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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6346

EggStreme Malware Framework Revised (Custom Loader Ciphers, Passive-Mode Agent, SMB/VBScript Staging) in Suspected Chinese APT Attacks on Philippine Government Organizations

highACTIVE

A suspected Chinese APT has rebuilt its fileless EggStreme malware framework after Bitdefender's September 2025 disclosure, changing loader cryptography, adding a passive listening agent on TCP 5060, adding AD reconnaissance and in-memory PowerShell/.NET/PE execution, and moving lateral movement to SMB-delivered VBScript. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6346
Also known asEggStreme, EggStremeFuel/RawCookie, EggStremeAgent/Gorem RAT
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (domain-joined endpoints and servers)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwareEggStreme
ToolsImpacket - S0357, Stowaway
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1018 Remote System Discovery, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1056.001 Keylogging, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.005 Visual Basic, T1078.002 Domain Accounts, T1087.002 Domain Account, T1090.001 Internal Proxy, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft and 9 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment administration, defense
Target regionsphilippines, taiwan
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6346 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 29 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: EggStreme SMB-Staged VBScript (prncnfg.vbs) and Officelog.bat Execution from C:\Users\Public

Behaviour-first detection of the revised EggStreme lateral-movement stage (TL-2026-6346): a batch wrapper C:\Users\Public\Officelog.bat launches C:\Users\Public\prncnfg.vbs through WScript.exe, which stages StandaloneUpdater.exe. Any WScript.exe execution of a .vbs from the Public profile is also flagged. Tracks T1059.005, T1570 and T1021.002.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1059.005, T1570, T1021.002
  • Data sources: sysmon:EventCode=1 (index=sysmon, sourcetype XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational), DeviceProcessEvents, windows process_creation
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h
((Image="*\\wscript.exe" CommandLine="*\\Users\\Public\\*.vbs*") OR CommandLine="*\\Users\\Public\\Officelog.bat*" OR CommandLine="*\\Users\\Public\\prncnfg.vbs*")
| eval indicator=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)Officelog[.]bat"),"Officelog.bat",if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)prncnfg[.]vbs"),"prncnfg.vbs","public_vbs_via_wscript"))
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentImage) as parent_images by host, User, Image, indicator
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (FileName =~ "wscript.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has @"\Users\Public\" and ProcessCommandLine has ".vbs")
    or ProcessCommandLine has @"\Users\Public\Officelog.bat"
    or ProcessCommandLine has @"\Users\Public\prncnfg.vbs"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Sigma

title: EggStreme SMB-Staged VBScript and Batch Wrapper Execution from C:\Users\Public
id: 3f6a1c2e-8b41-4d27-9a53-6e0c71b4d101
status: experimental
description: Detects WScript.exe running a VBScript from C:\Users\Public or execution of Officelog.bat / prncnfg.vbs from that folder, the SMB-delivered staging chain reported for the revised EggStreme framework (TL-2026-6346).
references:
    - https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/eggstreme-malware-revises-architecture-infrastructure
    - https://www.bitdefender.com/en-gb/blog/businessinsights/eggstreme-fileless-malware-cyberattack-apac
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-18
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1570
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_wscript:
        Image|endswith: '\wscript.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - '.vbs'
    selection_named:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Users\Public\Officelog.bat'
            - '\Users\Public\prncnfg.vbs'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts deliberately staged in C:\Users\Public by IT software deployment
    - The legitimate prncnfg.vbs lives in System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts and does not match the Public path
level: high

Known false positives:

  • IT software deployment tooling that stages scripts in C:\Users\Public
  • Admins running ad-hoc VBScript maintenance scripts from the Public profile

Tuning notes: Adjust the index name to your Sysmon index (index=sysmon is assumed). Exclude known deployment accounts or parent processes by User/ParentImage. The legitimate Microsoft prncnfg.vbs is in System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts, so the query keys on the Public path.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • EggStreme DLL Side-Loading — System-Named DLLs from Non-System Paths · unlock with TL Creds
  • EggStreme Post-Exploitation AD Reconnaissance and WMI with Credentials · unlock with TL Creds
  • EggStreme Passive-Mode Agent Listener on TCP 5060 and Stowaway Proxy Port · unlock with TL Creds
  • EggStreme In-Memory PowerShell/.NET Hosting by Non-PowerShell Process · unlock with TL Creds
  • EggStreme Passive Agent Firewall Rule 'Core Networking - SIP' Creation · unlock with TL Creds
  • EggStreme C2 and Staged Domain DNS Resolution · unlock with TL Creds
  • EggStreme StandaloneUpdater Run-Key Persistence Masquerading as OneDrive · unlock with TL Creds
  • EggStreme C2 Infrastructure Connections (mTLS Agent, Fuel and Wizard) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-18, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 29 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6346.

Sample indicators (3 of 29)

  • IP address: 45.115.225[.]73
  • Domain: fsstore[.]org
  • File hash: a363c1529033fb6017985ce07ab0ad57

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 29 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

29 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Victims are multiple Philippine government organizations, with Taiwan a low-to-medium confidence lead.

