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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6249

GhostMap: Linux eBPF Rootkit in IronWorm (Shai-Hulud's Rusty Cousin) and Atomic Arch Payloads

highACTIVE

Aqua Nautilus describes GhostMap, a Linux eBPF rootkit shared by the IronWorm npm implant and the Atomic Arch AUR payload, which rewrites kernel-returned data so user-space tools omit selected processes and sockets. IronWorm is a Rust credential-stealing implant delivered through compromised npm packages; Aqua does not independently establish who operates it. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6249
Also known asIronWorm, Atomic Arch, GhostMap
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsnpm ecosystem weavedb-sdk (examined specimen, published from compromised asteroiddao account); Arch Linux AUR AUR packages with modified PKGBUILDs installing atomic-lockfile / lockfile-js / js-digest; Linux Linux hosts with eBPF enabled (rootkit loads with sufficient privilege; hiding degrades under kernel lockdown)
MalwareShai-Hulud
ToolsTor expert bundle with custom torrc
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1014 Rootkit, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy, T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1543.002 Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service, T1547.013 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries, T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files and 2 more in the attack flow
MotivationUNKNOWN
Target sectorstechnology, software development, cryptocurrency web3, cloud
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6249 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 25 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: IronWorm npm Preinstall Dropper - node_modules tools/setup and Atomic Arch deps ELF Execution

Detects Linux ELF execution launched from inside npm package directories as used by IronWorm (weavedb-sdk 0.45.3 preinstall hook running ./tools/setup, a Rust ELF) and the Atomic Arch delivery chain (atomic-lockfile, lockfile-js, js-digest shipping the deps ELF), plus the .github/scripts/precheck alternate dropper path and known IronWorm/GhostMap SHA256 hashes. Behaviour-first: a binary executed from node_modules/PACKAGE/tools/setup is anomalous for most packages and is the entry point of the chain that installs glugi.service and loads the GhostMap eBPF rootkit (TL-2026-6249, T1195.002). The SHA256 36abd242ddaa27f0 (prefix) is community-corroborated (1 sighting) and the MD5 178d327d87243a6d (prefix) is an OSINT-tier sibling indicator with unverified relation.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1195.002
  • Data sources: sysmon_for_linux (index=linux sourcetype=sysmon:linux EventCode=1)
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=linux sourcetype="sysmon:linux" EventCode=1
    (Image="*/node_modules/*/tools/setup" OR Image="*/node_modules/atomic-lockfile/*" OR Image="*/node_modules/lockfile-js/*" OR Image="*/node_modules/js-digest/*" OR CommandLine="*.github/scripts/precheck*" OR Hashes="*36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36*" OR Hashes="*6144d433f8a0316869877b5f834c801251bbb936e5f1577c5680878c7443c98b*" OR Hashes="*178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e*")
| eval known_ironworm_pkg=if(match(Image, "(weavedb-sdk|weavedb-client|arnext|roidjs|atomic-notes|atomic-lockfile|lockfile-js|js-digest)"), "yes", "no")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Image) as image values(CommandLine) as cmdline values(ParentImage) as parent_image values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_cmdline values(known_ironworm_pkg) as known_ironworm_pkg by host User
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let ironworm_pkgs = dynamic(['weavedb-sdk','weavedb-client','arnext','roidjs','atomic-notes','atomic-lockfile','lockfile-js','js-digest']);
let ironworm_sha256 = dynamic(['36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36','6144d433f8a0316869877b5f834c801251bbb936e5f1577c5680878c7443c98b']);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FolderPath contains '/node_modules/' and (FolderPath endswith '/tools/setup' or FolderPath has_any ('atomic-lockfile','lockfile-js','js-digest')))
    or ProcessCommandLine contains '.github/scripts/precheck'
    or SHA256 in~ (ironworm_sha256)
    or MD5 =~ '178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e'
| extend KnownIronWormPkg = FolderPath has_any (ironworm_pkgs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256, MD5, KnownIronWormPkg
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: IronWorm npm Preinstall Dropper Execution from node_modules
id: 7b3e2c14-5a9d-4f61-8c0e-2d41a6b9f3a7
status: experimental
description: Detects Linux ELF execution from npm package directories matching the IronWorm weavedb-sdk preinstall tools/setup chain, the Atomic Arch atomic-lockfile deps payload, the .github/scripts/precheck dropper path and known IronWorm or GhostMap hashes
references:
  - https://www.aquasec.com/blog/ironworm-ebpf-rootkit-ghostmap-linux/
  - https://research.jfrog.com/post/iron-worm-shai-hulud-rustier-cousin/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.t1195.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: linux
detection:
  selection_setup:
    Image|contains: '/node_modules/'
    Image|endswith: '/tools/setup'
  selection_atomic:
    Image|contains:
      - '/node_modules/atomic-lockfile/'
      - '/node_modules/lockfile-js/'
      - '/node_modules/js-digest/'
  selection_precheck:
    CommandLine|contains: '.github/scripts/precheck'
  selection_hash:
    Hashes|contains:
      - '36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36'
      - '6144d433f8a0316869877b5f834c801251bbb936e5f1577c5680878c7443c98b'
      - '178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate npm packages that ship a tools/setup helper binary
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate npm packages that ship a native tools/setup helper executed from node_modules during install
  • Internal build tooling that deliberately runs binaries from node_modules/*/ directories in CI

Tuning notes: Allowlist reviewed internal packages that legitimately ship tools/setup binaries (by package name and hash). Restrict to developer, build and CI Linux hosts to cut noise. Enable the Hashes field in the Sysmon for Linux config to use the hash branches. The MD5 178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e is a community-related sibling indicator (OSINT tier) - treat a match as a hunting lead, not confirmation. Use the known_ironworm_pkg field to prioritise alerts.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Atomic Arch AUR Build Installing [indicator], [indicator] or [indicator] via npm · unlock with TL Creds
  • IronWorm glugi.service Systemd Persistence and Self-Named /var/lib Installer · unlock with TL Creds
  • IronWorm [indicator] Fallback Exfiltration and Hidden Loopback Collector on 127.0.0.1:8738 · unlock with TL Creds
  • IronWorm Worm Propagation - Spoofed [indicator] Git Commits and precheck Dropper · unlock with TL Creds
  • IronWorm Credential Harvesting - Multi-Class Secret File Reads by Dropper Executable · unlock with TL Creds
  • IronWorm Tor Hidden-Service C2 Beacon Traffic via .onion Proxy Requests ([indicator]) · unlock with TL Creds
  • GhostMap eBPF Rootkit Load and user.d xattr Collector Activity from Non-Standard Executable · unlock with TL Creds
  • IronWorm Tor Expert Bundle Runtime Download and torrc Launch from Non-Standard Path · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 25 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6249.

Sample indicators (3 of 25)

  • Domain: temp[.]sh
  • File hash: 0c16ee8a8c1f5b51b01bce924e173030f032912d5b66f1a564fd636a67ddbf5f
  • File hash: 36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 25 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

25 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Community OSINT corroboration

1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.

Technical analysis

GhostMap is an eBPF rootkit recovered from the IronWorm Rust implant and found in a comparison payload from the Atomic Arch campaign. Aqua Security (Dolev Mizrahi, Ivan Kosarev; 2026-11-17) analysed a specimen of the npm package weavedb-sdk 0.45.3, whose preinstall hook runs ./tools/setup, a Rust ELF. On first run the specimen copied itself to /var/lib/glugi/glugi, created and enabled glugi.service, and the systemd-started successor process (same hash as the original) loaded the rootkit. A second run used /var/lib/havebi/havebi, so install names vary. The npm package page carries an author deprecation notice claiming compromise by the 'Mini Shai-Hulud worm (TeamPCP)'; Aqua flags this as the package author's claim and says its research does not establish who operates IronWorm.

GhostMap (active checkpoint: 13 programs, 10 maps, 13 links) conceals data by mutating kernel-returned buffers with bpf_probe_write_user. For process hiding, enter_getdents records the directory buffer address and exit_getdents (sys_exit_getdents64) walks linux_dirent64 records, matching numeric names against the hidden_pids map and enlarging the preceding record's d_reclen (low byte only) so readers skip the hidden entry; the returned byte count is unchanged. An on_exec hook compares the process comm to the hidden_names map and adds matching PIDs, so a child that execs a matching program is hidden even under a visible parent while a fork-only child stays visible. Socket hiding (hidden_inodes map, net_exit_read, exit_recvmsg) removes listeners from /proc/net/tcp and turns netlink diagnostic messages into NLMSG_NOOP; in testing, ss still showed the listener but without process-owner annotation. A controlled PTRACE_ATTACH against a protected process killed the attaching task with SIGKILL (anti-debugging). JFrog separately reports the process and TCP hiding depend on a memory-write helper that fails under kernel lockdown.

The implant runs a loopback collector on 127.0.0.1:8738 that stores records through setxattr into the user.d extended attribute on the installed executable; static analysis links the stored data to outbound C2 message construction. No successful external delivery or authenticated remote command execution was observed by Aqua, and no privilege-escalation exploit was demonstrated; severity is analyst-assigned. Stopping the service removed programs and links, while three pinned maps remained but did not keep hiding active. The Atomic Arch payload shares the 13 program names, 10 map names, helper-use bitmaps, a byte-identical 1,142-byte forged sudo wrapper and the port 8738 listener, which supports a shared rootkit implementation but not a common operator.

Broader context from JFrog (2026-06-03): IronWorm is a Rust, UPX-packed (modified magic) infostealer worm published from the compromised npm account asteroiddao across about 36-38 packages in the Arweave/WeaveDB ecosystem. It steals roughly 86 environment variables and 20+ credential files (cloud, Kubernetes, Vault, CI, npm/GitHub tokens, AI API keys, Exodus wallet via Electron hook), beacons to a Tor hidden service at /api/agent, falls back to temp.sh, and self-propagates by committing trojanized code to victims' GitHub repositories (spoofing claude@users.noreply.github.com and bot identities) and by abusing npm Trusted Publishing (OIDC). Atomic Arch (June 2026, reported by BleepingComputer, Sonatype and others) hijacked orphaned AUR packages and altered PKGBUILDs to install the npm package atomic-lockfile, which contains a Linux ELF named deps acting as a credential stealer with optional root-only eBPF rootkit features. Counts of affected AUR packages vary by source (20+ per Sonatype, 400+ per BleepingComputer, higher figures elsewhere). Hunt note: affected Atomic Arch versions are not established.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Defense Evasion

T1014 Rootkit; T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1564.014 Hide Artifacts: Extended Attributes; T1622 Debugger Evasion

Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain

Credential Access

T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files

Persistence

T1543.002 Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service; T1547.013 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Hunt for /var/lib/glugi/glugi, /var/lib/havebi/havebi, glugi.service and the user.d extended attribute on executables
  • Check Linux hosts that installed weavedb-sdk 0.45.3 or other asteroiddao-published npm packages, and AUR hosts that installed atomic-lockfile, lockfile-js or js-digest
  • Rotate all credentials reachable from affected hosts: npm/GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Kubernetes and Vault secrets, SSH keys, AI API keys, wallet secrets
  • Alert on eBPF program attachment using bpf_probe_write_user (Tracee flagged exit_getdents, net_exit_read, exit_recvmsg)
  • Do not trust in-host process/socket listings on suspected hosts; collect disk images and memory, and compare /proc enumeration with an out-of-band view before rebuilding

Workarounds

  • If a host is confirmed compromised, reinstall from a known-good image rather than attempting in-place rootkit removal
  • Block or monitor outbound Tor traffic from build and developer hosts

Longer-term hardening

  • Disable npm lifecycle scripts in CI and developer builds (ignore-scripts) where feasible
  • Review AUR PKGBUILDs and maintainer changes before building; avoid building orphaned packages unreviewed
  • Restrict unprivileged and unneeded BPF use (kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled, CAP_BPF/CAP_SYS_ADMIN controls) and consider kernel lockdown
  • Review npm Trusted Publishing/OIDC trust configuration and GitHub Actions workflow changes
  • Deploy runtime eBPF-aware monitoring (e.g., Tracee) and log bpf() syscalls

Affected and fixed versions

  • npm ecosystem — weavedb-sdk (examined specimen, published from compromised asteroiddao account)
    Vulnerable versions: 0.45.3
  • Arch Linux AUR — AUR packages with modified PKGBUILDs installing atomic-lockfile / lockfile-js / js-digest
  • Linux — Linux hosts with eBPF enabled (rootkit loads with sufficient privilege; hiding degrades under kernel lockdown)

Timeline

  • JFrog Security Research publishes 'IronWorm: Shai-Hulud's rustier cousin', describing a Rust npm infostealer worm with an eBPF rootkit and Tor C2 published from the compromised asteroiddao npm account (weavedb-sdk 0.45.3 among 36-38 packages).
  • Cloud Security Alliance publishes a research note on IronWorm covering the preinstall ./locked-ioc-11 chain, Tor C2 at /api/agent and the eBPF rootkit behavior.
  • Atomic Arch AUR supply-chain campaign first identified per secondary reporting: orphaned AUR packages modified so builds install the npm package atomic-lockfile carrying the deps ELF stealer with optional eBPF rootkit.
  • BleepingComputer reports 400+ AUR packages distributing atomic-lockfile; Sonatype reports at least 20 hijacked orphaned packages; AUR maintainers remove malicious commits and ban accounts.
  • JFrog reports an evolved IronWorm variant in compromised jscrambler npm packages.
  • Aqua begins controlled experiments with the IronWorm specimen, hiding test PIDs 3035 and 3934 via the getdents64 hook while control PIDs stayed visible.
  • Aqua observes a run installing to locked-ioc-8 with hidden target PID 3820 and the loopback collector on 127.0.0.1:8738.
  • Aqua confirms exec-based hiding: a fork-only child stays visible while a child executing a matching program is hidden under a visible parent.
  • Aqua Nautilus publishes 'Uncovering GhostMap', naming the shared eBPF rootkit in IronWorm and Atomic Arch payloads and releasing hashes, paths and Tracee detection findings.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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