Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6340
GhostMap eBPF Rootkit Hides Malware Processes and Sockets in IronWorm (npm) and Atomic Arch (AUR) Supply Chain Campaigns
Aqua Nautilus identified GhostMap, an eBPF rootkit that hides malware processes, selected directory entries and network sockets from some Linux utilities, in samples from the IronWorm (npm) and Atomic Arch (AUR/npm) supply chain campaigns. In a privileged lab run the implant persisted via a systemd service. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6340 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | GhostMap, IronWorm, Atomic Arch |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | npm ecosystem npm packages from compromised 'asteroiddao' account (e.g. weavedb-sdk 0.45.3, weavedb-lite 0.1.1, wao 0.41.2, zkjson 0.8.5) and atomic-lockfile, js-digest, lockfile-js; Arch Linux Arch User Repository (AUR) orphaned packages with modified PKGBUILDs; Linux Linux hosts with eBPF enabled where the implant runs with privileges |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-506, CWE-829 |
| Malware | GhostMap, IronWorm, Shai-Hulud |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1014 Rootkit, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy, T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1543.002 Systemd Service, T1547.013 XDG Autostart Entries, T1552.001 Credentials In Files, T1552.004 Private Keys and 3 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | technology, software-development, cryptocurrency, cloud |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6340 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 27 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: GhostMap/IronWorm/Atomic Arch Malicious Package Install and Preinstall Payload Execution
Detects execution of package-manager commands or preinstall payloads tied to the IronWorm (npm) and Atomic Arch (AUR/npm) supply chain campaigns that deliver the GhostMap eBPF rootkit: installs of atomic-lockfile, js-digest, lockfile-js, weavedb-sdk, weavedb-lite and zkjson, execution of the bundled Rust ELFs (tools/setup, src/hooks/deps, lib/install-deps.mjs), and known SHA256/MD5 values (including the community-observed sample with SHA256 prefix 36abd242). Any hit means the host should be treated as credential-compromised.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1195.002, T1059.004
- Data sources: sysmon_for_linux, linux:process_creation, DeviceProcessEvents
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=linux sourcetype="sysmon:linux" EventCode=1 (CommandLine="*atomic-lockfile*" OR CommandLine="*js-digest*" OR CommandLine="*lockfile-js*" OR CommandLine="*weavedb-sdk*" OR CommandLine="*weavedb-lite*" OR CommandLine="*zkjson*" OR CommandLine="*install-deps.mjs*" OR Image="*/tools/setup" OR Image="*/src/hooks/deps" OR Hashes="*36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36*" OR Hashes="*178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e*")
| eval install_cmd=if(match(CommandLine,"(npm|bun|pnpm|yarn) +(i|install|add)"),"yes","no"), payload_exec=if(match(Image,"/(tools/setup|src/hooks/deps)$"),"yes","no")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(Image) as images values(install_cmd) as install_cmd values(payload_exec) as payload_exec by host, User, ParentImage
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
| table first_seen last_seen host User ParentImage images command_lines install_cmd payload_exec countMicrosoft KQL
let malicious_pkgs = dynamic(["atomic-lockfile","js-digest","lockfile-js","weavedb-sdk","weavedb-lite","zkjson","wao@0.41.2","install-deps.mjs"]);
let known_sha256 = dynamic(["36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36","8795b5215dd06c5366a038a65b18b4dfefa5fd90244a567c3e0b58323103377c","6144d433f8a0316869877b5f834c801251bbb936e5f1577c5680878c7443c98b","3607de2597f8955f9a88f36ee43b64d3891b8ef536e99fa098e80169350f7b01"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (malicious_pkgs)
or FolderPath endswith "/tools/setup"
or FolderPath endswith "/src/hooks/deps"
or SHA256 in (known_sha256)
or MD5 == "178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256Sigma
title: GhostMap IronWorm Atomic Arch Malicious Package Install and Preinstall Payload
id: 3f6a1c52-8b1e-4d0a-9c71-6e2a5d9b0f11
status: experimental
description: Detects installs of npm packages tied to the IronWorm and Atomic Arch supply chain campaigns, execution of their bundled preinstall Rust ELF payloads, and known sample hashes that deliver the GhostMap eBPF rootkit.
