Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6299
GravityRAT Android spyware and DropDeckX Windows lure hidden in fake job-recruitment apps targeting Indian military and defense personnel (SpaceCobra / Cosmic Leopard)
Lookout reports an ongoing GravityRAT campaign that uses fake 'Global Recruiter' job sites to push the sideloaded Android spyware GlobalRecruiters.apk (com.resumee.resumebuilder) and an Electron-based Windows lure, DropDeckX, at Indian military and defense-industry personnel. Lookout detected the malware on 14 devices in India over 12 months, and links the activity to Pakistan-aligned SpaceCobra / Cosmic Leopard.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6299 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | GravityRAT fake recruiter campaign, Global Recruiter lure, DropDeckX |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Google Android (sideloaded APK); Microsoft Windows (DropDeckX Electron lure) |
| Attribution | SpaceCobra, Cosmic Leopard (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Pakistan |
| Malware | DropDeckX, Gravity RAT (Android), HeavyLift |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1426 System Information Discovery, T1430 Location Tracking, T1437.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1533 Data from Local System, T1555 Credentials from Password Stores and 7 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government administration, defense, military, defense-industry |
| Target regions | india, South Asia |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6299 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 41 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: GravityRAT Fake-Recruiter Lure - GlobalRecruiters.apk / DropDeckX Download or Lure-Domain Lookup (Exploitation)
Behaviour-first detection of the delivery stage of the SpaceCobra / Cosmic Leopard GravityRAT campaign (TL-2026-6299): a Windows host writing GlobalRecruiters.apk or a DropDeckX installer/executable to disk, or resolving the fake Global Recruiter / DropDeckX infrastructure (recruitersglobal.net, dropdeckx.com, movie-date.net, dock-sync.com) via Sysmon DNS events. Either signal indicates a user followed the fake-recruiter lure and was pushed to sideload or install the payload.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1566.002, T1204.001
- Data sources: sysmon
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h ((EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("recruitersglobal.net","*.recruitersglobal.net","dropdeckx.com","*.dropdeckx.com","movie-date.net","*.movie-date.net","dock-sync.com","*.dock-sync.com")) OR (EventCode=11 (TargetFilename="*GlobalRecruiters.apk*" OR TargetFilename="*DropDeckX*Setup*.exe" OR TargetFilename="*DropDeckX*.msi" OR TargetFilename="*DropDeckX*.exe")))
| eval stage=case(EventCode=22,"lure_domain_lookup",EventCode=11,"lure_file_written",true(),"other")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(stage) as stages values(QueryName) as lure_domains values(TargetFilename) as lure_files values(Image) as processes by host, User
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")
| table first_seen last_seen host User stages lure_domains lure_files processes countMicrosoft KQL
union
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("recruitersglobal.net","dropdeckx.com","movie-date.net","dock-sync.com")
| project TimeGenerated=Timestamp, DeviceName, Account=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Indicator=RemoteUrl, Process=InitiatingProcessFileName, Source="network"),
(DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where FileName =~ "GlobalRecruiters.apk" or FileName startswith "DropDeckX"
| project TimeGenerated=Timestamp, DeviceName, Account=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Indicator=FolderPath, Process=InitiatingProcessFileName, Source="file")
| summarize hits=count(), first_seen=min(TimeGenerated), last_seen=max(TimeGenerated), indicators=make_set(Indicator, 10) by DeviceName, Account, SourceSigma
title: GravityRAT Lure File Written - GlobalRecruiters.apk or DropDeckX Installer
id: 6299a000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of the GravityRAT Android installer GlobalRecruiters.apk or a DropDeckX Electron installer or executable on a Windows endpoint, as served from the fake Global Recruiter sites in the SpaceCobra / Cosmic Leopard campaign.
references:
- https://cyberscoop.com/pakistani-hackers-defense-workers-fake-job-sites/
- https://gbhackers.com/gravityrat-spyware-campaign/
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/cosmic-leopard/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.002
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.001
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_apk:
TargetFilename|endswith: '\GlobalRecruiters.apk'
selection_dropdeckx:
TargetFilename|contains: '\DropDeckX'
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.exe'
- '.msi'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Security research or sandbox hosts that deliberately download the samples
- Analyst workstations handling malware samples
level: high
Known false positives:
- Threat researchers or sandboxes intentionally browsing to the lure domains or downloading the samples
- Security awareness simulations that reference the lure domains in a sinkhole or allow-list test
Tuning notes: Replace index=sysmon with your Sysmon index. DNS lookups (EventCode 22) require Sysmon DNS logging to be enabled. Exclude analyst and sandbox hosts via a lookup. Android sideloading itself is not visible in Windows telemetry; pair with MDM app inventory for package com.resumee.resumebuilder.
