Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6421
Blockchain Dead-Drop Resolvers: Threat Actors Host C2 Configurations on Public Blockchains (EtherHiding, Solana Memo, Bitcoin, TRON)
Cisco Talos describes threat actors using public blockchains (Bitcoin, Ethereum/EVM chains, BNB Smart Chain, TRON, Solana) as dead-drop resolvers to host and update C2 configurations. Because on-chain records are distributed and cannot be taken down, domain/server takedowns and static blocklists lose effectiveness. First disclosed .
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6421 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | EtherHiding, Blockchain dead-drop resolver, Solana Memo C2 resolver |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Multiple Windows endpoints and browsers (ClickFix/CLEARSHORT, Overlord RAT, JADESNOW, Glupteba); Apple macOS (ATOMIC stealer delivery via UNC5142); WordPress Compromised WordPress sites (plugin/theme/database JavaScript injection for ClearFake/CLEARSHORT) |
| Attribution | UNC5342, UNC5142, UAT-12643 (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | North Korea |
| Malware | BeaverTail - S1246, ClearFake, Glupteba, InvisibleFerret - S1245, JADESNOW, Overlord RAT, Vidar |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1008 Fallback Channels, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste, T1218.005 System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta, T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers and 4 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | cryptocurrency, technology, finance, gaming, telecoms, general |
| Target regions | Global, Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 9 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6421 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 31 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: ClickFix Run-Dialog PowerShell/MSHTA Remote Payload Execution (Blockchain DDR Delivery) — Exploitation
Detects powershell, pwsh, mshta or cmd spawned directly by explorer.exe (Run dialog / paste-and-run ClickFix lure) with a remote download, hidden or encoded execution pattern, or references to UNC5142 CLEARSHORT payload and C2 infrastructure (ratatui.today, browser-storage.com, recaptcha-manual.shop, 80.64.30.238 and others). ClickFix is the execution step of the EtherHiding/CLEARSHORT chains tracked in TL-2026-6421, where a compromised WordPress site resolves its lure through BNB Smart Chain contracts.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1204.004, T1218.005, T1059.001, T1189, T1105
- Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" (Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\mshta.exe" OR Image="*\\cmd.exe")
| eval ioc_hit=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)(ratatui[.]today|saaadnesss[.]shop|lapkimeow[.]icu|technavix[.]cloud|browser-storage[.]com|recaptcha-manual[.]shop|tlfiyat[.]shop|importenptoc[.]com|voicesharped[.]com|80[.]64[.]30[.]238|41[.]216[.]188[.]11)"),1,0)
| eval has_http=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)https?://"),1,0)
| eval clickfix_pattern=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)(iex[ ]|invoke-expression|irm[ ]|iwr[ ]|invoke-restmethod|invoke-webrequest|downloadstring|-enc[ ]|-encodedcommand|-w(indowstyle)?[ ]+h(idden)?)"),1,0)
| where ioc_hit=1 OR (has_http=1 AND clickfix_pattern=1)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(ParentCommandLine) as parent_cmd by host User Image ioc_hit
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
let ioc_pattern = dynamic(["ratatui.today", "saaadnesss.shop", "lapkimeow.icu", "technavix.cloud", "browser-storage.com", "recaptcha-manual.shop", "tlfiyat.shop", "importenptoc.com", "voicesharped.com", "80.64.30.238", "41.216.188.11"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "mshta.exe", "cmd.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (ioc_pattern) or (ProcessCommandLine contains "http" and ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex |invoke-expression|irm |iwr |invoke-restmethod|invoke-webrequest|downloadstring| -enc | -encodedcommand| -w(indowstyle)? +h(idden)?)")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: ClickFix Run Dialog Execution of PowerShell or MSHTA with Remote Payload (TL-2026-6421)
id: 3f6a1c52-8b7e-4d19-9a42-6c1e0b7d2a11
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell, MSHTA or cmd launched by explorer.exe (Run dialog or paste-and-run lure) with a remote download or hidden/encoded execution pattern, or referencing UNC5142 CLEARSHORT infrastructure. Matches ClickFix delivery used in blockchain dead-drop (EtherHiding) chains.