references:
- https://www.aquasec.com/blog/ironworm-ebpf-rootkit-ghostmap-linux/
- https://research.jfrog.com/post/iron-worm-shai-hulud-rustier-cousin/
- https://www.sonatype.com/blog/atomic-arch-npm-campaign-adds-malicious-dependency
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1195.002
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
logsource:
product: linux
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_pkg:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'atomic-lockfile'
- 'js-digest'
- 'lockfile-js'
- 'weavedb-sdk'
- 'weavedb-lite'
- 'zkjson'
- 'wao@0.41.2'
- 'install-deps.mjs'
selection_payload:
Image|endswith:
- '/tools/setup'
- '/src/hooks/deps'
selection_hash:
Hashes|contains:
- '36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36'
- '8795b5215dd06c5366a038a65b18b4dfefa5fd90244a567c3e0b58323103377c'
- '6144d433f8a0316869877b5f834c801251bbb936e5f1577c5680878c7443c98b'
- '3607de2597f8955f9a88f36ee43b64d3891b8ef536e99fa098e80169350f7b01'
- '178d327d87243a6d937ea9f1e4bcb20e'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Security researchers or package-reputation scanners installing the named packages in a sandbox
- Legitimate unrelated projects that happen to ship a file named tools/setup
level: high
Known false positives:
- Security researchers analysing the named packages in an isolated lab
- Unrelated internal projects that ship a script at tools/setup
Tuning notes: Exclude lab/sandbox hosts via a host lookup. Package-name matches are strong on their own; the tools/setup path match is broader, so require install_cmd=yes or a node_modules parent for lower-fidelity alerting. Update the hash and package lists as vendors publish further affected versions. The MD5 is a community-tier (TL_OSINT_Scan) sibling indicator, so treat it as corroboration, not ground truth.
- Atomic Arch Hijacked AUR PKGBUILD Spawning Malicious npm/Bun Dependency Install · unlock with TL Creds
- GhostMap eBPF Rootkit Loading: bpf() Syscall from Non-Approved or Self-Named /var/lib Process · unlock with TL Creds
- IronWorm Tor Expert Bundle Download and Tor Client Launched with Custom torrc · unlock with TL Creds
- IronWorm Spoofed claude@users.noreply.github.com Commit Identity or npm OIDC Token Exchange · unlock with TL Creds
- IronWorm and Atomic Arch Credential File Harvesting by Non-Standard Process · unlock with TL Creds
- Tor SOCKS Proxy Use by Non-Tor Process from Writable Path (IronWorm Multi-hop C2) · unlock with TL Creds
- GhostMap Implant Persistence: Self-Named systemd Service Binary Under /var/lib and user.d xattr Use · unlock with TL Creds
- IronWorm/Atomic Arch Loopback Collector on [indicator]:8738 and [indicator] Fallback Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 27 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6340.
Sample indicators (3 of 27)
- Domain:
temp[.]sh - URL:
hxxps://registry[.]npmjs[.]org/-/npm/v1/oidc/token/exchange/package - File hash:
0c16ee8a8c1f5b51b01bce924e173030f032912d5b66f1a564fd636a67ddbf5f
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 27 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
Aqua states the shared code does not establish that the same operators ran both campaigns.
GhostMap is the name Aqua Nautilus gave to an eBPF-based concealment component embedded in Linux implants from two software supply chain campaigns. IronWorm, documented by JFrog on 2026-06-03, is a Rust credential-stealing worm distributed through npm packages republished from the compromised 'asteroiddao' account; a malicious preinstall hook executes a bundled ~976 KB UPX-packed Rust ELF (tools/setup). Atomic Arch, documented by Sonatype on 2026-06-11, hijacked orphaned Arch User Repository (AUR) packages and modified their PKGBUILDs to run 'npm install atomic-lockfile minimist chalk'; atomic-lockfile's preinstall hook executes a bundled native Rust ELF, and a second wave used js-digest and lockfile-js (some via Bun).
Aqua's lab analysis (article dated 2026-11-17) shows the installer copying itself to a randomly named path (e.g. /var/lib/glugi/glugi, /var/lib/havebi/havebi) and creating and enabling a matching systemd service; the service process, not the installer, loads GhostMap. At one checkpoint GhostMap had 13 eBPF programs, 10 maps and 13 attachments. Process hiding works by recording the getdents64 buffer address on enter (enter_getdents) and, in exit_getdents, using bpf_probe_write_user to change the low byte of a directory record's length field so readers skip the next entry, while the returned byte count is unchanged. An on_exec program adds PIDs whose comm matches the hidden_names map to hidden_pids; a fork-only child stays visible while a child that execs a matching program is hidden. Socket hiding (net_exit_read, exit_recvmsg, hidden_inodes map) omits the listener from /proc/net/tcp and rewrites netlink messages to NLMSG_NOOP, but the tested ss build (iproute2 6.1.0-1ubuntu6.4) still showed the listener. An anti-debugging program sends SIGKILL to a task that attempts PTRACE_ATTACH on a protected process. Per JFrog, process and TCP hiding rely on a memory-write helper that fails under kernel lockdown, while netlink filtering and anti-debugging still work.
IronWorm's wider behavior per JFrog and SafeDep: harvesting of ~86 environment variables (14 AI/ML API keys) and 20+ credential files (cloud, Kubernetes, Vault, AI coding assistant auth files, Exodus wallet seed phrases); Tor-based C2 (downloads the Tor expert bundle, writes its own torrc, beacons to /api/agent) with temp.sh as an unconfirmed fallback; self-propagation via stolen GitHub credentials (commits as claude <claude@users.noreply.github.com>, backdated to the repo's last legitimate commit) and npm Trusted Publishing OIDC token exchange. Atomic Arch targets GitHub credentials, SSH artifacts, Vault tokens, browser cookie databases and Slack/Discord/Teams/Telegram stores and uploads via POST /upload. Aqua's lab run observed a loopback collector on 127.0.0.1:8738 accepting seven synthetic records stored in the 'user.d' extended attribute of the installed executable; no external delivery or authenticated remote command execution was observed. No public C2 IPs, domains, or onion addresses are published in the sources. The Atomic Arch payload shares the 13-program/10-map eBPF layout, a byte-identical 1,142-byte forged sudo wrapper and the 8738 loopback listener; Cornfield linked the campaigns via a shared embedded mnemonic. Severity is analyst-assigned; in-the-wild victims beyond reported package compromises are not established for GhostMap itself.
Defender guidance from Aqua: compare independent views (/proc enumeration vs direct /proc/PID access, /proc/net/tcp vs ss/netlink), correlate discrepancies with unexpected eBPF attachments (especially probe_write_user users) and new systemd services, preserve file metadata including extended attributes before cleanup, and avoid casual debugging of suspect processes. Aqua Tracee flagged the eBPF attachments but not individual buffer mutations.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1014 Rootkit; T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1564.014 Extended Attributes; T1622 Debugger Evasion
Execution
Command and Control
Initial Access
T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain
Credential Access
T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1552.001 Credentials In Files; T1552.004 Private Keys
Persistence
T1543.002 Systemd Service; T1547.013 XDG Autostart Entries
Exfiltration
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Treat any host that installed affected npm packages (e.g. weavedb-sdk, atomic-lockfile, js-digest, lockfile-js) or built flagged AUR packages as credential-compromised and rotate exposed secrets
- Search build history, caches and CI logs for 'npm install atomic-lockfile', 'bun install js-digest' and execution of tools/setup or src/hooks/deps
- Hunt for unexpected systemd services and executables under /var/lib/<random>/<random>, and preserve file metadata including extended attributes (user.d) before cleanup
- Compare /proc enumeration with direct /proc/PID access and /proc/net/tcp with ss/netlink output to find hidden processes and sockets
Workarounds
- Enable kernel lockdown where feasible (JFrog notes it breaks the memory-write helper used for process/TCP hiding)
- Restrict unprivileged BPF and require CAP_BPF/CAP_SYS_ADMIN auditing
Longer-term hardening
- Alert on eBPF program attachments that use bpf_probe_write_user and on bpf() syscalls from non-approved processes (e.g. with Tracee)
- Audit repositories for unexpected install hooks, workflow changes and backdated commits, including commits authored as claude@users.noreply.github.com
- Review AUR PKGBUILDs for maintainer changes on orphaned packages and unexpected npm/bun install steps
- Restrict npm Trusted Publishing and CI token scope; use ignore-scripts for untrusted dependency installs
Affected and fixed versions
- npm ecosystem — npm packages from compromised 'asteroiddao' account (e.g. weavedb-sdk 0.45.3, weavedb-lite 0.1.1, wao 0.41.2, zkjson 0.8.5) and atomic-lockfile, js-digest, lockfile-js
Vulnerable versions: weavedb-sdk@0.45.3; weavedb-lite@0.1.1; wao@0.41.2; zkjson@0.8.5; atomic-lockfile@1.4.2 (per secondary reporting) - Arch Linux — Arch User Repository (AUR) orphaned packages with modified PKGBUILDs
Vulnerable versions: Affected package list not established in Aqua article - Linux — Linux hosts with eBPF enabled where the implant runs with privileges
Vulnerable versions: Kernel versions not specified
Timeline
- JFrog publishes IronWorm research: a Rust npm worm with credential theft, Tor C2 and eBPF rootkit, spread via packages republished from the compromised 'asteroiddao' npm account.
- BleepingComputer reports IronWorm hitting 36 npm packages (other outlets cite 37-43); malicious versions deprecated and most malicious GitHub commits removed within about a day.
- Sonatype publishes Atomic Arch: orphaned AUR packages hijacked and PKGBUILDs modified to install the malicious npm dependency atomic-lockfile (Sonatype-2026-003775).
- Second wave observed using js-digest and lockfile-js (Sonatype-2026-003808); later reporting raises the count of affected AUR packages from 20+ to 400+ and, in some outlets, ~1,500.
- Aqua Nautilus lab test confirms GhostMap hides test PIDs from process listings while control PIDs stay visible.
- Aqua lab experiment shows single-byte mutation of getdents64 record lengths; a later run installs under locked-ioc-8.
- Aqua lab test shows fork-only children remain visible while children that exec a matching program are hidden.
- Aqua Nautilus publishes GhostMap analysis linking the eBPF rootkit in IronWorm and Atomic Arch samples (shared code, not proven shared operator).
- GBHackers reports on Aqua's GhostMap findings.
Sources cited
- Aqua Nautilus: IronWorm eBPF Rootkit GhostMap on Linux aquasec.com · Research · 2026-11-17
- JFrog: IronWorm, Shai-Hulud's Rustier Cousin research.jfrog.com · Research · 2026-06-03
- Sonatype: Atomic Arch - Attackers Hijack Trusted AUR Packages (npm campaign adds malicious dependency) sonatype.com · Research · 2026-06-11
- SafeDep: IronWorm campaign threat intelligence safedep.io · Research · 2026-06-03
- StepSecurity: 400 AUR packages hijacked - Atomic Arch campaign stepsecurity.io · Blog · 2026-06-12
- Hackers Abuse Linux eBPF Technology to Hide Malware Processes and Evade Detection gbhackers.com · News · 2026-11-18
- BleepingComputer: New IronWorm malware hits 36 packages in npm supply-chain attack BleepingComputer · News · 2026-06-04
- The Hacker News: Over 400 Arch Linux AUR packages compromised The Hacker News · News · 2026-06-12
- Privacy Guides: Around 1,500 AUR packages compromised with rootkit-like malware privacyguides.org · News · 2026-06-12
Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.