Threat reportAPTTL-2026-0106
APT36/Transparent Tribe Deploys Crimson RAT and CapraRAT for India-Targeted Multi-Platform Espionage
APT36/Transparent Tribe (Pakistan-nexus, ISI-linked) deploys Crimson RAT (.NET) and CapraRAT (Android) for persistent espionage against Indian military, government, defense, diplomatic, and education sectors since 2013. Multi-platform arsenal spanning Windows (CrimsonRAT, ObliqueRAT), Android (CapraRAT, modified AhMyth), and USB worms.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0106 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| Attribution | APT36 (high confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Pakistan |
| Malware | CapraRAT, CrimsonRAT, ObliqueRAT - S0644 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1025 Data from Removable Media, T1027.003 Steganography, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1056.001 Keylogging, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.005 Visual Basic, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery and 17 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | Military, Government, Defense, Diplomatic, Education |
| Target regions | India, South Asia |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 10 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-02-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0106 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 32 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Office Macro Dropping PE to User Directory Followed by .NET TCP C2
Detects the CrimsonRAT delivery chain: Office application (WINWORD.EXE/EXCEL.EXE) spawning process that creates PE file in %APPDATA% or %TEMP%, followed by .NET process execution with outbound TCP connection. Transparent Tribe's primary delivery is VBA macros that decrypt embedded PE payloads hidden in document text boxes (Trend Micro, Cisco Talos). The macro extracts a ZIP, then executes the CrimsonRAT binary which establishes TCP C2.
- Language: Splunk SPL
- ATT&CK: T1566.001, T1204.002, T1059.005, T1547.001
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon EventCode=1 (ParentImage="*WINWORD.EXE" OR ParentImage="*EXCEL.EXE" OR ParentImage="*POWERPNT.EXE") | where match(Image, "(?i)(cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe)") OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)(\\AppData\\|\\Temp\\|\\ProgramData\\).*\.exe") | eval stage="Stage 1 — Office macro spawned execution" | append [search index=sysmon EventCode=11 (TargetFilename="*AppData*" OR TargetFilename="*Temp*") (TargetFilename="*.exe" OR TargetFilename="*.zip") | where match(Image, "(?i)(WINWORD|EXCEL|POWERPNT)") | eval stage="Stage 2 — PE/ZIP dropped to user directory by Office"] | append [search index=sysmon EventCode=3 NOT (DestinationPort=80 OR DestinationPort=443) DestinationPort>1024 | where match(Image, "(?i)(\\AppData\\|\\Temp\\).*\.exe$") | eval stage="Stage 3 — .NET binary from user dir establishing TCP C2 on non-standard port" | eval risk="HIGH — CrimsonRAT delivery chain match"] | stats count values(stage) as attack_stages values(Image) as processes values(DestinationPort) as c2_ports by dest | where mvcount(attack_stages) >= 2Known false positives:
- Legitimate Office add-ins that extract and execute binaries (rare — should be inventoried)
- Software deployment tools using Office macros (enterprise-specific whitelist)
Tuning notes: Correlate stages: Office macro → PE drop → TCP C2. Two or more stages on same host within 5 minutes = high-confidence CrimsonRAT delivery. Whitelist known legitimate Office plugins that create executables. Focus on non-standard TCP ports (CrimsonRAT uses various high ports including 18582).
- TCP C2 on Port 18582 or Non-Standard Ports from .NET Process in User Directory · unlock with TL Creds
- BMP File Download Followed by PE Extraction and Execution — ObliqueRAT Steganography · unlock with TL Creds
- RDP Certificate Fingerprint WIN-P9NRMH5G6M8 — APT36 C2 Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
- CrimsonRAT Behavioral Pattern — .NET Binary with Keylogger and Screen Capture from User Directory · unlock with TL Creds
- Known Transparent Tribe C2 Domains and Infrastructure Indicators · unlock with TL Creds
- CapraRAT Android APK — Excessive Permission Request for Video/Game Application · unlock with TL Creds
- CrimsonRAT .NET Function Name Detection via Assembly Analysis · unlock with TL Creds
- USB Worm Behavior — Autorun and Executable Copy to Removable Media · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-02-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 32 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0106.
