Skip to navigation

Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6255

SynkLoader: Modular Multi-Language Malware Loader Distributed via Microsoft Teams IT Service Desk Phishing

highACTIVE

SynkLoader is a modular Python/PowerShell/C#/C++ loader delivered through Microsoft Teams messages in which attackers impersonate an IT Service Desk and push a fake 'PowerShell Cleaner' MSI hosted on Azure Blob Storage. Its modules profile Active Directory, harvest plaintext passwords with a fake Windows 11 lock screen (PhishLocker), and provide reverse-proxy, shell and VNC access for hands-on-keyboard activity; it is suspected to support initial access brokering or ransomware operations.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6255
Also known asPowerShell Cleaner (lure), PhishLocker (credential module)
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (workstations targeted via Microsoft Teams social engineering); Microsoft Microsoft Teams (external-tenant chat abuse, no vulnerability)
MalwarePhishLocker, StreamMaster, SynkLoader, TrafficRedirector
ToolsVNC
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1018 Remote System Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1056.002 GUI Input Capture, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.006 Python, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090.002 External Proxy, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsenterprise, all-sectors-with-microsoft-365
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6255 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 29 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: SynkLoader PowerShell Cleaner MSI Lure Execution (331.msi / Azure Blob)

Detects the SynkLoader initial execution stage (TL-2026-6255): msiexec installing the fake 'PowerShell Cleaner' MSI (331.msi) from Azure Blob Storage (filereserve.blob.core.windows.net), or msiexec spawning PowerShell that runs the obfuscated cleaner.ps1 / drops into %APPDATA%\fl\ang\. Behaviour-first: the MSI hash is unique per infection, so the logic keys on the lure mechanics rather than hashes.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1204.002, T1566.003
  • Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
((Image="*msiexec.exe" (CommandLine="*.blob.core.windows.net*" OR CommandLine="*331.msi*"))
 OR (ParentImage="*msiexec.exe" (Image="*powershell.exe" OR Image="*pwsh.exe") (CommandLine="*cleaner.ps1*" OR CommandLine="*\\fl\\ang\\*")))
| eval lure=case(like(lower(CommandLine),"%331.msi%"),"331.msi PowerShell Cleaner lure",like(lower(CommandLine),"%filereserve.blob.core.windows.net%"),"filereserve Azure blob MSI",like(lower(CommandLine),"%.blob.core.windows.net%"),"Azure blob hosted MSI",true(),"msiexec-spawned PowerShell loader (cleaner.ps1 or fl/ang path)")
| table _time host User ParentImage Image CommandLine lure

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "msiexec.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine contains ".blob.core.windows.net" or ProcessCommandLine contains "331.msi"))
    or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "msiexec.exe" and FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "cleaner.ps1" or ProcessCommandLine contains @'\fl\ang\'))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256

Sigma

title: SynkLoader PowerShell Cleaner MSI Lure Execution
id: 6d1f0a52-3c7b-4e48-9a1d-2b5e8f7c3a10
status: experimental
description: Detects msiexec installing the SynkLoader fake 'PowerShell Cleaner' MSI (331.msi) from Azure Blob Storage, or msiexec spawning PowerShell that runs cleaner.ps1 or references the %APPDATA%\fl\ang\ drop directory.
references:
  - https://expel.com/blog/synkloader-when-you-throw-in-everything-but-the-kitchen-sink/
  - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-synkloader-malware-pushed-in-microsoft-teams-phishing-campaign/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1566.003
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_msi_lure:
    Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '.blob.core.windows.net'
      - '331.msi'
  selection_child_ps:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'cleaner.ps1'
      - '\fl\ang\'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate software deployment that installs MSI packages from the organisation's own Azure Blob Storage
  - Installers whose custom actions legitimately launch PowerShell
level: high

Known false positives:

  • IT-managed MSI deployments that pull installers from the organisation's own Azure Blob Storage account
  • Legitimate installers whose MSI custom actions launch PowerShell scripts

Tuning notes: Allow-list your own Azure storage account hostnames and software-deployment parent processes (SCCM/Intune). Keep the 331.msi and filereserve.blob.core.windows.net branches unfiltered as they are IOC-specific. Ensure Sysmon EventCode 1 captures full CommandLine.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • SynkLoader Teams Phishing from External Tenant Impersonating IT Service Desk · unlock with TL Creds
  • SynkLoader Scheduled Task Persistence via Task Scheduler COM (pythonw.exe, 12-char Task Name) · unlock with TL Creds
  • SynkLoader pythonw.exe 90-120 Second Beaconing to Public Hosts · unlock with TL Creds
  • SynkLoader Dropped Files in [indicator] and Fake msvcp150/160 DLLs · unlock with TL Creds
  • SynkLoader Python Backdoor Spawning Shell and System/AD Profiling Commands · unlock with TL Creds
  • SynkLoader TrafficRedirector/StreamMaster pythonw.exe Connections to Internal Hosts · unlock with TL Creds
  • SynkLoader [indicator] Backdoor Launched by pythonw.exe from User Profile · unlock with TL Creds
  • SynkLoader C2 Domain Resolution ([indicator] and related) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 29 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6255.

