Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6565
October 2026 Infostealer Trend Report: Lzveil, StealC, Remus, DarkCloud, AgentTesla
AhnLab ASEC's October 2026 infostealer trend report describes a newly named infostealer, Lzveil, delivered together with the Remus stealer inside a 7Z archive that contains a password-protected RAR. StealC is also seen in crack/keygen lures spread through SEO poisoning and file hosting, while DarkCloud and AgentTesla arrive as phishing email attachments.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6565 |
|---|---|
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (user endpoints running pirated software or opening phishing attachments) |
| Malware | Agent Tesla, DarkCloud, Lzveil, Mega, Remus, Stealc |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol, T1055 Process Injection, T1056.001 Keylogging, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1113 Screen Capture, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers, T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment and 2 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | consumer, technology, logistics, manufacturing |
| Target regions | Global, south korea |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6565 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Infostealer python37.dll DLL Side-Loading From User-Writable Path — Exploitation
Detects python37.dll (the main malicious DLL in the ~1.6% of ASEC-analysed crack/keygen infostealer samples that use DLL side-loading) loaded by a non-Python host executable running from a user-writable directory. Covers Lzveil, StealC and Remus lures (T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading, T1036 Masquerading) in TL-2026-6565.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1574.002, T1036
- Data sources: sysmon:EventCode=7 (index=sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational), MDE:DeviceImageLoadEvents, sigma:windows/image_load
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\python37.dll" earliest=-24h
NOT Image IN ("*\\python.exe", "*\\pythonw.exe", "*\\py.exe", "*\\pyw.exe")
Image IN ("*\\Users\\*", "*\\ProgramData\\*", "*\\Temp\\*", "*\\Downloads\\*")
```Behaviour: python37.dll loaded by a non-Python host running from a user-writable path. ASEC reports python37.dll as the main side-loaded DLL for crack/keygen infostealers such as Lzveil, StealC and Remus```
| eval dll_unsigned=if(lower(Signed)="false", "yes", "no")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(ImageLoaded) as loaded_dll values(dll_unsigned) as dll_unsigned values(SignatureStatus) as dll_signature_status values(Hashes) as hashes by host, User, Image
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| table host User Image loaded_dll dll_unsigned dll_signature_status hashes count first_seen last_seenMicrosoft KQL
// TL-2026-6565 python37.dll side-loading by non-Python host in user-writable path (T1574.002)
DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "python37.dll"
| where not(InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("python.exe", "pythonw.exe", "py.exe", "pyw.exe"))
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (@"\Users\", @"\ProgramData\", @"\Temp\", @"\Downloads\")
| extend SameDirSideload = tolower(replace_string(FolderPath, FileName, "")) == tolower(replace_string(InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, ""))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName, HostProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName, HostPath = InitiatingProcessFolderPath, DllPath = FolderPath, SameDirSideload, DllSHA1 = SHA1, HostSHA256 = InitiatingProcessSHA256
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Python37.dll Side-Loaded by Non-Python Host From User-Writable Path
id: 7c1f0a52-3b8e-4d6a-9f21-5a4e8c0b1d11
status: experimental
description: 'Detects python37.dll loaded by a non-Python executable running from a user-writable directory. ASEC October 2026 infostealer report names python37.dll as the main malicious DLL in side-loading infostealer samples (Lzveil, StealC, Remus lures). TL-2026-6565.'
references:
- https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/96698/
- https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/research/remus-64bit-variant-of-lumma-stealer
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1574.002
- attack.t1036
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\python37.dll'
selection_path:
Image|contains:
- '\Users\'
- '\ProgramData\'
- '\Temp\'
- '\Downloads\'
filter_python:
Image|endswith:
- '\python.exe'
- '\pythonw.exe'
- '\py.exe'
- '\pyw.exe'
condition: selection and selection_path and not filter_python
falsepositives:
- Portable applications or games that legitimately bundle an embedded Python 3.7 runtime
- Developer tools run from user profile directories
level: high
Known false positives:
- Portable apps or games bundling an embedded Python 3.7 runtime and a renamed launcher
- Developer tooling unpacked into user profile directories
Tuning notes: Allowlist known-good host executables by hash or signer after a 14-day baseline. Raise priority when dll_unsigned=yes or SameDirSideload is true. Ensure Sysmon EventCode 7 is enabled for DLLs loaded from user paths.
- Crack/Keygen Infostealer Lure Executed From Archive Temp Directory — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- .NET Utility Spawned as Injection Host by User-Path Loader — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Remus EtherHiding RPC and Infostealer IOC Domain Resolution — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- Infostealer Phishing Attachment Executed From Mail Client Path — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- ASEC Infostealer Hash and ClickFix Domain Execution Match — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Remus C2 Over Non-Standard TCP 5902 From User-Path Binary — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- Browser Credential and Cookie Store Staging by Non-Browser Process — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Infostealer SMTP and FTP Exfiltration From User-Path Binary — C2 / Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6565.
Sample indicators (3 of 20)
- Domain:
nzqztr2208262ea[.]cfd - File hash:
0094855366c30a9da7d6f4962cb2206f - Domain:
arkedfile[.]s3[.]us-east-1[.]amazonaws[.]com
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 20 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
AhnLab ASEC's monthly infostealer trend report for October 2026 (published 2026-11-20) is built from ASEC's automated collection system, email honeypot, C2 automated analysis system and AhnLab product diagnostic logs. It reports that infostealers are mainly distributed disguised as cracks and keygens. Lures are promoted through SEO poisoning (search-result ranking manipulation) and hosted on file-sharing and cloud services including Mega and MediaFire, plus an Amazon S3 bucket and a '.cfd' domain. Victims who search for pirated software download an archive and run the payload themselves.
The report's headline finding is Lzveil, described as a new infostealer. Lzveil was distributed together with Remus: the files sit in a password-protected RAR nested inside a 7Z archive, and both stealers were observed executing at the same time on the victim host. StealC is also named as a family frequently identified in the crack/keygen channel. Of the samples ASEC analysed, about 98.4% run as plain EXE files and about 1.6% use DLL side-loading, with python37.dll as the main malicious DLL. ASEC notes that many samples carry version and certificate metadata impersonating Microsoft Corporation (most frequent), Stashabuz Ltd., Tuplemix Technologies and Snako, Inc.; those companies are not involved.
Phishing is the second channel. A DarkCloud sample arrived as an attachment in an email impersonating a US laboratory-equipment company. It collects documents, keylogging data, email client data, browser data, screenshots and cryptocurrency wallet data, and exfiltrated over SMTP in the analysed sample. An AgentTesla sample, a .NET information stealer, arrived in an email impersonating a shipping company and exfiltrated over FTP.
Background on Remus from other public research (not stated in the ASEC report): Gen Threat Labs (2026-04-07) and Flashpoint (2026-07-02) describe Remus as a 64-bit stealer closely related to Lumma, reached via a test-build family called Tenzor, that resolves C2 using EtherHiding and decrypts an embedded ChaCha20 C2 config. Flashpoint reports it sold as MaaS in three tiers (Basic $250, Pro $500, Enterprise $1,000). CIS (MS-ISAC) reports delivery via ClickFix/PLYCHIP, DonutLoader and cracked-software installers, HTTP C2 on non-standard ports, session-cookie theft aimed at MFA bypass, and, from a 29 July developer post, targeting of AI coding clients. The ASEC report does not state a CVE, a threat actor or the C2 servers of Lzveil, so none are asserted here. ASEC does not say which family each listed MD5 belongs to. Severity is an analyst estimate.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1056.001 Keylogging; T1113 Screen Capture
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1055 Process Injection; T1574.001 DLL
Exfiltration
T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Command and Control
Execution
Credential Access
T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
Initial Access
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
Resource Development
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Hunt for 7Z archives containing password-protected RAR files executed from user Downloads/Temp paths, and for python37.dll loaded by non-Python host executables
- Block or alert on the distribution domain nzqztr2208262ea.cfd and review proxy logs for the arkedfile S3 bucket URL
- Search endpoints for the five MD5 hashes listed in the IOC set
- Reset credentials, invalidate browser sessions and rotate crypto-wallet keys for any host where an infostealer is confirmed
Workarounds
- Do not block mediafire.com or mega.nz wholesale; instead inspect downloads from them and block archive/executable downloads for non-approved users
Longer-term hardening
- Prohibit installation of cracked software and keygens; restrict execution from user-writable download locations
- Enforce MFA and discourage saving passwords in browsers; deploy EDR with detection for browser credential-store access and DLL side-loading
- Filter inbound email attachments from impersonated lab-equipment and shipping senders; alert on outbound SMTP/FTP from non-mail hosts
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (user endpoints running pirated software or opening phishing attachments)
Timeline
- Gen Threat Labs: Tenzor test builds, the Lumma-to-Remus transitional family, carry an encrypted-string build date of 16 September 2025.
- Gen Threat Labs places the first Remus campaigns at the turn of January/February 2026 (month-level precision).
- Flashpoint first sees Remus offered for sale as a MaaS in March 2026 (month-level precision); CIS tracks distribution from March through September 2026.
- Gen Threat Labs publishes its analysis of Remus as a 64-bit variant of Lumma Stealer using EtherHiding and a ChaCha20-encrypted C2 config.
- Flashpoint publishes 'Remus Stealer: A New, Not-So-New Infostealer', detailing Basic/Pro/Enterprise tiers ($250/$500/$1,000).
- Per CIS, the Remus developer announces the stealer now targets AI coding clients (Claude, Codex, OpenCode, Cursor, Devin).
- End of the October 2026 observation period in which ASEC observed Lzveil co-delivered with Remus, StealC in crack/keygen lures, and DarkCloud and AgentTesla phishing campaigns.
- AhnLab ASEC publishes the October 2026 Infostealer Trend Report naming Lzveil as a new infostealer and listing distribution domains and MD5 hashes.
Sources cited
- SLTT C2 Traffic Tied to Remus Malware Distribution Operation (CIS) cisecurity.org · Advisory
- October 2026 Infostealer Trend Report (AhnLab ASEC, English) asec.ahnlab.com · Research · 2026-11-20
- 2026년 10월 인포스틸러 동향 보고서 (AhnLab ASEC, Korean) asec.ahnlab.com · Research · 2026-11-20
- Remus: Unmasking The 64-bit Variant of the Infamous Lumma Stealer (Gen Threat Labs) gendigital.com · Vendor report · 2026-04-07
- Remus Stealer: A New, Not-So-New Infostealer (Flashpoint) flashpoint.io · Vendor report · 2026-07-02
- April 2026 Infostealer Trend Report (AhnLab ASEC) asec.ahnlab.com · Research
- May 2026 Infostealer Trend Report (AhnLab ASEC) asec.ahnlab.com · Research
- June 2026 Infostealer Trend Report (AhnLab ASEC) asec.ahnlab.com · Research
- Remus infostealer evolves into sophisticated malware-as-a-service platform (SC Media) scworld.com · News
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.