Threat reportAPTTL-2026-0815
UNC1549 (Nimbus Manticore / Smoke Sandstorm / TA455 / Subtle Snail): Iran-Nexus IRGC APT Targeting Aerospace, Defense & Telecom via Fake Recruitment Portals and Azure-Hosted Custom Malware
UNC1549 is an Iran-nexus (IRGC-aligned) cyber-espionage group active since at least June 2022 that targets aerospace, aviation, defense and telecommunications organizations. It uses fake React-based career/recruitment portals and LinkedIn job lures impersonating Boeing, Airbus, Rheinmetall, Telespazio and Safran to deliver custom DLL-sideloaded malware (MINIBIKE/MiniJunk, MiniBrowse, SIGHTGRAB, TRUSTRAP and related backdoors) for persistence, credential theft, DCSync, and exfiltration over Azure-proxied C2.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0815 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Iranian Dream Job, Operation Nimbus Manticore |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Aerospace & Defense Sector Aerospace, aviation and defense manufacturers and their third-party suppliers; Telecommunications Sector Telecom and satellite providers (11 firms, 34 devices compromised); Microsoft Azure App Service / Azure Cloud Apps (abused as C2 hosting, not a product vulnerability) |
| Attribution | UNC1549 (high confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Iran |
| Malware | DCSYNCER.SLICK, MINIBIKE, MiniBrowse, SIGHTGRAB, TRUSTRAP |
| Tools | ZeroTier, ngrok - S0508 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync, T1005 Data from Local System, T1018 Remote System Discovery, T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.001 Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols and 19 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | aerospace, aviation, defense, defense manufacturing, telecommunications, satellite communications |
| Target regions | Middle East, Israel, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, India, Albania, Western Europe, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, France, United Kingdom |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-06-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0815 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 42 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: UNC1549 DLL Side-Loading — Signed Binary Loading Malicious DLL from User-Writable Path (Exploitation)
Detects UNC1549/Nimbus Manticore initial-access DLL side-loading (T1574.002): a legitimately-signed Microsoft/VMware/Citrix/FortiGate/NVIDIA executable (delivered in survey.zip) loading a malicious sideloaded DLL such as xmllite.dll or userenv.dll (MINIBIKE/MiniJunk loader) from a user-writable directory like C:\Users\Public, %TEMP%, or %APPDATA% rather than System32. This is the primary execution trigger of the MINIBIKE infection chain.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1574.002, T1574.001, T1036
- Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_xdr
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=7
| eval ImageLoaded_lc=lower(ImageLoaded), Image_lc=lower(Image)
| where (match(ImageLoaded_lc, "\\\\(xmllite|userenv)\.dll$"))
| where (match(ImageLoaded_lc, "\\\\users\\\\public\\\\") OR match(ImageLoaded_lc, "\\\\appdata\\\\") OR match(ImageLoaded_lc, "\\\\temp\\\\"))
| where NOT match(ImageLoaded_lc, "^c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\")
| stats count min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen values(ImageLoaded) as loaded_dlls by host Image Signed SignatureStatus
| convert ctime(firstSeen) ctime(lastSeen)
| where count > 0Microsoft KQL
// Sentinel/Defender XDR — signed binary side-loading UNC1549 loader DLL from user-writable path
DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("xmllite.dll", "userenv.dll")
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Users\Public\", @"\AppData\", @"\Temp\")
| where FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Windows\System32"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: UNC1549 DLL Side-Loading via Signed Binary from User-Writable Path
id: 6f3a1c2e-8d44-4f1a-9b2e-1c0a7e5d4b01
status: experimental
description: Detects a signed binary side-loading a UNC1549/MINIBIKE loader DLL (xmllite.dll, userenv.dll) from a user-writable directory, consistent with the survey.zip infection chain.
references:
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/analysis-of-unc1549-ttps-targeting-aerospace-defense
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/nimbus-manticore-deploys-new-malware-targeting-europe/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/16
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1574.002
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: image_load
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\xmllite.dll'
- '\userenv.dll'
ImageLoaded|contains:
- '\Users\Public\'
- '\AppData\'
- '\Temp\'
filter_system:
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\'
condition: selection and not filter_system
falsepositives:
- Portable applications that legitimately ship their own copy of xmllite.dll in a user directory
level: highKnown false positives:
- Portable/standalone applications that legitimately bundle their own xmllite.dll or userenv.dll in a user-writable directory
- Software installers staging DLLs in %TEMP% before relocating them
Tuning notes: Baseline legitimate signed binaries that load these DLL names from user paths in your environment and add them to an allow-list. Enrich with the signer/CompanyName field to flag binaries masquerading as Microsoft/VMware/Citrix/FortiGate/NVIDIA. Extend the DLL name list as new UNC1549 loaders are reported.
- UNC1549 Fake Recruitment Portal Archive Execution (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- UNC1549 MiniBrowse Browser Credential-Store Theft & SIGHTGRAB Screen Capture (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- UNC1549 DCSync via MS-DRSR Replication from Non-Domain-Controller (C2 / Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
- UNC1549 Kerberoasting & Domain Account Discovery (Exploitation/Credential Access) · unlock with TL Creds
- UNC1549 RDP History Deletion & Event-Log Clearing Anti-Forensics (Post-Exploitation/Defense Evasion) · unlock with TL Creds
- UNC1549 Azure-Proxied C2 Beaconing & ngrok/ZeroTier Tunneling (C2 / Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
- UNC1549 Run-Key & Scheduled-Task Persistence Masquerading as Update Service (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- UNC1549 Reverse SSH Tunnel over Port 443 + Azure C2 Egress (C2 / Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-06-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 42 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0815.
Sample indicators (3 of 42)
- IP address:
104.194.215[.]88 - Domain:
airbus[.]usa-careers[.]com - File hash:
b19bdfda0cd8e50f7b5968d39aa31449a9cf9b85b8d7e00e19400cf5734f70bf
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 42 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Operations expanded into Western Europe by September 2025.
UNC1549 (overlapping with Check Point's Nimbus Manticore, Microsoft's Smoke Sandstorm, Crowdstrike-tracked TA455, and PRODAFT's Subtle Snail) is a mature Iran-nexus espionage actor assessed to align with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) strategic priorities. First observed in June 2022 targeting Middle Eastern aerospace and defense entities, the group expanded through 2023-2025 to the global aerospace/defense supply chain and, by September 2025, to Western Europe (Portugal, Sweden, Denmark) and to telecommunications providers across Canada, France, the UAE, the UK and the United States.
Initial access relies on highly targeted social engineering: spear-phishing emails and fraudulent LinkedIn recruiter profiles drive victims to fake, React-based career portals that impersonate Boeing, Airbus, Rheinmetall, Teledyne FLIR, Telespazio and Safran. Victims are issued pre-shared credentials and download malicious ZIP archives (e.g. survey.zip) containing a legitimate, validly signed executable plus a malicious sideloaded DLL. UNC1549 also exploits trusted third-party relationships and VDI breakouts to reach primary targets.
The malware ecosystem centers on MINIBIKE (evolved into MiniJunk/SlugResin), a heavily obfuscated HTTPS backdoor supporting ~12 commands for reconnaissance, file operations, process creation via named pipes, and DLL loading. Supporting tools include MiniBrowse (Chrome/Edge/Brave credential and clipboard stealer), SIGHTGRAB (periodic screenshot capture written to C:\Users\Public\Videos and \Music), TRUSTRAP (fake credential-prompt windows), DCSYNCER.SLICK (DCSync via MS-DRSR), CRASHPAD, LIGHTRAIL, DEEPROOT, TWOSTROKE, GHOSTLINE, POLLBLEND, and SCCMVNC, with ZeroTier and ngrok used for tunneling.
Tradecraft emphasizes operational security: LLVM compiler-level obfuscation with opaque predicates and control-flow flattening, per-string XOR encryption, binary-size inflation with junk code to defeat AV size limits, masquerading as legitimate Microsoft/VMware/Citrix/FortiGate/NVIDIA binaries via DLL side-loading, valid code-signing certificates purchased through SSL.com (from May 2025) masquerading as European IT firms, RDP history deletion, and reverse SSH tunnels (ssh.exe -R over port 443). Command and control is proxied almost entirely through Microsoft Azure App Service (*.azurewebsites.net) and Azure Cloud App (*.cloudapp.azure.com) domains plus VPSes, blending malicious traffic into trusted cloud infrastructure. Credential access includes DCSync, browser credential theft, Kerberoasting (obfuscated Invoke-Kerberoast), and password spraying; lateral movement uses RDP session hijacking (tscon/query session) and SCCMVNC. No CVE is associated with this campaign; the threat is TTP- and tooling-driven rather than vulnerability-driven.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync; T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying; T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers; T1558.003 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture; T1213.002 Data from Information Repositories: SharePoint
Discovery
T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account
Lateral Movement
T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.001 Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding; T1036 Masquerading; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1574.001 DLL
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Execution
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell; T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1090 Proxy; T1132 Data Encoding; T1572 Protocol Tunneling
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment; T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
defense-impairment
T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing; T1685.005 Clear Windows Event Logs
stealth
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block and alert on all listed Azure App Service (*.azurewebsites.net) and Azure Cloud App (*.cloudapp.azure.com) C2 domains and the SSH-tunneling IPs (104.194.215.88, 13.60.50.172, 167.172.137.208, 34.18.42.26, 4.188.75.206, 4.240.113.27, 40.119.176.233) at the perimeter and proxy
- Hunt for unexpected outbound ssh.exe processes using -R reverse-tunnel flags, especially over port 443
- Quarantine and triage hosts matching MINIBIKE/MiniJunk/MiniBrowse/LIGHTRAIL hashes; reset credentials for any user who interacted with the fake recruitment portals
- Alert on DCSync-style MS-DRSR replication (GetNCChanges) from non-domain-controller hosts
Workarounds
- Restrict execution of openssh ssh.exe where not operationally required
- Disable or tightly monitor SharePoint mass-download and information-repository access
- Filter newly-registered and lookalike recruitment domains impersonating aerospace/defense brands
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for DLL side-loading against signed Microsoft/VMware/Citrix/FortiGate/NVIDIA binaries
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA and conditional access to neutralize stolen browser/VPN credentials
- Implement application allow-listing and monitor scheduled-task and Run-key persistence creation
- Segment and monitor third-party/supplier access and VDI environments to break trusted-relationship abuse
Affected and fixed versions
- Aerospace & Defense Sector — Aerospace, aviation and defense manufacturers and their third-party suppliers
Vulnerable versions: organizations targeted via spear-phishing, fake recruitment portals, and trusted-relationship access - Telecommunications Sector — Telecom and satellite providers (11 firms, 34 devices compromised)
Vulnerable versions: personnel targeted via LinkedIn job lures and MINIBIKE/SlugResin DLL side-loading - Microsoft — Azure App Service / Azure Cloud Apps (abused as C2 hosting, not a product vulnerability)
Vulnerable versions: *.azurewebsites.net; *.cloudapp.azure.com used for malicious C2 proxying
Timeline
- UNC1549 operations first observed targeting aerospace and defense organizations in the Middle East (Israel, UAE).
- Campaign expands across the global aerospace and defense supply chain, increasingly leveraging trusted third-party access and VDI breakouts.
- Group begins purchasing valid code-signing certificates through SSL.com, masquerading as European IT organizations to sign malware.
- PRODAFT/Mandiant report 34 devices compromised across 11 telecom firms in Canada, France, UAE, UK and US via LinkedIn job lures and MINIBIKE/SlugResin.
- Check Point publishes Nimbus Manticore research documenting new malware (MiniJunk, MiniBrowse) targeting defense, telecom and aviation in Portugal, Sweden and Denmark.
- Cloud Security Alliance research note assesses Nimbus Manticore as IRGC-aligned, deploying AI-assisted backdoors against Western sectors.
- Google Cloud/Mandiant Frontline Intelligence details full UNC1549 toolset (MINIBIKE, TWOSTROKE, DEEPROOT, LIGHTRAIL, GHOSTLINE, POLLBLEND, DCSYNCER.SLICK) and Azure C2 infrastructure.
- Picus Security publishes consolidated UNC1549 TTP analysis (Threat ID 74718); threat documented and operationalized for detection in the Threadlinqs platform.
Sources cited
- Frontline Intelligence: Analysis of UNC1549 TTPs, Custom Tools, and Malware Targeting the Aerospace and Defense Ecosystem Google Cloud · Research · 2025-11-19
- Nimbus Manticore Deploys New Malware Targeting Europe Check Point Research · Research · 2025-09-23
- CSA Research Note: Nimbus Manticore - AI-Assisted Backdoors Target Western Sectors (IRGC) labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org · Research · 2025-10-01
- UNC1549 TTPs: Iranian APT Targeting Aerospace and Defense picussecurity.com · Blog · 2026-06-16
- UNC1549 Hacks 34 Devices in 11 Telecom Firms via LinkedIn Job Lures and MINIBIKE Malware The Hacker News · News · 2025-09-08
- Check Point tracks Nimbus Manticore Iranian APT targeting critical infrastructure in Europe, Middle East industrialcyber.co · News · 2025-09-24
- Iran-Linked Hackers Target Europe With New Malware Dark Reading · News · 2025-09-24
- Mandiant tracks surge in UNC1549 campaigns, hitting aerospace and defense through third-party access industrialcyber.co · News · 2025-11-19
More from UNC1549
- Mirage Kitten (UNC1549) deploys new NodeRabbit and PollCat RATs against aviation and FinTech via fake-recruiter coding challenges
- Tortoiseshell (Mirage Kitten / UNC1549 / Nimbus Manticore): New Toolset (TWOSTROKE Backdoor, Reverse SSH Tunnel) and Expanded Infrastructure
- Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549 / Smoke Sandstorm): Iran-backed MiniJunk and MiniBrowse malware with obfuscation, sandbox evasion, DLL sideloading and RPC-based lateral movement
- Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) Ecosystem Overview, Including Nimbus Manticore (Mirage Kitten) NodeRabbit and PollCat Fake-Recruitment Campaign
- ASEC June 2026 APT Trend Report: Nation-State Actors Pivot to Cloud/OAuth Abuse, MaaS, and Supply-Chain Compromise
- Iranian "Dream Job" Campaign (TA455 / Charming Kitten) — SnailResin Loader & SlugResin Backdoor Targeting Aerospace, Aviation & Defense
Previous and next in apt
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.