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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6462

BADBOX 3.0 Android TV Box Malware Drives ~40 Billion Fraudulent Ad Bid Requests Daily

highACTIVE

BADBOX 3.0 is an ad-fraud and residential-proxy operation running on low-cost AOSP Android streaming boxes that are not Play Protect certified. HUMAN Security's Satori team reports roughly 40 billion bid requests per day at peak (over 4% of observed CTV traffic) and links the software catalog to the Chinese manufacturer TXCZ, with Vo1d botnet code found alongside the new fraud modules.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6462
Also known asBADBOX 3.0
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsTXCZ and other low-cost white-label manufacturers AOSP-based Android streaming/TV boxes (not Play Protect certified)
AttributionBADBOX operators (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwareBADBOX 3.0, BadBox, vo1d
ToolsSatori
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1036 Masquerading, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1090 Proxy, T1195.003 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain, T1496 Resource Hijacking, T1573 Encrypted Channel, T1583.001 Domains
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsadvertising, consumer, connected-tv, ad-tech
Target regionsGlobal, united states of america
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6462 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 29 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: BADBOX 3.0 Backdoor and Module C2 DNS Lookups (drgdj.top, pixelpioneerss.com, thedynamicleap.com) — Exploitation

TL-2026-6462: DNS resolution of the BADBOX 3.0 backdoor parent domain drgdj.top (api/file/gh subdomains) and the module C2 servers api.pixelpioneerss.com and bur.thedynamicleap.com. A pre-installed system-app backdoor on a non-Play-Protect-certified AOSP streaming box contacts these hosts to fetch its module list, so any hit from a consumer or IoT segment is a strong indicator of a compromised TV box.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1195.003, T1071.001, T1583.001
  • Data sources: dns_logs, stream:dns, DnsEvents
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=dns sourcetype="stream:dns" earliest=-24h
  (query="drgdj.top" OR query="*.drgdj.top" OR query="pixelpioneerss.com" OR query="*.pixelpioneerss.com" OR query="thedynamicleap.com" OR query="*.thedynamicleap.com")
| stats count AS lookups dc(query) AS distinct_names values(query) AS queried_names min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen BY src_ip
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%F %T"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%F %T")
| table src_ip lookups distinct_names queried_names first_seen last_seen

Microsoft KQL

DnsEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| extend QueryName = tolower(trim_end(@"\.", Name))
| where QueryName matches regex @"(^|\.)(drgdj\.top|pixelpioneerss\.com|thedynamicleap\.com)$"
| summarize Lookups = count(), QueryNames = make_set(QueryName, 20), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by ClientIP
| project ClientIP, Lookups, QueryNames, FirstSeen, LastSeen

Sigma

title: BADBOX 3.0 Backdoor and Module C2 DNS Lookups
id: 3b6d1f0e-6462-4a11-9c01-5a7e2d9c0001
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS queries for BADBOX 3.0 backdoor and module C2 domains (drgdj.top, pixelpioneerss.com, thedynamicleap.com) used by TXCZ-linked AOSP TV box malware. TL-2026-6462.
references:
    - https://cybersecuritynews.com/badbox-3-0-malware/
    - https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/alerts/2025/home-internet-connected-devices-facilitate-criminal-activity
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/19
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.resource-development
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1195.003
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1583.001
logsource:
    category: dns
detection:
    selection_sub:
        query|endswith:
            - '.drgdj.top'
            - '.pixelpioneerss.com'
            - '.thedynamicleap.com'
    selection_exact:
        query:
            - 'drgdj.top'
            - 'pixelpioneerss.com'
            - 'thedynamicleap.com'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Threat-intel research or sandbox hosts deliberately resolving BADBOX infrastructure
    - Security-vendor feeds or DNS sinkhole tests that query the listed domains
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Threat-intel research or sandbox hosts deliberately resolving BADBOX infrastructure
  • Security-vendor feeds or DNS sinkhole tests that query the listed domains

Tuning notes: Point the index/sourcetype at your DNS source (Zeek bro_dns, Infoblox, Windows DNS, Splunk Stream). Strip trailing dots from query if your source keeps them. Scope to guest/IoT VLANs to cut noise and add known research hosts to an exclusion lookup. Treat any hit as a compromised device: isolate the box rather than only blocking the name.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • BADBOX 3.0 Legacy C2 Endpoint Connection [indicator]:8081 — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • BADBOX 3.0 Ad-Fraud Tasking Servers ([indicator], [indicator], [indicator], speed25.top) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • BADBOX 3.0 Hour-Aligned Beaconing from IoT/CTV Segment — C2 / Behavioral · unlock with TL Creds
  • BADBOX 3.0 Module-List and Payload Host DNS (api/file/[indicator]) — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • BADBOX 3.0 Encrypted Secondary Payload Downloader IPs ([indicator]:8801, [indicator]:8802) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • BADBOX 3.0 PXYEDGE / IpMoYu Residential Proxy Domain DNS ([indicator], [indicator]) — C2 / Proxy · unlock with TL Creds
  • BADBOX 3.0 Hidden-Ad Config and Payload Staging DNS (shzhtxcz.com, Aliyun OSS terrtest) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • BADBOX 3.0 PXYEDGE Residential Proxy Server Connections — C2 / Proxy · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 29 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6462.

Sample indicators (3 of 29)

  • IP address: 47.113.90[.]237
  • Domain: drgdj[.]top
  • IP address: 39.108.226[.]196

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 29 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

29 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

HUMAN Security's Satori Threat Intelligence team published research on 2026-11-18 describing BADBOX 3.0, the successor to BADBOX and BADBOX 2.0. It was reported by Cyber Security News on 2026-11-19. The operation abuses low-cost Android streaming and TV boxes that run the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) rather than Google's Android TV OS and are not Play Protect certified. At peak the fraud produced about 40 billion bid requests per day, over 4% of the connected TV (CTV) traffic HUMAN observes and more than three times the daily volume of VASTFLUX, the previous record holder. These figures count bid requests, not ads watched, payments or infected devices. The source gives no unique infected-device count for BADBOX 3.0.

Infection starts with a backdoor packaged as a system app. It contacts a command-and-control server, which tells the box which modules to download. The modules come from a maintained collection of ad-fraud and proxy components. Backup copies sit on separate hosting services, so taking down one copy may not stop new infections. In one analyzed sample, a system app plays video ads in a transparent player placed off-screen, so the owner sees nothing change on the TV. Bid requests spoof the names of legitimate CTV apps that do not run on the infected boxes. Some of the fraud needs no real device at all: some requests falsely claim a server inserted an ad into a viewer's stream when no device or ad playback existed.

The malware can also enroll a box in any of 11 residential proxy networks without the owner's consent. Satori assessed PXYEDGE to be a renamed successor to IpMoYu. For one impersonated app, about 80% of U.S. requests came from addresses flagged as residential proxy exits. Satori tied the BADBOX 3.0 software catalog to the Chinese manufacturer TXCZ through server infrastructure, a factory-installed launcher, and code that checks for TXCZ-specific device settings. Code from the Vo1d Android TV botnet appeared next to the new fraud modules, strengthening a link noted in earlier BADBOX research.

Satori's detection signals: repeated traffic spikes at nearly the same hour, a browser identifier from an internal test build, and impersonated-app requests with a high share of residential proxy exit addresses. Defenders should not block an impersonated app name wholesale, because Satori saw no malicious behavior when it tested one such app on its intended hardware. A box that streams normally may still be compromised. Note: the primary HUMAN blog post could not be fetched during this research (HTTP 403), so BADBOX 3.0 specifics here rest on the Cyber Security News report. No CVE or CVSS score is stated in the source, and package names and file hashes were not published.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1036 Masquerading

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1090 Proxy; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Initial Access

T1195.003 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain

Impact

T1496 Resource Hijacking

Resource Development

T1583.001 Domains

Remediation

Patches

  • No vendor patch: the backdoor is part of the device software image; affected devices generally cannot be cleaned by the owner

Immediate actions

  • Disconnect suspicious Android streaming boxes from the network, as advised in the FBI BADBOX advisory
  • Block the published C2, payload and proxy infrastructure (domains and IPs) at DNS and perimeter
  • Hunt for outbound connections from IoT/CTV VLANs to drgdj.top, pixelpioneerss.com, thedynamicleap.com, speed25.top, shzhtxcz.com and the listed IPs

Workarounds

  • Remove or replace non-certified AOSP streaming boxes
  • Treat a box that streams normally as possibly compromised

Longer-term hardening

  • Buy only Play Protect certified Android TV devices and install apps only from official app stores
  • Segment consumer and IoT streaming devices from corporate networks
  • Ad-tech defenders: use behavioral signals (hour-aligned traffic spikes, test-build browser identifiers, high residential-proxy share) rather than blocking whole impersonated app names

Affected and fixed versions

  • TXCZ and other low-cost white-label manufacturers — AOSP-based Android streaming/TV boxes (not Play Protect certified)
    Vulnerable versions: Devices carrying the TXCZ software catalog / backdoored system app

Timeline

  • HUMAN Satori publicly discloses and disrupts BADBOX 2.0 (Triada-derived backdoor, PEACHPIT-linked groups, residential proxy module); Vo1d sinkholing by Shadowserver reported alongside.
  • FBI publishes advisory on BADBOX-infected home internet-connected devices facilitating criminal activity.
  • The Register reports HUMAN's threat intel lead warning that operators had de-emphasized ad fraud and leaned into residential proxy, and that a third version was coming.
  • Google announces legal action against the BADBOX 2.0 botnet operators.
  • HUMAN Satori publishes BADBOX 3.0 research: ~40 billion bid requests per day at peak, TXCZ software catalog attribution, Vo1d code overlap, 11 residential proxy networks.
  • Cyber Security News reports the BADBOX 3.0 findings and publishes the defanged IOC set.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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