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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6625

Overlord RAT: open-source Go RAT delivered via fake Zoom installer (.NET downloader), with optional Solana-based C2 resolver (disabled in observed build)

highACTIVE

Jamf Threat Labs (2026-08-06) found a macOS campaign in which a .NET 10 downloader posing as a Zoom installer fetches a garble-obfuscated Go agent built from the open-source Overlord framework, which beacons over TLS WebSocket (validation disabled) to hub.zoom.com.kg:5173. Overlord provides keylogging, screen/webcam/audio capture, remote desktop, interpreter execution and plugin loading; its Solana C2 resolver exists in the framework but was disabled in the analysed build. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6625
Also known asOverlord, Overlord RAT, win.overlord
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsApple macOS (ARM64 and Intel); Microsoft Windows (x64); Linux Linux (AMD64); Microsoft / Anysphere / VSCodium Visual Studio Code, Cursor, VSCodium (abused as UNK_DeadDrop delivery and persistence vehicle)
MalwareOverlord
Toolsgarble
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1056.001 Keylogging, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1059.006 Python, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1113 Screen Capture, T1123 Audio Capture, T1125 Video Capture, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1176 Software Extensions and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorstechnology, cryptocurrency, finance, education, business services, health
Target regionsunited states of america, Global
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6625 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Overlord RAT Fake Zoom Installer Stage 2 Launch from /tmp (TL-2026-6625)

Detects the macOS fake Zoom installer chain used to deploy the open-source Overlord Go RAT: the .NET 10 downloader (ZoomMeetings / ZoomInstallerFull) writes the garble-obfuscated agent to /tmp/ZoomMeetings and launches it with a backgrounded nohup. Also matches published SHA-256 hashes of the downloader and agent variants. Behaviour-first with hash corroboration; maps to user execution of a malicious file masquerading as Zoom.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1204.002, T1036.005, T1059.004, T1105
  • Data sources: splunk_cim_endpoint_processes, macos_endpoint_security, defender_for_endpoint_macos
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

| tstats summariesonly=false count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_path="*/tmp/ZoomMeetings" OR Processes.process="*nohup /tmp/ZoomMeetings*" OR Processes.process_name="ZoomInstallerFull*" OR Processes.process_hash="*7a2318127cabf28552a8aeed14a8445c8f36fbda5e57d8b122cf6f1c6b51a522*" OR Processes.process_hash="*d4cf150d6effeea315f136cdf448e32f4a8daac9e95f46def6a31ba18787dae3*" OR Processes.process_hash="*2c0bb97632bb9b90ee97be2ac350a557b08d84a7dad1f3ef63ffd83be1ab1f00*" OR Processes.process_hash="*7878031f2bd907e7300133b3e8ce640f3cdcba56686eaca3539d4c22773bc233*" OR Processes.process_hash="*9d8948e64f75c203e28f90f5bd7678dde6bd351c7507eecdaaeab2fbe4ec43bb*" OR Processes.process_hash="*5334c468f0ffd5899a949ac3e0bc4665f80c658cb46e1a972df4e4ba0bb905f8*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process
| rename Processes.* as *
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| table firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name process_name process_path process count

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FolderPath has "/tmp/" and FileName =~ "ZoomMeetings")
    or ProcessCommandLine has "nohup /tmp/ZoomMeetings"
    or FileName startswith "ZoomInstallerFull"
    or SHA256 in~ ("7a2318127cabf28552a8aeed14a8445c8f36fbda5e57d8b122cf6f1c6b51a522", "d4cf150d6effeea315f136cdf448e32f4a8daac9e95f46def6a31ba18787dae3", "2c0bb97632bb9b90ee97be2ac350a557b08d84a7dad1f3ef63ffd83be1ab1f00", "7878031f2bd907e7300133b3e8ce640f3cdcba56686eaca3539d4c22773bc233", "9d8948e64f75c203e28f90f5bd7678dde6bd351c7507eecdaaeab2fbe4ec43bb", "5334c468f0ffd5899a949ac3e0bc4665f80c658cb46e1a972df4e4ba0bb905f8")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Sigma

title: Overlord RAT Fake Zoom Installer Stage 2 Launched From /tmp (TL-2026-6625)
id: 5b0e7c1a-3f42-4d8e-9a61-2c7d94e0b1a3
status: experimental
description: Detects the Overlord Go agent staged by the fake Zoom .NET downloader being launched from /tmp/ZoomMeetings via nohup, or execution of the ZoomInstallerFull downloader build (Jamf Threat Labs, 2026-08-06).
references:
    - https://www.jamf.com/blog/fake-zoom-installer-delivers-overlord-rat-macos/
    - https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/dont-fear-repo-unkdeaddrop-phishing-campaign-targets-developers-steal
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: macos
detection:
    selection_stage2:
        Image|endswith: '/tmp/ZoomMeetings'
    selection_nohup:
        CommandLine|contains: 'nohup /tmp/ZoomMeetings'
    selection_downloader:
        Image|endswith: '/ZoomInstallerFull'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software that happens to stage a binary named ZoomMeetings under /tmp (rare; validate the signer)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Admin or packaging tooling that legitimately stages a binary called ZoomMeetings under /tmp
  • Security researchers detonating the published samples in a lab

Tuning notes: Scope Endpoint.Processes to macOS hosts and your EDR index; allow-list the notarized Zoom installer signer if your telemetry exposes it; hash terms are exact-match IOCs and can be refreshed from the TL-2026-6625 IOC list.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple and Gold in full, 2 calls a day on a free account)
  • Overlord UNK_DeadDrop Lure Repo Payload and Malicious VSIX Execution (TL-2026-6625) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Overlord Keychain Dump and Browser Credential Theft on macOS (TL-2026-6625) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Overlord RAT WebSocket C2 on TCP/5173 From Staged Binary (TL-2026-6625) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Overlord Gatekeeper Quarantine Strip and zoom.com.kg Payload Fetch (TL-2026-6625) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Overlord RAT Agent Interpreter Execution (TL-2026-6625) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lookalike zoom.com ccTLD Domain Resolution (TL-2026-6625) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Overlord RAT com.zoom LaunchAgent Persistence and Hardware Discovery (TL-2026-6625) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Overlord RAT Known C2 and Payload Infrastructure Contact (TL-2026-6625) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6625.

Sample indicators (3 of 28)

  • IP address: 18.204.152[.]241
  • Domain: hub[.]zoom[.]com[.]kg
  • File hash: 7a2318127cabf28552a8aeed14a8445c8f36fbda5e57d8b122cf6f1c6b51a522

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

28 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Proofpoint separately documented Overlord use by the likely North Korea-aligned UNK_DeadDrop cluster against developers.

Overlord is an open-source, cross-platform remote access framework written in Go (public repository github.com/vxaboveground/Overlord; Malpedia lists the repository reference dated 2026-03-05 and tracks the family as win.overlord). This record covers two independently reported uses of the framework.

Campaign 1 - Fake Zoom installer (Jamf Threat Labs, Ferdous Saljooki, 2026-08-06). Stage 1 is a macOS ARM64 Mach-O named ZoomMeetings, built as a self-contained .NET 10 single-file application (Jamf says it is the first time it has seen .NET used as a macOS downloader of this kind). The Mach-O wrapper embeds 34 PE DLLs; one carries 'Zoom Communications, Inc' / 'Zoom Meetings Installer' metadata and the other 33 are .NET runtime libraries. Strings in the malicious DLL are base64-encoded and XOR'd with key 0x94 and identifiers are obfuscated, which kept static AV engines from detecting the sample at analysis time. The downloader fingerprints OS and architecture via RuntimeInformation, requests one of three platform-specific payloads (macOS ARM64, macOS Intel, Windows x64 per GBHackers) from attacker infrastructure (cdn.zoom.com.kg) with a random 6-character ts= token (the server returns HTTP 401 without it), writes the payload to /tmp/ZoomMeetings and launches it with a backgrounded nohup. It simultaneously downloads the legitimate Zoom installer (.pkg on macOS, .exe on Windows) and prints a success message regardless of payload outcome. A second, earlier downloader build, ZoomInstallerFull, has plaintext strings and an embedded PDB path /Users/ollie/Documents/TheEgg/obj/Release/net10.0/osx-arm64/linked/ZoomInstallerFull.pdb. The initial delivery vector was still under investigation. Jamf does not analyse a Windows payload, although the downloader has a Windows branch.

