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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-0763

Iranian "Dream Job" Campaign (TA455 / Charming Kitten) — SnailResin Loader & SlugResin Backdoor Targeting Aerospace, Aviation & Defense

highACTIVE

TA455, an Iranian threat actor assessed as a subgroup of Charming Kitten / APT35 (tracked as UNC1549 by Mandiant and Yellow Dev 13 by PwC), has run a social-engineering "Dream Job" campaign since at least September 2023 against aerospace, aviation, and defense personnel.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0763
Also known asIranian Dream Job, Iranian Dream Job Campaign, Dream Job (Iranian)
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (64-bit); LinkedIn LinkedIn (social engineering vector — recruiter personas)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-427, CWE-426
AttributionTA455 (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusIran
MalwareBassBreaker, SlugResin, SnailResin
ToolsGitHub dead-drop resolver (account: msdnedgesupport)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1021 Remote Services, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1090 Proxy, T1102 Web Service, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1204 User Execution, T1553 Subvert Trust Controls, T1555 Credentials from Password Stores, T1566 Phishing, T1574 Hijack Execution Flow and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsaerospace, aviation, defense, government
Target regionsMiddle East, Israel, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, India, Albania
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-10-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0763 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: SnailResin secur32.dll Side-Load From User-Writable Path — Exploitation

Detects the core TA455 SnailResin execution event: a signed-looking host EXE (SignedConnection.exe) loading a co-located, relocated secur32.dll from a user-writable directory (Temp/Downloads/Users) instead of System32/SysWOW64. This is DLL search-order hijack / side-loading where the malicious loader masquerades as the legitimate Windows Security Support Provider module. Fires when the secur32.dll image-load originates outside the legitimate system paths.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1574.002, T1036.005, T1204.002
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_defender_atp, windows_security
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\secur32.dll" NOT (ImageLoaded="C:\\Windows\\System32\\*" OR ImageLoaded="C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*" OR ImageLoaded="C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*") 
| eval susp_path=if(match(lower(Image),"\\\\(users|temp|downloads|appdata)\\\\"),"user_writable","other") 
| where susp_path="user_writable" OR like(lower(Image),"%signedconnection.exe") 
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Image) as host_image values(ImageLoaded) as loaded_dll values(Signed) as signed by Computer User 
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime) 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

Microsoft KQL

DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "secur32.dll"
| where FolderPath !startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32\\" and FolderPath !startswith "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\" and FolderPath !startswith "C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\"
| where FolderPath has_any ("\\Users\\", "\\Temp\\", "\\Downloads\\", "\\AppData\\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: SnailResin secur32.dll Side-Load From Non-System32 Path
id: 7c3a1e64-2d51-4b9a-9f0e-0763a1b2c3d4
status: experimental
description: Detects secur32.dll loaded from a user-writable path rather than System32/SysWOW64, indicating TA455 SnailResin DLL side-loading via SignedConnection.exe.
references:
    - https://www.clearskysec.com/irdreamjob24/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/10
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1574.002
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\secur32.dll'
    filter_legit:
        ImageLoaded|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
    condition: selection and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
    - Portable applications bundling their own secur32.dll (rare)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate portable software that ships and loads its own copy of secur32.dll from an application directory
  • Software installers staging DLLs in Temp during setup

Tuning notes: Allow-list known good application directories that legitimately ship secur32.dll. Pair with code-signing checks on the host EXE and correlate with recent ZIP extraction events to reduce noise.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • [indicator] Execution From ZIP-Extracted User Path — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • SMB Lateral Movement + Admin-Share Access Post-Compromise — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Periodic Web Beacon To Trusted-Service-Fronted C2 — Command & Control · unlock with TL Creds
  • Code-Signed Host EXE Loading Relocated [indicator] — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Dream Job ZIP Drops EXE+DLL Pair To User Path — Exploitation/Delivery · unlock with TL Creds
  • GitHub Dead-Drop Resolver Query From Loader Process — Command & Control · unlock with TL Creds
  • Browser Credential-Store Access Following [indicator] Load — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • GitHub Dead-Drop Resolver + xboxapicenter C2 Beacon — Command & Control · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-10-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0763.

Sample indicators (3 of 26)

  • IP address: 185.186.244[.]130
  • Domain: careers2find[.]com
  • File hash: 918e70e3f5fdafad28effd512b2f2d21c86cb3d3f14ec14f7ff9e7f0760fd760

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

26 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Fake recruiting sites (careers2find[.]com) and AI-generated LinkedIn recruiter personas deliver a ZIP containing SignedConnection.exe and a malicious secur32.dll that is DLL side-loaded as the SnailResin loader, activating the SlugResin backdoor (an updated BassBreaker variant). The toolset's deliberate overlap with North Korean Kimsuky/Lazarus "Dream Job" operations creates attribution ambiguity.

ClearSky Cyber Security published the "Iranian Dream Job" report on 2024-11-12, attributing an espionage campaign active since at least September 2023 to the Iranian threat actor TA455. TA455 is assessed to be a sub-cluster of Charming Kitten (APT35 / Mint Sandstorm / CALANQUE), tracked by Mandiant as UNC1549 and by PwC as Yellow Dev 13, and linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The campaign targets the aerospace, aviation, and defense sectors with a particular focus on Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, India, and possibly Albania.

The operation borrows the well-known "Dream Job" social-engineering playbook. TA455 operators impersonate recruiters using fake LinkedIn personas decorated with AI-generated profile photographs and stolen identities of real individuals. Victims are engaged through LinkedIn messaging and a fraudulent recruitment portal, careers2find[.]com, fronted through Cloudflare to obscure the true hosting location. The site (and accompanying PDF "instructions") guide the target through downloading a ZIP archive that mixes benign job-related documents with a signed executable, SignedConnection.exe, and a malicious secur32.dll.

When SignedConnection.exe is launched, it side-loads the trojanized secur32.dll — the SnailResin loader (Trojan:Win64/SnailResin) — which decrypts and runs SlugResin (Backdoor:Win64/SlugResin), an updated version of the BassBreaker backdoor that grants remote access for follow-on credential theft, lateral movement, and secondary payload deployment. To resolve command-and-control infrastructure, SnailResin uses GitHub as a dead-drop resolver: it reads encoded C2 locations from seemingly innocuous GitHub accounts such as "msdnedgesupport", then communicates with backend infrastructure (e.g., xboxapicenter[.]com) while blending into the traffic of trusted services including GitHub, Cloudflare, and Microsoft Azure.

The campaign's most notable analytic feature is intentional tradecraft overlap with North Korean "Dream Job" operations (Lazarus/Kimsuky), which ClearSky assesses may be deliberate false-flag/attribution-confusion or evidence of tool-sharing, complicating attribution for defenders.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Lateral Movement

T1021 Remote Services

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1574 Hijack Execution Flow; T1656 Impersonation

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1102 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Execution

T1204 User Execution

defense-impairment

T1553 Subvert Trust Controls

Credential Access

T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

Initial Access

T1566 Phishing

stealth

T1574 Hijack Execution Flow

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1585 Establish Accounts; T1587 Develop Capabilities; T1588 Obtain Capabilities

Reconnaissance

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block careers2find[.]com and xboxapicenter[.]com at web/DNS proxies and perimeter
  • Block the C2 IPs 185.186.244.130, 89.221.225.249, and 77.91.74.171 at the firewall
  • Hunt for SignedConnection.exe and side-loaded secur32.dll outside System32, and for the listed SHA-256/SHA-1/MD5 hashes across the fleet
  • Alert on outbound requests to GitHub accounts used as dead-drop resolvers (e.g., msdnedgesupport) from non-developer hosts

Workarounds

  • Configure Windows to prefer KnownDLLs and safe DLL search order; block DLL loads from the same directory as user-downloaded executables
  • Strip or quarantine executables and DLLs from inbound ZIP archives at the mail/web gateway

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for DLL side-loading and unsigned/relocated secur32.dll loads
  • Enforce application allow-listing (WDAC/AppLocker) to prevent execution of ZIP-delivered binaries from user-writable paths
  • Security-awareness training focused on LinkedIn recruiter lures and unsolicited 'dream job' offers for aerospace/defense staff
  • Restrict and monitor egress to code-hosting/cloud services from sensitive segments; treat GitHub/Cloudflare/Azure traffic as in-scope for inspection

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (64-bit)
    Vulnerable versions: targeted endpoints running side-loaded secur32.dll
  • LinkedIn — LinkedIn (social engineering vector — recruiter personas)
    Vulnerable versions: N/A — abused legitimate platform

Timeline

Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source

  • Mandiant later reports suspected UNC1549 activity ongoing since at least June 2022 (exact day not stated).
  • TA455 begins the Iranian "Dream Job" campaign, targeting aerospace, aviation, and defense personnel via fake recruiting sites and LinkedIn personas (assessed start: at least September 2023).
  • Fake recruitment portal locked-ioc-13 stood up behind Cloudflare; AI-generated LinkedIn recruiter personas created to engage targets.
  • Mandiant reports UNC1549 job-lure attacks on aerospace, aviation and defense in Israel and the UAE using MINIBIKE, MINIBUS and LIGHTRAIL with Azure C2 (exact day not stated).
  • ClearSky observes a LinkedIn recruiter account used by the actor created roughly four months prior; at least two additional TA455-generated recruiter personas identified.
  • Victims delivered ZIP archives containing locked-ioc-10 and malicious locked-ioc-17; DLL side-loading executes the SnailResin loader, activating the SlugResin backdoor.
  • SnailResin observed using GitHub accounts (e.g., msdnedgesupport) as dead-drop resolvers to obtain encoded C2 locations, blending into GitHub/Cloudflare/Azure traffic.
  • The Hacker News reports on the campaign — "Iranian Hackers Use 'Dream Job' Lures to Deploy SnailResin Malware in Aerospace Attacks" — summarizing ClearSky's findings on the SnailResin/SlugResin chain and GitHub dead-drop C2.
  • ClearSky Cyber Security publishes the "Iranian Dream Job" report (Ver 1.1), detailing TA455 attribution, SnailResin/SlugResin tooling, IOCs, and overlap with North Korean Dream Job operations.
  • Sector ISAC and threat-advisory outlets (RH-ISAC, Rewterz, Infosecurity Magazine) disseminate the TA455 "Dream Job" IOCs and TTPs to aviation/defense defenders, flagging the campaign as actively targeting critical industries.
  • Follow-on reporting tracks UNC1549/TA455 expanding LinkedIn job-lure operations into telecom targets with MINIBIKE malware, confirming a persistent operational pattern.

Update history

Sources cited

More from TA455

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated .

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