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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-0698

Hola Browser for Windows Supply-Chain Compromise — Undeclared me.exe XMRig Monero Cryptominer (Troj/GoMiner-B)

highACTIVE

The Windows build of the Chromium-based Hola Browser (v1.251.91.0) was compromised in a supply-chain attack that bundled an undeclared executable, me.exe, into C:\Program Files\Hola\. Sophos identified the binary (detection Troj/GoMiner-B) as a Go-wrapped XMRig Monero cryptominer that runs only when the host is idle.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0698
Also known asme.exe miner, HolaMonitorService cryptominer, Troj/GoMiner-B
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsHola Hola Browser for Windows
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-494, CWE-1357
MalwareTroj/GoMiner-B
ToolsXMRig
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1055 Process Injection, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1195 Supply Chain Compromise, T1195.001 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools, T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain, T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File, T1496 Resource Hijacking, T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing, T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution and 1 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsconsumer, technology, general
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources5 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-06, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0698 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 16 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: hola_monitor_svc Auto-Start Service Persistence (Post-Exploitation)

Detects the persistence stage of Troj/GoMiner-B: registration of the masquerading auto-start Windows service 'hola_monitor_svc' whose binPath points at HolaMonitorService.exe (a self-copy of me.exe). Catches both the sc.exe create command line (Sysmon EventCode 1) and the service-installed system event (EventCode 7045), masquerading as a legitimate Hola monitoring component.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1543.003, T1569.002, T1036.005
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, edr
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

(index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\sc.exe" CommandLine="*create*" CommandLine="*hola_monitor_svc*") OR (index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:System" EventCode=7045 (Service_Name="hola_monitor_svc" OR Service_File_Name="*HolaMonitorService.exe*")) | eval svc=coalesce(Service_Name,"hola_monitor_svc") | stats count min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen values(CommandLine) as cmd values(Service_File_Name) as binpath by host, svc | convert ctime(firstSeen) ctime(lastSeen)

Microsoft KQL

DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where FileName =~ "sc.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "create" and ProcessCommandLine has "hola_monitor_svc" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine | union (DeviceEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where ActionType == "ServiceInstalled" and (AdditionalFields has "hola_monitor_svc" or AdditionalFields has "HolaMonitorService.exe") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, AdditionalFields) | order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: Hola Monitor Service Persistence (Troj/GoMiner-B)
id: 9f3c1a72-4d8e-4b2a-9c11-0698aa000002
status: experimental
description: Detects creation/installation of the masquerading auto-start Windows service hola_monitor_svc used by the me.exe XMRig idle miner for persistence.
references:
    - https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/you-do-surprise-me-exe-an-unexpected-executable-in-hola-browser
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/06
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_sc:
        Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'create'
            - 'hola_monitor_svc'
    condition: selection_sc
falsepositives:
    - None expected; hola_monitor_svc is not a legitimate Hola service name
level: high

Known false positives:

  • None expected — hola_monitor_svc is not a real Hola service. Investigate any occurrence.

Tuning notes: Pair the sc.exe process-creation and 7045 service-install signals to reduce noise. Extend binPath matching to any executable under \Hola\ that registers as auto-start to catch renamed variants.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Compromised Hola Installer Dropping Undeclared [indicator] (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Service Installation via Self-Copy (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Idle XMRig Miner — Defender Tampering, Idle-Time CPU & Stratum Mining Traffic (C2/Impact) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Sigma — Undeclared [indicator] Dropped in Hola Directory (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Sigma — [indicator] Persistence & Masquerade (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Sigma — Defender Exclusion + XMRig Idle-Miner Markers (C2/Impact) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Hola Supply-Chain Drop — Unsigned [indicator] Written to Hola Program Directory (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Defender Exclusion for Hola Directory + Idle XMRig Miner Behavior (C2/Impact) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-06, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 16 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0698.

Sample indicators (3 of 16)

  • File hash: e3541caf708c075f0bb22fc68b03acd8457fea7cf0732ea935b1eb016d1c7721
  • File hash: 174086534a2de730058465a4a4e231ce3778ab17ebebfd7f62b3bf9750bc7bdb
  • File hash: 8046735d354814bf9ef9a053cb9cad8cfec261f2

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 16 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

16 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Hola confirmed the distribution-pipeline compromise (~0.1% of users affected) and engaged Sygnia for forensics.

In early June 2026, Sophos discovered an undeclared executable, me.exe, bundled into the Windows distribution of the Chromium-based Hola Browser version 1.251.91.0. The file was found during AppEsteem certification checks of the Hola installer and was independently observed by incident-response firm Sygnia. Sophos detects the binary as Troj/GoMiner-B; static analysis showed it is a Go-compiled wrapper around the open-source XMRig miner, evidenced by the embedded Go module path 'm/cmd/xmrig-idle' and runtime strings such as 'killed orphan miner pid %d' and 'user active, stopping miner'.

The miner was delivered through a compromise of Hola's software update/distribution pipeline rather than a code vulnerability in the browser itself — a classic supply-chain attack against widely-used consumer software. The legitimate, code-signed Hola installer (SHA256 174086534a2de730058465a4a4e231ce3778ab17ebebfd7f62b3bf9750bc7bdb) silently delivered the unsigned me.exe (SHA256 e3541caf708c075f0bb22fc68b03acd8457fea7cf0732ea935b1eb016d1c7721) into the Hola program directory.

Once on disk, me.exe establishes persistence by copying itself to C:\Program Files\Hola\HolaMonitorService.exe and registering an auto-start Windows service named hola_monitor_svc, masquerading as a legitimate Hola monitoring component. For defense evasion the malware adds a Windows Defender exclusion for its working directory; the binary is unsigned, carries no compile timestamp, is obfuscated, and writes mining code into memory. The 'idle miner' design suppresses CPU-intensive mining while the user is active and resumes when the host is idle, reducing the chance a victim notices performance degradation.

The payload is a Monero (XMR) cryptocurrency miner, monetizing victim CPU resources for the attacker. No command-and-control domains, mining pool URLs, or Monero wallet addresses were disclosed in the public reporting at time of analysis. Hola confirmed the supply-chain compromise affecting approximately 0.1% of its user base, rebuilt its distribution pipeline, implemented advanced code-signing verification, and tightened access controls. Sygnia was engaged for forensic investigation.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1055 Process Injection

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

Initial Access

T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1195.001 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools; T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain

Execution

T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File; T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution

Impact

T1496 Resource Hijacking

Persistence

T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

defense-impairment

T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Patches

  • Update to a Hola Browser build released after the rebuilt distribution pipeline with code-signing verification

Immediate actions

  • Identify hosts running Hola Browser for Windows v1.251.91.0 and check for C:\Program Files\Hola\me.exe and C:\Program Files\Hola\HolaMonitorService.exe
  • Stop and delete the Windows service hola_monitor_svc and remove the dropped executables
  • Remove any Windows Defender exclusion added under the Hola program directory and run a full AV scan
  • Block/alert on file hash e3541caf708c075f0bb22fc68b03acd8457fea7cf0732ea935b1eb016d1c7721

Workarounds

  • Remove Hola Browser from managed Windows endpoints until a verified clean build is confirmed

Longer-term hardening

  • Uninstall and reinstall Hola Browser only from a verified, code-signed source after vendor remediation
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for service creation and Defender-exclusion tampering
  • Monitor for anomalous sustained CPU usage tied to idle-time processes
  • Treat consumer VPN/proxy browser software as elevated supply-chain risk and restrict in enterprise environments

Affected and fixed versions

  • Hola — Hola Browser for Windows
    Vulnerable versions: 1.251.91.0
    Fixed in: builds released after pipeline rebuild with code-signing verification

Timeline

  • Hola rebuilds distribution pipeline, implements advanced code-signing verification, and tightens access controls; engages Sygnia for forensics.
  • Hola confirms supply-chain compromise of its Windows distribution pipeline affecting approximately 0.1% of users.
  • Sophos publishes research blog and BleepingComputer reports the supply-chain compromise.
  • Sophos classifies locked-ioc-8 as Troj/GoMiner-B, a Go-wrapped XMRig Monero cryptominer (xmrig-idle).
  • Sophos discovers undeclared locked-ioc-8 bundled in Hola Browser for Windows v1.251.91.0 during AppEsteem certification checks; independently observed by Sygnia.
  • Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes full threat analysis TL-2026-0698 with MITRE mapping, IOCs, and detection coverage.

Sources cited

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 5 sources; published ; last updated —.

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