Stage 2 is the Overlord agent (zoomMacArm), a Go binary compiled with garble (not part of Overlord's standard build), which mangles pclntab names and defeated GoReSym. The hardcoded C2 is hub.zoom.com.kg:5173 over secure WebSocket with TLSInsecureSkipVerify defaulting to true. Overlord capabilities per Jamf: system-wide keylogging via CGEventTap, screen capture streaming, microphone capture (miniaudio), webcam capture, system information (CPU, RAM, battery, OS, architecture, admin status), filesystem operations (browse/read/write/upload/download/move/rename/delete/chmod/zip), process control (list/kill/suspend/resume), script execution through bash, python3, ruby, node, perl or pwsh, native dylib / WebAssembly plugin loading from C2, self-update, remote desktop over WebSocket or WebRTC, and an opt-in Solana-based C2 address resolver. In the analysed build the Solana toggle resolves to false and no wallet or RPC endpoint is configured, so the hardcoded WebSocket address is used; the Solana capability is therefore a framework feature rather than observed behaviour. Persistence is opt-in via OVERLORD_ENABLE_PERSISTENCE and did not fire in the primary sample, but a second variant (SHA-256 7878031f...) copied itself to ~/Library/Application Support/Overlord/com.zoom, installed the LaunchAgent ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.zoom.plist with label com.zoom, and ran ioreg -rd1 -c IOPlatformExpertDevice to collect hardware UUID, serial number and model before contacting C2. Per GBHackers, hub.zoom.com.kg, cdn.zoom.com.kg and dash.zoom.com.kg resolve to 18.204.152.241, and hub.zoom.com.lv previously resolved to 179.61.227.46.

Campaign 2 - UNK_DeadDrop (Proofpoint, Saher Naumaan and Carlos Rubio, 2026-06-08). Proofpoint describes Overlord as an open-source Go framework and documents its use by UNK_DeadDrop, an unconfirmed but 'very likely' North Korea-aligned cluster that sent more than 250 emails to nearly 100 organizations over about six weeks in April-May 2026 with fake developer job offers and code-review requests that led to GitHub/GitLab lure repositories (crypto platforms, exploit archives, Foundry testing, AI payments). A hidden .vscode/tasks.json with runOn folderOpen runs vendor/run-update.sh (Linux/macOS) or a VBScript/CMD launcher (Windows), installs a malicious VSIX (google-update-support.vsix) into Cursor, VS Code and VSCodium, strips macOS quarantine, and launches Go Overlord binaries (google-update-support-linux-amd64, -darwin-amd64, -darwin-arm64) that connect over WebSocket Secure to 23.137.105.75:5173. Custom modules browserlogin, companywallet and cleanup steal browser credentials and crypto wallet data; on macOS a darwin-password-prompt Mach-O shows a fake password dialog and the agent then modifies browser Keychain ACLs and dumps the login keychain. On Windows the chain runs AES-256-GCM encrypted JavaScript inside the editor's Electron process (ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1) and abuses a bundled Python to bypass App-Bound Encryption. Proofpoint does not mention Zoom, and it describes no Solana resolver (Solana appears only in a lure repo's description). Jamf states there is no direct overlap between the Zoom campaign and UNK_DeadDrop.

Attribution: none is stated for the Zoom campaign. Jamf notes that the com.zoom LaunchAgent label and plist name match FlexibleFerret, a DPRK-attributed macOS family linked to Contagious Interview, but does not attribute the activity. Proofpoint states attribution of UNK_DeadDrop to a known actor remains unconfirmed. Treat both as unattributed with low-confidence DPRK-aligned overlap. Victim sectors and geography for the Zoom campaign are not stated; UNK_DeadDrop targeting was mostly US-based developers and crypto, finance, technology, education, business services and telehealth organizations. Hunt-rationale note: the originally assigned Infosecurity Magazine article could not be fetched; this record is grounded in the Jamf and Proofpoint primary reports plus Iru, Malpedia, GBHackers and Hackread. Severity HIGH is an analyst judgement based on the RAT's full surveillance and remote-control capability.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Collection

