Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6411
Brand-Impersonation Phishing Delivering Legitimate RAT/RMM Tools (ConnectWise, Datto, SimpleHelp, Tiflux) — Adobe, SSA, Docusign, IRS, Zoom Lures
Cofense reports a 239% rise in malware delivery campaigns in H1 2026 versus H1 2025, with 94% abusing legitimate remote access tools (RATs/RMM). Lures impersonating Adobe, the Social Security Administration, Docusign, the IRS and Zoom lead to fake download pages and brand-named MSI installers that enrol victims in attacker-controlled RMM instances.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6411 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | RMM abuse phishing, Legitimate RAT abuse |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | ConnectWise ScreenConnect (ConnectWise RAT); Datto Datto RMM; SimpleHelp SimpleHelp; Tiflux Tiflux RMM; Splashtop Splashtop remote access; Microsoft Windows endpoints (MSI installation, Windows Installer) |
| Malware | Ultra VNC |
| Tools | Atera, ConnectWise - S0591, Itarian, NetSupport Manager, ScreenConnect, SimpleHelp, Splashtop, SuperOps, Tiflux RMM |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic, T1112 Modify Registry, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1218.007 System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec, T1219.002 Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software, T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing, T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link, T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services, T1608.001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | government administration, finance, health, education, professional-services, general-enterprise |
| Target regions | North America, Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 10 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6411 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 29 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Brand-Named RMM Installer MSI Executed via Msiexec (Adobe/SSA/Zoom/Docusign Lures) — Exploitation
Detects user-execution of brand-impersonating MSI installers (setup_Zoom.msi, Social_Security_Administration_v02.4_EN_US.msi, Adobe software update.msi, Adobeclient-33.2.msi, AdbRdBkUpsStUp.msi, Network Solutions Agreement.msi) through msiexec, the delivery step in TL-2026-6411 where phishing lures enrol victims in attacker-controlled ConnectWise/ScreenConnect, Tiflux, SimpleHelp or Datto RMM instances. Also fires on generic brand-named MSIs launched from Downloads/AppData/Temp or a URL.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1204.002, T1218.007, T1036.005, T1566.002
- Data sources: sysmon (index=sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode 1)
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 (Image="*msiexec.exe" OR OriginalFileName="msiexec.exe") ```TL-2026-6411 brand-named RMM installer MSI launched via msiexec```
| eval cmd=lower(CommandLine)
| eval known_ioc_msi=if(match(cmd,"social_security_administration_v[0-9]|setup_zoom[.]msi|adobe software update[.]msi|adobeclient-[0-9]|adbrdbkupsstup|adbrd_bkups_stup|network solutions agreement[.]msi"),1,0)
| eval brand_msi=if(match(cmd,"(adobe|zoom|docusign|social_security|[_ -]irs[_ .-]|[_ -]ssa[_ .-])") AND match(cmd,"[.]msi") AND match(cmd,"(users.[^ ]*(downloads|appdata|desktop|temp)|windows.temp|https?://)"),1,0)
| where known_ioc_msi=1 OR brand_msi=1
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(CommandLine) as CommandLine values(ParentImage) as ParentImage max(known_ioc_msi) as known_ioc_msi by host User
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)Microsoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "msiexec.exe"
| extend Cmd = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend KnownIocMsi = Cmd matches regex @"social_security_administration_v[0-9]|setup_zoom\.msi|adobe software update\.msi|adobeclient-[0-9]|adbrdbkupsstup|adbrd_bkups_stup|network solutions agreement\.msi"
| extend BrandMsi = Cmd matches regex @"(adobe|zoom|docusign|social_security|[_ -]irs[_ .-]|[_ -]ssa[_ .-])" and Cmd matches regex @"\.msi" and Cmd matches regex @"(users\\[^ ]*(downloads|appdata|desktop|temp)|windows\\temp|https?://)"
| where KnownIocMsi or BrandMsi
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, KnownIocMsi, BrandMsi
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: Brand-Named RMM Installer MSI Executed via Msiexec
id: 3f6a1d52-7c0e-5b8a-9a41-6411a0000001
status: experimental
description: Detects msiexec installing MSI packages named after the Adobe, SSA, Zoom, Docusign or Network Solutions lures used to deliver legitimate RMM/RAT tools (TL-2026-6411), or brand-named MSIs run from user-writable paths.
references:
- https://cofense.com/blog/betrayed-expectations-malware-delivery-via-common-brands
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/tiflux-rmm-install
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/phishing-bitb-rmm-attacks
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/19
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.002
- attack.t1218.007
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1036.005
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\msiexec.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'msiexec.exe'
selection_ioc_names:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Social_Security_Administration_v'
- 'setup_Zoom.msi'
- 'Adobe software update.msi'
- 'Adobeclient-'
- 'AdbRdBkUpsStUp'
- 'AdbRd_BkUps_StUp'
- 'Network Solutions Agreement.msi'
selection_brand:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Adobe'
- 'Zoom'
- 'Docusign'
- 'Social_Security'
selection_msi:
CommandLine|contains: '.msi'
selection_path:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Downloads\'
- '\AppData\'
- '\Desktop\'
- '\Temp\'
- 'http://'
- 'https://'
condition: selection_img and (selection_ioc_names or (selection_brand and selection_msi and selection_path))
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Zoom or Adobe installers deployed manually from the Downloads folder
- IT staff installing vendor MSIs outside the software-deployment tool
level: high
Known false positives:
- Users legitimately installing Zoom or Adobe MSIs manually from the Downloads folder
- IT staff running vendor MSIs outside the deployment tool (SCCM/Intune)
Tuning notes: Exclude hosts/accounts of the software-deployment service and your sanctioned Zoom/Adobe installer file names. Restrict brand_msi to non-admin users if noise is high. known_ioc_msi=1 hits should be treated as high fidelity.
- Brand-Named Installer Downloaded From Cloud Storage or Campaign Infrastructure — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- RMM Agent Spawning Scripts, Downloads or Evasion Helpers (HideCursor/HideUL) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- RMM Agent Connecting to ScreenConnect Relay Ports or Tunnel Services — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- Msiexec Silent Install of Remotely Hosted MSI or ScreenConnect Client Setup — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Vulnerable HwRwDrv Driver or Rogue ScreenConnect Service Registered — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Script Dropper Fetching Payload From SMOKE#SCREEN Staging Hosts or WebDAV Share — C2/Lateral · unlock with TL Creds
- Rogue RMM Agent Service Installed (ScreenConnect/Tiflux/Splashtop/UltraVNC) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Contact With RMM-Phishing Delivery and Relay Infrastructure — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 29 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6411.
Sample indicators (3 of 29)
- IP address:
84.54.33[.]192 - Domain:
lenwillfilenetwork[.]com - File hash:
f792d82e4472c001852998a3575e492907f38daa8d58ecdb3b3604b38d7b8a07
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 29 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
2 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
Cofense's H1 2026 analysis (published 2026-11-18, Jacob Malimban) finds that malware-delivery phishing campaigns grew 239% compared with H1 2025, that 18% of such campaigns impersonated brands not previously seen, that the top five brands account for roughly 24% of campaign volume, and that 94% of campaigns deliver a legitimate remote access tool rather than bespoke malware. ConnectWise RAT (ScreenConnect) is the most frequently abused tool, with Datto RMM, SimpleHelp, GoTo, Faronics Deploy, Itarian, SuperOps, Tiflux, Splashtop, TrustConnect and Atera also observed. Cofense notes NetSupport Manager was previously more prominent and that ConnectWise RAT has been used to deliver ransomware in the past.
Brand breakdown per Cofense: Adobe is the top brand (volume up about 18-fold; ConnectWise 44%, Datto RMM 16%, GoTo 7%) with emails claiming a document is viewable and landing pages saying Adobe Reader is out of date. The Social Security Administration is second (roughly flat; ConnectWise 55%, SimpleHelp 12%, Faronics Deploy 9%) using statement/benefit-letter lures and MSI names such as Social_Security_Administration_v02.4_EN_US.msi. Docusign is up about 250% (ConnectWise 34%, GoTo 11%, Itarian 5%), with some download pages delivering malware instead of the expected document and one observed malicious SuperOps RMM instance. The IRS is up about 10-fold (ConnectWise 50%, Tiflux 13%, Splashtop 13%) with refund and filing-extension lures, mostly after April 15; one chain installs Tiflux RAT first, which then installs Splashtop and an UltraVNC utility. Zoom is up over 100% (ConnectWise 29%, TrustConnect 14%, Atera 7%) with fake meeting invitations leading to fake Zoom app downloads such as setup_Zoom.msi.
Delivery techniques: payloads hosted on trusted Google and Amazon cloud services; PDFs containing shortened links or QR codes to hide the phishing destination; brand-matched MSI filenames; and PowerShell used after the initial RAT install to push further payloads. Because the RAT/RMM binaries are legitimately signed products, endpoint and reputation controls often do not flag them; the attacker-controlled tenant/relay is what distinguishes malicious from sanctioned use.
The Cofense article lists no CVEs, named actors or IOCs (it refers to Cofense ATRs 415874, 417484, 415883, 415954 and 416603). Technical indicators in this record come from corroborating public reporting of the same technique cluster (Huntress Tiflux RMM analysis of 2026-05-07; Huntress BitB/rogue-ScreenConnect analysis of 2026-09-09; Securonix SMOKE#SCREEN as reported by The Hacker News 2026-08-04) and are labelled by source in each IOC context; they are not claimed to be the exact infrastructure behind the Cofense dataset. Mitigations recommended by Cofense: enforce an allowlist of approved remote access tools (or block certificates of RATs the organization does not use) and refresh awareness training with current Adobe, SSA, IRS and Zoom lures.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Stealth
T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Execution
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
defense-impairment
T1112 Modify Registry; T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
stealth
T1218.007 System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec
Command and Control
T1219.002 Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software
Persistence
T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Initial Access
T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
Resource Development
T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services; T1608.001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Inventory all RMM/RAT agents (ScreenConnect, Datto, SimpleHelp, GoTo, Atera, SuperOps, Splashtop, Tiflux, TrustConnect, Itarian, Faronics) and remove any not provisioned by IT
- Hunt for ScreenConnect client services whose relay host or instance ID is not your own tenant
- Block or alert on MSI/EXE downloads from newly registered or lookalike domains and from public cloud storage buckets reached via email links
- Isolate hosts where an unapproved RMM service was installed following an email-link click and rotate credentials used on them
Workarounds
- Block QR-code and URL-shortener links in inbound PDF attachments at the mail gateway
- Quarantine inbound email linking to .msi downloads
Longer-term hardening
- Enforce an application allowlist for remote access tools; block code-signing certificates of RATs the organization does not use
- Restrict msiexec and MSI installation by standard users and enable AppLocker/WDAC rules for installers
- Egress-filter RMM relay domains and ports (for example ScreenConnect 8041) to only approved tenants
- Update security awareness training and phishing simulations with Adobe update, SSA benefit notice, IRS refund, Docusign and Zoom invitation lures; include QR-code and shortened-link PDFs
Affected and fixed versions
- ConnectWise — ScreenConnect (ConnectWise RAT)
Vulnerable versions: Legitimate product abused via attacker-controlled instances; no product vulnerability - Datto — Datto RMM
Vulnerable versions: Abused via attacker-controlled instances - SimpleHelp — SimpleHelp
Vulnerable versions: Abused via attacker-controlled instances - Tiflux — Tiflux RMM
Vulnerable versions: Abused via attacker-controlled instances - Splashtop — Splashtop remote access
Vulnerable versions: Abused via attacker-controlled instances - Microsoft — Windows endpoints (MSI installation, Windows Installer)
Vulnerable versions: All supported Windows versions permitting user-level MSI installs
Timeline
- Cofense reports an earlier iteration of the SSA-themed ConnectWise RAT campaign in Q4 2024; the campaign has run since at least 2024 (date approximated to quarter start).
- Huntress observes an uptick in Tiflux RMM abuse incidents beginning around this date.
- Microsoft Security publishes analysis of signed malware impersonating workplace apps to deploy RMM backdoors.
- Malspam with a 'service agreement' lure sent from businessservices@locked-ioc-14 delivers the Tiflux MSI via a CAPTCHA-gated page.
- Huntress publishes Tiflux triple-threat analysis (Tiflux, Splashtop/ScreenConnect, UltraVNC, vulnerable HwRwDrv driver).
- The Hacker News reports the SMOKE#SCREEN campaign using fake Adobe and Zoom updates to deploy ScreenConnect.
- Huntress detects a fake Adobe PDF Reader browser-in-the-browser lure installing two rogue ScreenConnect clients.
- Huntress responds to a second incident delivered via RingCentral Office@Hand message with the locked-ioc-18 Adobe lure.
- Huntress publishes analysis of BitB phishing and rogue RMM persistence.
- Cofense publishes H1 2026 data: 239% rise in malware delivery campaigns vs H1 2025, 94% abusing legitimate RATs; Adobe up ~18x, IRS ~10x, Docusign ~250%, Zoom >100%.
Sources cited
- UltraViolet Cyber: Threat Advisory SMOKE#SCREEN RMM Abuse uvcyber.com · Advisory · 2026-08-05
- Huntress: Service Agreement Email Kickstarts Rogue RMM Tiflux Triple Threat Huntress · Research · 2026-05-07
- Huntress: Phishing Attacks Serve Browser-in-the-Browser Pages, Rogue RMM Persistence Huntress · Research · 2026-09-09
- Microsoft Security: Signed malware impersonating workplace apps deploys RMM backdoors Microsoft · Vendor report · 2026-03-03
- LevelBlue SpiderLabs: Beyond Fake Updates - Application-Store-Themed Phishing and Large-Scale Distribution of ScreenConnect levelblue.com · Research
- Trinity Cyber: How RMM Tools Attack Your Network trinitycyber.com · Research
- Betrayed Expectations: Malware Delivery via Common Brands (Cofense, Jacob Malimban) cofense.com · Blog · 2026-11-18
- Cofense: New Weapon of Choice - How Threat Actors Hijack Legitimate Remote Access Tools cofense.com · Blog
- The Hacker News: Fake Adobe and Zoom Updates Install ScreenConnect (SMOKE#SCREEN) The Hacker News · News · 2026-08-04
- Security Affairs: SMOKE#SCREEN Campaign Abuses ScreenConnect to Give Attackers Remote Control Access securityaffairs.com · News
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.