Threat reportAPTTL-2026-0159
CRESCENTHARVEST — Iranian IRGC-Aligned Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting Protestors & Dissidents via DLL Sideloading with Signed Google Executable
Acronis Threat Research Unit (TRU) uncovered CRESCENTHARVEST, a cyberespionage campaign targeting supporters of Iran's ongoing protests. The attack delivers a dual-module malware payload — a RAT and infostealer — via DLL sideloading using a signed Google Chrome Software Reporter Tool executable, with initial access through malicious .LNK files disguised as protest-related media bundled in RAR archives.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0159 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| Nation-state nexus | Iran |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1056.001 Keylogging, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery and 19 more in the attack flow |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 11 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-02-28, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0159 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 23 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: CRESCENTHARVEST Post-Exploitation — NetworkProfile EventID 10000 Persistence + Keylogging + Chrome Encryption Bypass
Detects CRESCENTHARVEST post-exploitation: (1) Novel scheduled task persistence triggered by NetworkProfile EventID 10000 (fires on any network connectivity change, including after reboot). (2) Keylogger output file daT.txt in spool\Drivers\color\ directory. (3) Chrome app-bound encryption bypass via COM IElevator broker — decrypted key saved to decrypted_appbound_key.txt. (4) Telegram Desktop tdata session theft staged to C:\Windows\Temp data.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1053.005, T1546, T1056.001, T1555.003, T1528
- Data sources: sysmon, edr_telemetry, file_monitoring, scheduled_task_logs, named_pipe_monitoring
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
| search (
(EventCode=1 AND Image="*schtasks*" AND CommandLine="*NetworkProfile*" AND CommandLine="*10000*")
OR (EventCode=11 AND TargetFilename="*spool\\Drivers\\color\\daT.txt")
OR (EventCode=11 AND TargetFilename="*decrypted_appbound_key*")
OR (EventCode=11 AND TargetFilename="*\\Temp\\tdata*")
OR (EventCode=17 AND Image="*software_reporter_tool*")
OR (EventCode=1 AND Image="*powershell*" AND CommandLine="*IElevator*")
)
| eval indicator=case(
match(CommandLine, "NetworkProfile.*10000|10000.*NetworkProfile"), "eventid_10000_persistence",
match(TargetFilename, "daT\.txt"), "keylogger_output",
match(TargetFilename, "decrypted_appbound_key"), "chrome_encryption_bypass",
match(TargetFilename, "Temp.*tdata"), "telegram_session_theft",
EventCode=17, "named_pipe_credential_share",
match(CommandLine, "IElevator"), "com_elevation_broker",
1=1, "unknown"
)
| stats count by Computer, User, indicator, Image, TargetFilename, CommandLine, _time
| sort _time
| table _time, Computer, User, indicator, Image, TargetFilename, CommandLineMicrosoft KQL
union
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "NetworkProfile" and ProcessCommandLine has "10000"
| extend Indicator = "eventid_10000_persistence"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Indicator, ProcessCommandLine
),
(
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "daT.txt" and FolderPath has "spool\\Drivers\\color"
| extend Indicator = "keylogger_output"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Indicator, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName
),
(
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName has "decrypted_appbound_key"
| extend Indicator = "chrome_encryption_bypass"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Indicator, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName
),
(
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FolderPath has "\\Temp\\tdata"
| extend Indicator = "telegram_session_theft"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Indicator, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName
)
| sort by Timestamp ascSigma
title: CRESCENTHARVEST — NetworkProfile EventID 10000 Scheduled Task Persistence
id: b2c3d4e5-f6a7-4b8c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e
status: experimental
description: Detects novel CRESCENTHARVEST persistence — scheduled task triggered by NetworkProfile EventID 10000 (fires on any network connectivity change). Also detects keylogger output and Chrome encryption bypass artifacts.
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/02/28
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.credential_access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1053.005
- attack.t1546
- attack.t1056.001
- attack.t1555.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'NetworkProfile'
- '10000'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate scheduled tasks using NetworkProfile EventID 10000 triggers (extremely unusual)
level: criticalKnown false positives:
- Legitimate NetworkProfile EventID 10000 scheduled task triggers (extremely unusual in enterprise)
- Legitimate Chrome diagnostic tools writing to appbound key paths (none known)
Tuning notes: NetworkProfile EventID 10000 as schtasks trigger is CRESCENTHARVEST signature — novel persistence technique not seen in other campaigns. daT.txt in spool\Drivers\color is definitive keylogger output. decrypted_appbound_key.txt is Chrome encryption bypass artifact. Telegram tdata in Windows\Temp is session theft staging.
- CRESCENTHARVEST Exploitation — Chrome App-Bound Encryption Bypass via COM IElevator Broker · unlock with TL Creds
- CRESCENTHARVEST Post-Exploitation — Keylogger daT.txt + Browser Credential Harvest + Telegram tdata Theft · unlock with TL Creds
- CRESCENTHARVEST Kill Chain Correlation — LNK Delivery to DLL Sideload to JSON C2 Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
- CRESCENTHARVEST Exploitation — RAR Archive with Malicious .LNK Files + conhost --headless Nesting · unlock with TL Creds
- CRESCENTHARVEST DLL Sideloading — Deprecated [indicator] Loading Unsigned Modules · unlock with TL Creds
- CRESCENTHARVEST C2 Infrastructure + Anti-Analysis — JSON HTTPS + XOR Deobfuscation + Job Object Anti-Debug · unlock with TL Creds
- CRESCENTHARVEST Exploitation — LNK conhost --headless Chain + [indicator] DLL Sideloading · unlock with TL Creds
- CRESCENTHARVEST C2 — JSON HTTPS to [indicator] + Multipart Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-02-28, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 23 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0159.
Sample indicators (3 of 23)
- IP address:
185.242.105[.]230 - Domain:
servicelog-information[.]com - File hash:
0fbc1f9cbacf076d2ced458e2d1afff0c615640a4647996bca2b651b80f90a6e
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 23 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
CRESCENTHARVEST is a targeted cyberespionage campaign discovered by Acronis TRU in early 2026, designed to surveil and compromise Farsi-speaking Iranians sympathetic to the ongoing anti-IRGC protests. The campaign leverages geopolitical developments to deliver malware through social engineering, bundling malicious .LNK files alongside authentic protest images, videos, and a Farsi-language report titled 'the rebellious cities of Iran.'
The infection chain begins with spear-phishing or protracted social engineering, delivering a RAR archive containing decoy media and two malicious .LNK shortcuts disguised as video and image files. When clicked, the .LNK files invoke nested conhost.exe processes with --headless switches to obscure execution, spawning cmd.exe then PowerShell to extract a ZIP payload embedded within the .LNK to the user's %TEMP% folder.
Persistence is established through a novel scheduled task mechanism: instead of traditional startup triggers, the task fires on Windows NetworkProfile EventID 10000, executing the payload whenever the system establishes network connectivity — including after reboot or offline-to-online transitions.
The payload uses DLL sideloading via software_reporter_tool.exe, a legitimate Google-signed binary (Chrome's deprecated Software Reporter Tool, removed in 2023). The executable loads two malicious DLLs using LoadLibraryExA without path restrictions, enabling search order hijacking.
Module 1 (urtcbased140d_d.dll) is a C++ implant that bypasses Chrome's app-bound encryption by instantiating the browser's COM elevation broker (IElevator interface) to decrypt the master key from the Local State file. The decrypted key is saved to APPDATA\decrypted_appbound_key.txt and shared with Module 2 via a named pipe. This module shows heavy code overlap with the open-source ChromElevator project. PDB path artifact: E:\new\stealer\Stealer\x64\Release.
Module 2 (version.dll) is the main RAT/infostealer with extensive capabilities: keylogging via WH_KEYBOARD_LL hooks (logging to C:\Windows\System32\spool\Drivers\color\daT.txt), browser credential harvesting (Chrome, Firefox, Edge), Telegram Desktop session theft, user enumeration, shell command execution, directory traversal, DLL loading, WMI-based security product detection, and system profiling. It uses PEB walking to resolve APIs dynamically and XOR decryption with key '!@#$6756' for string obfuscation. Anti-analysis employs Windows Job Objects to restrict process memory ('Process on a Diet' technique).
C2 communications use JSON over HTTPS via WinHTTP APIs. The implant registers with {"Identifier":"admin"} and receives commands like KeyLog, Tel_s, F_log, Cook, GetUser, shell. A notable bug causes the malware to send the C2 domain as its User-Agent instead of the intended Chrome UA string, reducing evasion effectiveness. Multiple predefined C2 endpoints (/register_agent, /info, /Out, /upload, etc.) exist but most operations route through /Out and /upload.
Infrastructure centers on servicelog-information[.]com resolving to 185.242.105.230 hosted in Riga, Latvia on ASN AS42532 (VEESP-LV-AS), with historical Cloudflare CDN proxying via AS13335. The code shows methodological similarities to campaigns attributed to Iranian threat groups documented by Check Point Research (Educated Manticore, Nimbus Manticore), including similar LNK unpacking scripts, JSON-based C2 communication, and WinHTTP exfiltration patterns.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1056.001 Keylogging; T1560 Archive Collected Data
stealth
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1574.001 DLL; T1622 Debugger Evasion
exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
execution
T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1204.002 Malicious File
discovery
T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1087.001 Local Account; T1518.001 Security Software Discovery
command-and-control
T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1132.001 Standard Encoding; T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography
credential-access
T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
privilege-escalation
T1546 Event Triggered Execution
initial-access
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment; T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
resource-development
T1583.003 Virtual Private Server; T1587.001 Malware; T1588.002 Tool
Timeline
- Google deprecates and removes Software Reporter Tool (locked-ioc-14) from Chrome, the binary later abused in this campaign for DLL sideloading.
- The Google code-signing certificate on locked-ioc-14 expires in 2024, but the binary remains signed and usable for sideloading.
- Threat actor prepares Farsi-language protest report ('the rebellious cities of Iran') and bundles authentic protest media with malicious .LNK files in RAR archives.
- Earliest protest images used in CRESCENTHARVEST decoy materials dated to January 9, 2026, establishing the campaign's minimum start date.
- C2 domain locked-ioc-13 observed active, resolving to locked-ioc-18 (VEESP-LV-AS, Latvia) with intermittent Cloudflare CDN proxying.
- Acronis TRU begins actively monitoring the CRESCENTHARVEST campaign after discovering malware samples and bundled decoy files.
- Acronis TRU publishes full technical analysis of CRESCENTHARVEST campaign including IOCs, attack chain, and attribution analysis. Source: https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/crescentharvest-iranian-protestors-and-dissidents-targeted-in-cyberespionage-campaign/
- Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes TL-2026-0159 with full MITRE mapping, IOCs, detections, and simulation coverage.
- As of 2026-05-29, CRESCENTHARVEST remains ACTIVE: the Acronis TRU report and corroborating coverage (Hacker News, The Record) describe an ongoing Iranian IRGC-aligned campaign with no reported takedown, sinkhole, or disruption of C2 locked-ioc-13 (Latvia VEESP). With no CVE to patch, no successor, and IRGC dissident-surveillance and Manticore APT activity escalating Feb-May 2026, the threat persists.
Sources cited
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: Iran's Social Engineering and Spear-Phishing Campaigns cyber.gc.ca · Advisory · 2024-01-01
- Acronis TRU: CRESCENTHARVEST — Iranian Protestors and Dissidents Targeted in Cyberespionage Campaign acronis.com · Research · 2026-02-17
- Check Point Research: Educated Manticore — Iran-Aligned Threat Actor Targeting Israel Check Point Research · Research · 2023-05-09
- Check Point Research: Iranian Educated Manticore Targets Leading Tech Academics Check Point Research · Research · 2025-01-01
- Check Point Research: Nimbus Manticore Deploys New Malware Targeting Europe Check Point Research · Research · 2025-01-01
- Google TAG: Untangling Iran APT42 Operations Google Cloud · Research · 2024-08-01
- Harfang Lab: RedKitten AI-Accelerated Campaign Targeting Iranian Protests harfanglab.io · Research · 2026-01-01
- Unit 42: LNK Malware Execution Techniques Unit 42 · Research · 2024-01-01
- Iran International: IRGC Monitoring and Suppression of Dissent iranintl.com · News · 2026-02-01
- BBC: IRGC Suppression of Protests bbc.com · News · 2026-01-01
- DW: How Dangerous Are Iranian Secret Services in Germany dw.com · News · 2026-01-01
Previous and next in apt
- MuddyWater Operation Olalampo — Iran MOIS-Nexus APT Deploys New Malware Variants with Telegram Bot C2 Targeting Middle Eastern Governments and Critical Infrastructure Previous report
- CHAR Rust Backdoor + GhostFetch/GhostBackDoor/HTTP_VIP — Iran MOIS-Linked MuddyWater AI-Assisted Malware Suite with Telegram Bot C2 Next report
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 11 sources; published ; last updated —.