Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6548
Trigram Campaign Impersonates ~50 AI and Blockchain Brands to Deliver Infostealers to Developers (Overlord RAT, install_guard.js; UNK_DeadDrop continuation)
Trigram is an industrialized campaign targeting AI, blockchain and logistics developers in Europe and the US with ClickFix-style lures (fake recruitment, conference and package-tracking sites impersonating ~50 brands), a forged-commit compromise of the antd-img-crop GitHub repository, and trojanized repositories, all delivering the install_guard.js infostealer and the Overlord RAT. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6548 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Trigram, DeepfakeGuard, UNK_DeadDrop continuation, OverLord stealer campaign |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | nanxiaobei (open source) antd-img-crop (GitHub repository); Microsoft / Anysphere VS Code and Cursor developer workstations (malicious extension / tasks.json abuse); Multiple Windows, macOS and Linux developer endpoints running Node.js-based loaders |
| Attribution | UNK_DeadDrop (low confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | North Korea |
| Tools | google-dev-tools.google-update-support |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1056.002 GUI Input Capture, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver, T1176.002 IDE Extensions, T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste, T1219 Remote Access Tools and 9 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | technology, blockchain web3, artificial intelligence, logistics, financial services, education |
| Target regions | Europe, North America |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 11 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6548 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 29 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Trigram ClickFix Stage-2 Loader Fetch (verify_m / verify_w / icagllmbt.space) — Exploitation
Detects the pasted ClickFix terminal command used by the Trigram (UNK_DeadDrop continuation) campaign: curl -ks retrieval of the stage-2 loader (verify_m on Linux/macOS, verify_w/v.cmd on Windows) from icagllmbt.space, plus follow-on references to install_guard.js, the deepfake_guard work directory, or the api.gaganata.ink / api.fallgganata.ink stage-3 stores. Catches the user-execution moment before the Node.js infostealer and OverLord agent are installed.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1204.004, T1059.004, T1059.001, T1105
- Data sources: sysmon, linux_auditd, defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
(index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 (CommandLine="*icagllmbt.space*" OR CommandLine="*/verify_w*" OR CommandLine="*/verify_m*" OR CommandLine="*install_guard.js*" OR CommandLine="*deepfake_guard*" OR CommandLine="*api.gaganata.ink*" OR CommandLine="*api.fallgganata.ink*")) OR (index=linux sourcetype="linux:audit" type=EXECVE ("icagllmbt.space" OR "verify_m" OR "install_guard.js" OR "deepfake_guard")) | eval cmd=coalesce(CommandLine,_raw), img=coalesce(Image,a0), actor=coalesce(User,auid) ```Trigram ClickFix: curl -ks to verify_m/verify_w on icagllmbt.space then install_guard.js``` | eval stage=case(like(cmd,"%icagllmbt.space%"),"stage2_host_icagllmbt", like(cmd,"%install_guard.js%"),"stage3_install_guard_js", like(cmd,"%deepfake_guard%"),"deepfake_guard_workdir", true(),"stage2_loader_verify_path") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(stage) as stage values(ParentImage) as parent_image values(cmd) as command_line by host actor img | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen) | table first_seen last_seen host actor img parent_image stage command_line countMicrosoft KQL
// Trigram ClickFix stage-2 loader fetch (curl -ks / PowerShell) - TL-2026-6548
let c2_hosts = dynamic(["icagllmbt.space","api.gaganata.ink","api.fallgganata.ink","api.chestsoi.ink","api.cerysoi.ink","api.gamsterb.ink","asteara.org"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (c2_hosts)
or (ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/verify_w","/verify_m") and FileName in~ ("curl","curl.exe","wget","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","bash","sh","zsh"))
or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("install_guard.js","deepfake_guard","nvdg_worker.vbs")
| extend CurlInsecureSilent = ProcessCommandLine has_any ("curl -ks","curl -sk")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, CurlInsecureSilent, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Trigram ClickFix Stage-2 Loader Fetch via curl or wget
id: 3a7d9c10-5e42-4f8b-b1a6-2d94c7e08f11
status: experimental
description: Detects curl/wget retrieving the Trigram verify_m/verify_w stage-2 loader, the icagllmbt.space host or install_guard.js, as pasted by victims during the ClickFix referral-code lure.