Sample indicators (3 of 32)
- IP address:
173.249.50[.]243 - Domain:
shareboxs[.]net - IP address:
173.212.206[.]227
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 32 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
APT36, also known as Transparent Tribe, Earth Karkaddan, Operation C-Major, PROJECTM, and Mythic Leopard, is a Pakistan-nexus advanced persistent threat group active since at least 2013. The group is assessed with high confidence to be linked to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate, conducting persistent cyber-espionage operations primarily against Indian military and government targets within the India-Pakistan geopolitical context.
**V1 CORRECTION: The v1 seed data claimed 'Indian startup ecosystem' targeting. This is FABRICATED. All verified primary sources (Cisco Talos, Trend Micro, Kaspersky, SentinelOne, Proofpoint) consistently document targeting of Indian military, government, defense, diplomatic, and education sectors. The group expanded to education (universities/colleges) in late 2021 (Cisco Talos), NOT startups. No evidence of specific startup ecosystem targeting exists in any primary source.**
**WINDOWS ARSENAL:**
1. **Crimson RAT** — The group's primary implant since at least 2016. Written in .NET with minimal obfuscation (Trend Micro notes this may indicate limited funding). Capabilities: file enumeration, process listing, screenshot capture, keylogging module, USB worm module, browser credential theft, arbitrary command execution, file exfiltration/deletion, drive listing, system info collection. Communicates over TCP to C2 servers. Continuously updated with new capabilities and obfuscation. Delivered primarily via malicious Office documents (XLS/DOC) with VBA macros that decrypt embedded PE payloads hidden in text boxes.
2. **ObliqueRAT** — C/C++-based implant discovered by Cisco Talos (Feb 2020). Reserved for hyper-targeted operations where stealth is critical. Capabilities: system info, drive enumeration, file search/exfiltration (ZIP compressed), command execution, file download/deletion, process listing/killing, reverse shell. Evolved delivery: initially embedded in maldocs, later hosted on compromised legitimate websites (e.g., iiaonline.in — Indian Industries Association). Hidden inside BMP image files using steganography.
3. **Custom downloaders/droppers** — Lightweight tools for quick deployment, containing limited capabilities compared to CrimsonRAT/ObliqueRAT.
**ANDROID ARSENAL:**
4. **CapraRAT** — Custom Android RAT with design similarities to CrimsonRAT (shared function names, commands, capabilities — documented by Trend Micro Jan 2022). Observed since 2017. Capabilities: GPS location, SMS read/send, contacts, call history, audio recording, camera, screen recording, file browsing/upload/deletion, process management. Delivered as trojanized apps: YouTube mimics, TikTok, gaming apps, weapons enthusiast apps, romance/honeytrap apps. SentinelOne documented 'CapraTube Remix' campaign (2024) targeting gamers and weapons enthusiasts with WebView-wrapped YouTube/CrazyGames apps.
5. **Modified AhMyth RAT** — Open-source Android RAT customized by Transparent Tribe. Distributed as fake Aarogya Setu COVID-19 tracking app and porn-themed apps. Enhanced with audio surveillance, SMS deletion, auto-download of contacts/messages/WhatsApp media. C2 configuration fetched from external URL (not hardcoded).
6. **StealthAgent** — Earlier Android spyware (2018) intercepting calls/messages, tracking location, stealing photos.
**DELIVERY METHODS:** - Spearphishing emails with malicious Office documents (VBA macros) — primary vector - Honeytrap social engineering (fake profiles of women, romance-themed lures) - Fake government documents (military notices, pay commission updates, COVID-19 tracking) - Fake conference materials (agenda documents for defense conferences) - Fake domains: studentsportal[.]live, 7thcpcupdates[.]info, clawsindia[.]com, sharingmymedia[.]com - USB worm propagation module built into CrimsonRAT - Malicious Android APKs distributed via WhatsApp groups and phishing links - Trojanized apps mimicking legitimate services (YouTube, TikTok, COVID tracking)
**INFRASTRUCTURE:** Cisco Talos identified ZainHosting (Lahore, Pakistan) as infrastructure provider — registered ~2,000 domains including malicious ones. Email address rupees001@gmail.com linked to both legitimate hosting business and Transparent Tribe infrastructure. Uses typo-squatted domains (geo-news[.]tv mimicking geo[.]tv) with shared SSL certificates across malicious infrastructure.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1025 Data from Removable Media; T1056.001 Keylogging; T1113 Screen Capture; T1115 Clipboard Data; T1123 Audio Capture; T1125 Video Capture
defense-evasion
T1027.003 Steganography; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1070.004 File Deletion
exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
execution
T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1059.005 Visual Basic; T1204.002 Malicious File
discovery
T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery
command-and-control
T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1102 Web Service; T1571 Non-Standard Port
lateral-movement
T1091 Replication Through Removable Media
persistence
T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
credential-access
T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
initial-access
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment; T1566.002 Spearphishing Link; T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service
resource-development
Remediation
Patches
- N/A — social engineering delivery, no specific CVEs
Immediate actions
- Block known Transparent Tribe C2 domains: shareboxs.net, sharingmymedia.com, tryanotherhorse.com, viral91.xyz, geo-news.tv
- Block known C2 IPs: 173.249.50.243, 173.212.206.227, 89.45.67.160, 212.8.240.221
- Disable Office VBA macros via GPO for non-essential users
- Block sideloaded Android APKs — enforce Google Play-only installation policy for military/government devices
- Monitor for .NET processes with CrimsonRAT behavioral patterns (TCP C2 communication, keylogger module deployment)
Workarounds
- Disable macro execution in Office documents from external sources
- Block execution of .NET binaries from %TEMP% and %APPDATA% directories
- Android: do not install APKs from untrusted sources, especially via WhatsApp links
Longer-term hardening
- Implement email gateway sandboxing for Office document attachments
- Deploy EDR with .NET assembly analysis for CrimsonRAT detection
- Mobile Device Management (MDM) for government/military personnel — restrict app installation sources
- User awareness training: honeytrap social engineering, fake government document lures
- Network monitoring for TCP connections to known Transparent Tribe infrastructure patterns
- Monitor USB device connections — CrimsonRAT includes USB worm module
Timeline
- Transparent Tribe first observed by security researchers. Kaspersky traces activity back to 2013, initially targeting Indian military and government personnel with early variants of espionage tools. Source: https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-2/98233/
- Palo Alto Unit42 publishes link between 'ProjectM' (Pakistan-based actor) and Operation Transparent Tribe, establishing the Pakistan-nexus attribution. Source: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-projectm-link-found-between-pakistani-actor-and-operation-transparent-tribe/
- Earliest observed CapraRAT Android samples. Trend Micro identifies com.example.appcode.appcode package with public test certificate, suggesting early development phase. C2 hosted on android.viral91.xyz subdomain. Source: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/a/investigating-apt36-or-earth-karkaddans-attack-chain-and-malware.html
