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Threat reportRansomwareTL-2026-6143

N0n ransomware group claims data theft from MediaMath (US, Technology) — 143M-row identity graph

highACTIVE

On 2026-11-16 the N0n data-theft extortion group listed MediaMath, a US programmatic advertising and identity-resolution firm, on its leak site with status 'NOT PAID — EXPOSED'. The group claims a 143,186,369-row cookie-to-device identity graph plus campaign analytics and client data; the claims are unverified and MediaMath has not confirmed a breach.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6143
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMediaMath Programmatic advertising / identity resolution data (claimed); Fortinet FortiGate SSL-VPN (targeted by N0n credential stuffing; no vulnerability involved)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-521, CWE-798
Malwaren0n locker
ToolsOpenCode
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts, T1090 Proxy, T1110.004 Brute Force: Credential Stuffing, T1114 Email Collection, T1133 External Remote Services, T1136 Create Account, T1485 Data Destruction, T1490 Inhibit System Recovery, T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service and 3 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstechnology, advertising, transport, retail, health, finance
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, Asia
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6143 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 12 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: N0n FortiGate SSL-VPN Credential Stuffing (/remote/login) — Initial Access

Detects bursts of failed FortiGate SSL-VPN logins in which one source address tries many distinct usernames within 10 minutes. This is the pattern of N0n's automated credential-stuffing pipeline against GET /remote/login (T1110.004), which SOCRadar reports runs through a 15-thread residential SOCKS5 proxy pool. The pipeline feeds valid-account access through External Remote Services (T1133). TL-2026-6143 / MediaMath is an unverified leak-site claim; this is group-level hunting content, not a confirmed MediaMath TTP. No CVE is involved: access relied on weak or stolen credentials.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1110.004, T1133, T1595
  • Data sources: fortinet:fortigate_event (index=fortinet, sourcetype=fortigate_event), CommonSecurityLog (Fortinet CEF)
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=fortinet sourcetype=fortigate_event subtype=vpn earliest=-60m (action="ssl-login-fail" OR logdesc="SSL VPN login fail" OR logid=0101039426)
| eval src_ip=coalesce(remip, srcip)
| bin _time span=10m
| stats count AS failed_logins dc(user) AS distinct_users values(user) AS sample_users BY _time src_ip
| where failed_logins>=20 AND distinct_users>=5
| sort - failed_logins

Microsoft KQL

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1h)
| where DeviceVendor =~ 'Fortinet'
| where Activity has 'SSL VPN login fail' or DeviceEventClassID == '0101039426' or AdditionalExtensions has 'ssl-login-fail'
| extend SourceAddr = coalesce(SourceIP, tostring(extract(@'remip=([0-9.]+)', 1, AdditionalExtensions)))
| extend AcctName = coalesce(SourceUserName, tostring(extract(@'user=([^; ]+)', 1, AdditionalExtensions)))
| summarize FailedLogins = count(), DistinctUsers = dcount(AcctName), SampleUsers = make_set(AcctName, 10) by SourceAddr, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
| where FailedLogins >= 20 and DistinctUsers >= 5
| project TimeGenerated, SourceAddr, FailedLogins, DistinctUsers, SampleUsers

Sigma

title: FortiGate SSL-VPN Failed Login (N0n Credential Stuffing Building Block)
id: a3e91c52-6f0b-4d7e-8c24-91b5d7e03a11
status: experimental
description: Detects FortiGate SSL-VPN login failures. N0n (TL-2026-6143) runs automated credential stuffing against /remote/login through a residential SOCKS5 proxy pool. A single event is weak signal; alert on 20+ events from one source or 5+ distinct usernames within 10 minutes using the SIEM's aggregation or correlation feature.
references:
  - https://socradar.io/blog/n0n-ransomware-ai-assisted-extortion/
  - https://www.ransomware.live/group/n0n
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-16
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1110.004
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1133
logsource:
  product: fortinet
  service: fortigate
detection:
  selection:
    logdesc: 'SSL VPN login fail'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Users mistyping passwords or locked-out accounts after a password change
  - Misconfigured VPN clients retrying stale credentials
level: medium

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate users repeatedly failing VPN login after a password rotation or account lockout
  • Vulnerability scanners or authorized red-team credential tests against the SSL-VPN portal
  • Shared NAT egress addresses (branch offices, mobile carriers) where many real users fail logins at once

Tuning notes: Adjust index and sourcetype to your Fortinet ingestion. Raise failed_logins/distinct_users thresholds for large user populations, and exclude corporate NAT egress ranges. N0n rotates residential proxy IPs, so also hunt for one username failing from many IPs, and correlate any successful ssl-login after a failure burst. Enforce phishing-resistant MFA and lockout on the portal.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • N0n External RDP Failed-Logon Spray Followed by Success — Initial Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • N0n Bulk S3 Read/Delete via IAM User Access Key — Cloud Collection and Destruction · unlock with TL Creds
  • N0n Covert Proxy and Tunneling Tool Execution — C2 Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
  • N0n Exposed AWS Key Use: S3 ListBuckets Enumeration by IAM User — Initial Access · unlock with TL Creds
  • N0n Backup and Shadow Copy Destruction Before Encryption — Impact · unlock with TL Creds
  • N0n Tor Leak-Site and .onion Resolution from Corporate Host — C2 / Extortion Contact · unlock with TL Creds
  • N0n Hidden Service-Named Local Admin Account Creation — Post-Exploitation Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • N0n Operator Infrastructure Egress ([indicator]:8877) — C2 / Tool Staging · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 12 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6143.

Sample indicators (3 of 12)

  • IP address: 185.157.161[.]148
  • Domain: nongzecboljwv3yfndkggsybsglfrkffw7bvk2zemuteoxe6etpusnad[.]onion
  • URL: hxxps://www[.]ransomware[.]live/id/TWVkaWFNYXRoQE4wbg

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 12 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

12 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

ransomware.live recorded MediaMath (United States, Technology) as a victim of the N0n group, discovered 2026-11-16 12:42 UTC, with an estimated attack date of 2026-11-16 and status 'NOT PAID — EXPOSED'. According to the listing, the group claims to hold: a consumer identity graph export of 143,186,369 rows linking consumer cookie identifiers to device identifiers; campaign analytics exports containing agency and advertiser names, budgets and performance for well-known consumer brands; curated marketplace consumer segment memberships; brand safety and fraud verification data; a named client's site whitelist; and monthly campaign performance and verification reports. No ransom amount is listed. All details are the group's own claims, relayed by a single aggregator; no victim statement or independent verification was found. No CVE, IOC or intrusion vector is stated for this specific victim.

N0n (also written n0n) is a data-theft extortion group that emerged in September 2026. ransomware.live tracks 281 N0n victims (159 posted in the current month), 49% in the United States, and reports that 78.9% of victims with a domain are tied to infostealer activity; many entries are marked 'PENDING EXPOSURE'. WatchGuard classifies the group as a 'Data Broker' running direct and double extortion from a single Tor leak site. On 2026-10-12 the group posted 38 maritime, port and logistics organizations in one batch with a 2026-10-19 deadline; reported demands ranged from roughly $2.4M to $28M depending on the source, and none of the 38 had publicly confirmed a breach.

SOCRadar (published 2026-10-30) documented the operator's exposed workspace — a public Python HTTP file server at 185.157.161.148:8877 (Sweden) holding 1,719 files including attack scripts, ransomware source code, extortion infrastructure and an AI coding agent environment (OpenCode, 154 model entries across seven providers). Observed access methods were mass RDP scanning, automated FortiGate SSL-VPN credential stuffing (GET /remote/login) through a 15-thread residential SOCKS5 proxy pool, exposed cloud (AWS) keys and reused hosting-portal sessions; SOCRadar found no evidence of vulnerability exploitation. Post-access activity included hidden administrator accounts disguised as services, covert proxies, credential/session-token theft, mailbox access with captured email MFA codes, S3 data exfiltration (40 buckets, up to 110 GB each), encryption, and deletion of data and backups. The locker used hardcoded, reused encryption keys. SOCRadar suspects a Russia-based operator but found no definitive attribution. Whether any of these TTPs were used against MediaMath is not stated in any source; they are group-level behaviours and should be treated as hunting guidance, not confirmed MediaMath facts.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Lateral Movement

T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

Initial Access

T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services

Command and Control

T1090 Proxy

Credential Access

T1110.004 Brute Force: Credential Stuffing; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie

Collection

T1114 Email Collection; T1530 Data from Cloud Storage

Persistence

T1136 Create Account

Impact

T1485 Data Destruction; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1657 Financial Theft

Exfiltration

T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Resource Development

T1588.007 Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence

Reconnaissance

T1595 Active Scanning

Remediation

Patches

  • No CVE is associated; access in documented cases relied on weak or stolen credentials, not vulnerability exploitation

Immediate actions

  • Treat the leak-site claim as a potential incident: validate whether the claimed MediaMath identity graph, campaign analytics and whitelist data originate from your own or a vendor environment
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on SSL-VPN, RDP and admin portals; reset credentials for any account exposed to infostealer logs
  • Monitor FortiGate SSL-VPN logins for credential stuffing (high-volume failed GET/POST to /remote/login from residential proxy IPs)
  • Audit AWS access keys; rotate any key exposed in code, logs or third-party tools and review S3 List/Get/Delete activity in CloudTrail
  • Block egress to 185.157.161.148 and review historical connections

Workarounds

  • Geo/ASN rate-limit and lockout policies on VPN portals
  • Disable unused local admin and service accounts; alert on new account creation

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for hidden service-like admin accounts and covert proxy tooling
  • Keep immutable, offline backups and protect backup/S3 deletion with MFA delete and object lock
  • Restrict RDP/WinRM exposure to the internet and require VPN plus MFA
  • Monitor infostealer-log exposure for corporate domains

Affected and fixed versions

  • MediaMath — Programmatic advertising / identity resolution data (claimed)
  • Fortinet — FortiGate SSL-VPN (targeted by N0n credential stuffing; no vulnerability involved)

Timeline

  • ransomware.live records the earliest N0n victim (estimated attack date); WatchGuard lists extortion dates from 2026-09-12 and the group is described as emerging in September 2026
  • SOCRadar snapshots the operator's publicly exposed Python HTTP file server (locked-ioc-5:8877), with a second snapshot on 2026-09-26
  • N0n posts 38 maritime, port and logistics organizations across 18 countries on its leak site in a single batch
  • Payment deadline (13:27 UTC) for the 38 maritime victims passes; no on-chain payments observed and stolen data is published
  • SOCRadar observes the operator's AI service usage costs exceeding $7,216
  • SOCRadar publishes its analysis of N0n's AI-assisted operations, FortiGate credential-stuffing pipeline and exposed workspace
  • ransomware.live discovers N0n's listing of MediaMath at 12:42 UTC with status 'NOT PAID — EXPOSED', claiming a 143,186,369-row identity graph export and related advertising data

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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