EggStreme is a multi-stage, mostly fileless framework first documented by Bitdefender on 2025-09-17 in an intrusion against a Philippine military company. The chain is: EggStremeFuel (aka RawCookie) profiles the host and sideloads/deploys EggStremeLoader; EggStremeLoader sets up persistence and decrypts EggStremeReflectiveLoader; the reflective loader runs EggStremeAgent (aka Gorem RAT), the core backdoor. EggStremeWizard is a secondary backdoor providing reverse shell and file upload/download, and EggStremeKeylogger was injected into processes in the original intrusion. All stages rely on DLL sideloading with DLLs named after system libraries (e.g. advapi32.dll, dbghelp.dll, dwmapi.dll, iscsiexe.dll, xwizards.dll, mscorsvc.dll), staging via file shares, in-memory execution, and mutual TLS (wolfSSL over raw TCP with an inner AES-256-CBC layer).

Bitdefender's follow-up (reported by The Hacker News on 2026-11-18) shows the operators revised the toolkit after disclosure. The Fuel configuration moved to AES-256-CBC (first build 2025-09-29). The loader cipher changed from RC4 (keys such as google, Windows, svchost) to RC5-32 CBC (build 2025-10-13), then to a custom 8-byte-block CBC cipher (variant A, 2025-10-28), a host-bound RC4 build keyed from the C: volume serial number (2025-11-11), and custom cipher variant B from mid-December 2025. Payloads are hidden in files that mimic system data such as C:\Windows\Media\Alarm00.wav, Feeds.tmp, msinfo32.dll and wpndatabase.dat. The agent gained AD reconnaissance (commands 24-26), TCP forwarding (76/77), WMI queries with credentials (79), token impersonation (80), an embedded .NET loader (83), hosted in-memory PowerShell (84/85), and PE staging with reflective execution via the export werfault (86-88). A passive-mode agent opens a listener on TCP 5060 instead of beaconing, with an inbound firewall rule named 'Core Networking - SIP'. The operators moved from a single 2019 certificate authority (linking 32 domains) to campaign-specific CAs. The keylogger does not appear in any observed post-disclosure agent build.

Lateral movement shifted from Impacket-like tooling, Stowaway proxying and Netlogon script injection to an unmanaged SMB-reachable staging system: a batch wrapper (C:\Users\Public\Officelog.bat) launches a VBScript (C:\Users\Public\prncnfg.vbs) through WScript.exe, which stages StandaloneUpdater.exe (imitating OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe) with an HKCU Run-key persistence value. Valid domain credentials are reused across machines. Initial access is unknown. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 tracks CL-STA-1048, which used EggStremeFuel and EggStremeLoader between March and September 2025, alongside MASOL RAT and TrackBak. The same article covers separate China-nexus activity against Southeast Asian governments (Mustang Panda PlugX ASEAN Summit lures in late October 2026; Earth Alux with FINALDRAFT, PerfectPioneer and KUKURAT); it is context rather than part of the EggStreme cluster, and no link is claimed.

Attribution remains a suspected Chinese APT; Bitdefender makes no new attribution claim and could not tie the original campaign to a named group.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Discovery

T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1087.002 Domain Account

Lateral Movement

T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

Defense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1574.001 DLL; T1620 Reflective Code Loading

Execution

T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.005 Visual Basic

Collection

T1056.001 Keylogging

Initial Access

T1078.002 Domain Accounts

Command and Control

T1090.001 Internal Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography

Privilege Escalation

T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft

Persistence

T1543.003 Windows Service; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains

defense-impairment

T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Alert on WScript.exe or cmd.exe executing scripts from C:\Users\Public\ (Officelog.bat, prncnfg.vbs)
  • Alert on HKCU Run values pointing into %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\OneDrive\setup\logs\ or non-vendor OneDrive subfolders (StandaloneUpdater)
  • Hunt for creation of the firewall rule 'Core Networking - SIP' and TCP 5060 listeners on non-VoIP hosts
  • Block/alert on the listed domains and IPs; track hosts serving unrelated certificates on TCP 8443-8445
  • Capture process memory before remediation because payloads are decrypted only in memory

Workarounds

  • Restrict SMB lateral access between workstations and monitor for unmanaged staging hosts

Longer-term hardening

  • Enable PowerShell script block logging and monitor CLR loads (clr.dll, System.Management.Automation) in non-.NET processes
  • Detect non-Windows processes reading wpndatabase.dat, Alarm00.wav, Feeds.tmp, msinfo32.dll and other payload-hiding paths
  • Restrict WMIC and LOLBins; audit SMB staging shares and Netlogon scripts
  • Rotate domain credentials and limit credential reuse across hosts

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (domain-joined endpoints and servers)
    Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific; no vulnerability exploited in reporting

Timeline

  • Earliest observed EggStremeLoader build (iscsiexe.dll, RC4 key 'google') compiled.
  • Unit 42 reports CL-STA-1048 using EggStremeFuel and EggStremeLoader from March through September 2025 (month-level date).
  • Bitdefender publishes the first EggStreme report on an intrusion against a Philippine military company.
  • First EggStremeFuel build with a new AES-256-CBC configuration format, 12 days after disclosure.
  • First loader build switching from RC4 to RC5-32 CBC (observed in the wild the next day).
  • Three loader builds using a custom CBC cipher (variant A) compiled within about 95 minutes.
  • Loader build with RC4 key derived from the C: volume serial number (host-bound).
  • Loader build using custom cipher variant B, adopted from mid-December 2025.
  • Development IP locked-ioc-17 observed in February 2026 (month-level date).
  • Variant B loader build containing debug strings compiled.
  • Around June 2026, development IP locked-ioc-14 seen and three new domains (locked-ioc-16, locked-ioc-11, locked-ioc-26) staged.
  • The Hacker News reports Bitdefender's findings on the revised EggStreme architecture targeting Philippine government organizations.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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