references:
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/the-challenge-of-defending-against-bulletproof-dead-drops-on-public-blockchains/
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc5142-etherhiding-distribute-malware
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/19
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.004
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1218.005
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1189
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
selection_http:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'http://'
- 'https://'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'iex '
- 'Invoke-Expression'
- 'irm '
- 'iwr '
- 'Invoke-RestMethod'
- 'Invoke-WebRequest'
- 'DownloadString'
- ' -enc '
- ' -EncodedCommand'
- ' -w hidden'
- ' -WindowStyle Hidden'
selection_ioc:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'ratatui.today'
- 'saaadnesss.shop'
- 'lapkimeow.icu'
- 'technavix.cloud'
- 'browser-storage.com'
- 'recaptcha-manual.shop'
- 'tlfiyat.shop'
- 'importenptoc.com'
- 'voicesharped.com'
- '80.64.30.238'
- '41.216.188.11'
condition: selection_parent and selection_img and ((selection_http and selection_cli) or selection_ioc)
falsepositives:
- Administrators pasting legitimate one-liner installers (package manager bootstrap scripts)
- Software deployment helpers launched interactively from Explorer
level: high
Known false positives:
- Administrators intentionally running a remote bootstrap one-liner from the Run dialog
- Software packaging or deployment scripts started manually from Explorer
- Developer onboarding scripts using irm|iex from trusted internal hosts
Tuning notes: Allowlist known internal bootstrap URLs by excluding on CommandLine. Raise to critical when ioc_hit=1. Scope to non-admin workstations first and keep the explorer.exe parent condition; add RunMRU registry telemetry if available for enrichment.
- EtherHiding Browser RPC Lookup Followed by ClickFix Script Launch — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- macOS ATOMIC Stealer curl/xattr/chmod Download Chain — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Dead-Drop Campaign C2 and Staging Infrastructure Connections (UAT-12643, UNC5142, Glupteba) — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- MSHTA Spawning Script Interpreters or Executing Remote Content — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Non-Browser GoFile Upload Service Contact (Stealer Exfiltration) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- PowerShell Blockchain JSON-RPC Query with In-Memory Decryption — C2 Resolution · unlock with TL Creds
- Run Key Persistence from Script Host or LOLBin — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Multi-Chain Blockchain RPC Dead-Drop Resolution by Non-Browser Process — C2 Fallback · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 31 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6421.
Sample indicators (3 of 31)
- IP address:
41.216.188[.]11 - Domain:
upload[.]gofile[.]io - URL:
hxxps://raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/fuad686337/tyu/refs/heads/main/BEGIMOT.xll
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 31 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
2 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
Named users include ClearFake/UNC5142, UNC5342, UAT-12643, Lazarus, Glupteba and Iranian state-sponsored actors.
Cisco Talos (Chetan Raghuprasad, 2026-11-18) documents the evolution of blockchain-based dead-drop resolvers (DDRs): malware carries no hardcoded C2 but queries a public ledger for an encoded/encrypted pointer, decrypts it in memory and then beacons to the resolved infrastructure. Operators rotate C2 by publishing a new transaction or contract update; no change to the implant is required.
Bitcoin (2016 onward): early crimeware (Cerber-era experiments) derived values from transaction data and block explorer APIs. Glupteba (reported by Trend Micro 2019-09-04) queried public Electrum servers for the history of a hardcoded script hash, parsed the OP_RETURN data of related transactions and decrypted it with AES-GCM using a key hardcoded in the binary to obtain the C2 domain. Bitcoin's fees, confirmation latency and ~80-byte payload limit pushed actors to other chains.
