Threat reportAPTTL-2026-6522
North Korean Remote IT Worker Fake Construction Front Company "The Great House" (thegreathouse.us) Uses Deepfake Video Calls and Telegram Outreach
Silent Push assesses with confidence that thegreathouse.us, a fake Lynchburg, VA construction and engineering company, is operated by a North Korean remote IT worker seeking US construction and engineering contracts to generate revenue for the DPRK regime. The operator used a real-time deepfake on a video call and Telegram contact; no malware delivery was reported.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6522 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | The Great House, The Great House Construction, thegreathouse19 |
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| Affected products | Not applicable US construction and engineering firms and project owners (business-process targeting) |
| Attribution | DPRK Remote IT Worker (high confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | North Korea |
| Malware | BeaverTail - S1246, telegram |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1036 Masquerading, T1583.001 Domains, T1585.001 Social Media Accounts, T1585.002 Email Accounts, T1657 Financial Theft, T1684.001 Impersonation |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | construction, engineering, real-estate, professional-services |
| Target regions | North America |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6522 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 16 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: DPRK IT Worker Front 'The Great House' (thegreathouse.us) - Web Proxy Contact (Domain, Telegram, LinkedIn)
Detects web/proxy traffic to thegreathouse.us, the Telegram account t.me/thegreathouse19 and the associated LinkedIn company page (linkedin.com/company/the-great-house). Silent Push (2026-11-19) attributes the site to a North Korean remote IT worker running a fake Lynchburg, VA construction company (domain created 2025-10-18) that solicits contracts using Telegram outreach and real-time deepfake video calls. No malware is reported; a hit means a user or vendor-management host engaged with the front and should trigger vendor due-diligence review (TL-2026-6522).
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1583.001, T1585.001, T1566.003
- Data sources: proxy:pan:threat, proxy:zscaler:nss:web, proxy:bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog
- Severity: medium
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=proxy sourcetype IN ("pan:threat","zscaler:nss:web","bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog") earliest=-24h (url="*thegreathouse.us*" OR dest_host="*thegreathouse.us" OR url="*t.me/thegreathouse19*" OR url="*linkedin.com/company/the-great-house*") | eval ioc_match=case(like(url,"%t.me/thegreathouse19%"),"telegram_thegreathouse19", like(url,"%linkedin.com/company/the-great-house%"),"linkedin_the_great_house", true(),"thegreathouse.us") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(url) as urls values(http_user_agent) as user_agents by user src ioc_match | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has "thegreathouse.us" or RemoteUrl has "t.me/thegreathouse19" or RemoteUrl has "linkedin.com/company/the-great-house"
| project TimeGenerated=Timestamp, Source="DeviceNetworkEvents", Host=DeviceName, User=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Indicator=RemoteUrl, Process=InitiatingProcessFileName),
(CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has "thegreathouse.us" or RequestURL has "t.me/thegreathouse19" or RequestURL has "linkedin.com/company/the-great-house"
| project TimeGenerated, Source="CommonSecurityLog", Host=DeviceVendor, User=SourceUserName, Indicator=RequestURL, Process=RequestClientApplication)
| summarize Hits=count(), First=min(TimeGenerated), Last=max(TimeGenerated) by Host, User, Indicator, SourceSigma
title: Web Access to DPRK IT Worker Front Company The Great House
id: 6f1c2a9e-3b7d-4e58-9a41-0d52c8b7e1a1
status: experimental
description: Detects proxy traffic to thegreathouse.us, the Telegram account thegreathouse19 and the associated LinkedIn company page, indicators of a fake construction company attributed to a North Korean remote IT worker.
references:
- https://www.silentpush.com/blog/nk-construction/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/20
tags:
- attack.resource-development
- attack.t1583.001
- attack.t1585.001
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.003
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection_domain:
cs-host|endswith: 'thegreathouse.us'
selection_url:
c-uri|contains:
- 't.me/thegreathouse19'
- 'linkedin.com/company/the-great-house'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Security researchers or threat-intel analysts investigating the front company
- Procurement staff legitimately vetting the vendor
level: mediumKnown false positives:
- Security researchers or threat-intel analysts visiting the site for investigation
- Procurement or vendor-management staff performing due diligence on the company
Tuning notes: Adjust index/sourcetype to your proxy platform and confirm the url, dest_host, user and src field names. Telegram and LinkedIn URL paths are only visible with TLS inspection; without it, rely on the domain match and DNS detection. Exclude the SOC/TI analyst subnet. Any hit from procurement, estimating or project-management users should open a vendor-risk ticket and be reported to FBI IC3.
- DNS Resolution of DPRK IT Worker Front Domain [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- DPRK IT Worker Front - Contract/Payment Language in Email with [indicator] or [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- Community-Observed DPRK-Tagged Domains and Contagious Interview Context Domains - DNS Lookups · unlock with TL Creds
- Endpoint Network Connection to DPRK IT Worker Front Domain [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- Telegram Deep Link or Process Command Line Referencing thegreathouse19 Front Account · unlock with TL Creds
- Community-Reported DPRK-Tagged File Hash Execution (Related Context) · unlock with TL Creds
- DPRK IT Worker Front - Email Correspondence with [indicator] / [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- Community-Observed DPRK-Tagged Sibling Infrastructure and Contagious Interview Context Domains - Network Connections · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 16 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6522.
Sample indicators (3 of 16)
- IP address:
37.211.126[.]117 - Domain:
thegreathouse[.]us - URL:
hxxps://t[.]me/thegreathouse19
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 16 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
On 2026-11-19 Silent Push published research exposing "The Great House" (thegreathouse.us), a website presenting as a construction and engineering company in Lynchburg, Virginia. The site advertises Design & Build, Project Management, Construction, Remodeling, Renovation, Preconstruction and Interior Design, and claims "10+ years in business, 200+ clients, 60k+ sqft built". The domain was created on 2025-10-18, which contradicts the claimed decade of operation.
Attribution rests on the registrant email devtop0109@gmail.com. Silent Push reports that this address registered thegreathouse.us and no other domain, and that it appears on a publicly reported list of roughly 1,400 addresses compiled by third-party researchers and attributed to DPRK IT workers. Silent Push states it can "confidently assess" the site is operated by a North Korean remote worker. The page notes that the tradecraft matches Contagious Interview (also tracked as a Lazarus subgroup, Famous Chollima and WageMole) front companies, but it does not attribute this site to Contagious Interview by name. It describes this operation as having moved into a new industry.
Operational tradecraft: unlike earlier Contagious Interview fronts, which lured job-seekers into running malicious code, this front targets prospective clients and pursues construction and engineering contracts directly. Silent Push made first contact through the Telegram account thegreathouse19, which is published on the website. On the first call (about 25 minutes) the operator kept the camera off and resisted identity verification. On the second call the operator used real-time deepfake software that showed layering artifacts and facial distortion, kept the mouth out of frame, could not keep lip movement in sync with the voice, declined a request to hold a hand in front of the face, and then ended the video feed. The operator introduced himself as "Edward", while the site lists the company email james@thegreathouse.us. Contact details conflict: the site shows (434) 261-0111 (Lynchburg area code), the tel: link markup contains +1 479-410-0717 (Arkansas), and the domain registration lists +1 351-345-0257 (Massachusetts) with a New York registrant address. A LinkedIn company page (linkedin.com/company/the-great-house) is associated with the front.
No malware is stated to be delivered in this operation, and no IP addresses, hosting, registrar, certificate or CVE data are published for it, so the indicators are domain, email, phone, social and persona artifacts. Contextual infrastructure from the earlier April 2025 Silent Push Contagious Interview report (BlockNovas, Angeloper Agency, SoftGlide and related hosts) is recorded below and labelled as related context only; it is not stated to be operationally linked to The Great House. Silent Push also cites a separate DPRK recruiting scheme in which US, EU and Latin American citizens are offered 35% of a salary to act as the face and legal identity, with 65% returned to the DPRK worker via cryptocurrency, wire transfers or third-party payment processors. Defender guidance from the source: test video calls for deepfakes (hand in front of face, head turn, lean back), reconcile website contact details against registration data, compare claimed history to domain age, verify contractor licenses through the state licensing board directly, treat Telegram-only contact and pushback on verification as red flags, and report suspected activity to the FBI via IC3.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1036 Masquerading; T1684.001 Impersonation
Resource Development
T1583.001 Domains; T1585.001 Social Media Accounts; T1585.002 Email Accounts
Impact
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block and alert on thegreathouse.us and the associated Telegram, LinkedIn and email indicators
- Do not sign contracts, pay deposits or share project data with The Great House; report any contact to the FBI via IC3
- Verify contractor licensing directly through the state licensing board, not through links supplied by the counterparty
Workarounds
- Treat refusal of camera-on verification or identity checks as a red flag and pause the engagement
Longer-term hardening
- Add deepfake challenge steps to remote interview and vendor-onboarding calls (hand in front of face, head turn, lean back)
- Cross-check vendor website contact details (phone area codes, addresses) against domain registration data and domain age
- Screen registrant and contact emails against published DPRK IT worker email lists during vendor and hiring due diligence
- Require identity verification before engaging vendors who push to move to Telegram-only communication
Affected and fixed versions
- Not applicable — US construction and engineering firms and project owners (business-process targeting)
Timeline
- Related Contagious Interview infrastructure: locked-ioc-6 resolves to locked-ioc-8 (AS44477 Stark Industries), per Silent Push April 2025 report (context only)
- Silent Push publishes the Contagious Interview April '25 update exposing front companies BlockNovas LLC, Angeloper Agency and SoftGlide LLC; Reuters covers it the same day
- FBI IC3 publishes PSA250723-4 on North Korean IT worker revenue generation and facilitators
- The Raven File publishes analysis of DPRK IT worker email address patterns; the third-party list of about 1,400 addresses later includes locked-ioc-4
- locked-ioc-5 is created using registrant email locked-ioc-4, contradicting the site's claim of 10+ years in business
- Silent Push publishes 'Silent Push Exposes North Korean Fake Construction Company', documenting the Telegram contact, deepfake video calls and attribution to a DPRK remote worker
Sources cited
- FBI IC3 PSA250723-4: North Korean IT worker threat ic3.gov · Advisory · 2025-07-23
- Proactively Defending Financial Institutions Against North Korean Remote IT Workers (Silent Push) silentpush.com · Research
- Unmasking DPRK IT Workers: Email Address Patterns as Hiring Red Flags (The Raven File) theravenfile.com · Research · 2025-08-19
- How AI services power the DPRK's IT contracting scams (Okta Threat Intelligence) sec.okta.com · Vendor report · 2025-04-01
- North Korean synthetic identity creation (Unit 42) Unit 42 · Vendor report
- Silent Push Exposes North Korean Fake Construction Company silentpush.com · Blog · 2026-11-19
- Contagious Interview (DPRK) Launches a New Campaign Creating Three Front Companies (Silent Push, April '25 Update) silentpush.com · Blog · 2025-04-24
- North Korean cyber spies created US firms to dupe crypto developers (Reuters) reuters.com · News · 2025-04-24
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.