Threat reportPhishingTL-2026-6116
Fake Linkt Toll Balance Phishing Campaign Targeting Australian Drivers (Credential and Card Theft)
Email phishing campaign impersonating Linkt, an Australian toll road brand, using the subject 'Action required: outstanding toll balance' and claiming A$112.38 is due. A GeoTargetly short link leads victims to linktaccount.sbs, where a fake login page and a fake payment page capture Linkt credentials and full credit card details.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6116 |
|---|---|
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Linkt (Transurban) Linkt customer accounts and brand (impersonated) |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1204.001 Malicious Link, T1566.002 Spearphishing Link, T1583.001 Domains, T1598.003 Spearphishing Link, T1657 Financial Theft, T1684.001 Impersonation |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | consumers, transport, finance |
| Target regions | australia |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6116 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 17 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Linkt Toll Phishing — Proxy Access to linktaccount.sbs / gtly.link Pay-Now Redirect (Exploitation)
Detects web proxy traffic to linktaccount.sbs (fake Linkt login and A$112.38 card-capture pages) or the GeoTargetly short link gtly.link/UdsGkBL-T behind the 'Pay now' button of the 'Action required: outstanding toll balance' phishing email (TL-2026-6116). A hit identifies users who clicked through and may have submitted credentials or card data.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1566.002, T1204.001
- Data sources: proxy, pan:url, zscaler:nss:web, bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=proxy sourcetype IN ("pan:url","zscaler:nss:web","bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog") earliest=-24h
| eval host=lower(coalesce(dest_host,url_domain,cs_host)), url_full=lower(coalesce(url,cs_uri,request_url)), method=upper(coalesce(http_method,cs_method))
| where host="linktaccount.sbs" OR like(host,"%.linktaccount.sbs") OR like(url_full,"%gtly.link/udsgkbl-t%")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(url_full) as urls values(action) as actions by src_ip, user, host
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table first_seen last_seen src_ip user host urls actions countMicrosoft KQL
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has "linktaccount.sbs" or RemoteUrl has "gtly.link/UdsGkBL-T"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, ActionTypeSigma
title: Linkt Toll Phishing Proxy Access to linktaccount.sbs or gtly.link Redirect
id: 6f1c2a10-6116-4b1e-9a01-3d5e7c0a0001
status: experimental
description: Detects proxy requests to the Linkt-impersonating phishing site linktaccount.sbs or the GeoTargetly short link gtly.link/UdsGkBL-T used in the fake outstanding toll balance campaign.
references:
- https://www.mailguard.com.au/blog/fake-linkt-toll-balance-notice-targets-drivers-with-phishing-scam
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/16
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.002
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.001
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection_host:
c-uri|contains: 'linktaccount.sbs'
selection_short:
c-uri|contains: 'gtly.link/UdsGkBL-T'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Security researchers or mail-security analysts detonating the phishing URL
- Threat-intel sandbox or URL-scanning traffic
level: high
Known false positives:
- Security team members or sandboxes opening the phishing URL during analysis
- Mail-security vendors rewriting and scanning links in quarantined messages
Tuning notes: Adjust the index and sourcetype list to your proxy (field names are coalesced across Palo Alto, Zscaler and Blue Coat). Exclude known sandbox and analyst source IPs. gtly.link is a legitimate shortener, so the match is on the full short-link path only; extend with new gtly.link paths as they are reported. Escalate any hit with POST activity (see TL-2026-6116-KQL-003) to a credential reset and card-reissue workflow.
- Linkt Toll Phishing — User Click-Through on [indicator] / [indicator] Short Link (Safe Links) · unlock with TL Creds
- Linkt Display-Name Impersonation From Non-Linkt Sender (Toll Lure) · unlock with TL Creds
- Linkt Toll Phishing — HTTP POST Credential/Card Submission to [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- Linkt Lookalike Domain Access — 'linkt' Host Not on linkt.com.au · unlock with TL Creds
- Linkt Toll Phishing — [indicator] Short-Link Redirect Landing on .sbs Host · unlock with TL Creds
- Historical Linkt Toll Phishing Infrastructure — DNS Lookups of Prior-Campaign Domains · unlock with TL Creds
- Linkt Toll Phishing — DNS Resolution of [indicator] (Infrastructure) · unlock with TL Creds
- Linkt Toll Phishing — Email From [indicator] / [indicator] or 'outstanding toll balance' Subject (Delivery) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 17 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6116.
Sample indicators (3 of 17)
- Domain:
linktaccount[.]sbs - Domain:
gtly[.]link - Domain:
dropazz[.]com
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 17 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
On 16 November 2026 (17:17:54 AEDT) MailGuard documented a phishing email impersonating Linkt, the Australian toll road brand. The message uses the display name 'Linkt Customer Service', the generic greeting 'Dear customer', and the subject 'Action required: outstanding toll balance'. It claims Linkt 'attempted to charge your saved payment method' and that the payment 'could not be completed'. The same amount, A$112.38, appears in every observed email, which MailGuard considers unusual for a genuine notice. Recipients get seven days to pay to avoid 'additional fees or enforcement action'. The email has a green 'Pay now' button, a reference number, an 'Amount due' panel, and a footer that references linkt.com.au/help and borrows trademark wording from genuine Linkt communications.
Sender infrastructure uses two pairs of domains. The display-address domains are dropazz.com and 5kay.store, and the actual sending domains are send.dropazz.com and rsend.5kay.store. Sending addresses are unique per message and use long random alphanumeric strings, which undermines sender-based blocklisting. The 'Pay now' button routes through a shortened link, gtly.link/UdsGkBL-T, created with GeoTargetly (a legitimate link-management service), and then to the phishing site linktaccount.sbs.
The phishing site has two stages. First, a replica Linkt login page asks for an email or username and a password, and these are captured. Second, a 'Make a payment' page repeats A$112.38, shows an 'Action required' banner, and tightens the deadline to 'You must pay within 2 days or a penalty may apply', which contradicts the seven days in the email. The page displays a 'Secure payment processed by Stripe' notice and requests full card details. Fake errors such as 'Your card number is incorrect' and 'We are unable to authenticate your payment method. Please choose a different payment method and try again.' push victims to submit additional cards. MailGuard could not progress past this stage, so downstream behavior (OTP collection, exfiltration, monetization) is not documented in the source.
This campaign continues a long-running pattern of Linkt-themed fraud. MailGuard documented earlier Linkt campaigns on 12 December 2025 (failed auto top-up lure, linkt-transurban.diia-gov.com, $115.27), 19 February 2026 and 17 April 2026 ('overdue Final Toll Invoice', image-only emails, card and SMS code capture). Linkt's own scam page lists outstanding-balance, account-on-hold, SMS and fake-rebate lures across 2023-2026. No threat actor attribution is stated by any source, and infrastructure overlap between this campaign and the earlier ones is not established. Severity MEDIUM is an analyst assessment.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Execution
Initial Access
Resource Development
Reconnaissance
Impact
Defense Evasion
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block and sinkhole linktaccount.sbs, gtly.link/UdsGkBL-T, dropazz.com, send.dropazz.com, 5kay.store and rsend.5kay.store at mail gateway, DNS and web proxy
- Search mail logs for the subject 'Action required: outstanding toll balance' and the display name 'Linkt Customer Service', and purge matching messages
- Search proxy and DNS logs for connections to linktaccount.sbs and gtly.link to identify users who clicked
- Force password resets for any user who entered credentials, and reset any reused passwords
- Advise affected cardholders to contact their bank to cancel and reissue cards
Workarounds
- Go directly to the Linkt app or linkt.com.au rather than using links in email; Linkt does not request payment details through links in SMS or email
Longer-term hardening
- Alert on mail whose display name contains 'Linkt' but whose sending domain is not linkt.com.au
- Treat messages from newly registered or low-reputation TLDs such as .sbs and .store with extra scrutiny
- Run user awareness training on toll-notice lures: generic greetings, shifting deadlines and links to non-official domains
- Report samples to Linkt's online scam report form and Scamwatch (scamwatch.gov.au)
Affected and fixed versions
- Linkt (Transurban) — Linkt customer accounts and brand (impersonated)
Vulnerable versions: Brand impersonation only; no product vulnerability
Timeline
- Linkt's scam page lists an 'outstanding toll balance' lure that gave a 12-hour payment window (listed as Aug 2025; day not given, month precision only).
- MailGuard documents a Linkt 'auto top up failed' email campaign using locked-ioc-1, with a fake login, a $115.27 balance and card harvesting.
- MailGuard documents image-only 'Your vehicle has an overdue Final Toll Invoice' emails that impersonate Linkt, with card capture and SMS verification code prompts.
- MailGuard documents a recurrence of the 'overdue Final Toll Invoice' lure using new sender domains and a fake portal showing 'Account on Hold' and retry prompts.
- Linkt's scam page lists emails claiming payment is needed to restore a suspended 'account on hold' (listed as Aug 2026; day not given, month precision only).
- MailGuard publishes the analysis of the fake login and payment pages and the IOC list; it could not progress past the card-harvesting stage.
- MailGuard observes the 'Action required: outstanding toll balance' email (17:17:54 AEDT) from locked-ioc-8 and locked-ioc-9, linking via locked-ioc-3 to locked-ioc-7.
Sources cited
- Scamwatch (ACCC) - report scams scamwatch.gov.au · Advisory
- Linkt - Security and latest scams linkt.com.au · Vendor report
- Fake Linkt toll balance notice targets drivers with phishing scam mailguard.com.au · Blog · 2026-11-16
- Fake Linkt Invoice Scam Targets Australian Drivers and Businesses mailguard.com.au · Blog · 2026-04-17
- Linkt 'Overdue Final Toll Invoice' phishing scam mailguard.com.au · Blog · 2026-02-19
- Linkt email scam tricks users with fake toll payment alerts mailguard.com.au · Blog · 2025-12-12
Previous and next in phishing
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.