EVM smart contracts / EtherHiding (first documented by Guard.io, October 2023; on BNB Smart Chain from ClearFake): malicious code or encoded C2 domains/IPs are stored in contract variables or transaction calldata and read with eth_call (read-only, no on-chain transaction from the victim) over public RPC endpoints or centralized explorer APIs. Google GTIG tracks UNC5142 (financially motivated, ClearFake/CLEARSHORT three-contract router/logic/config design with AES-GCM encrypted lures delivering ATOMIC, VIDAR, LUMMAC.V2, RADTHIEF) and UNC5342 (DPRK, Contagious Interview, JADESNOW downloader, INVISIBLEFERRET backdoor, BEAVERTAIL, payloads Base64+XOR encoded on Ethereum and BSC; contract updated 20+ times in four months at ~$1.37 per update).
TRON: Chainalysis reports UNC5342 using TRON (with Aptos fallback) transactions that carry encoded pointers to a specific BNB Smart Chain transaction whose input data holds encrypted C2 addresses and configuration; disrupting it requires action on three chains at once. Talos describes TRON as a front-line channel with multi-chain fallback.
Solana (SPL Memo Program): actors send micro-value transactions invoking the Memo Program with encrypted C2 IPs/URLs. Implants poll public Solana JSON-RPC with getSignaturesForAddress/getSignatures and getTransaction, extract the memo, decrypt it in memory and connect. Talos (2026-11-18) attributes this to UAT-12643 (suspected North Korea-aligned, low confidence; Overlord RAT with AES-256 encrypted Base58 WebSocket URL in a 43-character memo, Good Game Python stealer, clipboard hijacker) and references Lazarus use of the technique in March 2026.
Defensive implications from Talos: move beyond static domain/IP blocklists; restrict or monitor outbound traffic to public node/RPC providers (Infura, QuickNode, Tatum, native chain endpoints) where there is no business need; baseline developer RPC use and flag automated high-frequency eth_call/getTransaction/getSignaturesForAddress calls; inspect JSON-RPC payloads for anomalous base-encoded data; detect lightweight in-memory decrypters on endpoints. Expected evolution: multi-chain fallback, decentralized RPC aggregators, private transaction relayers and zero-knowledge proofs to obscure the querying host. The Talos article itself lists no IOCs; the IOCs below come from the cited Google GTIG, Talos UAT-12643 and Trend Micro reports.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Command and Control
T1008 Fallback Channels; T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218.005 System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Execution
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript; T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
Persistence
T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Credential Access
T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
Initial Access
T1566.003 Phishing: Spearphishing via Service
Exfiltration
T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block or alert on outbound connections from non-developer/non-business hosts to public blockchain RPC and explorer endpoints (bsc-dataseed.binance.org, Infura, QuickNode, Tatum, Solana/TRON public APIs, Etherscan/BscScan/Blockchair/Blockcypher/Ethplorer/Binplorer APIs)
- Hunt for JSON-RPC calls (eth_call, getSignaturesForAddress, getSignatures, getTransaction) originating from browsers on web pages or from non-standard processes
- Block the network IOCs and hashes in this report; scan WordPress sites for injected JavaScript loading Web3.js
Workarounds
- Chrome Enterprise: DownloadRestrictions for .exe/.msi/.bat/.dll, URLBlocklist for blockchain node URLs, enhanced Safe Browsing
- Use ClamAV signatures and Snort rules published by Talos for UAT-12643 (Snort2 1:67490, 1:67491; Snort3 7:74, 7:75)
Longer-term hardening
- Baseline legitimate developer/business RPC usage and alert on automated high-frequency queries and anomalous Base64/encoded payload lengths in JSON-RPC traffic
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for in-memory decrypters, mshta spawning PowerShell, Run-dialog ClickFix execution and MSBuild inline tasks
- Do not rely on static domain/IP blocklists alone; treat public ledgers as an adversary communications layer
- Train staff on fake-recruiter coding-test lures and ClickFix fake error/update pages
Affected and fixed versions
- Multiple — Windows endpoints and browsers (ClickFix/CLEARSHORT, Overlord RAT, JADESNOW, Glupteba)
Vulnerable versions: Not version specific - Apple — macOS (ATOMIC stealer delivery via UNC5142)
Vulnerable versions: Not version specific - WordPress — Compromised WordPress sites (plugin/theme/database JavaScript injection for ClearFake/CLEARSHORT)
Vulnerable versions: Not version specific
Timeline
- Trend Micro reports Glupteba updating C&C servers from Bitcoin OP_RETURN data fetched via Electrum servers and AES-GCM decrypted (C&C locked-ioc-17).