references:
- https://www.stormshield.com/news/cti-trigram-campaign/
- https://safedep.io/blog/antd-img-crop-forged-commit-overlord-stealer
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.004
- attack.t1059.004
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
- attack.tool.overlord
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: linux
detection:
selection_loader:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'icagllmbt.space'
- 'install_guard.js'
- 'deepfake_guard_run.sh'
- 'deepfake_guard_work'
selection_curl:
Image|endswith:
- '/curl'
- '/wget'
CommandLine|contains:
- '/verify_m'
- '/verify_w'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Security researchers or sandboxes deliberately fetching the Trigram loader
- Internal tooling that happens to use a /verify_m or /verify_w path
level: high
Known false positives:
- Security researchers or sandboxes deliberately detonating the Trigram loader
- Internal tooling that uses a /verify_m or /verify_w URL path on a different host
Tuning notes: Highest fidelity is the icagllmbt.space and install_guard.js strings; the bare /verify_m and /verify_w paths are generic, so require them alongside curl/wget or add the C2 hosts when reducing noise. Refresh the host list from the threat IOC set as the operators rotate domains. Ensure Linux auditd EXECVE logging is enabled for the linux branch.
- Trigram [indicator] Prebuild Hook Dropper Fetching Stage-2 Loader — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Trigram Fake Password Dialog and Keychain / Secret File Harvesting on macOS and Linux — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Trigram Node.js GitLab Dead-Drop Resolver Followed by .ink C2 Connection — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- Trigram Sideloaded IDE Extension google-dev-tools.google-update-support and Portable Node — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Trigram OverLord LaunchDaemon and systemd Persistence Disguised as Google Update Supporter — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Trigram and UNK_DeadDrop Infrastructure IP Connections (rms-platform, lure hosting, C2 5173) — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- Trigram OverLord Windows Persistence and Staging Artifacts (GoogleUpdateSupporterNode) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Trigram C2 and Relay Domain Resolution (gaganata.ink, chestsoi.ink, cerysoi.ink, [indicator]) — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 29 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6548.
Sample indicators (3 of 29)
- IP address:
170.205.30[.]27 - Domain:
asteara[.]org - URL:
hxxps://gitlab[.]com/drop-indexings/tasks/-/raw/main/config.json
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 29 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Stormshield assesses with high confidence that it continues Proofpoint's UNK_DeadDrop cluster; North Korea-aligned similarities (Contagious Interview, Kimsuky) are noted but attribution is not proven.
Stormshield's CTI team (published 2026-11-17) describes Trigram as a three-layer operation: (1) decoy sites impersonating about 50 Web3/AI brands (recruitment lures on domains such as join*, buildwith*, inv2*, *hires, *careers, *talents, *council), a fake ICAGLLMBT conference site, and DHL/DPD/Aramex package-tracking pages; (2) C2/relay infrastructure that serves install_guard.js and receives installation telemetry; and (3) an operator back office called rms-platform (Django, exposed in debug mode on 170.205.30.27:8000) that scrapes GitHub profiles to build target lists, sends phishing mail through Resend, Brevo, Mailgun and Smartlead, issues referral codes and waybill codes bound to the victim IP, records visitor sessions with FullStory, scores targets as important/moderate/useless, exports data from an external MongoDB, and includes a wallet monitoring module. Stormshield rates the three lure scenarios as one operator/one platform with high confidence.
Infection chain: the victim passes a referral-code gate, is told to paste a 'human verification' command into a terminal that merely POSTs a nonce to /api/verify, sees a deliberate 'Operation timeout... Nonce Refreshed' error, and from then on the Copy button and Ctrl+C silently place a different command (with trailing newline) on the clipboard. That command curls (curl -ks) a stage-2 loader: v.cmd (Windows, from /verify_w), u or verify_m (Linux/macOS, from /verify_m). The loader decodes an embedded Base64 script, takes a lock, checks for Node.js >= 18 and otherwise downloads portable Node.js 20.18.1, then fetches install_guard.js (must be >= 50 KB) and runs it. The kit presents itself as a 'deepfake_guard' tool and reports each step (copiedCmdline through passwordSaved) to guard-launcher-result, guard-install-log and guard-install-progress endpoints. On Windows the loader tries to remove Mark-of-the-Web (Zone.Identifier).
SafeDep (2026-11-03) showed the same payload chain delivered through the nanxiaobei/antd-img-crop GitHub repository (about 98,000 npm downloads/week; the npm package itself was not affected): on 2026-10-31 at 15:12 UTC an unsigned forged '4.30.0' commit (2aa850469fa1ff2e2efe8eebdf1e085e4d11212a, reusing the real March 12 author/date) was force-pushed, adding a prebuild hook (scripts/prebuild.js) that fetches verify_m/verify_w from icagllmbt.space when a developer runs npm run build. Stage 3, install_guard.js (AES-256-GCM encrypted, loaded in memory), resolves its C2 through a GitLab dead-drop (gitlab.com/drop-indexings/tasks, later up-indexings/tasks, config.json listing the current API domain), steals browser credentials/cookies, macOS Keychain and Linux keyring contents, browser-extension and desktop crypto wallets, .env/.npmrc/.gitconfig/SSH/KeePass files, and installs the OverLord agent (Go module overlord-client; Node variant on Windows) disguised as Google Update Supporter with persistence via LaunchDaemon com.google.UpdateSupporter, systemd google-agent.service, XDG autostart and the scheduled task GoogleUpdateSupporterNode. On macOS and Linux a fake system dialog harvests the user's password; on Windows a short-lived SYSTEM scheduled task is used to decrypt Chromium keys. A sideloaded VS Code/Cursor extension named google-dev-tools.google-update-support is another entry vector (SafeDep's assessment, inferred rather than confirmed).
Attribution: Stormshield assesses with high confidence a continuation of UNK_DeadDrop (Proofpoint, 2026-06-08: trojanized repos with .vscode/tasks.json folderOpen tasks, Overlord-derived google-update-support agents, asteara.org and 170.205.29.83 infrastructure), noting an evolution to multiple initial-access vectors and remote payload fetching. Operator identities in the back-office code and repos (eros1030109@gmail.com as hard-coded super-admin, 0xapp123, silviattech1129, alexlopez-g, harper.danie95@gmail.com) link to a Genians Kimsuky report (2026-08-10) and OctoProbe's GitPower research. Proofpoint rates UNK_DeadDrop 'very likely North Korea-aligned' but unconfirmed, SafeDep explicitly says technique overlap with Contagious Interview does not prove the operators, and Stormshield does not state a firm Kimsuky link, so attribution confidence is LOW. Stormshield promised a follow-up article on Overlord and the wallet-theft details. No CVE is involved and no CVSS applies. Severity HIGH is an analyst judgment.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1070.004 File Deletion
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1176.002 IDE Extensions; T1543.004 Launch Daemon
Credential Access
T1056.002 GUI Input Capture; T1552.001 Credentials In Files; T1555.001 Keychain; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
Execution
T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.004 Unix Shell; T1059.007 JavaScript; T1204.004 Malicious Copy and Paste
Command and Control
T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver; T1219 Remote Access Tools
Initial Access
T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain; T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
defense-impairment
T1553.005 Mark-of-the-Web Bypass
Resource Development
T1583.001 Domains; T1583.006 Web Services
Reconnaissance
Remediation
Patches
- No CVE or vendor patch applies; the antd-img-crop npm package is reported clean, only the GitHub repository head was compromised
Immediate actions
- Block and hunt for the listed domains, IPs, GitLab dead-drop URLs and install_guard.js / verify_m / verify_w retrievals; alert on curl -ks piped from terminals to unfamiliar hosts
- Hunt for artifacts: /var/tmp/deepfake_guard_work, /var/tmp/deepfake_guard_run.sh, %TEMP%\deepfake_guard_work, ~nvdg_worker.vbs, portable node-v20.18.1 in temp directories, LaunchDaemon com.google.UpdateSupporter, google-agent.service, scheduled task GoogleUpdateSupporterNode
- Check developer endpoints for the extension google-dev-tools.google-update-support in VS Code/Cursor/VSCodium and for unexpected .vscode/tasks.json folderOpen tasks
- If a host ran any pasted terminal command from a recruitment/conference/tracking site, treat it as compromised: isolate, rotate browser-stored passwords, session cookies, SSH keys, API tokens, .env secrets and move crypto assets to new wallets from a clean device
Workarounds
- Do not run npm run build from the antd-img-crop GitHub source at commit 2aa8504; use the published npm release
- Apply the Stormshield YARA rule Dropper_DeepfakeGuard_NodeLoader_Generic to launcher scripts
Longer-term hardening
- Train developers that legitimate sites never require pasting a command into a terminal for verification (ClickFix) and to distrust unsolicited recruiter/code-review requests
- Open untrusted repositories only in isolated VMs/containers; keep VS Code Workspace Trust enabled and review .vscode/tasks.json
- Require signed commits and branch protection for dependencies; monitor for head-commit signature loss and force-pushes; pin dependencies to released npm versions rather than building from GitHub
- Restrict egress from build hosts and monitor GitLab/GitHub raw-content fetches used as dead-drop resolvers
Affected and fixed versions
- nanxiaobei (open source) — antd-img-crop (GitHub repository)
Vulnerable versions: Forged commit 2aa850469fa1ff2e2efe8eebdf1e085e4d11212a ('4.30.0', force-pushed 2026-10-31)
Fixed in: npm package not affected; no fixed version stated - Microsoft / Anysphere — VS Code and Cursor developer workstations (malicious extension / tasks.json abuse)
Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific - Multiple — Windows, macOS and Linux developer endpoints running Node.js-based loaders
Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific
Timeline
- Proofpoint publishes UNK_DeadDrop research (tracked since April 2026): trojanized repos with folderOpen tasks, Overlord-derived google-update-support agents, locked-ioc-24 and locked-ioc-20 infrastructure.
- chestsoi.ink registered via NameCheap; gaganata.ink and fallgganata.ink follow on 2026-07-28 (per SafeDep).
- Genians publishes its Kimsuky report; the locked-ioc-10 address later found as Trigram super-admin appears in its indicators.
- DHL/DPD/Aramex package-tracking lure domains resolve to locked-ioc-21 for a short window (2026-10-08 to 2026-10-10).
- locked-ioc-17 (conference lure and stage-2 server) registered via NameCheap.
- Forged unsigned '4.30.0' commit 2aa8504 force-pushed to nanxiaobei/antd-img-crop at 15:12 UTC, adding a prebuild hook that fetches verify_m/verify_w from locked-ioc-17; GitLab relay drop-indexings/tasks in use.
- SafeDep publishes its antd-img-crop/OverLord analysis; GitLab repository up-indexings/tasks created at 03:05 UTC with config.json uploaded by account 0xapp123. OctoProbe publishes GitPower research the same day.
- Stormshield observes payloads querying up-indexings/tasks, linked to locked-ioc-18.
- Stormshield creates YARA rule Dropper_DeepfakeGuard_NodeLoader_Generic for the verify_m/verify_w launchers.
- Stormshield publishes the Trigram CTI report (high-confidence continuation of UNK_DeadDrop; ~50 impersonated brands); The Hacker News covers it the same day.
Sources cited
- FBI IC3 alert on Contagious Interview (cited by Stormshield) ic3.gov · Advisory
- Stormshield CTI: Trigram campaign stormshield.com · Research · 2026-11-17
- SafeDep: antd-img-crop GitHub Repository Hijacked to Deliver OverLord Stealer safedep.io · Research · 2026-11-03
- SafeDep IOC list (CSV): antd-img-crop / OverLord safedep.io · Research · 2026-11-03
- Proofpoint: Don't Fear the Repo - UNK_DeadDrop phishing campaign targets developers Proofpoint · Research · 2026-06-08
- Genians: Kimsuky integrates AI into attack operations (Operation GitPower) genians.co.kr · Research · 2026-08-10
- Genians: Operation GitPower (Ukraine targeting) genians.co.kr · Research
- OctoProbe: Kimsuky Operation GitPower GitHub C2 octoprobe.ai · Research · 2026-11-03
- Contra community: alert on fake designer job offers contra.com · Blog · 2026-06-26
- The Hacker News: Trigram Campaign Impersonates About 50 AI and Blockchain Brands The Hacker News · News · 2026-11-17
- DailySecurityReview: North Korea-Linked Trigram Targets Web3 Developers With ClickFix dailysecurityreview.com · News
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 11 sources; published ; last updated —.