Threat reportAPTTL-2026-2950
Belarusian Cyber Partisans maintain two-year undetected access to Russian healthcare network using Vasilek Telegram backdoor
Russian firm Solar (Rostelecom) reports that the Belarusian Cyber Partisans hacktivist group sat inside an unnamed Russian healthcare organization's network for about two years, from early 2024 until discovery in December 2025. The actors used the Telegram-controlled Vasilek backdoor, DNS tunnelers and GOST proxies, and reached sensitive medical data and connected healthcare organizations; no destructive activity was observed.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-2950 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Unnamed Russian healthcare organization Windows servers and workstations (VMware Tools, WSUS hosts) |
| Attribution | Cyber Partisans (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Belarus |
| Malware | PartisanDNS, Vasilek |
| Tools | DNSCat2, GOST, Impacket - S0357, Impacket wmiexec, Wmiexec |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.004 Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1056.001 Keylogging, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1070.006 Timestomp, T1071.004 DNS, T1082 System Information Discovery and 13 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | health |
| Target regions | russia |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-10-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-2950 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 42 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Impacket wmiexec Command Output Redirected to Local ADMIN$ (__<ts>.<usec>) — Cyber Partisans Lateral Execution
Detects the Impacket wmiexec.py execution pattern reported by Solar in the Cyber Partisans intrusion: cmd.exe is launched with output redirected to \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__<unix timestamp>.<microseconds>. The command-line shape is highly specific to wmiexec and was among the earliest traces of the two-year healthcare intrusion.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1047, T1021.002, T1059.003
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, process_creation
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
earliest=-24h (index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1) OR (index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4688)
```wmiexec.py runs: cmd.exe /Q /c <cmd> 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__<unix_ts>.<usec> 2>&1```
| eval cmd=coalesce(CommandLine, Process_Command_Line), proc=coalesce(Image, New_Process_Name), parent=coalesce(ParentImage, Creator_Process_Name), usr=coalesce(User, Account_Name)
| search cmd="*127.0.0.1*ADMIN$*__*"
| regex cmd="__\d{10}\.\d{3,7}"
| table _time host usr parent proc cmdMicrosoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ 'cmd.exe'
| where ProcessCommandLine contains '127.0.0.1' and ProcessCommandLine contains 'ADMIN$'
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @'__\d{10}\.\d{3,7}'
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Impacket wmiexec Output Redirection to Local ADMIN$ Share
id: 7c1e4a9b-3d52-4f86-a0b7-91e2c5d83f10
status: experimental
description: Detects cmd.exe with output redirected to \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\__<unix timestamp>.<microseconds>, the Impacket wmiexec.py semi-interactive shell pattern observed in the Cyber Partisans healthcare intrusion.
references:
- https://rt-solar.ru/solar-4rays/blog/7027/
- https://ics-cert.kaspersky.com/publications/reports/2025/06/05/ttps-of-cyber-partisans-activity-aimed-at-espionage-and-disruption/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/10/05
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.s0357
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
selection_cmd:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '127.0.0.1'
- 'ADMIN$'
- '__'
selection_ts:
CommandLine|re: '__\d{10}\.\d{3,7}'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Custom admin scripts that deliberately write command output to ADMIN$ with a timestamp-style filename (very rare)
level: highKnown false positives:
- Home-grown administration scripts that redirect output to ADMIN$ using epoch-style file names
- Authorized red-team or pentest activity using Impacket wmiexec
Tuning notes: Index names (sysmon, wineventlog) are deployment-specific; adjust them. Process-creation command-line auditing (4688 with command line, or Sysmon EID 1) must be enabled. Allow-list authorized pentest source hosts by host/user. Pair with Microsoft-Windows-SMBServer/Security EID 1015 on the target for network-side corroboration.