- EtherHiding emerges with the ClearFake campaign using BNB Smart Chain contracts (Google GTIG: September 2023; Guard.io documents it in October 2023).
- UNC5142 creates its main three-contract (router/logic/config) BSC infrastructure with AES-GCM encrypted lures and STUN reconnaissance.
- DPRK cluster UNC5342 begins using EtherHiding in the Contagious Interview campaign (JADESNOW, INVISIBLEFERRET); contract updated 20+ times within four months.
- UNC5142 deploys a secondary three-contract infrastructure on BSC.
- Last observed on-chain update by UNC5142; no activity observed by GTIG after late July 2025.
- Google GTIG publishes reports on UNC5142 EtherHiding and DPRK (UNC5342) adoption of EtherHiding.
- Lazarus-linked use of Solana Memo Program transactions for C2 resolution is reported (March 2026).
- Cisco Talos publishes its dead-drop blockchain analysis and the UAT-12643 report (Overlord RAT with Solana memo C2 discovery).
Sources cited
- DPRK Adopts EtherHiding: Nation-State Malware Hiding on Blockchains (Google GTIG) Google Cloud · Vendor report · 2025-10-16
- UNC5142 Leverages EtherHiding to Distribute Malware (Google GTIG) Google Cloud · Vendor report · 2025-10-16
- Blockchain dead drops / EtherHiding (Chainalysis) chainalysis.com · Research
- Glupteba campaign hits network routers and updates C&C servers with data from Bitcoin transactions (Trend Micro) Trend Micro · Research · 2019-09-04
- EtherHiding: Hiding Web2 Malicious Code in Web3 Smart Contracts (Guard.io) guard.io · Research
- Dead drop resolver APT report (CyCraft) cycraft.com · Research · 2026-03-31
- Cisco Talos IOC repository, November 2026 GitHub · Code repository · 2026-11-18
- The challenge of defending against bulletproof dead drops on public blockchains (Cisco Talos) Cisco Talos · Blog · 2026-11-18
- UAT-12643: suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing (Cisco Talos) Cisco Talos · Blog · 2026-11-18
More from UNC5342
- Evolution of C2 Infrastructure: Blockchain-Based (On-Chain) C2 and EtherHiding Adoption by UNC5142, UNC5342 and Commodity Malware (Tsundere, SleepyDuck, SharkStealer)
- EtherHiding / Blockchain Dead Drops: Nation-State Actors Drive 440% Surge in On-Chain Malware C2
- Blockchain-Based C2 Evolution: Nation-State Actors Adopt Smart-Contract C2 (EtherHiding, JADESNOW/INVISIBLEFERRET, SharkStealer)
- ClickFix Campaign Uses EtherHiding to Deliver Node.js RAT, Infostealer, and Malicious Chrome Extension — DPRK Wallet Trail Exposed
- North Korean UNC5342 EtherHiding Campaign: Node.js RAT Delivered via Fake macOS Update Lures Using Ethereum Smart-Contract C2
- DPRK's UNC5342 Adopts EtherHiding to Deliver JADESNOW and INVISIBLEFERRET via Blockchain Smart Contracts
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.