Sample indicators (3 of 29)

  • Domain: neversoftmain[.]net
  • File hash: 151d2a7f52f047638ca8ad80c859c6bfe04d7510fb10933817fa0e3ba5d07a11
  • Domain: rootfarmapp[.]net

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 29 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

29 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

SynkLoader was discovered by Expel (analyst Marcus Hutchins) in August 2026 after EDR flagged a scheduled task in a customer environment (reported as 2026-08-18). Compile dates and file timestamps indicate the family was first compiled and distributed around 2026-07-28. Expel named it for its mix of languages: Python, PowerShell, C# and C++, sometimes up to three languages in a single module. Attackers choose which modules to deploy based on the victim environment and their objectives.

Initial access is Microsoft Teams phishing from an external Microsoft 365 (onmicrosoft.com) tenant displaying the name 'IT Service Desk' (reported vishing in some accounts). The victim is persuaded to install a 'PowerShell Cleaner' MSI (331.msi) hosted on Azure Blob Storage (filereserve.blob.core.windows.net), which makes the download appear trustworthy and bypasses email attachment controls. The MSI runs PowerShell, extracts an obfuscated cleaner.ps1 and archive6.zip (a bundled Python framework, the malicious ss.py loader, precompiled libraries and fake Microsoft runtime DLLs such as msvcp150.dll / msvcp160.dll) to the user profile (OSEC reports most files under %APPDATA%\fl\ang\). The hash-gated, in-memory PowerShell decrypts the Python environment and launches ss.py under pythonw.exe.

The ss.py backdoor beacons every 90-120 seconds to one of several hard-coded .net C2 domains (reported hosting on ASN 399629), encrypts traffic with a modified ChaCha20 cipher keyed to a victim ID, and executes Python code returned by the C2 via exec(). Modules are delivered selectively from different C2s. Modules: System Profiler (hostname, user, privilege level, processes, services, AD domain, count of AD computers), Persistence Module (a DLL manually mapped in memory creates a randomly named, 12-character scheduled task through the Task Scheduler COM interface rather than schtasks.exe, triggering at logon and daily at 10:00), PhishLocker (full-screen borderless fake Windows 11 lock screen capturing the plaintext domain password; Alt+Tab reveals windows beneath it, and a default background on a customized machine is a tell), TrafficRedirector (backconnect reverse proxy letting attackers reach internal services or route internet traffic through the victim IP, defeating IP allow-lists and geo-anomaly alerting), Interactive Shell (remote PowerShell RAT), StreamMaster (VNC with remote mouse/keyboard) and a Module Status Script.

Module hashes are unique per infection, so hash IOCs have limited value; domains, the Azure blob URL, file artifacts and behaviors are more durable. Expel built an emulator for the shell module; the operator ran profiling commands and disconnected apparently after concluding the environment was not real. The emphasis on measuring AD size led Hutchins to assess likely ransomware use; Hive Pro assesses a ransomware group or initial access broker at low-to-medium confidence. OSEC notes similarities to TWINLOOT (fake lock screen, Python loaders, Azure abuse). Hutchins speculated developers used AI to write the code (unconfirmed). The same fake Teams identity was reportedly still in use two weeks after Expel's publication. No threat actor is named.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1620 Reflective Code Loading; T1684.001 Impersonation

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task

Credential Access

T1056.002 GUI Input Capture

Execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.006 Python; T1204.002 Malicious File; T1559.001 Component Object Model

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1090.002 External Proxy; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography

Initial Access

T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block the SynkLoader C2 domains (neversoftmain.net, rootfarmapp.net, tripinupdate.net, dondermicapp.net, aroclenetapp.net) at DNS/proxy
  • Hunt for %APPDATA%\fl\ang\, ss.py run by pythonw.exe, and msvcp150.dll/msvcp160.dll outside system paths
  • Hunt for randomly named scheduled tasks (logon + daily 10:00) running pythonw.exe from user profile paths
  • Reset passwords and revoke sessions for any user who interacted with the fake IT Service Desk or saw an unexpected lock screen
  • Isolate affected hosts and review sign-ins originating from the victim's IP for follow-on access

Workarounds

  • Do not install unsolicited MSI files received via chat
  • Treat a lock screen that appears unexpectedly during an active session as suspicious

Longer-term hardening

  • Restrict external Teams federation or allow-list trusted external tenants; flag external senders using 'IT Service Desk' style display names
  • Allow-list company Azure storage domains and block unknown *.blob.core.windows.net hosts
  • Restrict MSI installation and PowerShell execution to IT staff; enable PowerShell script block logging and AMSI
  • Train users to verify IT requests through an independent channel and to use Ctrl+Alt+Delete / Alt+Tab to validate lock screens
  • Detect Task Scheduler COM-based task creation, not only schtasks.exe command lines

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (workstations targeted via Microsoft Teams social engineering)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows 11 and other Windows endpoints with user-executable MSI/PowerShell
  • Microsoft — Microsoft Teams (external-tenant chat abuse, no vulnerability)
    Vulnerable versions: Tenants permitting external federated chat

Timeline

  • Compile dates and file timestamps indicate SynkLoader was first compiled and distributed around this date
  • Expel EDR detects a SynkLoader scheduled task in a customer environment, starting the investigation (reported date)
  • BleepingComputer reports Expel's analysis of SynkLoader, a Teams IT help desk phishing loader with a fake 'PowerShell Cleaner' MSI
  • OSEC weekly situation report summarizes SynkLoader, noting similarities to TWINLOOT and suspected initial access broker role
  • Hutchins reports the attackers still using the same fake Teams identity two weeks after the original research was published
  • Expel publishes a follow-up post on how SynkLoader got its name; other analysts report similar activity and share additional IOCs

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats