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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0235

GoPix Banking Trojan: Memory-Only Implants with PAC-Based MITM and Malvertising Delivery

highACTIVE

GoPix is a sophisticated Brazilian banking trojan actively targeting financial institution customers and cryptocurrency users via malvertising campaigns. It employs memory-only execution, PAC file manipulation for MITM attacks, direct syscalls for defense evasion, and browser process injection to intercept Pix transactions, Boleto slips, and crypto wallets.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0235
Also known asGoPIX, Trojan-Banker.Win64.GoPix
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows; Google Chrome; Mozilla Firefox; Microsoft Edge; Opera Software Opera
Nation-state nexusBrazil
MalwareHEUR:Trojan-Banker.OLE2.GoPix, HEUR:Trojan-Banker.Win64.GoPix, Trojan.PowerShell.GoPix
ToolsCustom HTTP C2 with JSON configuration delivery
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1007 System Service Discovery, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1049 System Network Connections Discovery, T1055 Process Injection, T1056 Input Capture, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol and 15 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsfinancial-services, banking, government, cryptocurrency, retail
Target regionsBrazil, Latin America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-03-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0235 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 23 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: GoPix PAC File Registry Modification for Browser MITM Proxy

Detects modification of the AutoConfigURL registry key to point to a local PAC file or localhost proxy, a technique used by GoPix to intercept banking traffic via PAC-based man-in-the-middle. GoPix sets the proxy auto-config to route Brazilian banking domains through a local HTTP server on port 18080.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1090.001, T1557, T1112
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\Internet Settings\AutoConfigURL" (Details="*file:///*" OR Details="*127.0.0.1*" OR Details="*localhost*") | eval attack_vector=case(match(Details, "file:///"), "local_pac_file", match(Details, "127\.0\.0\.1"), "localhost_proxy", 1=1, "unknown") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Details) as pac_urls values(Image) as modifying_processes by Computer, User, attack_vector | table Computer, User, first_seen, last_seen, count, attack_vector, pac_urls, modifying_processes

Microsoft KQL

DeviceRegistryEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where RegistryKey has "Internet Settings" and RegistryValueName == "AutoConfigURL" | where RegistryValueData has_any ("file:///", "127.0.0.1", "localhost") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName

Sigma

title: GoPix PAC File Registry Modification for Browser MITM Proxy
id: 0df90621-22de-443b-b6dd-6f3e59d41196
status: experimental
description: Detects modification of Internet Settings AutoConfigURL registry key to local file or localhost proxy indicative of GoPix PAC-based MITM attack on banking traffic
references:
    - https://securelist.com/gopix-banking-trojan/119173/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/03/16
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1090.001
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1557
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Internet Settings\AutoConfigURL'
        Details|contains:
            - 'file:///'
            - '127.0.0.1'
            - 'localhost'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Corporate proxy auto-configuration deployments via GPO
    - VPN software modifying proxy settings
    - Web development proxy tools (Fiddler, Charles)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Corporate proxy auto-configuration deployments via Group Policy
  • VPN software that modifies proxy settings during connection
  • Web development proxy tools such as Fiddler or Charles Proxy

Tuning notes: Whitelist known corporate PAC file URLs and GPO-deployed proxy configurations. Filter on specific modifying processes approved for proxy management. Add alert for any PAC URL pointing to file:/// paths specifically.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • GoPix Avast Safe Banking Port Probe and Suspicious File Download · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoPix Suspended Browser Process Creation for Shellcode Injection · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoPix Clipboard Monitoring and Financial Data Pattern Theft · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoPix NSIS Installer Execution from Browser Download with Suspicious Signing · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoPix Malicious Root Certificate Installation for HTTPS Interception · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoPix Local MITM Proxy Listener and Banking Traffic Interception · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoPix PowerShell Stdin-Based Encrypted Payload Delivery · unlock with TL Creds
  • GoPix C2 Communication to Known Threat Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-03-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 23 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0235.

