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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6564

'Party' Panel: Malware-as-a-Service Android Banking Trojan Rented to Target Indian Bank Customers

highACTIVE

CloudSEK describes a multi-tenant 'rent-a-trojan' panel whose tenants ('parties') distribute a two-stage Android banking trojan through fake Google Play lure pages hosted on a bare IP. The malware steals card data and SMS OTPs, sets call forwarding, and exfiltrates via Telegram bots and Firebase, targeting customers of six Indian banks and card issuers and users of government services.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6564
Also known asParty Panel, rent-a-trojan panel
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsGoogle Android (sideloaded APK installs; stage 1 abuses a store-style session install to bypass Restricted Settings on Android 13+); Indian banks, card issuers and government-service users Customers of six Indian banks/card issuers plus traffic e-challan, farmer income-support and pensioner life-certificate themes
ToolsSecuriDropper (technique)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1406 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1437.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1481 Web Service, T1533 Data from Local System, T1541 Foreground Persistence, T1582 SMS Control, T1616 Call Control, T1624.001 Event Triggered Execution: Broadcast Receivers, T1629.003 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools, T1633.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks, T1636.004 Protected User Data: SMS Messages, T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel and 2 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinance, banking, government administration, consumers
Target regionsindia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6564 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 16 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Party Panel Android Trojan - Known Package Names, Signing Certificate or APK Hash on Managed Device

Detects installation of the Party stage 1 dropper (com.secure.android.manager), the stage 2 SMS-stealing payload (com.userdb.customer, no launcher icon, boot-receiver and watchdog persistence), any app signed with the shared CN=editor certificate (SHA-1 927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9), or either published SHA-256 hash (TL-2026-6564). Telemetry is an MDM/MTD app-inventory feed ingested into Splunk.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1655.001, T1406, T1624.001, T1541, T1629.003
  • Data sources: mdm: mdm:android:app_inventory (Intune/MTD app inventory export), Microsoft Defender DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory, Microsoft Defender DeviceFileEvents
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=mdm sourcetype="mdm:android:app_inventory" earliest=-24h
| search (package_name IN ("com.secure.android.manager","com.userdb.customer") OR signing_cert_sha1="927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9" OR file_sha256 IN ("66b51246f648a25aca8150d82900e37568dc67712ea4341afb7929638368acd7","5fcd3ff3c0a07651041eb79bd8b04aee37d6848f6b77bbad567b6fa9852215ff"))
| eval stage=case(package_name=="com.secure.android.manager","stage1_dropper", package_name=="com.userdb.customer","stage2_payload", true(),"cert_or_hash_match")
| fillnull value="unknown" device_id user app_label installer_package
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(stage) as stage values(app_label) as app_label values(installer_package) as installer by device_id, user, package_name
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let pkgs = dynamic(["com.secure.android.manager","com.userdb.customer"]);
let hashes = dynamic(["66b51246f648a25aca8150d82900e37568dc67712ea4341afb7929638368acd7","5fcd3ff3c0a07651041eb79bd8b04aee37d6848f6b77bbad567b6fa9852215ff"]);
union isfuzzy=true
( DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory
  | where OSPlatform has "Android"
  | where SoftwareName has_any (pkgs)
  | project TimeGenerated=now(), Source="DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory", DeviceName, Indicator=SoftwareName, Detail=SoftwareVersion ),
( DeviceFileEvents
  | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
  | where SHA256 in~ (hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated=Timestamp, Source="DeviceFileEvents", DeviceName, Indicator=SHA256, Detail=FolderPath ),
( AndroidAppInventory_CL
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
  | where PackageName_s in~ (pkgs) or SigningCertSha1_s =~ "927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9" or FileSha256_s in~ (hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated, Source="AndroidAppInventory_CL", DeviceName=DeviceId_s, Indicator=PackageName_s, Detail=SigningCertSha1_s )
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Sigma

title: Party Panel Android Trojan Package, Certificate or Hash Installed
id: 8d2a4e90-1b73-4c6f-a5d8-2e9f0c3b7a12
status: experimental
description: Detects the Party MaaS stage 1 and stage 2 package names, the shared CN=editor signing certificate SHA-1 and the published APK SHA-256 hashes in Android app-inventory telemetry (TL-2026-6564).
references:
    - https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/inside-party-panel-android-banking-trojan-targeting-indian-banks
    - https://www.threatfabric.com/blogs/droppers-bypassing-android-13-restrictions
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/20
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1624.001
    - attack.t1541
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1655.001
    - attack.t1406
logsource:
    product: android
    category: package_install
detection:
    selection_pkg:
        PackageName:
            - 'com.secure.android.manager'
            - 'com.userdb.customer'
    selection_cert:
        SigningCertSha1: '927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9'
    selection_hash:
        Sha256:
            - '66b51246f648a25aca8150d82900e37568dc67712ea4341afb7929638368acd7'
            - '5fcd3ff3c0a07651041eb79bd8b04aee37d6848f6b77bbad567b6fa9852215ff'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - None expected because the package names, certificate and hashes are specific to this campaign
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Security researchers or malware analysts running the samples on enrolled lab devices

Tuning notes: Map the index, sourcetype and field names (package_name, signing_cert_sha1, file_sha256, installer_package) to your MDM/MTD feed; the sourcetype shown is a naming convention, not a guaranteed product sourcetype. Exclude lab devices by device group. Treat any hit as confirmed compromise: isolate, tell the user to dial ##002# to cancel call forwarding, and block the card.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account)
  • Android APK Sideload Download from Bare-IP HTTP Host (Party Panel stage 1 delivery) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Android Dropper Spoofing Play Store Installer (com.android.vending) and Play Protect Disabled · unlock with TL Creds
  • Android Banking Trojan Exfiltration via Telegram Bot API (sendMessage / sendDocument / sendPhoto) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Android Browser Request to Bare-IP /customer/?party= Lure Path · unlock with TL Creds
  • Android USSD Call Forwarding (**21*) and SMS Interception by Party Stage 2 Payload · unlock with TL Creds
  • DNS Query for Party Panel Operator Domain [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
  • Party Panel Android Banking Trojan - Fake Play Store Lure Page / Panel Server Access (TL-2026-6564) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Party Panel Stage 2 WebSocket C2 - [indicator]:8080 /ws · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 16 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6564.

Sample indicators (3 of 16)

  • IP address: 103.151.199[.]22
  • Domain: sanaminfotech[.]online
  • File hash: 66b51246f648a25aca8150d82900e37568dc67712ea4341afb7929638368acd7

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 16 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

16 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

CloudSEK's XVigil found a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) panel that generates fake Google Play lure pages and branded Android banking malware for Indian banks and card issuers. A single unprotected server (103.151.199.22:8080) hosted the panel, the lures and the APKs. The panel API answered without authentication and exposed 50 tenant accounts ('parties'), 34 of them paid licences of 7 to 60 days approved between 8 and 12 November 2026. Each tenant selects a brand, a page design (Play Store clone, netbanking portal or bare download page), a card-data form and its own Telegram bot, and the panel then builds a branded APK. 19 tenants went live on 10 November 2026, and lures and APKs impersonating three of the six targeted institutions were still live on 14 November 2026.

Infection chain: the victim reaches a lure page titled '<BANK> CREDIT CARD - Apps on Google Play' that copies the Play Store layout (bank logo, 4.8-star rating, '500K+ downloads', 'Play Protect Verified' badge). The page collects mother's name, date of birth, card number, expiry and CVV, and a page script streams every keystroke to the panel before submit, so abandoned forms also leak data. The page states the 'web portal is inactive' and walks the victim through installing the APK using Hinglish instructions. The server has no domain or CDN; the operator's one domain, used for a WebSocket node, is on clientHold, and the page falls back to the bare IP.

Stage 1 (com.secure.android.manager) is a dropper labelled '<BANK> CREDIT CARD' padded with invisible Unicode characters. It requests only three permissions, XOR-decrypts a 4.4 MB asset into a second APK and installs it while posing as the Play Store (com.android.vending), so Android 13+ treats it as a store install and skips Restricted Settings; this session-install technique was documented by ThreatFabric in 2023 as SecuriDropper. It also disables the Google Play Protect verifier, starts a local VPN that routes Play Store and Play Services traffic into a dead tunnel, and performs emulator, Frida, Xposed and Magisk checks.

Stage 2 (com.userdb.customer) has no launcher icon, restarts on nine boot and power events and runs a watchdog service. On commands delivered via Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) it forwards every incoming SMS (including bank OTPs) to the C2 (WebSocket ws://103.129.96.11:8080/ws), to Telegram and to an operator phone number, uploads the SMS inbox and gallery photos (often including card, Aadhaar and PAN images), sends SMS from the victim's number, and sets call forwarding with the USSD code **21*<number>#. Exfiltration uses a Firebase project and 13 Telegram bots; one admin chat receives alerts from 24 of 26 branded tenants. Together with the card data from the fake page, the operator has what is needed for card-not-present fraud.

Analysis was static only; CloudSEK did not run the samples and did not access victim records, which were referred to the affected institutions, CERT-In and I4C. Attribution to an India-based operator is MEDIUM confidence and circumstantial (Hinglish text, Asia/Kolkata time formatting, Indian hosting, all-Indian targets). No individual was identified, the APKs carry no developer paths or emails, and the payload C2 sits in a range registered to an Indian non-banking financial company that CloudSEK says is most likely compromised or misused. The source gives no malware family name and no CVE. Both stages are signed with the same certificate (CN=editor, SHA-1 927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9). A BeaconBeagle lookup of both IPs returned no match (HTTP 404).

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1406 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1629.003 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools; T1633.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks; T1655.001 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

Command and Control

T1437.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1481 Web Service

Collection

T1533 Data from Local System; T1636.004 Protected User Data: SMS Messages

Persistence

T1541 Foreground Persistence; T1624.001 Event Triggered Execution: Broadcast Receivers

Impact

T1582 SMS Control; T1616 Call Control

Exfiltration

T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Initial Access

T1660 Phishing

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block 103.151.199.22 and 103.129.96.11 (port 8080) and the domains sanaminfotech.online and node3.sanaminfotech.online at network, email and mobile threat-defence layers
  • Hunt managed devices for packages com.secure.android.manager and com.userdb.customer and for the signing certificate SHA-1 927ca44949d7788aa86f9d7f04d7fdacecd1dfb9
  • Customers who installed an APK from a link: dial ##002# to cancel call forwarding, block the card, uninstall the app and report at cybercrime.gov.in or 1930
  • Report hosting, Firebase and Telegram abuse to the respective providers

Workarounds

  • Install apps only from Google Play or the App Store
  • Do not sideload APKs received via links, SMS or messaging apps

Longer-term hardening

  • Watch for call-forwarding activation and new-device OTP use around card-not-present transactions
  • Publish an advisory naming the official bank app package and warn customers never to install an APK from a link, SMS or WhatsApp
  • Subscribe to brand monitoring and takedown for fake Google Play lure pages impersonating the institution

Affected and fixed versions

  • Google — Android (sideloaded APK installs; stage 1 abuses a store-style session install to bypass Restricted Settings on Android 13+)
    Vulnerable versions: Android devices whose users sideload the APK
  • Indian banks, card issuers and government-service users — Customers of six Indian banks/card issuers plus traffic e-challan, farmer income-support and pensioner life-certificate themes

Timeline

  • ThreatFabric publishes 'Bypassing Android 13 Restrictions with SecuriDropper', documenting the session-based install technique that skips Restricted Settings; CloudSEK says the Party stage 1 dropper uses this technique
  • Panel begins approving paid tenant licences (7 to 60 days); 34 of 50 tenants are approved between 8 and 12 November
  • 19 of the 34 approved tenants go live with branded lure pages and APKs
  • Last of the 34 paid tenant licences approved
  • Lure pages and APKs impersonating three of the six targeted institutions are still live (APK-only for the others); panel API found unauthenticated, exposing all 50 tenants
  • CloudSEK publishes its analysis; victim records referred to affected institutions, CERT-In and I4C

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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