- GravityRAT Campaign Infrastructure - Lure and Payload Domain Resolution (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Scheduled Task Creation (Event 4698) Referencing User-Writable Path - DropDeckX Persistence (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- PHP POST to Android-Library-Lookalike Hostname - Cloudflare-Fronted GravityRAT C2 Pattern (C2) · unlock with TL Creds
- GravityRAT [indicator] Download / Lure Site Access via Web Proxy (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- DropDeckX Electron Lure Spawning Discovery, Credential and Downloader Utilities (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Historical GravityRAT C2 and Distribution Infrastructure Resolution (C2 / Retro-Hunt) · unlock with TL Creds
- DropDeckX / GravityRAT Scheduled Task Persistence from User-Writable Path (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- GravityRAT Periodic PHP POST Beaconing / Exfiltration over Web C2 (C2 / Exfiltration) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 41 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6299.
Sample indicators (3 of 41)
- Domain:
recruitersglobal[.]net - File hash:
ce2ce25cbe461af221cf215b3c67bf531cf74855 - Domain:
movie-date[.]net
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 41 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Lookout researchers (published 2026-11-17, covered by CyberScoop and GBHackers) describe a continuing social-engineering campaign aimed at Indian military personnel and defense contractors, and possibly defense personnel elsewhere. Operators built detailed fake job-recruiter websites, including one branded 'Global Recruiter' at recruitersglobal.net that offers a resume builder and connections to overseas employers. The site carries an 'our clients' section with logos of Airbus, BAE Systems, Thales, Lockheed Martin, Rheinmetall, Northrop Grumman, Saab, Rolls-Royce and Safran. The sources state these companies are not involved. The site's Google Play button does not open the store. It shows a message that the Google Play version is 'under review' and tells the visitor to download the APK directly, which pushes sideloading. A similar Microsoft Store pretext is used for the Windows download. Lookout did not find the apps on Google Play. One of the lure sites made no reference to India.
The Android sample is GlobalRecruiters.apk (package com.resumee.resumebuilder), a GravityRAT variant. Per Lookout it collects contacts, call logs, historical and incoming SMS, GPS coordinates, files from external storage (documents, images, audio and encrypted WhatsApp backups), connected Wi-Fi details, device account information and the IMEI. The sources do not say whether the operators can decrypt the WhatsApp backups. Data is uploaded to C2 servers at intervals of 1 to 30 minutes. The C2 infrastructure is fronted by Cloudflare and uses PHP endpoints on subdomains named to resemble Android libraries. The sources do not list the C2 hostnames, the app's manifest permissions or any Android persistence mechanism.
The Windows component is DropDeckX, advertised at dropdeckx.com as an Electron-based 'cloud storage utility'. It collects system information and credentials, persists through Windows Task Scheduler and downloads additional payloads. Lookout tied it to the mobile activity through shared registration dates and name servers, and noted similarities to HeavyLift, the loader Cisco Talos documented in Operation Celestial Force.
