Skip to navigation

Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6482

Blockchain-Based C2 Resolution (EtherRAT, TONResolver) in Fake Guest-Complaint Phishing Targeting Hotels

highACTIVE

Cofense reports phishing campaigns using fake guest complaint, review, or inquiry emails against hospitality staff (front desk, reservations, guest relations). A linked archive holds a disguised LNK that downloads a NodeJS runtime and installs EtherRAT or TONResolver, which fetch their C2 address from an Ethereum smart contract or the TON blockchain so C2 can rotate without changing the malware. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6482
Also known asEtherRAT, TONResolver, TrojanSpy.JS.TONRESOLVER.A
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows
MalwareEtherRAT, NetSupportManager RAT, PureRAT, TONResolver
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.007 Double File Extension, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers, T1566.002 Spearphishing Link, T1568 Dynamic Resolution and 2 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorshospitality, travel
Target regionsGlobal, japan
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6482 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: EtherRAT/TONResolver LNK-Launched Hidden PowerShell Download Loader (Node.js Staging)

Detects PowerShell started by explorer.exe or cmd.exe (the parent chain of a malicious LNK shortcut from a phishing archive) that uses a download cradle together with a hidden window or Node.js / BigInteger loader markers. This is the first-stage loader of the fake guest-complaint hotel phishing campaign (TL-2026-6482) that rebuilds a domain from two large integers, fetches a PS1 to %TEMP%, downloads Node.js and installs EtherRAT or TONResolver. Maps to T1204.002, T1059.001, T1105, T1027 and T1566.002.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1566.002, T1204.002, T1059.001, T1105, T1027
  • Data sources: sysmon (index=sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode 1), DeviceProcessEvents, windows process_creation
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h (Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe") (ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\cmd.exe")
| eval cmd=lower(CommandLine)
| eval hidden_window=if(match(cmd,"-w(indowstyle)?\s+hidden|-win\s+hidden"),1,0)
| eval download_cradle=if(match(cmd,"invoke-webrequest|invoke-restmethod|downloadstring|downloadfile|\biwr\b|\birm\b|\biex\b|net\.webclient|start-bitstransfer"),1,0)
| eval loader_markers=if(match(cmd,"biginteger|\[bigint\]|nodejs"),1,0)
| where download_cradle=1 AND (hidden_window=1 OR loader_markers=1)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_image by host, User, Image
| table first_seen last_seen host User Image parent_image command_lines count

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ('powershell.exe', 'pwsh.exe')
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ('explorer.exe', 'cmd.exe')
| extend Cmd = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend HiddenWindow = Cmd matches regex @'-w(indowstyle)?\s+hidden|-win\s+hidden'
| extend DownloadCradle = Cmd matches regex @'invoke-webrequest|invoke-restmethod|downloadstring|downloadfile|\biwr\b|\birm\b|\biex\b|net\.webclient|start-bitstransfer'
| extend LoaderMarkers = Cmd matches regex @'biginteger|\[bigint\]|nodejs'
| where DownloadCradle and (HiddenWindow or LoaderMarkers)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256

Sigma

title: EtherRAT/TONResolver LNK-Launched Hidden PowerShell Download Loader
id: 3f6c2a1e-8b47-4d52-9a0e-5c1d7e2b4f01
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell launched from explorer.exe or cmd.exe (typical of a malicious LNK from a phishing archive) using a download cradle together with a hidden window or Node.js/BigInteger loader markers, as seen in fake guest-complaint hotel phishing delivering EtherRAT and TONResolver (TL-2026-6482).
references:
  - https://cofense.com/blog/from-guest-complaints-to-malware-blockchain-abuse-targets-hotels
  - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_gb/research/26/f/tonresolver.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/19
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1566.002
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1105
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1027
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\explorer.exe'
      - '\cmd.exe'
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
  selection_cradle:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
      - 'Invoke-RestMethod'
      - 'DownloadString'
      - 'DownloadFile'
      - 'Net.WebClient'
      - 'Start-BitsTransfer'
      - 'iwr '
      - 'irm '
  selection_hidden:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '-WindowStyle Hidden'
      - '-w hidden'
      - '-win hidden'
  selection_markers:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'BigInteger'
      - '[bigint]'
      - 'nodejs'
  condition: selection_parent and selection_img and selection_cradle and (selection_hidden or selection_markers)
falsepositives:
  - Administrative or software-deployment scripts launched from cmd.exe that download files with a hidden window
level: high

Known false positives:

  • IT automation or software deployment scripts that start a hidden PowerShell download from cmd.exe
  • Legitimate installers invoked by users that use Invoke-WebRequest to fetch Node.js for developer tooling

Tuning notes: Exclude known deployment tooling by ParentCommandLine or signed script hashes. On non-developer hospitality endpoints (front desk, reservations) any match is high fidelity; on developer or IT hosts raise the bar to require loader_markers=1. Add the user-writable extraction paths (Downloads, Temp) if you want to narrow further.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account)
  • Node.js Runtime Executing From User-Writable Path (TONResolver Nodejs Drop) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Follow-On Credential Theft: LSASS Access From User-Writable Path and Browser Credential Store Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • EtherRAT/TONResolver Rotating C2 Infrastructure and Community-Observed Sibling Indicators · unlock with TL Creds
  • Double-Extension LNK Shortcut Created From Phishing Archive (Fake Guest Complaint Lure) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Node.js From User-Writable Path Spawning Recon or Shell Child (EtherRAT/TONResolver RAT Commands) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Proxy Request to TON Contract get_domain Endpoint or Known Dead-Drop Contract Address (TONResolver, EtherRAT) · unlock with TL Creds
  • TONResolver HKCU Run Key Persistence Launching Node.js · unlock with TL Creds
  • Node.js / PowerShell DNS Resolution of TON and Ethereum Dead-Drop Providers (EtherRAT, TONResolver) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6482.

Sample indicators (3 of 28)

  • Domain: gateway001kir[.]com
  • Domain: sslgateway001[.]com
  • Domain: waygatterol002[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

28 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

3 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

Cofense Intelligence observed phishing emails posing as hotel guests who submit complaints, negative reviews or inquiries, addressed to front desk, reservations and guest relations mailboxes. The lure asks the recipient to review a photo or document; some messages are sent as replies inside existing threads, and Cofense assesses with moderate confidence that generative AI writes each email uniquely. The embedded link delivers an archive containing an LNK shortcut with a mismatched .JPG extension and a dummy .MP4 file whose size changes on every download, likely to defeat hash-based detection.

Executing the LNK downloads a NodeJS runtime and installs one of two JavaScript RATs. EtherRAT queries a smart contract on Ethereum via a public JSON-RPC endpoint and decodes the returned value into its C2 domain. TONResolver does the same against the TON blockchain. Trend Micro's separate analysis of TONResolver (tracked as TrojanSpy.JS.TONRESOLVER.A, Japanese hotel and accommodation targets) shows the LNK (disguised as a PNG) running PowerShell that rebuilds a domain from two large integers and fetches a PS1 script to %TEMP% (served only when the User-Agent contains 'PowerShell'). The script hides its window, downloads Node.js v24.13.0 from nodejs.org if needed, drops a JavaScript payload under %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Nodejs\ and runs it with node.exe. The payload is obfuscated with a custom VM and persists through the HKCU Run key, with mutex-based single-instance checks.

TONResolver resolves its C2 by calling the get_domain getter on a TON contract through tonapi.io; an update wallet authorises domain changes with op_code 0x17BE49CF. C2 traffic is a WebSocket session using ECDH secp256k1 key exchange, HKDF-SHA256 and AES-256-CBC with a 20-second keepalive. Provisional command types cover endpoint information (username, hostname, OS, CPU, memory, MAC, domain), arbitrary JavaScript execution, file retrieval and execution, and PowerShell execution. Trend Micro's MDR observed follow-on activity: an executable in %TEMP% that interacted with lsass.exe and accessed Chrome and Edge profile data (suspected credential theft).

Because C2 is rotated by a small blockchain transaction, blocking a single domain is ineffective; Cofense notes that blocking one blockchain's APIs may not stop the other family. Domain history on the contracts shows repeated rotation (TON contract: 2026-02-07, 2026-02-09, 2026-02-20, 2026-06-02). Cofense assesses with moderate confidence that this activity continues earlier Booking.com-spoofing ClickFix campaigns that delivered PureRAT, NetSupport Manager RAT and infostealers, but cannot rule out a shared kit used by multiple actors. No named actor is attributed. Note: a different EtherRAT campaign documented by Sysdig (React2Shell/CVE-2025-55182, Linux, different contract) shares the family name and Ethereum dead-drop technique but is not evidenced as the same operation; its indicators are not included here.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.007 Double File Extension

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.007 JavaScript; T1204.002 Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver; T1568 Dynamic Resolution; T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

Persistence

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Credential Access

T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Initial Access

T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block the listed C2 domains and the EtherRAT/TONResolver domains at DNS and web proxy, recognising they rotate
  • Hunt for node.exe running from %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Nodejs\ or other non-installed paths, and for HKCU Run keys launching node.exe
  • Hunt for LNK files with image extensions (.jpg/.png) spawning powershell.exe from extracted archives
  • Alert on non-developer endpoints querying tonapi.io or public Ethereum JSON-RPC endpoints
  • Reset browser-stored credentials and invalidate sessions on any host where the loader executed

Workarounds

  • Block or tightly monitor outbound access to tonapi.io and public Ethereum RPC providers where there is no business need
  • Remove the malicious shortcut, script, persistence entries and any additional payloads rather than only blocking addresses

Longer-term hardening

  • Train hospitality staff (front desk, reservations, guest relations) on fake guest-complaint lures, including replies in existing threads
  • Apply equal scrutiny to mail sent to public-facing mailboxes (support, sales, business development)
  • Restrict execution of LNK files from downloaded archives and block archives from untrusted links at the mail gateway
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for JavaScript run under Node.js and PowerShell download cradles

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints in hospitality organizations (user-execution based; no product vulnerability)

Timeline

  • TONResolver contract updated to point to C2 domain locked-ioc-24 (Trend Micro)
  • TON contract rotated C2 to locked-ioc-19 two days later
  • TON contract rotated C2 to locked-ioc-16
  • Start of Trend Micro telemetry window (17 May to 8 June 2026) covering the Japanese hotel phishing campaign
  • TON contract rotated C2 to locked-ioc-15; around June the loader switched from [bigint] to System.Numerics.BigInteger and the Cloudflare name-server pair changed
  • End of Trend Micro telemetry window; MDR reported follow-on executable in %TEMP% accessing lsass.exe and Chrome/Edge profile data
  • Cofense publishes analysis of fake guest-complaint phishing against hotels delivering EtherRAT and TONResolver with blockchain-resolved C2

Sources cited

Previous and next in malware

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats