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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-1458

Iran-Linked Actors Track US Military Personnel via SS7 Roaming Abuse and Ad-Tech Location Data

highACTIVE

US military personnel and contractors deployed across the Gulf were tracked before and during the Iran war through two parallel surveillance vectors: abuse of SS7 roaming-location queries against Middle Eastern telecom networks, and Iran-linked exploitation of commercial advertising/real-time-bidding (RTB) location data to geolocate phones in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-1458
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMultiple Regional Mobile Network Operators SS7 (Signaling System 7) inter-carrier roaming signaling infrastructure; Mobile Advertising / Ad-Tech Industry Real-time bidding (RTB) location data broker pipelines and advertising SDK identifiers (AAID/IDFA-class)
Nation-state nexusIran
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1020 Automated Exfiltration, T1036 Masquerading, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1102 Web Service, T1119 Automated Collection, T1213 Data from Information Repositories, T1430.002 Impersonate SS7 Nodes, T1449 Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS, T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service, T1583 Acquire Infrastructure, T1584 Compromise Infrastructure and 5 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, military, defense-contractors
Target regionsMiddle East, Gulf, bahrain, iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources13 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-07-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-1458 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 16 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: SS7 MAP-Layer Location-Query Burst Against Roaming Subscriber (SPL)

Detects a burst of MAP-layer ProvideSubscriberInfo / AnyTimeInterrogation-class location-request queries against a single roaming IMSI within a short window, consistent with SS7 'ping' location-tracking abuse fingerprinted to an Iranian mobile network operator in the TL-2026-1458 campaign against US personnel roaming in Bahrain/Iraq.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1450, T1590
  • Data sources: telecom_signaling_gateway_logs, map_layer_event_log, signaling_firewall_logs
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=telecom_signaling sourcetype="map_signaling:events" EventCode=7770
| regex Message="(?i)(ProvideSubscriberInfo|AnyTimeInterrogation|SendRoutingInfo)"
| rex field=Message "target_imsi=(?<target_imsi>\S+)"
| rex field=Message "origin_gt=(?<origin_gt>\S+)"
| rex field=Message "roaming_network=(?<roaming_network>\S+)"
| bin _time span=1m
| stats count as query_count dc(origin_gt) as distinct_origins values(roaming_network) as networks by target_imsi, _time
| where query_count > 5
| sort - query_count

Microsoft KQL

TelecomSignalingLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where EventID == 7770
| where Message has_any ("ProvideSubscriberInfo", "AnyTimeInterrogation", "SendRoutingInfo")
| extend target_imsi = extract(@"target_imsi=(\S+)", 1, Message)
| extend origin_gt = extract(@"origin_gt=(\S+)", 1, Message)
| summarize QueryCount = count(), DistinctOrigins = dcount(origin_gt) by target_imsi, bin(TimeGenerated, 1m)
| where QueryCount > 5
| project TimeGenerated, target_imsi, QueryCount, DistinctOrigins
| order by QueryCount desc

Sigma

title: Suspicious SS7 MAP-Layer Location-Query Burst Against Roaming Subscriber
id: 8f3c1a2e-4b7d-4e11-9c2a-1a2b3c4d5e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects repeated MAP-layer ProvideSubscriberInfo/AnyTimeInterrogation-class location queries against a single roaming subscriber, consistent with SS7-based real-time location tracking (SS7 ping) abuse.
references:
    - https://citizenlab.ca/us-military-smartphones-targeted-through-roaming-and-ad-tech/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-07-17
tags:
    - attack.reconnaissance
    - attack.t1450
    - attack.t1590
    - attack.tool.ss7_ping
logsource:
    category: application
    product: telecom_signaling
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 7770
        Message|contains:
            - 'ProvideSubscriberInfo'
            - 'AnyTimeInterrogation'
            - 'SendRoutingInfo'
    timeframe: 1m
    condition: selection | count(target_imsi) by target_imsi > 5
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate roaming authentication bursts during handset network re-registration or handover
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate roaming authentication/re-registration bursts during normal handset network handover or roaming-partner reconciliation jobs

Tuning notes: Tune the 5-query/1-minute threshold against baseline roaming re-registration volume per carrier; allowlist known roaming-partner GTs with documented high-frequency legitimate polling.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • SS7 MAP-Layer Location-Query Burst Against Roaming Subscriber (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Advertising-Identifier Multi-Region RTB Correlation Consistent With Pattern-of-Life Tracking (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Exfiltration-Pattern Automated Collection Handoff From RTB Broker Pipeline to External Web Service (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Suspicious SS7 MAP-Layer Location-Query Burst Against Roaming Subscriber · unlock with TL Creds
  • MAP-Layer Global Title Masquerade Detected by Signaling Firewall · unlock with TL Creds
  • Advertising Identifier Correlated Across Repeated RTB Bid Records for Same Device · unlock with TL Creds
  • Signaling Firewall Global-Title Masquerade Detection (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cross-Border SS7 Query Fingerprint Recurrence Against Military-Adjacent Roamers (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-07-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 16 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-1458.

16 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The campaign was documented by the Mobile Surveillance Monitor research initiative and reported by the Financial Times, with Citizen Lab Senior Research Fellow Gary Miller attributing at least some SS7 tracking attempts to an Iranian mobile network operator.

In the run-up to, and during, the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran in late February 2026 and Tehran's subsequent missile and drone retaliation against US forces in the Gulf, telecom networks across the Middle East recorded a sustained surge of SS7 (Signaling System 7) location-request traffic — commonly called 'SS7 pings' — targeting the phones of US military personnel and contractors roaming on regional carriers. SS7 is a decades-old inter-carrier signaling protocol still used globally to route calls and SMS between operators; it contains long-documented design weaknesses that let any party with legitimate (or abused) network signaling access query a subscriber's approximate real-time location by interrogating home-location-register (HLR) and visitor-location-register (VLR) records for a roaming device, without compromising the device itself.

Telecom data reviewed by the Financial Times and shared by the nonprofit Mobile Surveillance Monitor research project — founded by Citizen Lab Senior Research Fellow Gary Miller — showed regional carriers repeatedly fielding and, in some cases, blocking these location-request bursts against specific roaming subscribers. Analysis of the blocked requests produced a signaling 'fingerprint' that Miller linked to an Iranian mobile network operator, matching several other tracking attempts in the dataset. Miller characterized the pattern as 'very specific user targeting,' noting the actors were 'targeting specific devices' rather than conducting broad surveillance, and assessed that 'Iran absolutely has capabilities to get real-time, immediate, and continuous location information,' whether via SS7 abuse or other mobile network access in the region. Targeting concentrated on US personnel and contractors in Bahrain and Iraq, where tens of thousands of American troops are stationed, rather than against military communications systems directly — the campaign instead abused ordinary commercial roaming infrastructure that services any traveling subscriber's device.

A second, distinct tracking vector ran in parallel: a US official told the Financial Times that Iran-linked actors separately abused commercially available advertising/ad-tech location databases — the kind of granular device-location data harvested and brokered through mobile advertising SDKs and real-time-bidding (RTB) auction pipelines — to track phones belonging to US personnel specifically in Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdistan region. This vector requires no telecom-level access at all; it exploits the ordinary advertising-identifier/location data-broker supply chain that most mobile apps feed by default, illustrating how commercial ad-tech has become a parallel, lower-barrier surveillance channel usable by state actors without any protocol exploitation.

US Central Command acknowledged receiving reports of the tracking activity but disclosed minimal detail on protective countermeasures taken; some US officials reportedly downplayed the operational significance of the tracking data to the FT. Researchers characterized the dual-vector campaign — combining a legacy telecom-signaling weakness with commercial ad-tech data supply chains — as reflecting a significant evolution and growing sophistication in Iran's use of both telecom infrastructure and commercial data markets for intelligence collection and, potentially, target identification supporting kinetic operations during an active conflict.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Exfiltration

T1020 Automated Exfiltration; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Defense Evasion

T1036 Masquerading

Discovery

T1046 Network Service Discovery

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1102 Web Service

Collection

T1119 Automated Collection; T1213 Data from Information Repositories

collection

T1430.002 Impersonate SS7 Nodes

Network Effects

T1449 Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1584 Compromise Infrastructure; T1585 Establish Accounts

Reconnaissance

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1590 Gather Victim Network Information; T1591 Gather Victim Org Information; T1596 Search Open Technical Databases

Remediation

Patches

  • No software patch applicable — SS7 is a protocol-level, inter-carrier trust design weakness rather than a discrete vulnerability with a vendor fix

Immediate actions

  • Deploy/verify carrier-side SS7 signaling firewalls (e.g., filtering of unsolicited ProvideSubscriberInfo, AnyTimeInterrogation, and SendRoutingInfo-class MAP queries) on all roaming-partner interconnects
  • For deployed personnel, disable or restrict mobile advertising identifier (AAID/IDFA) sharing and limit background app location permissions on government and personal devices
  • Issue OPSEC guidance restricting personal-device roaming on host-nation commercial networks in theater; prefer managed/military communications where mission-critical
  • Coordinate with host-nation and roaming-partner carriers to flag and block signaling traffic fingerprinted to the implicated Iranian operator

Workarounds

  • Use of managed devices with location-permission lockdown and ad-ID reset/opt-out
  • Airplane-mode / SIM-out discipline for sensitive movements in theater
  • Preference for carriers/networks known to operate signaling firewalls

Longer-term hardening

  • Expand telecom threat-intel sharing (e.g., via GSMA FASG / Mobile Surveillance Monitor-style initiatives) to fingerprint and block repeat-offender operators abusing roaming trust relationships
  • Push carriers toward Diameter/5G signaling security controls and SS7-to-Diameter interworking firewalls to close legacy protocol gaps as networks migrate
  • Engage the mobile advertising/RTB industry on tightening geolocation data-broker access controls and contractual restrictions against military-adjacent target lists
  • Institutionalize pattern-of-life/OPSEC training on ad-tech location leakage for deployed and contractor personnel

Affected and fixed versions

  • Multiple Regional Mobile Network Operators — SS7 (Signaling System 7) inter-carrier roaming signaling infrastructure
    Vulnerable versions: SS7 MAP-layer roaming/location-query interfaces (protocol-inherent, all deployments without signaling firewalls)
    Fixed in: Networks with deployed SS7/Diameter signaling firewalls filtering unsolicited location-query MAP operations
  • Mobile Advertising / Ad-Tech Industry — Real-time bidding (RTB) location data broker pipelines and advertising SDK identifiers (AAID/IDFA-class)
    Vulnerable versions: Default advertising-identifier and location-sharing configurations on consumer mobile apps
    Fixed in: Devices with ad-ID reset/opt-out and location permissions restricted

Timeline

  • Telecom data later reviewed by the Financial Times shows regional Middle East carriers beginning to field a surge of SS7 location-request ('SS7 ping') traffic against roaming subscriber devices tied to US military personnel, in the run-up to the US-Israeli campaign against Iran.
  • Mobile Surveillance Monitor telemetry shows the SS7 location-request surge was not confined to Bahrain and Iraq alone but affected telecom networks across several Middle Eastern countries in the run-up to the conflict, per Security Boulevard's review of the underlying research.
  • US-Israeli military assault on Iran begins (late February 2026); SS7 location-request activity against US personnel roaming in the Gulf continues through this period per Mobile Surveillance Monitor data.
  • Iran retaliates with missile and drone strikes against US forces and military installations across the Gulf region; SS7 tracking-request bursts and ad-tech-based location tracking in Iraqi Kurdistan continue into the early days of the conflict.
  • Financial Times publishes the first public report on the SS7 roaming-abuse and ad-tech location-tracking campaign, citing telecom data reviewed from the Mobile Surveillance Monitor research project and unnamed US officials.
  • Multiple outlets (The Defense Post, SOFX, IBTimes, TechNadu, Türkiye Today, DiyaTV, Sahara Reporters) republish and expand on the FT reporting, adding detail on Bahrain/Iraq targeting and CENTCOM's acknowledgment of the reports.
  • Per Security Boulevard's follow-up reporting, unnamed US officials publicly dispute suggestions that the mobile tracking data played a significant role in enabling Iranian kinetic strikes against US forces, contesting the operational-impact framing of the FT's original report.
  • Security Boulevard and other outlets publish additional analyst commentary characterizing the campaign as a significant evolution in Iran's telecom-based intelligence-collection sophistication, describing it as 'a coordinated campaign' combining SS7 abuse with commercial advertising-identifier tracking.
  • Citizen Lab publishes Senior Research Fellow Gary Miller's analysis and on-record attribution, linking at least some blocked SS7 tracking attempts to a fingerprint matching an Iranian mobile network operator.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 13 sources; published ; last updated —.

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