Attribution: Lookout links the activity to the group tracked as SpaceCobra (ESET) or Cosmic Leopard (Cisco Talos), described as possibly aligned with the Pakistani government. Direct government involvement is not confirmed. GravityRAT has been used against Indian targets since 2015 per CyberScoop. Earlier reporting documents Windows, Android and macOS variants, social-media approaches through fictitious recruiter personas (Meta, via ESET), Android lures such as BingeChat and Chatico (ESET, June 2023) and the HeavyLift loader and GravityAdmin panel (Talos, June 2024). Talos documented HeavyLift persistence through SCHTASKS and macOS cron, virtualization checks, and Cloudflare-hidden HTTP(S) C2. Those findings come from earlier campaigns and are context for this one, not Lookout observations. The sources do not map the three published SHA-1 hashes to specific files, and they do not explain the roles of movie-date.net and dock-sync.com.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery; T1426 System Information Discovery
Command and Control
T1090 Proxy; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Execution
T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
Collection
T1430 Location Tracking; T1533 Data from Local System; T1636.002 Protected User Data: Call Log; T1636.003 Protected User Data: Contact List; T1636.004 Protected User Data: SMS Messages
command-and-control
T1437.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
Credential Access
T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Initial Access
T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link; T1660 Phishing
Resource Development
T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
Exfiltration
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Search MDM/EMM app inventories for package com.resumee.resumebuilder and file GlobalRecruiters.apk, and isolate any matching device
- Block and hunt DNS, proxy and firewall logs for recruitersglobal.net, dropdeckx.com, movie-date.net and dock-sync.com
- Hunt Windows endpoints for DropDeckX and for newly created scheduled tasks that launch Electron applications from user-writable paths
- Warn defense and defense-industry staff about unsolicited recruiter contact and 'under review' app-store messages
Workarounds
- Restrict app sideloading through MDM policy
- Allow only approved app stores on corporate and BYOD devices
Longer-term hardening
- Disable installation from unknown sources on managed Android devices and enforce Play Protect
- Deploy mobile threat defense (MTD) on devices used by defense and government staff
- Tell staff to check vacancies on the employer's official careers portal, and treat requests to install apps from outside an approved store as suspicious
- Keep WhatsApp backups off personal devices that also handle sensitive work data
Affected and fixed versions
Timeline
Last updated · revalidated 1× · latest source
- Cyble documented an earlier GravityRAT Android chat-app lure, 'SoSafe Chat' (November 2021; day not stated in sources).
- ESET dates the BingeChat/Chatico Android GravityRAT campaign to June 2022 (day not stated); the apps were distributed through rogue sites locked-ioc-34 and locked-ioc-35.
- locked-ioc-34 registered (ESET); used for the BingeChat trojanized messenger lure attributed to SpaceCobra.
- ESET publishes 'Android GravityRAT goes after WhatsApp backups' and tracks the actor as SpaceCobra.
- CERT-In issues an alert on Android GravityRAT malware (August 2023; day not stated).
- Cisco Talos publishes Operation Celestial Force, attributing GravityRAT, HeavyLift and GravityAdmin activity to a Pakistani nexus it tracks as Cosmic Leopard.
- CyberScoop reports that Lookout links the campaign to SpaceCobra / Cosmic Leopard, possibly aligned with the Pakistani government.
- Lookout publishes research on the fake-recruiter GravityRAT campaign. It observed activity over about 12 months, still active, with detections on 14 devices in India.
- Cyber Security News relays the Lookout findings, including the six GravityRAT C2 endpoints and an extended IOC list.
- GBHackers publishes the technical summary, including locked-ioc-21, DropDeckX and the published IOCs.
Update history
- 2026-11-18 — Fake Defense-Contractor Recruitment Site Spreads GravityRAT Android Spyware (SpaceCobra / Cosmic Leopard): What changed No severity, exploitability, status or attribution change; existing values (HIGH / ACTIVE / MEDIUM) already match the newer report. Intelligence is expanded only.
Sources cited
- Lookout Threat Intelligence: GravityRAT spyware (primary report; not retrievable during research, URL as pointed to by CyberScoop) lookout.com · Research · 2026-11-17
- Cisco Talos: Cosmic Leopard / Operation Celestial Force (GravityRAT, HeavyLift, GravityAdmin) Cisco Talos · Research · 2024-06-13
- ESET: Android GravityRAT goes after WhatsApp backups ESET WeLiveSecurity · Research · 2023-06-15
- Kaspersky: GravityRAT spyware evolves to target multiple platforms Kaspersky · Vendor report · 2020-10-20
- Cisco Talos IOC repository: cosmic-leopard GitHub · Code repository · 2024-06-13
- Hackers Target Indian Military Personnel With GravityRAT Spyware Hidden in Fake Job Recruitment Apps (GBHackers) gbhackers.com · News · 2026-11-18
- Pakistani hackers are spying on defense workers with fake job sites (CyberScoop) cyberscoop.com · News · 2026-11-17
- The Hacker News: GravityRAT Android Trojan steals WhatsApp backups and deletes files The Hacker News · News · 2023-06-15
- The Record: Android malware, alleged Pakistan espionage campaign against India The Record · News
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated .