Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6433
UAT-12643 (suspected North Korea-aligned) hides Overlord RAT C2 addresses in Solana transaction memos; Good Game stealer deployed
Cisco Talos tracks UAT-12643, a financially motivated Windows malware campaign that stores AES-encrypted, Base58-encoded Overlord RAT WebSocket C2 addresses in Solana Memo Program transactions from an operator-controlled wallet, allowing C2 rotation without redeploying implants. Delivery uses LNK files disguised as PDFs, HTA droppers and MSBuild project files, with the Python Good Game stealer and a clipboard hijacker as companion payloads.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6433 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows |
| Attribution | UAT-12643 (low confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | North Korea |
| Malware | Good Game, Overlord RAT, Python |
| Tools | certutil - S0160 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1056.001 Keylogging, T1090 Proxy, T1113 Screen Capture, T1123 Audio Capture, T1125 Video Capture, T1127.001 MSBuild, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1218.005 Mshta, T1497.001 System Checks, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1542 Pre-OS Boot, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder and 6 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | cryptocurrency, gaming, telecoms, finance, consumer |
| Target regions | Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 7 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6433 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Registry Persistence and Task Manager Disable - Zoipers, MsgEdgeUpdate, AppData Network Run Value, DisableTaskMgr
Detects HKCU Run values Zoipers (Good Game stealer), MsgEdgeUpdate (clipboard hijacker) and randomized Run values pointing to AppData\Roaming\Network (Overlord RAT), plus the Good Game stealer setting DisableTaskMgr=1 to hide itself during collection (UAT-12643, TL-2026-6433).
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1547.001, T1562.001, T1115
- Data sources: sysmon_eventid_13, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint_DeviceRegistryEvents, windows_registry_set
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=endpoint sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=13 earliest=-24h
```UAT-12643 registry persistence and defence impairment: Zoipers, MsgEdgeUpdate, Overlord Run value in AppData Roaming Network, DisableTaskMgr=1```
| eval tobj=lower(TargetObject), det=lower(Details)
| rex field=tobj "currentversion.run.(?<run_value>[a-z0-9_.-]+)$"
| eval det_name=case(run_value="zoipers","GoodGame_Zoipers_RunKey", run_value="msgedgeupdate","ClipboardHijacker_MsgEdgeUpdate_RunKey", isnotnull(run_value) AND match(det,"appdata.roaming.network."),"OverlordRAT_AppData_Network_RunKey", isnotnull(run_value) AND match(det,"msgedgeupdate[.]exe"),"ClipboardHijacker_MsgEdgeUpdate_RunKey", match(tobj,"policies.system.disabletaskmgr$") AND match(det,"0x00000001"),"GoodGame_DisableTaskMgr", true(),null())
| where isnotnull(det_name)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen values(Details) as run_data values(Image) as writer_images by Computer, User, run_value, det_nameMicrosoft KQL
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet"
| where (RegistryKey contains "CurrentVersion" and RegistryKey has "Run"
and (RegistryValueName in~ ("Zoipers", "MsgEdgeUpdate")
or RegistryValueData contains @"Roaming\Network\"
or RegistryValueData contains "MsgEdgeUpdate.exe"))
or (RegistryKey has @"Policies\System" and RegistryValueName =~ "DisableTaskMgr" and RegistryValueData == "1")
| extend Family = case(
RegistryValueName =~ "Zoipers" or RegistryValueName =~ "DisableTaskMgr", "GoodGameStealer",
RegistryValueName =~ "MsgEdgeUpdate" or RegistryValueData contains "MsgEdgeUpdate.exe", "ClipboardHijacker",
"OverlordRAT")
| extend Signal = iff(RegistryValueName =~ "DisableTaskMgr", "TaskManagerDisabled", "RunKeyPersistence")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, Family, Signal, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: UAT-12643 Run Key Persistence and DisableTaskMgr - Zoipers, MsgEdgeUpdate and AppData Network Folder
id: 6e4c9f85-2d71-4a4a-bf6d-8150ac3d2e44
status: experimental
description: Detects HKCU Run values Zoipers (Good Game stealer), MsgEdgeUpdate (clipboard hijacker) and Run values pointing into AppData Roaming Network (Overlord RAT), plus DisableTaskMgr set to 1 as done by the Good Game stealer during collection (UAT-12643, TL-2026-6433).
references:
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-12643-suspected-north-korea-aligned-actor-blends-blockchain-resilience-with-targeted-infostealing/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-19
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1562.001
- attack.collection
- attack.t1115
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection_name:
TargetObject|endswith:
- '\CurrentVersion\Run\Zoipers'
- '\CurrentVersion\Run\MsgEdgeUpdate'
selection_data:
TargetObject|contains: '\CurrentVersion\Run\'
Details|contains:
- '\Roaming\Network\'
- '\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe'
selection_taskmgr:
TargetObject|endswith: '\Policies\System\DisableTaskMgr'
Details: 'DWORD (0x00000001)'
condition: selection_name or selection_data or selection_taskmgr
falsepositives:
- Third-party software with an identically named Run value (rare)
- Custom in-house software installed under an AppData Network folder
- Kiosk or hardening group policy intentionally disabling Task Manager
level: high
Known false positives:
- Third-party software that happens to use a Run value named Zoipers (Zoiper softphone variants)
- In-house tools installed under an AppData Network folder
- Kiosk or hardening GPO setting DisableTaskMgr=1
Tuning notes: Validate Zoipers hits against the Zoiper softphone install path; the name-based branches are high fidelity for MsgEdgeUpdate, the AppData Network path branch may need an allowlist, and DisableTaskMgr should be excluded for GPO-managed kiosk hosts (writer image svchost/gpsvc) and prioritised when the writer is a user-writable binary.
- HTA Dropper, MSBuild Inline-Task Downloader and Known Payload Hashes - Execution · unlock with TL Creds
- Overlord RAT WinRE Recovery OEM and AppData Network Persistence - Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- UAT-12643 Staging and C2 Infrastructure [indicator] / [indicator] Connections · unlock with TL Creds
- Double-Extension LNK Lures and Known Staging Artifacts (payment-invoice.pdf.lnk, payload.hta, dl.xml) - Initial Execution · unlock with TL Creds
- Clipboard Hijacker MsgEdgeUpdate.exe and Good Game SK_ Staging Archive Artifacts · unlock with TL Creds
- Good Game Stealer GoFile Upload and Discord Webhook from Non-Browser Process - Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
- LOLBin Payload Downloaders (MpCmdRun -DownloadFile, certutil -urlcache) - LNK Delivery · unlock with TL Creds
- Solana RPC Dead-Drop Lookup Followed by WebSocket C2 on Port 5173 - C2 · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6433.
Sample indicators (3 of 26)
- IP address:
41.216.188[.]11 - Domain:
gofile[.]io - File hash:
b7dfd524b305f476eebf5fc05c4689ed105df44e66353b0d21212a2192c9c26c
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Community OSINT corroboration
1 of this threat's indicators have also been reported by the open-source security community. Community sightings are unverified and are kept separate from Threadlinqs' curated indicators. Indicator values, reporters and campaign linkage are available to authenticated Red-tier users.
Technical analysis
Talos assesses North Korea alignment with low confidence.
Cisco Talos (disclosed 2026-11-18) tracks UAT-12643, a financially motivated actor targeting cryptocurrency holders, gaming account owners and VoIP/messaging software users. Its toolset consists of a Go-based modular Windows RAT (Overlord), the publicly available Python infostealer 'Good Game' v1.1.2 (by CirqueiraDev, repackaged with PyInstaller on Python 3.12.0), and a compact C++ multi-cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker. The actual initial-delivery method was not observed; artifacts include LNK files disguised as PDFs (with Word, Windows Update or Edge PDF icons), HTA droppers run via mshta.exe and an MSBuild project file (dl.xml).
LNK variants download the payload either with MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile (saved as RuntimeBroker.exe) or with certutil -urlcache -f, using a double-extension filename. Both were built on a machine named win-8oa3ccqae4d and a LNK generator script (payload URL + icon type) was recovered. The HTA dropper uses MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP to fetch a raw binary and ADODB.Stream to write it to %TEMP%\s.exe, then runs it hidden. The MSBuild dl.xml uses an inline C# CodeTaskFactory task compiled and run in memory, downloading with a spoofed 'Microsoft BITS/7.8' User-Agent.
Overlord RAT supports 35 commands: keylogging (GetAsyncKeyState), webcam, microphone and desktop audio capture, screenshots, extensive file operations, process enumeration/termination, command/script execution with streamed output, a reverse SOCKS proxy into the victim network, and HTTP plugin download with reflective DLL injection. It detects in-memory execution to suppress artifacts in sandboxes. With admin rights it obtains SeDebugPrivilege and calls NtSetInformationProcess to set ProcessBreakOnTermination, so forced termination triggers a CRITICAL_PROCESS_DIED BSoD. Persistence is an HKCU Run value with a randomized name pointing to a binary in the user's Application Data 'Network' folder, plus WinRE persistence: a .bat launcher and a randomly named (20-character) copy written to %TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\ with ResetConfig.xml patched, surviving 'Reset this PC'.
C2 resolution is the novel element: encrypted WebSocket C2 URLs (up to 566 bytes per Memo Program transaction) are published from an actor-controlled Solana wallet. The RAT calls getSignatures then getTransaction (jsonParsed), scans instructions for data exactly 43 characters long (AES-256-encrypted, Base58-encoded URL) and ignores the rest. Solana is only a lookup service, not the command or exfiltration channel. The observed C2 channel is a WebSocket on port 5173.
Good Game stealer collects from 23 Chromium/Firefox browser variants, Discord tokens (LevelDB, validated against the Discord API), Roblox ROBLOSECURITY cookies, 21 crypto wallets, Steam/Riot/Epic/Rockstar launchers, Telegram sessions, a system profile with IP geolocation (ipwhois.app), a screenshot and webcam frame, and a keyword-filtered sweep of user folders (English/French/Spanish/Portuguese terms such as seed phrases, 2FA backup codes, passwords). It exits on sandbox/VM indicators, zips data to SK_<8 chars>.zip, uploads to upload.gofile.io and posts the link plus a victim fingerprint to a Discord webhook. Persistence uses HKCU Run value 'Zoipers' and the Startup folder; Task Manager is disabled (DisableTaskMgr=1) during collection. The clipboard hijacker (mutex UuuRjinBZPBMIjnc) copies itself to %APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe with Run value MsgEdgeUpdate and replaces clipboard crypto addresses every 500 ms with attacker wallets.
Infrastructure: a staging server at 41.216.188.11 ran a Flask file-delivery service (port 8000) with an exposed root folder; ports 5173 (Overlord WebSocket C2), 5656 and 5959 (Python stealer TCP C2). Attribution is low confidence: Overlord was used by UNK_DeadDrop (Proofpoint, June 2026, a very likely North Korea-aligned cluster) and Solana-memo C2 was reported in March 2026 against Lazarus/TraderTraitor, but other actors have also used Overlord and Solana-hosted addressing (October 2026). A Solana lookup alone is not evidence of compromise; stronger hunting leads are a non-browser Windows process querying Solana followed by an unfamiliar WebSocket, or a GoFile upload followed by a Discord webhook request from the same process. Blocking the staging IP does not remove installed implants.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
T1056.001 Keylogging; T1113 Screen Capture; T1123 Audio Capture; T1125 Video Capture
Command and Control
Defense Evasion
T1127.001 MSBuild; T1218.005 Mshta; T1497.001 System Checks; T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories; T1620 Reflective Code Loading; T1622 Debugger Evasion
Execution
Credential Access
T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1552.001 Credentials In Files; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
Persistence
T1542 Pre-OS Boot; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Exfiltration
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block 41.216.188.11 and egress to ports 5173, 5656, 5959 and 8000 on that host
- Hunt for HKCU Run values MsgEdgeUpdate and Zoipers, %APPDATA%\MsgEdgeUpdate.exe, %TEMP%\s.exe and mutex UuuRjinBZPBMIjnc
- Hunt for files under %TARGETOSDRIVE%\Recovery\OEM\ and a modified ResetConfig.xml on endpoints
- Alert on mshta.exe, MSBuild.exe, certutil -urlcache and MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile fetching remote payloads
- Rotate browser-saved credentials, Discord tokens, Roblox cookies and move crypto funds from wallets on any infected host
Workarounds
- Apply Talos ClamAV and Snort signatures (Snort2 1:67491, 1:67490; Snort3 7:75, 7:74)
- Reimage rather than 'Reset this PC' on infected hosts, since WinRE persistence survives reset
Longer-term hardening
- Alert on non-browser processes querying Solana RPC endpoints followed by new WebSocket connections
- Alert on gofile.io uploads followed by Discord webhook requests from the same process
- Restrict LOLBin network access (mshta, MSBuild, certutil, MpCmdRun) via application control and egress filtering
- Display file extensions and block LNK/HTA attachments at the mail gateway
- Deploy EDR with behavioral coverage for process-critical flag abuse and reflective DLL injection
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: Windows endpoints (x64) running the malware; not a product vulnerability
Timeline
- Breakglass Intelligence documents a Node.js loader using Solana memo dead-drop C2, linked to Lazarus/TraderTraitor (month-level date; per Talos citation)
- Proofpoint publishes UNK_DeadDrop, a very likely North Korea-aligned cluster distributing Overlord RAT binaries (C&C locked-ioc-19:5173)
- October 2026 reporting on the MALFEX npm campaign documents Overlord and Solana-based address discovery by other actors (month-level date)
- Talos releases ClamAV (e.g., Win.Trojan.OverlordRAT-10060615-0), Snort2 (1:67491, 1:67490) and Snort3 (7:75, 7:74) detection content
- Cisco Talos discloses UAT-12643, its Go-based Overlord RAT with Solana memo C2 resolution, Good Game stealer and clipboard hijacker; IOCs published to GitHub
- GBHackers publishes coverage of the Talos research on Solana-hosted Overlord C2 addresses
Sources cited
- UAT-12643: Suspected North Korea-aligned actor blends blockchain resilience with targeted infostealing Cisco Talos · Research · 2026-11-18
- Proofpoint: UNK_DeadDrop phishing campaign targets developers (Overlord RAT) Proofpoint · Research · 2026-06-08
- Breakglass Intelligence: Lazarus Group using the Solana blockchain as a dead-drop C2 channel intel.breakglass.tech · Research · 2026-03-01
- Cisco Talos IOCs - UAT-12643 (2026/11) GitHub · Code repository · 2026-11-18
- CirqueiraDev (Good Game stealer developer) on GitHub GitHub · Code repository
- North Korea-Linked Hackers Hide Overlord RAT Server Addresses in Solana Blockchain Transactions gbhackers.com · News · 2026-11-19
- The Hacker News: Eight malicious npm packages (MALFEX, Overlord/Solana) The Hacker News · News · 2026-10-01
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.