T1056.001 Keylogging; T1113 Screen Capture; T1123 Audio Capture; T1125 Video Capture

Execution

T1059.004 Unix Shell; T1059.006 Python; T1204.002 Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1219 Remote Access Tools

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

Persistence

T1176 Software Extensions; T1543.001 Launch Agent

defense-impairment

T1553.001 Gatekeeper Bypass

Credential Access

T1555.001 Keychain; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block and alert on DNS/proxy/egress to hub.zoom.com.kg, cdn.zoom.com.kg, dash.zoom.com.kg, hub.zoom.com.lv and to 18.204.152.241, 179.61.227.46 and 23.137.105.75 (any outbound TCP/5173 WebSocket to non-corporate hosts)
  • Hunt macOS endpoints for /tmp/ZoomMeetings, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.zoom.plist and ~/Library/Application Support/Overlord/ and for the published SHA-256 hashes
  • If found: isolate the host, kill the process, remove /tmp/ZoomMeetings, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.zoom.plist and ~/Library/Application Support/Overlord/com.zoom, and rotate credentials, tokens and keychain/browser-stored secrets exposed on the host (keylogging, screen, webcam and audio capture were available)
  • Treat any host that opened a UNK_DeadDrop lure repository as compromised: check for .vscode/tasks.json with runOn folderOpen, the google-update-support VSIX in Cursor/VS Code/VSCodium and google-update-support-* binaries

Workarounds

  • No patch applies (user-execution malware); in managed environments restrict installation of unsigned or non-notarized installers and block execution from /tmp

Longer-term hardening

  • Download Zoom and other collaboration software only from official vendor sources
  • Deploy EDR with file monitoring in Protect/Block mode and web protection that blocks lookalike Zoom domains (Iru and Jamf both recommend this)
  • Disable automatic task execution and enforce Workspace Trust in VS Code/Cursor; review installed editor extensions
  • Alert on interpreter processes (bash, python3, ruby, node, perl, pwsh) spawned by unsigned binaries running from /tmp, and on unsigned processes requesting Accessibility/Input Monitoring, screen, microphone or camera access

Affected and fixed versions

  • Apple — macOS (ARM64 and Intel)
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific; user-execution malware
  • Microsoft — Windows (x64)
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific; user-execution malware
  • Linux — Linux (AMD64)
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific; user-execution malware
  • Microsoft / Anysphere / VSCodium — Visual Studio Code, Cursor, VSCodium (abused as UNK_DeadDrop delivery and persistence vehicle)
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific; abuse of folder-open tasks and VSIX extensions

Timeline

  • Malpedia references the open-source Overlord GitHub repository (vxaboveground) dated 2026-03-05; the framework is later abused by multiple operators.
  • First commit of the Pulsynk lure repository; UNK_DeadDrop lure repositories were created through 2026-05-27 (Proofpoint), delivering Overlord Go binaries to developers via email-driven job-offer and code-review lures.
  • Latest observed UNK_DeadDrop lure repositories (forge-4626-invariants and x402-kit clones) created; campaign had sent 250+ emails to nearly 100 organizations over about six weeks.
  • Proofpoint publishes 'Don't Fear the Repo', documenting Overlord use by UNK_DeadDrop (likely North Korea-aligned, unconfirmed) with C2 locked-ioc-23:5173 and VS Code/Cursor task and VSIX delivery.
  • Jamf Threat Labs publishes analysis of the fake Zoom installer: .NET 10 downloader ZoomMeetings drops a garble-obfuscated Overlord agent beaconing to locked-ioc-18:5173.
  • GBHackers republishes the Jamf findings with infrastructure details: cdn/hub/locked-ioc-17 resolve to locked-ioc-21; locked-ioc-20 previously resolved to locked-ioc-22.
  • Hackread reports the campaign as targeting both macOS and Windows; Solana resolver noted as present but disabled in the examined build.
  • Malpedia adds the auto-generated YARA rule win_overlord_auto (derived from a single sample) for the win.overlord family.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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