Sample indicators (3 of 23)

  • Domain: paletolife[.]com
  • File hash: EB0B4E35A2BA442821E28D617DD2DAA2
  • Domain: correioez0ubcfht9i3[.]lovehomely[.]com

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 23 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

23 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

GoPix is an advanced banking trojan originating from Brazilian cybercriminal groups, active since December 2022 and continuing through March 2026. The malware represents a significant evolution in Latin American financial crime tooling, adopting techniques historically associated with nation-state APT groups.

## Delivery and Initial Access

GoPix spreads through malvertising campaigns leveraging Google Ads that impersonate popular services including WhatsApp, Google Chrome, and Correios (the Brazilian postal service). Victims clicking these ads are directed to malicious landing pages that employ legitimate anti-fraud IP scoring services to screen targets and filter out security researchers and sandboxes. The landing page checks for the presence of Avast Safe Banking by probing localhost port 27275, then returns a JSON response with two URLs depending on detection results.

If Avast is not detected, the victim receives an NSIS installer executable digitally signed with a stolen code-signing certificate issued to PLK Management Limited (the same certificate legitimately signs Driver Easy Pro software). The installer creates and runs an obfuscated batch file that launches PowerShell for next-stage download. If Avast is detected, the victim instead receives a ZIP archive containing a LNK shortcut with an obfuscated PowerShell command that bypasses browser download restrictions.

## Multi-Stage Memory-Only Infection Chain

The infection proceeds through multiple memory-only stages designed to leave minimal disk artifacts:

1. An initial PowerShell script collects system information and contacts C2 for a JSON configuration containing folder/file names for %APPDATA%, an obfuscated PowerShell script, an encrypted PowerShell script (ps), encrypted malicious code (sc), and a GoPix configuration file (pf).

2. The obfuscated PowerShell script decrypts the encrypted PowerShell payload and launches a new PowerShell instance via stdin, keeping decrypted content memory-only.

3. The decrypted PowerShell performs in-memory decryption of GoPix dropper shellcode, main payload shellcode, and the main implant. It creates a small shellcode piece within the PowerShell process and jumps to the GoPix dropper shellcode.

4. The shellcode (architecture-specific x86/x64) uses API hashing via CRC32 in newer versions (stack strings in older versions) and erases MZ signatures from loaded modules to evade memory scanning tools.

5. The GoPix dropper verifies execution within Explorer.exe, detects installed browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Opera), uses direct syscalls to launch the chosen browser in a suspended state, and injects the main shellcode and parameters into the browser process.

## Main Implant Capabilities

The GoPix main implant operates entirely in memory within the injected browser process and provides three core capabilities:

**Clipboard Hijacking:** Monitors clipboard content for Pix instant payment transaction keys, Boleto bancario typeable lines (e.g., 23790.12345 60000.123456...), and Bitcoin/Ethereum wallet addresses. Pix and Boleto data is exfiltrated to C2, while cryptocurrency wallet addresses are silently replaced with attacker-controlled addresses.

**PAC-Based Man-in-the-Middle:** GoPix deploys a malicious Proxy AutoConfig (PAC) file and local HTTP server to intercept and manipulate banking traffic in real-time. Unlike traditional PAC-based phishing redirects, GoPix manipulates traffic while the user navigates the legitimate financial website. The PAC file uses CRC32 hashing of domain names to hide targeted banking sites. The local proxy enumerates network connections, identifies the originating process, and compares the process executable CRC32C checksum against a hardcoded browser list, terminating non-browser connections. Multiple Brazilian financial institutions are targeted including state government banking portals and major commercial banks.

**Root Certificate Injection:** GoPix injects a trusted root certificate directly into the browser process memory, enabling HTTPS traffic interception and manipulation without triggering browser certificate warnings. Two certificates have been identified: Root CA 2024 (expired January 2025) and Root CA 2025 (created February 2025, expires February 2027).

## Evasion Techniques

GoPix employs sophisticated evasion across its entire kill chain: anti-fraud service abuse for victim screening, stolen code-signing certificates, memory-only execution with no disk artifacts, direct syscalls to bypass API hooks, unique per-string encryption algorithms in the dropper, CRC32-based API hashing, MZ signature erasure to defeat memory scanners, stdin-based PowerShell delivery, and extremely short-lived C2 infrastructure (online only for hours). These techniques make traditional YARA-based hunting ineffective.

## Attribution

GoPix is attributed to Brazilian cybercriminal groups with moderate confidence. The operators demonstrate operational security awareness through short-lived infrastructure, victim handpicking rather than mass distribution, and adoption of APT-grade evasion techniques. The campaign has been continuously active since December 2022 with ongoing evolution of TTPs.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1056 Input Capture; T1115 Clipboard Data

discovery

T1007 System Service Discovery; T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1049 System Network Connections Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1518 Software Discovery; T1614 System Location Discovery

defense-evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1055 Process Injection; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1480 Execution Guardrails

exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution

command-and-control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy

defense-impairment

T1112 Modify Registry; T1553 Subvert Trust Controls

initial-access

T1189 Drive-by Compromise

persistence

T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

credential-access

T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

impact

T1565 Data Manipulation; T1657 Financial Theft

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block all identified C2 domains at DNS and proxy layers
  • Block identified malicious certificate thumbprints in certificate trust stores
  • Monitor and alert on PAC file modifications in browser proxy settings
  • Deploy clipboard monitoring detection rules for Pix key and Boleto pattern replacement
  • Scan endpoints for unsigned or suspiciously signed NSIS installers

Workarounds

  • Disable PowerShell for non-administrative users where feasible
  • Block execution of LNK files from ZIP archives downloaded via browser
  • Configure Group Policy to prevent PAC file auto-configuration changes
  • Use ad-blockers to reduce malvertising exposure
  • Verify Pix transaction keys and Boleto lines on separate trusted devices before completing transactions

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for direct syscall injection patterns
  • Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized PowerShell execution
  • Deploy browser isolation for access to financial institution websites
  • Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement from compromised endpoints
  • Monitor for anomalous root certificate installations in browser certificate stores
  • Deploy DNS security solutions to detect short-lived C2 domain patterns

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows
    Vulnerable versions: Windows 10 (x86/x64); Windows 11 (x64)
  • Google — Chrome
    Vulnerable versions: All versions (targeted for injection)
  • Mozilla — Firefox
    Vulnerable versions: All versions (targeted for injection)
  • Microsoft — Edge
    Vulnerable versions: All versions (targeted for injection)
  • Opera Software — Opera
    Vulnerable versions: All versions (targeted for injection)

Timeline

  • GoPix malvertising campaigns first observed via Google Ads impersonating WhatsApp, Chrome, and Correios
  • First public reporting on GoPix by security researchers; initial campaign analysis published
  • The Hacker News publishes coverage of GoPix malvertising campaign targeting Brazil PIX payment system
  • RH-ISAC publishes advisory on GoPIX infostealer targeting PIX payment system in Brazil
  • GoPix operators evolve shellcode to use CRC32-based API hashing, replacing older stack string technique
  • Root CA 2024 certificate (thumbprint f110d0bd...) used for HTTPS interception expires
  • Operators deploy new Root CA 2025 certificate (thumbprint 1b1f85b6...) valid through February 2027
  • GoPix expands clipboard monitoring to include Boleto bancario typeable lines alongside Pix and crypto wallets
  • GoPix confirmed highly active with ongoing malvertising campaigns targeting Brazilian financial institution customers
  • Kaspersky GReAT publishes comprehensive technical analysis revealing memory-only implants, PAC-based MITM, and direct syscall techniques
  • As of 2026-05-29, GoPix remains ACTIVE: Kaspersky GReAT's March 2026 analysis reports ~90,000 infection attempts, live Google Ads malvertising, and a Root CA cert valid through Feb 2027, with no takedown, arrests, or successor. As a non-CVE criminal banking trojan, there is nothing to patch and operations continue against Brazilian Pix/Boleto and crypto users.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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