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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6392

RevStealer: Commercial Infostealer with Sandbox-Aware Anti-Analysis (Score-Based Environment Gate, H.264 Hardware Probe) and Polygon Dead-Drop C2 Failover

highACTIVE

RevStealer is a commercially sold Windows infostealer distributed through game-cheat lures, trojanized/impersonated software and a fake 'Claude Opus 5 Free Desktop' Electron app. Its native payload exits on CIS-region language settings and when a ten-check weighted environment score (including an MFTEnumEx hardware H.264 encoder probe) reaches 7, then steals browser, wallet, gaming and credential data, uses Polygon smart contracts for C2 failover and deletes itself. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6392
Also known asREVSTEALER, REF2859
SeverityHIGH
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (consumer and enterprise endpoints)
MalwareRevStealer
ToolsXMRig
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1020 Automated Exfiltration, T1027.007 Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver, T1106 Native API, T1113 Screen Capture, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1218.003 System Binary Proxy Execution: CMSTP and 8 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsconsumer, gaming, cryptocurrency, technology
Target regionsGlobal (excluding CIS/Central Asia language environments)
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6392 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: RevStealer Loader Adds AppData Path to Microsoft Defender Exclusions

Detects the RevStealer (REF2859) Electron loader behaviour of adding the user's AppData folder to Microsoft Defender exclusions before dropping and launching the native stealer payload, via Add-MpPreference/Set-MpPreference command lines or direct writes to the Defender Exclusions\Paths registry key. The same exclusion tampering is used by the LockAppHost miner module. Defender exclusions on AppData are rare in managed estates, so this is a high-fidelity early signal (T1562.001, T1204.002).

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1562.001, T1204.002
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_defender
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=-24h ((EventCode=1 (CommandLine="*Add-MpPreference*" OR CommandLine="*Set-MpPreference*") CommandLine="*Exclusion*" (CommandLine="*AppData*" OR CommandLine="*%APPDATA%*" OR CommandLine="*%LOCALAPPDATA%*")) OR (EventCode=13 TargetObject="*Windows Defender*Exclusions*Paths*AppData*")) | eval trigger=if(EventCode=13,"registry_exclusion","powershell_exclusion"), evidence=coalesce(CommandLine,TargetObject) | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(trigger) as trigger values(evidence) as evidence by host, User, Image | convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)

Microsoft KQL

let lookback = 24h;
union
(DeviceProcessEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
 | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('Add-MpPreference','Set-MpPreference') and ProcessCommandLine has 'Exclusion'
 | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('AppData','%APPDATA%','%LOCALAPPDATA%')
 | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Account = AccountName, Actor = FileName, Evidence = ProcessCommandLine, Parent = InitiatingProcessFileName, Source = 'process'),
(DeviceRegistryEvents
 | where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
 | where RegistryKey has 'Exclusions' and RegistryKey has 'Paths' and (RegistryKey has 'AppData' or RegistryValueName has 'AppData')
 | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Actor = InitiatingProcessFileName, Evidence = strcat(RegistryKey, ' ', RegistryValueName), Parent = InitiatingProcessParentFileName, Source = 'registry')
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: RevStealer Loader Adds AppData Path to Defender Exclusions
id: 3f6c1a52-8b7e-4d0a-9c21-5a7d4e9b1f03
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell Add-MpPreference/Set-MpPreference calls that add an AppData path to Microsoft Defender exclusions, as done by the RevStealer Electron loader and the LockAppHost miner module (TL-2026-6392).
references:
    - https://www.morphisec.com/?p=11634
    - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/revstealer-credential-harvesting-infostealer
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/19
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1562.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_cmdlet:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Add-MpPreference'
            - 'Set-MpPreference'
    selection_exclusion:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Exclusion'
    selection_path:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AppData'
            - '%APPDATA%'
            - '%LOCALAPPDATA%'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators or developers excluding a per-user build or tool directory
    - Endpoint management scripts that configure Defender exclusions
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Administrators or developers deliberately excluding a per-user build/tool directory under AppData
  • Endpoint management or software deployment scripts that configure Defender exclusions

Tuning notes: Allow-list known admin accounts and management-tool parent processes. Sysmon EventCode 13 must be enabled for the Exclusions registry key. Enable Defender tamper protection so exclusion writes are blocked, and keep this rule as the alert for attempts.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • RevStealer Known Sample Hashes and Module Filenames on Endpoint · unlock with TL Creds
  • RevStealer Follow-On Module Persistence via Run Key or Scheduled Task/Service · unlock with TL Creds
  • RevStealer C2, Module and Lure Domain Contact · unlock with TL Creds
  • RevStealer Media Foundation Sandbox-Gate Probe (mfplat.dll in Unsigned AppData Process) · unlock with TL Creds
  • RevStealer Browser Process Access by AppData Binary (App-Bound Encryption Bypass) · unlock with TL Creds
  • RevStealer LockAppHost XMRig Miner Hidden in nslookup.exe or svchost.exe · unlock with TL Creds
  • RevStealer LockAppHost CMSTP INF UAC Bypass Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • RevStealer Polygon JSON-RPC Dead-Drop Lookup from Non-Browser Process · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6392.

Sample indicators (3 of 26)

  • Domain: relay7[.]apiforge[.]click
  • File hash: e712d2be2d4554c756b6a2b9aaf22dfa2100e31679c6e9eec8d4501c9730a856
  • Domain: serve[.]eastpeak[.]xyz

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

26 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

RevStealer (Malpedia: win.revstealer; tracked by Elastic Security Labs as REF2859) has been sold as a commercial infostealer since at least February 2026, when the earliest sample was seen on VirusTotal; Gen Threat Labs first documented it in July 2026. Elastic reported roughly 4,700 samples matching its detection over the past year (a file count, not confirmed infections). Joe Security analyzed a sample that showed little activity in a standard sandbox and attributed its final native payload to RevStealer based on ThreatFox IOC 1850356 (relay7.apiforge.click), the Malpedia entry and code-level similarity to a MalwareBazaar reference sample (13543ef85a0988a09ef430a1f114f920a670a82f9e360ff9e6872252062d4768); the two builds differ in dispatcher order and build-specific constants.

Delivery and loading: Elastic found at least 17 YouTube channels (many hijacked, using short AI-generated videos) promoting the cheat sites elitecheatsx.live and resight-cheats.net; other samples impersonated Slack, qBittorrent, SteelSeries GG and Blender. Morphisec (31 Aug 2026) documented a fake 'Claude Opus 5 Free Desktop' project on GitHub/cheat sites delivering a ~101 MB archive containing a windowless 64-bit Electron loader with an AES-256-CBC-encrypted native payload resource. The loader attempts to add the user's AppData folder to Microsoft Defender exclusions, drops the payload to a randomly named AppData directory, launches it hidden and detached, and tries to delete its staging file. Pre-decryption checks require >=2 GiB RAM, >=2 logical CPUs, a non-blocklisted hostname/username and a recognized graphics adapter; a timing check around a JavaScript debugger statement wipes the encoded string table on pauses over ~100 ms. Most samples are packed with VMProtect. Anthropic itself was not compromised; the lure only impersonates the brand.

Anti-analysis in the final native payload (Joe Security, Elastic, Morphisec): (1) a language-based kill switch - default/system language and keyboard layout are hashed with FNV-1a and compared to an embedded table of CIS/Central Asian locales (Russian, Ukrainian and others); a match terminates execution; (2) a weighted environment gate of ten checks (nine weighted checks plus one direct host-identity gate) covering display/GPU/PCI vendor, CPU topology/core count, running-process blocklist, physical memory, username/computer-name blocklist, system uptime, sleep/timing acceleration, Media Foundation hardware H.264 support, CPUID consistency and virtualization. The Media Foundation check initializes Media Foundation and calls MFTEnumEx to enumerate hardware H.264 video encoders, which virtual machines frequently lack and which many sandboxes do not monitor. When the cumulative score reaches 7 the sample resets internal state and exits after a short randomized delay. Joe identified FUN_140005FFC as the scoring routine in the reference sample and a bare-metal Joe Sandbox run (analysis 1948922) is cited to defeat the gate. Additional hardening includes import-less API resolution/API hashing, 14 indirect syscall wrappers, string encryption, a vectored exception handler so one failing collector does not end the session, a CAPTCHA/verification window (random six-character token on raw builds) that blocks automated execution, and runtime-only decryption of the C2 configuration.

Collection and C2: the stealer harvests Chromium credentials and cookies (including a Chrome App-Bound Encryption bypass that launches the browser under a debugger with a hardware breakpoint to read the key from memory), 225 Chromium wallet-extension IDs and 51 standalone wallet apps, password managers, Windows Credential Manager, messaging, VPN/FTP, OBS Studio, Sticky Notes, 2FA apps, selected documents, and gaming accounts (Steam, Battle.net, EA Desktop, Roblox session cookie, Minecraft launchers). It profiles the host (hardware, locale, environment block, processes, installed apps), captures the clipboard and a screenshot, and streams encrypted typed records to the C2 without an on-disk archive. Each build has a primary C2 and a Polygon smart-contract address; if the primary is unreachable it queries up to five public Polygon JSON-RPC endpoints and decrypts the fallback C2 with an embedded AES key (EtherHiding-style dead drop resolver). The core stealer has no persistence and self-deletes after exfiltration.

Follow-on modules (Elastic activity set; not observed delivered to a live RevStealer host, so linkage rests on shared code): ProManager (wallet/extension theft, overlays, password-field capture; Run key), WinUpdate (clipboard crypto-address replacement, mnemonic theft; scheduled task/Run key), SoftManager (reverse SOCKS5 proxy over encrypted WebSocket; logon script/scheduled task/Run key) and LockAppHost (XMRig miner; CMSTP UAC bypass, Defender exclusions, disables 5 Windows Update services, 11 update tasks and 2 malware-removal tasks; hides in suspended nslookup.exe/svchost.exe; Run key or service). Elastic's public YARA rule has no coverage for LockAppHost.

No CVE, vulnerability or named threat actor is associated. Severity is analyst-assigned. The Joe Security article date is shown as 06.10.2026 (day/month ambiguous); the timeline places it at 2026-10-06 (DD.MM reading) with that caveat, and first_disclosed uses the earliest unambiguous dated source.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Exfiltration

T1020 Automated Exfiltration

Defense Evasion

T1027.007 Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion; T1218.003 System Binary Proxy Execution: CMSTP; T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks; T1497.003 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Credential Access

T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

Command and Control

T1090 Proxy; T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver

Execution

T1106 Native API; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

Collection

T1113 Screen Capture

Impact

T1496.001 Resource Hijacking: Compute Hijacking

Privilege Escalation

T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block the C2, lure and module domains listed in the IOCs at DNS/proxy and hunt historical logs for them
  • Hunt for hidden Electron processes writing a native executable to a randomly named AppData directory and for Defender exclusions on AppData paths
  • Because session cookies and the Chrome App-Bound Encryption key may be stolen, revoke active sessions and rotate passwords, API keys and wallet seed material rather than relying on a password reset alone
  • Where LockAppHost may have run, remove Defender exclusions, re-enable Windows Update services/tasks and look for a miner hidden in a suspended nslookup.exe or svchost.exe

Workarounds

  • Enable Microsoft Defender tamper protection to prevent exclusion changes
  • Monitor outbound traffic to public Polygon JSON-RPC endpoints from non-blockchain workstations

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for Defender exclusion tampering, CMSTP abuse and indirect syscall usage
  • Restrict installation of unsanctioned software and game cheats on corporate endpoints; allow-list AI desktop clients from official vendor channels only
  • Run suspect samples on bare-metal or hardened sandboxes since the sample gates on VM artifacts such as missing hardware H.264 encoders
  • Deploy Elastic YARA/behavior rules for RevStealer and add custom coverage for the LockAppHost module

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (consumer and enterprise endpoints)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints where the user executes the trojanized application

Timeline

  • Earliest RevStealer sample detected on VirusTotal ('since at least February 2026'; day not stated), indicating commercial sale began by this time.
  • Gen Threat Labs first documents REVSTEALER (July 2026; day not stated).
  • Morphisec Threat Labs publishes analysis of a fake 'Claude Opus 5 Free Desktop' Electron lure delivering RevStealer via GitHub and game-cheat sites.
  • Elastic Security Labs publishes REF2859 research with a white paper, IOCs, YARA rule and detections; documents ten-check scoring gate, Polygon C2 failover and four linked follow-on modules.
  • The Hacker News reports the four RevStealer-linked modules (ProManager, WinUpdate, SoftManager, LockAppHost), including Defender disablement and miner deployment; notes no YARA coverage for LockAppHost.
  • Joe Security blog 'Inside RevStealer's Sandbox-Aware Anti-Analysis System' details the weighted environment gate (threshold 7), MFTEnumEx hardware H.264 probe and randomized-delay termination; page date reads 06.10.2026 and day/month order is ambiguous.

Sources cited

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

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