- wmiexec ADMIN$ Output Artifact Files (__<unix_ts>.<usec>) in the Windows Directory — SMB Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
- VMware Tools Directory Hijack: Unsigned vmtools.dll, Renamed vmtoolsd.dll and Scheduler-Loader Payloads — DLL Hijack Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
- Telegram Bot API Egress from Non-User Processes and Vasilek C2 Domains — Telegram-Controlled Backdoor · unlock with TL Creds
- AppMgmt Service ImagePath/ServiceDll Tampering (StealthyWMIExec/NimExec Style Execution) · unlock with TL Creds
- Shell and Discovery Commands Spawned by Vasilek / Scheduler-Loader Payloads and Self-Deletion via cmd /c del · unlock with TL Creds
- GOST / 3proxy Tunneling Proxy Execution Including vmtoolsd32.exe and WsusService.exe Masquerades · unlock with TL Creds
- Cyber Partisans Backdoor Service Installation (tpvmmon, aweman32, uplay_r164, msadcs32, vmauad) — Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
- PartisanDNS / DNSCat2 DNS Tunnel Domains and High-Volume Subdomain Tunneling — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-10-10, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 42 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-2950.
Sample indicators (3 of 42)
- IP address:
103.219.153[.]203 - Domain:
c0ce[.]org - File hash:
c499fab59acbb1750e1e0e5a3c51d119ccd6374e5f0b45639f29598720222766
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 42 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Solar (the Rostelecom cybersecurity subsidiary) investigated an intrusion at a Russian healthcare organization with extensive infrastructure and connections to numerous other healthcare entities. Earliest signs of compromise date to early 2024 and the intrusion was discovered in December 2025. Solar attributes the activity to the Belarusian Cyber Partisans. This is a vendor-sourced attribution that has not been independently verified. Solar assesses that the absence of destructive activity was linked to the value of keeping the access for further espionage. The group accessed sensitive medical data and abused trusted relationships to reach connected healthcare organizations.
Execution and lateral movement relied on Impacket wmiexec.py, which runs cmd.exe with output redirected to files under \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$ (named __<unix timestamp>.<microseconds>). The actors also used legitimate RDP access and SMB command execution over ADMIN$; Microsoft-Windows-SMBServer/Security Event ID 1015 is a relevant log source. Temporary parameter changes to the AppMgmt service were made with StealthyWMIExec/NimExec-style techniques. Persistence used five Windows services (tpvmmon, aweman32, uplay_r164 loading DNSCat2; msadcs32 loading the PartisanDNS DNS tunneler; vmauad, a VMware Authentication Adapter lookalike, loading a custom scheduler-loader authd.exe). The actors also hijacked C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtools.dll with an unsigned Vasilek backdoor, keeping the original as vmtoolsd.dll so it could be rolled back.
The scheduler-loader authd.exe is configuration driven. It supports an interval trigger (+480 minutes after service start), a cron-style window (Saturday 22:00-23:00 UTC for the GOST proxy) and SHA-256 hostname keying of its task structures, so payloads run only on intended hosts. Scheduled payloads were vmtoolsd32.exe (GOST proxy), rpctool32.exe (Vasilek 1.5.8) and E:\WSUS\UpdateServicesPackages\WsusService.exe (GOST). Vasilek v1.5.8 is a Windows backdoor controlled through the Telegram Bot API, with commands issued through a group (GroupAnonymousBot). It is obfuscated with OLLVM control-flow flattening, repeating-key XOR with per-position bit rotation, and a Vigenère-encoded command table, and it has 59 commands. These cover shell execution, screenshots, keylogging (key_on), window tracking, process and file operations, and self-deletion via cmd /c del. It uses an embedded TLSe/LibTomCrypt TLS stack instead of Schannel, so its JA3/JA4 fingerprint differs from normal Windows applications. Five C2 domains were observed, four of them new single-character-prefix variants of previously known domains (c0ce.org, p7cp.org, w3a01.net, f91j.org, plus gov-by.com). PartisanDNS uses a DGA over many TLDs on the vfvnfaq second-level domain.
Kaspersky's June 2025 report on Cyber Partisans TTPs documented the same toolset in earlier intrusions: Vasilek (Telegram-controlled), DNSCat2, 3proxy, Gost, SeekDNS, and the Pryanik time-triggered wiper (CVE-2021-31728 driver abuse). Solar says the Vasilek version it examined is newer. Russia's Supreme Court designated the group an extremist organization in July 2026. Defenders should note that the group was a destructive actor against Belarusian and Russian targets in other campaigns, so access of this kind carries latent destructive potential even though none was observed here.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Lateral Movement
T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol; T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.004 Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion; T1070.006 Timestomp; T1480.001 Environmental Keying; T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1569.002 Service Execution
Collection
T1056.001 Keylogging; T1113 Screen Capture; T1115 Clipboard Data
Command and Control
T1071.004 DNS; T1090 Proxy; T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication; T1568.002 Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms; T1572 Protocol Tunneling
Discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery
Initial Access
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
stealth
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Hunt for the Windows services tpvmmon, aweman32, msadcs32, uplay_r164 and vmauad and for the paths and hashes in the IOC list
- Check C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\ for an unsigned vmtools.dll alongside a renamed vmtoolsd.dll, and for authd.exe, vmtoolsd32.exe and rpctool32.exe
- Block and sinkhole the listed C2 and DNS-tunnel domains; alert on DNS queries to vfvnfaq.* and on DNS TXT/NULL tunneling patterns
- Review outbound access to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) from servers and non-user hosts
Workarounds
- Block egress to Telegram from server segments that have no business need for it
- Enforce application allow-listing so unsigned binaries cannot run from VMware Tools or WSUS directories
Longer-term hardening
- Alert on ADMIN$ writes of files named __<unix timestamp>.<microseconds> (Impacket wmiexec) and on SMBServer/Security Event ID 1015
- Monitor for unusual JA3/JA4 fingerprints from VMware Tools or WSUS directories
- Restrict and audit trust relationships, VPNs and remote access between healthcare partner organizations
- Restrict creation of new services and DLL replacement in VMware Tools and WSUS directories
Affected and fixed versions
- Unnamed Russian healthcare organization — Windows servers and workstations (VMware Tools, WSUS hosts)
Timeline
Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source
- Earliest signs of compromise at the Russian healthcare organization (early 2024; exact day not given). Impacket wmiexec activity is among the earliest traces.
- Kaspersky ICS CERT publishes its report on Cyber Partisans TTPs, first documenting Vasilek, DNSCat2, Gost, 3proxy and the Pryanik wiper.
- Solar discovers the intrusion during an investigation (December 2025; exact day not given), after roughly two years of dwell time.
- Russia's Supreme Court designates the Cyber Partisans an extremist organization (July 2026; exact day not given).
- Solar publishes its technical report on the attack in the Solar 4RAYS blog.
- The Record publishes coverage of the Solar report; the Cyber Partisans respond dismissively.
- GBHackers, Cyberpress and The Record publish English-language coverage of the Partisan Zmiy / Vasilek campaign and its IOCs.
Update history
- 2026-10-10 — Partisan Zmiy (Cyber Partisans) Campaign Uses Vasilek Telegram C2 Backdoor and DNS Tunneling Against Healthcare Networks: What changed No change to severity, exploitability, status or attribution confidence; this update adds indicators, techniques and tags only. New indicators (7) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- Solar 4RAYS: attack on a medical organization (Partisan Zmiy) rt-solar.ru · Research · 2026-10-02
- Kaspersky ICS CERT: TTPs of Cyber Partisans activity aimed at espionage and disruption Kaspersky · Research · 2025-06-05
- Belarusian hacktivists spent two years inside Russian healthcare network, researchers say The Record · News · 2026-10-05
- Belarusian hackers taunt Kaspersky over report detailing their attacks The Record · News
- Belarusian hacktivists unfazed by Kaspersky's report scworld.com · News
- Russian malware discovered with Telegram hacks for C2 operations csoonline.com · News
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated .