTSAPI32.dll, SensApi.dll and dbghelp.dll with every export forwarding to the genuine System32 DLL), DLL hijacking in C:\Windows\System32\wbem (ncobjapi.dll and wbemcomn.dll loaded by the WMI service), abuse of the .NET native image cache with names such as Microsoft.Exchange.Search.Mdb.ni.dll (the malicious file loads first, then falls back to the real library), and Vtable Fixups to run native code before normal .NET execution. Some samples activate only when the parent process is Exchange's search service, and loaders stay quiet in generic sandboxes while awaiting their Exchange/Windows host context; observed evasion includes extended sleeps, unusual process creation and direct/indirect system calls. Near-identical single-task binaries suggest an automated compilation and packaging framework. ReversingLabs also notes older related Turla tooling: NetInjector/NetBootstrapper (Unit 42 IronNetInjector, 2021), LightNeuron (ESET 2019, also abused Exchange transport agents) and Neuron/Nautilus (NCSC 2017).
ReversingLabs contributed file correlation: 12 related CerealLoader files, byte-different copies (two appended .dnmd sections of 23,552 bytes each), MVIDs, a shared import hash, additional NetInjector copies, YARA hypotheses and hunting guidance. Its historical corpus dates (earliest ESET-listed loader compiled 2022-04-27, first uploaded to VirusTotal from Kazakhstan 2022-05-11) are first-seen dates, not proof of deployment or new victims. Severity is an analyst judgment based on nation-state attribution and government targeting; no CVSS applies.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
Defense Evasion
T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1055 Process Injection; T1070.004 File Deletion; T1480 Execution Guardrails; T1497.003 Time Based Checks; T1574.001 DLL; T1620 Reflective Code Loading
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
Discovery
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery; T1087.002 Domain Account
Command and Control
Collection
T1074.001 Local Data Staging; T1114 Email Collection; T1119 Automated Collection; T1560 Archive Collected Data
Persistence
stealth
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Run 'netsh http show servicestate' on Exchange servers to enumerate live HTTP.sys listeners and look for unexpected listeners
- Search reverse-proxy, load-balancer and WAF logs (not only IIS logs) for requests to /owa/sdds/, /AUTODISCOVER/PROXYSERVICE/, /AUTODISCOVER/MICROSOFT.EXCHANGE.PROXYSERVICE/, /AUTODISCOVER/INTEGRATED/API/ and /MICROSOFT-SERVER-ACTIVESYNC/INTEGRATED/API/ (normalize case)
- Hunt for the published SHA-256 hashes, MVIDs and import hash on Exchange servers
- Inspect C:\Windows\System32\wbem for ncobjapi.dll and wbemcomn.dll, and Exchange/Windows service directories for unexpected managed DLLs named version.dll, WTSAPI32.dll, SensApi.dll or dbghelp.dll
- Review module loads in EdgeTransport.exe and WmiPrvSE.exe for unexpected paths and signed/unsigned inconsistencies
Workarounds
- No vendor patch applies: no CVE or initial-access vulnerability is identified in the sources. Rebuild or restore compromised Exchange servers from known-good media and rotate credentials exposed on them (LSA Secrets extraction observed)
Longer-term hardening
- Compare .NET native image cache contents (Microsoft.Exchange.Search.Mdb.ni.dll, EdgeTransport.ni.exe, Microsoft.Ceres, Microsoft.Search.Platform entries) against a known-good host of the same Exchange build
- Do not rely on checking for new transport agents alone: CerealBox wraps handlers of existing agents
- Baseline YARA hypotheses against legitimate Exchange mixed-mode and native-image-cache files before enabling production alerts
- Restrict and monitor outbound/inbound access to Exchange servers and monitor for EWS, Active Directory, LSA Secrets and WMI activity originating from Exchange hosts
- Hunt under all vendor aliases (CerealLoader, BlankPage, CerealMood, MSIL/Agent.YCA, MSIL/Agent.YCC) and pivot on MVID/import-hash/similarity
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Exchange Server (on-premises; EdgeTransport.exe transport service, OWA/Autodiscover/ActiveSync endpoints)
Vulnerable versions: Specific versions not stated in sources; compromised government on-premises Exchange servers
Timeline
- Compile date of the earliest ESET-listed CerealLoader, per ESET.
- Same file uploaded to VirusTotal from Kazakhstan and first reached the ReversingLabs corpus (first-seen only, not proof of deployment).
- ReversingLabs first saw locked-ioc-24 candidate 2751ae95, ten days before ESET's first documented detection.
- ESET detects Cereal on a government Exchange server in Kazakhstan.
- Romanian government organization compromised, identified later after ESET improved detection; collection targeted NATO and EU institutional addresses.
- Activity surge on the Kazakhstan server the day after the Old New Year holiday, per ESET.
- ReversingLabs first saw Microsoft.Ceres.dll (SensApi proxy build).
- ESET publicly discloses the Cereal toolset and attributes it to Turla with high confidence.
- Date on ReversingLabs' YARA hunting rules.
- ReversingLabs re-verifies SHA-256 resolutions for the ESET-listed and related loaders.
- ReversingLabs publishes correlation of 12 related CerealLoader files and new hunting guidance.
Sources cited
- Exchange for breakfast: Turla's Cereal tricks are not for kids (ESET Research) ESET WeLiveSecurity · Research · 2026-11-10
- ESET Research: Russia-aligned Turla group uses novel Exchange tool to spy on EU, NATO emails eset.com · Vendor report · 2026-11-10
- Turla LightNeuron: An email too far (ESET) ESET WeLiveSecurity · Research · 2019-05-07
- MITRE ATT&CK: Turla (G0010) MITRE · Research
- ESET malware-ioc repository (turla) GitHub · Code repository
- Inside Turla's Cereal: 12 Exchange loaders, older traces and new ways to hunt (ReversingLabs) reversinglabs.com · Blog · 2026-11-19
- Turla hackers use new Cereal malware to spy on govt Exchange servers (BleepingComputer) BleepingComputer · News
- Russia-Linked APT Turla Turned Exchange Servers Into Their Own Control Room (Security Affairs) securityaffairs.com · News
- Turla's Cereal malware turns victims' Exchange servers into spy hubs (Help Net Security) Help Net Security · News
- Russia-Linked Turla Hijacks Exchange Servers to Spy on NATO and EU Emails (Infosecurity Magazine) infosecurity-magazine.com · News
More from Turla
- Turla (Secret Blizzard) Cereal modular .NET toolset targets government Microsoft Exchange servers
- ASEC June 2026 APT Trend Report: Nation-State Actors Pivot to Cloud/OAuth Abuse, MaaS, and Supply-Chain Compromise
- Turla (Snake/Uroburos) Exploits SharePoint Flaw to Breach French Justice-Sector Server
- Amadey: Commodity Loader/Botnet Evolved into RAT — Dominant LockBit 3.0 Loader, Adopted by FSB's Secret Blizzard Against Ukrainian Military
- Turla STOCKSTAY .NET Backdoor Targeting Ukraine Government and Military via CVE-2025-8088
- Kazuar P2P Botnet Evolution — Secret Blizzard (Russia FSB Center 16) Modular Espionage Implant with Kernel/Bridge/Worker Architecture
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.