- Amnesty International publishes report on Pakistani agencies using Transparent Tribe's CrimsonRAT against human rights activists in Pakistan, expanding known targeting beyond Indian government/military. Source: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa33/8366/2018/en/
- Cisco Talos discovers ObliqueRAT, a C/C++-based implant attributed to Transparent Tribe. Reserved for hyper-targeted operations with stealth priority. Distributed via malicious documents. Source: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/obliquerat-hits-victims-via-maldocs/
- Transparent Tribe distributes fake Aarogya Setu COVID-19 tracking app (modified AhMyth RAT) targeting Indian military via WhatsApp groups. Indian Army issues warning about Pakistani intelligence operatives distributing the fake app. Source: https://securelist.com/transparent-tribe-part-2/98233/
- Team Cymru publishes comprehensive Transparent Tribe infrastructure mapping, documenting RDP certificate pattern 'WIN-P9NRMH5G6M8' across C2 servers. Source: https://team-cymru.com/blog/2021/07/02/transparent-tribe-apt-infrastructure-mapping-2/
- Transparent Tribe begins targeting Indian educational institutions (universities, colleges) — first documented expansion beyond military/government. Cisco Talos identifies locked-ioc-2, studentsportal[.]website domains and ZainHosting (Lahore) infrastructure. Source: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/transparent-tribe-targets-education/
- Trend Micro publishes comprehensive Earth Karkaddan (APT36) analysis documenting full attack chain: spearphishing → macro → Crimson RAT, plus CapraRAT Android component with CrimsonRAT code similarities. Source: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/a/investigating-apt36-or-earth-karkaddans-attack-chain-and-malware.html
- SentinelOne documents CapraTube Remix: updated CapraRAT APKs targeting gamers (CrazyGames), weapons enthusiasts (Forgotten Weapons YouTube), and TikTok users. Updated for Android 8.0+ compatibility. C2: locked-ioc-8 / locked-ioc-6:18582. Source: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/capratube-remix-transparent-tribes-android-spyware-targeting-gamers-weapons-enthusiasts/
- As of 2026-05-29, APT36/Transparent Tribe remains highly active and undisrupted, with CYFIRMA (Dec 2025) and The Hacker News (Jan 2026) documenting new weaponized-LNK/HTA campaigns deploying Crimson RAT, CapraRAT, ElizaRAT and DeskRAT against Indian government and academia. Bitdefender (Mar 2026) reports the group escalating to AI-generated "vibeware" implants in Nim/Zig/Crystal, plus CERT-In 2025 advisories, confirming ACTIVE status with no takedown.
Sources cited
- Amnesty International — Pakistan Digital Surveillance (CrimsonRAT vs Human Rights) amnesty.org · Advisory · 2018-05-15
- Cisco Talos — Transparent Tribe Targets Education Sector Cisco Talos · Vendor report · 2022-07-13
- Cisco Talos — Transparent Tribe APT Expands Windows Malware Arsenal Cisco Talos · Vendor report · 2021-09-02
- Trend Micro — Earth Karkaddan (APT36) Attack Chain and Malware Arsenal Trend Micro · Vendor report · 2022-01-17
- Kaspersky — Transparent Tribe Evolution Part 2 (Android RAT + ObliqueRAT) Kaspersky Securelist · Vendor report · 2020-08-26
- SentinelOne — CapraTube Remix (CapraRAT Gamers/Weapons Targeting) SentinelOne · Vendor report · 2024-07-01
- Team Cymru — Transparent Tribe Infrastructure Mapping team-cymru.com · Vendor report · 2021-07-02
- Palo Alto Unit42 — ProjectM Link to Transparent Tribe Unit 42 · Vendor report · 2016-03-29
- Cisco Talos — ObliqueRAT Hits Victims via Maldocs Cisco Talos · Vendor report · 2020-02-19
- K7 Computing — Transparent Tribe Targets Educational Institution labs.k7computing.com · Vendor report · 2022-06-01
More from APT36
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- Operation RapidRust: APT36 Deploys RUSTYSHADE, RUSTYMOVE, PSNATCH, and BASHNATCH Against India and Afghanistan Government/Defense Targets
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- Operation ShadowRecruit: APT36-Linked SheetAgent RAT Campaign Abuses ControlR RMM and Google Sheets C2 to Target Indian Government Job Seekers
- SHEETCREEP: C# Windows RAT Abusing the Google Sheets API v4 for Command-and-Control (APT36 / Transparent Tribe)
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Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.