Skip to navigation

Threat reportAPTTL-2026-2848

Antino Backdoor Uses Outlook and OneDrive for C2 in China-Nexus Espionage Campaign (UAT-11587)

highACTIVE

Cisco Talos tracks UAT-11587, a China-nexus (high confidence) cluster that has deployed the Rust-based Antino backdoor against government, defense, policy and academic organizations across eight Asian countries since September 2025. Antino uses Microsoft Graph to dead-drop C2 through Outlook (commands) and OneDrive (heartbeats, tools, exfiltration), delivered by a five-stage chain starting from spoofed spear-phishing.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-2848
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (endpoints; abuse of Microsoft Graph, Outlook, OneDrive, mshta.exe, GatherOsState.exe, Scripted Diagnostics)
AttributionUAT-11587 (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwareAntino
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1059.007 JavaScript, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1202 Indirect Command Execution, T1204.002 Malicious File and 12 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, defense, diplomatic, police - law enforcement, legislative, think tanks, academia, civil society
Target regionstaiwan, india, philippines, cambodia, pakistan, thailand, myanmar, syria
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-03, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2848 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 36 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: UAT-11587 Antino — Script Host Staging From Cloudflare Pages / R2 / CloudFront (Exploitation)

Detects mshta.exe, wscript.exe or cscript.exe launched with an HTA/WSF payload or a URL pointing at *.pages.dev, *.r2.dev or *.cloudfront.net. This is stage 1-2 of the UAT-11587 five-stage Antino chain (HTA/WSF stager contacting Cloudflare Pages, then a JScript downloader pulling RC4-encrypted resources from R2/CloudFront). Community OSINT (TL_OSINT_Scan) corroborates the Pages and CloudFront hosts, first sighted Jan 2026, before the vendor report.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1218.005, T1059.007, T1204.002, T1105
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security_4688
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 (Image="*mshta.exe" OR Image="*wscript.exe" OR Image="*cscript.exe") (CommandLine="*.pages.dev*" OR CommandLine="*.r2.dev*" OR CommandLine="*.cloudfront.net*" OR CommandLine="*File_download?m=*" OR CommandLine="*.hta*" OR CommandLine="*.wsf*")
| eval remote_stager=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)https?://"),"yes","no")
| where remote_stager="yes" OR match(CommandLine,"(?i)(Downloads|AppData|Temp|Public)")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parents by host, User, Image
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (".pages.dev", ".r2.dev", ".cloudfront.net", "File_download?m=", ".hta", ".wsf")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)https?://" or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Downloads", "AppData", "Temp", "Public")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Script Host Staging From Cloudflare Pages, R2 or CloudFront (UAT-11587 Antino)
id: a3f1c2d4-7b86-4e21-9c55-1d0e8f6b2a11
status: experimental
description: Detects mshta.exe, wscript.exe or cscript.exe whose command line references Cloudflare Pages, Cloudflare R2 or CloudFront hosts, the delivery pattern of the UAT-11587 Antino HTA/WSF stager and JScript downloader.
references:
  - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/china-nexus-uat-11587-targets-government-and-policy-organizations-across-asia-with-antino-backdoor/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-10-02
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.007
  - attack.t1204.002
  - attack.defense-evasion
  - attack.t1218.005
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
  selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '.pages.dev'
      - '.r2.dev'
      - '.cloudfront.net'
      - 'File_download?m='
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Internal web applications or admin scripts hosted on Cloudflare Pages or CloudFront that are launched through a script host
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legacy intranet HTA applications or admin WSF scripts that are legitimately fetched over HTTPS from a cloud-hosted origin
  • Software packagers that invoke wscript.exe against a CloudFront-hosted installer script

Tuning notes: Allow-list the specific internal HTA/WSF paths and signed parent processes in your estate. Mshta or wscript with a remote URL is rarely legitimate for standard users, so consider blocking rather than alerting. Enable Sysmon EventCode 1 with full command-line capture.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • UAT-11587 Antino — Spoofed Spear-Phish From [indicator] With Pages.dev Tracking Link (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • UAT-11587 Antino — sdiagnhost/GatherOsState Spawning Shells and Discovery Commands (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • UAT-11587 Antino — Sustained Graph API Beaconing From Non-Browser Process (C2) · unlock with TL Creds
  • UAT-11587 Antino — mshta.exe Loading .NET CLR for BinaryFormatter Chain (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • UAT-11587 Antino — HKCU Run Key Persistence by Carrier or Script Host (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • UAT-11587 Antino — DNS/Network Contact With Known Delivery and Staging Infrastructure (C2 / Delivery) · unlock with TL Creds
  • UAT-11587 Antino — [indicator] Sideloading [indicator] (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • UAT-11587 Antino — Microsoft Graph / Outlook DNS Lookups From Anomalous Process (C2) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-03, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 36 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2848.

Sample indicators (3 of 36)

  • IP address: 103.27.110[.]220
  • Domain: osc-cdn[.]com
  • URL: hxxps://my-662ylt3w[.]pages[.]dev/Institutional_Disciplinary_Action_Report_May_2026.hta

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 36 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

36 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

3 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community, which observed at least one of them before this report was published. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

Cisco Talos assesses with high confidence that UAT-11587 is a China-nexus cluster active from September 2025 through July 2026. By July 2026 Talos had identified at least 16 affected institutions across Taiwan, India, the Philippines, Cambodia, Pakistan, Thailand, Myanmar and Syria; secondary reporting cites approximately 350 compromised endpoints. Targeted sectors include defense and national security, executive government, foreign affairs/diplomatic services, justice and law enforcement, legislative institutions, government IT, think tanks, universities and civil-society groups. Activity accelerated March-June 2026, with roughly 57 new endpoints observed in India on June 8-9, 2026.

Initial access is spear-phishing. Operators spoof a trusted organization in the RFC5322 From header while the SMTP envelope sender is the attacker-controlled domain osc-cdn.com (SPF passes via Migadu; DMARC fails but is accepted because the impersonated domain publishes p=none). Some lures reproduce Gmail's native attachment-preview widget inside the HTML body using four inline Base64 PNG images wrapped in an anchor to an attacker Cloudflare Pages URL of the form my-<project>.pages.dev/File_download?m=<target-identifier>, which gives per-recipient tracking. Earlier waves (Sep-Nov 2025) delivered attachments directly with Philippines-themed content. Decoys include a Taiwan information-warfare workshop document, a Taiwan Ministry of Finance legislative tax ruling and a CSIS Indo-Pacific 2026 forecast; other recovered lure filenames reference Bajo de Masinloc, cross-border repression, a Tehran bilateral summit and an Indian cabinet-meeting item (.doc.exe).

The infection chain has five stages. (1) An HTA or WSF stager executed via mshta.exe/Windows Script Host contacts Cloudflare Pages. (2) A JScript downloader retrieves three encrypted resources from Cloudflare R2 or Amazon CloudFront, decrypting them with RC4 and a custom Base64 decoder. (3) A .NET BinaryFormatter deserialization chain (System.Windows.Forms.AxHost+State gadget with ActivitySurrogateSelector) loads TestAssembly.dll into mshta.exe memory. (4) TestAssembly.dll downloads a lure-specific decoy plus a three-file sideloading bundle. (5) The legitimate Microsoft ADK binary GatherOsState.exe sideloads the malicious slc.dll (Antino) and calls its SLOpen export.

Antino is a Rust-compiled Windows backdoor (PE manifest AntinoApp in Gen2, custom .cfg section holding XOR-encrypted JSON config with alternating key 0xAB 0xCD). It supports cmd, powershell, system_info, execute_program, list_files, upload_file, download_file, load_shellcode, add_to_run (HKCU Run persistence) and exit. C2 runs entirely over Microsoft Graph: the implant polls an attacker-controlled Outlook mailbox every 10 seconds for messages with subject command_req_[session_id] and replies with command_res_[session_id] (JSON body: command_type, command_data, request_id); OneDrive handles registration/heartbeats (/antino/heartbeats/{id}.json, roughly every minute), tool delivery (/antino_uploads/) and exfiltration (/antino_downloads/). Gen1 (Oct 2025) used email drafts for heartbeats and XOR/Base64 hostname-derived session IDs; Gen2 (Dec 2025-Jan 2026) moved heartbeats to OneDrive JSON and random UUIDv4 session IDs. Shellcode is protected with a Sleep hook that flips VirtualAlloc regions to PAGE_READWRITE and XOR-encrypts them during sleep, restored via a vectored exception handler. The actor also abuses Windows Scripted Diagnostics (CScriptedDiag CLSID {1F3D8AA5-9EBF-4EE4-85C2-EA40379AEDE8} from sdiageng.dll, Program Compatibility Wizard package C:\Windows\diagnostics\system\PCW) so that sdiagnhost.exe runs attacker-controlled PowerShell.

Attribution rests on decoy metadata (zh-CN language tag, Simplified Chinese author value 未定义, +08:00 creation timestamps), ten Antino builds referencing the mainland-China Rust mirror rsproxy.cn, and CloudFront infrastructure (d32tpl7xt7175h.cloudfront.net) shared with reported China-nexus UNC6384. Talos notes some overlap with Jewelbug (Symantec) but designates UAT-11587 a separate cluster because of different core malware and C2 architecture, and found no connection to Jewelbug's financially motivated activity. Single primary source: Cisco Talos; no CVE is involved.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1202 Indirect Command Execution; T1218.005 Mshta; T1574.001 DLL; T1620 Reflective Code Loading; T1684.001 Impersonation

Discovery

T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1059.007 JavaScript; T1204.002 Malicious File

Command and Control

T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Persistence

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder; T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading

Initial Access

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment; T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

Exfiltration

T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains; T1583.006 Web Services; T1608.001 Upload Malware

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Hunt for mshta.exe or wscript.exe retrieving content from *.pages.dev, *.r2.dev or *.cloudfront.net
  • Hunt for GatherOsState.exe running from user-writable directories and loading slc.dll
  • Alert on sdiagnhost.exe spawning PowerShell or followed by HKCU Run key changes
  • Block osc-cdn.com, microsoft-flash.com, wps-cn.com and the listed R2/CloudFront/Pages hosts
  • Review Microsoft Graph activity (graph.microsoft.com, login.microsoftonline.com) correlated with suspicious process execution

Workarounds

  • Apply Cisco Talos ClamAV signatures (Html.Trojan.UAT-11587, Win.Trojan.UAT-11587, Txt.Trojan.UAT-11587) and Snort rules 1:66880, 1:66881, 1:66882

Longer-term hardening

  • Enforce DMARC reject on owned domains and flag mail where envelope sender and From domain differ
  • Restrict or disable HTA/WSF execution (mshta.exe, wscript.exe) for standard users
  • Apply Entra/Conditional Access controls and monitor for unmanaged-tenant Graph API use from endpoints
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral coverage of DLL sideloading and in-memory shellcode

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (endpoints; abuse of Microsoft Graph, Outlook, OneDrive, mshta.exe, GatherOsState.exe, Scripted Diagnostics)

Timeline

Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source

  • Earliest UAT-11587 / Antino activity observed by Cisco Talos (Sep-Nov 2025: Philippines-themed emails with direct attachments)
  • Antino Gen1 builds (no manifest; heartbeats via email drafts; XOR/Base64 hostname session IDs) observed from October 2025
  • Antino Gen2 builds (AntinoApp manifest, UUIDv4 session IDs, OneDrive JSON heartbeats) appear, Dec 2025-Jan 2026
  • Philippines HTA campaigns and broader policy/geopolitical lures begin in January 2026
  • Operations accelerate March-June 2026 across the Philippines, Taiwan, Cambodia, Myanmar, Syria, Pakistan and Thailand
  • Cloudflare Pages-hosted HTA lures dated May 2026 in circulation (e.g. Institutional_Disciplinary_Action_Report_May_2026.hta, Tehran_Bilateral_Summit_Proceedings_May2026.hta, Internal_Review_Dossier_0520.hta).
  • Spike of roughly 57 new compromised endpoints in India on June 8-9, 2026
  • By July 2026 Talos identifies at least 16 affected institutions in eight countries (about 350 endpoints per secondary reporting)
  • Cisco Talos research on UAT-11587 and Antino publicly reported; The Hacker News coverage published

Update history

Sources cited

Previous and next in apt

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated .

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats