Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6248
BubbleLoader: Loader/Packer Trojanizing Legitimate Windows Software (WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox Launcher, virtiofs)
BubbleLoader is a loader/packer that patches the entry point of a legitimate Windows executable and appends two PNG files, so the trojanized host decrypts and reflectively loads a secondary PE payload in memory. ReversingLabs observed early examples in February 2026 and two activity clusters in mid-September and early October 2026, and states adversaries are actively using it.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6248 |
|---|---|
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | RARLAB WinRAR (trojanized copies); x64dbg x64dbg (trojanized copies); Microsoft Windows Media Player (trojanized copies); Mozilla Firefox launcher (trojanized copies); virtiofs virtiofs (trojanized copies) |
| Malware | BubbleLoader |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing, T1027.007 Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution, T1027.009 Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads, T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File, T1036.008 Masquerading: Masquerade File Type, T1106 Native API, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary, T1620 Reflective Code Loading, T1622 Debugger Evasion |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6248 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: BubbleLoader Trojanized Host Utility Execution (IOC Hash or Untrusted Path)
Detects execution of a BubbleLoader-trojanized host binary (TL-2026-6248). Behaviour clause: wmplayer.exe or virtiofs.exe, two hosts named by ReversingLabs that should only run from Program Files or Windows, running from any other path. IOC clause: process SHA256 matches one of the 24 BubbleLoader samples. BubbleLoader patches the host entry point (T1554) and unpacks a reflectively loaded PE (T1027.002), so the host keeps its normal name and the unpacked payload hash changes every run. The host and path are therefore the stable signals.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1554, T1027.002
- Data sources: sysmon, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode 1, DeviceProcessEvents, sigma:process_creation/windows
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 earliest=-24h@h
```BubbleLoader trojanized host utility - IOC SHA256 match or wmplayer and virtiofs outside trusted install paths```
| eval sha256=lower(mvindex(split(mvindex(split(Hashes,"SHA256="),1),","),0))
| eval ioc_hit=if(in(sha256,"4987af027009d572c26f6d009c5e53e237cb2e3ab9d52094c14dc0b8b6f40b14","3bde84b2ba4c53ace15695770779383ff788d850cea38d21cb0c6d80e650d710","a347e678626686a9bb27120df1e92ce98561f60f0f54e2501bcb4648cc41566a","053066c7764e8c5c35ef3b44e7c51f0cad0d287adab41966d393c78357c1c917","d5c8c4e528c659f6b772e16e0e26529c02faf21e46402ec0e97b25d99f801626","df11dd7bb354f4b020c8e3bd09f7751fc89d0b764519d7ea2bdc2f5e4d3b15be","f88891995c61bb349c772e8864a4d408d5ed605b59b7b7db581a58601f820029","e39a78e433f1704f2f5776ef389ec802beb628350691614bfc581d49842aae56","07784d651f8d049356a98a433eeb08b4168429f1c4a8bc8d0e597381e57249e8","08c98eb05a9b95a4f934ba67310ff670af63fc057c0c53879592b450b8848cfd","8e01f550789617de4605dc5e3288ff51795e88462126dd71ef3ec85f3e318b37","1e61e1842792d3f790820b3b9268edd22e68e0f43eaedfaf1015f6eaf9ef7c2d","ad70a492aef847553f771d6fb717541d11e242a83de63f3c0100de76a5ecdff5","c0974e323cb96b77a98c28f7dbc3f00bf8fe421890b2cbfb11b43a7b64fa6c3b","aa71f94a01b82617fbc44f6d1727c93cfc9d39727c332681f850bcbce96dc2ae","70ece0d830302898af0df01137b4042b6a039d2ef34f77abbac48a9e73f7674a","776e778dfe8c5c19f1433da60b7f9d0de86a84723e9bfc66bb2b2fd0f98f04bf","fd00db1f4e95aea21083a4eaed555091e39ea3c4200ea79bc856b45f1c2ebb3a","d14c71d924e965af4e98ab8f93b7ffbeb561c7fb37d5280f7146a900a7a0da6f","17a34146fef39ec6a403546364249a574f8add6d40dfc09ee30f8ad478226f15","ce86d243904e31d815713351b99e251ce4b415b3df7bb204a9f8b695e9c4b333","184f90da785a868dc1439b0796cc2081efc133040f2c4f79cfcc45acfa50089c","e4b6699c56fe9d3bb1f6492c9c42b0497e546155ac0f81b4994612142f5cb03f","da84d6ea16251c912e9603ab1f642df2b7178d07db053588f7c1f7ab3df8d4c3"),1,0)
| search ioc_hit=1 OR ((Image="*\\wmplayer.exe" OR Image="*\\virtiofs.exe") NOT (Image="C:\\Program Files\\*" OR Image="C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*" OR Image="C:\\Windows\\*"))
| eval detection_reason=if(ioc_hit=1,"BubbleLoader sample SHA256 match","Host utility running outside trusted install paths")
| table _time host User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine sha256 detection_reason
| sort - _timeMicrosoft KQL
// BubbleLoader trojanized host utilities (TL-2026-6248)
let iocs = dynamic(["4987af027009d572c26f6d009c5e53e237cb2e3ab9d52094c14dc0b8b6f40b14","3bde84b2ba4c53ace15695770779383ff788d850cea38d21cb0c6d80e650d710","a347e678626686a9bb27120df1e92ce98561f60f0f54e2501bcb4648cc41566a","053066c7764e8c5c35ef3b44e7c51f0cad0d287adab41966d393c78357c1c917","d5c8c4e528c659f6b772e16e0e26529c02faf21e46402ec0e97b25d99f801626","df11dd7bb354f4b020c8e3bd09f7751fc89d0b764519d7ea2bdc2f5e4d3b15be","f88891995c61bb349c772e8864a4d408d5ed605b59b7b7db581a58601f820029","e39a78e433f1704f2f5776ef389ec802beb628350691614bfc581d49842aae56","07784d651f8d049356a98a433eeb08b4168429f1c4a8bc8d0e597381e57249e8","08c98eb05a9b95a4f934ba67310ff670af63fc057c0c53879592b450b8848cfd","8e01f550789617de4605dc5e3288ff51795e88462126dd71ef3ec85f3e318b37","1e61e1842792d3f790820b3b9268edd22e68e0f43eaedfaf1015f6eaf9ef7c2d","ad70a492aef847553f771d6fb717541d11e242a83de63f3c0100de76a5ecdff5","c0974e323cb96b77a98c28f7dbc3f00bf8fe421890b2cbfb11b43a7b64fa6c3b","aa71f94a01b82617fbc44f6d1727c93cfc9d39727c332681f850bcbce96dc2ae","70ece0d830302898af0df01137b4042b6a039d2ef34f77abbac48a9e73f7674a","776e778dfe8c5c19f1433da60b7f9d0de86a84723e9bfc66bb2b2fd0f98f04bf","fd00db1f4e95aea21083a4eaed555091e39ea3c4200ea79bc856b45f1c2ebb3a","d14c71d924e965af4e98ab8f93b7ffbeb561c7fb37d5280f7146a900a7a0da6f","17a34146fef39ec6a403546364249a574f8add6d40dfc09ee30f8ad478226f15","ce86d243904e31d815713351b99e251ce4b415b3df7bb204a9f8b695e9c4b333","184f90da785a868dc1439b0796cc2081efc133040f2c4f79cfcc45acfa50089c","e4b6699c56fe9d3bb1f6492c9c42b0497e546155ac0f81b4994612142f5cb03f","da84d6ea16251c912e9603ab1f642df2b7178d07db053588f7c1f7ab3df8d4c3"]);
let hosts = dynamic(["wmplayer.exe","virtiofs.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| extend IocHit = SHA256 in~ (iocs)
| extend OddPath = FileName in~ (hosts) and not (FolderPath startswith @"C:\Program Files" or FolderPath startswith @"C:\Windows")
| where IocHit or OddPath
| extend Reason = iff(IocHit, "BubbleLoader sample SHA256 match", "Host utility running outside trusted install paths")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, Reason
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: BubbleLoader Trojanized Host Utility Execution - IOC Hash or Untrusted Path
id: 7c1a4e52-3b0d-4f6a-9e21-5a8d0c3b6f11
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of a BubbleLoader trojanized host binary, either a process whose SHA256 matches a published BubbleLoader sample or wmplayer.exe or virtiofs.exe running outside Program Files and Windows.
references:
- https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/threat-researchers-notebook-bubbleloader
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1554
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1027.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_ioc:
Hashes|contains:
- '4987af027009d572c26f6d009c5e53e237cb2e3ab9d52094c14dc0b8b6f40b14'
- '3bde84b2ba4c53ace15695770779383ff788d850cea38d21cb0c6d80e650d710'
- 'a347e678626686a9bb27120df1e92ce98561f60f0f54e2501bcb4648cc41566a'
- '053066c7764e8c5c35ef3b44e7c51f0cad0d287adab41966d393c78357c1c917'
- 'd5c8c4e528c659f6b772e16e0e26529c02faf21e46402ec0e97b25d99f801626'
- 'df11dd7bb354f4b020c8e3bd09f7751fc89d0b764519d7ea2bdc2f5e4d3b15be'
- 'f88891995c61bb349c772e8864a4d408d5ed605b59b7b7db581a58601f820029'
- 'e39a78e433f1704f2f5776ef389ec802beb628350691614bfc581d49842aae56'
- '07784d651f8d049356a98a433eeb08b4168429f1c4a8bc8d0e597381e57249e8'
- '08c98eb05a9b95a4f934ba67310ff670af63fc057c0c53879592b450b8848cfd'
- '8e01f550789617de4605dc5e3288ff51795e88462126dd71ef3ec85f3e318b37'
- '1e61e1842792d3f790820b3b9268edd22e68e0f43eaedfaf1015f6eaf9ef7c2d'
- 'ad70a492aef847553f771d6fb717541d11e242a83de63f3c0100de76a5ecdff5'
- 'c0974e323cb96b77a98c28f7dbc3f00bf8fe421890b2cbfb11b43a7b64fa6c3b'
- 'aa71f94a01b82617fbc44f6d1727c93cfc9d39727c332681f850bcbce96dc2ae'
- '70ece0d830302898af0df01137b4042b6a039d2ef34f77abbac48a9e73f7674a'
- '776e778dfe8c5c19f1433da60b7f9d0de86a84723e9bfc66bb2b2fd0f98f04bf'
- 'fd00db1f4e95aea21083a4eaed555091e39ea3c4200ea79bc856b45f1c2ebb3a'
- 'd14c71d924e965af4e98ab8f93b7ffbeb561c7fb37d5280f7146a900a7a0da6f'
- '17a34146fef39ec6a403546364249a574f8add6d40dfc09ee30f8ad478226f15'
- 'ce86d243904e31d815713351b99e251ce4b415b3df7bb204a9f8b695e9c4b333'
- '184f90da785a868dc1439b0796cc2081efc133040f2c4f79cfcc45acfa50089c'
- 'e4b6699c56fe9d3bb1f6492c9c42b0497e546155ac0f81b4994612142f5cb03f'
- 'da84d6ea16251c912e9603ab1f642df2b7178d07db053588f7c1f7ab3df8d4c3'
selection_path:
Image|endswith:
- '\wmplayer.exe'
- '\virtiofs.exe'
filter_trusted:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
- 'C:\Windows\'
condition: selection_ioc or (selection_path and not filter_trusted)
falsepositives:
- Portable or sideloaded copies of Windows Media Player or virtiofs in a lab or VM image
- Software deployment tools staging these binaries in a temporary directory
level: highKnown false positives:
- Portable or sideloaded copies of Windows Media Player or virtiofs in lab or VM images
- Software deployment tooling that stages wmplayer.exe or virtiofs.exe in a temp directory before install
Tuning notes: Change index=sysmon to your Sysmon index. The hash list is the 24 SHA256 values from the ReversingLabs report, so refresh it if the report is updated. The path clause covers only wmplayer.exe and virtiofs.exe, which have fixed install locations. WinRAR and x64dbg are left out because portable copies in user folders are common. Add your own Virtio-Win or custom install directory to the trusted list if it is outside Program Files.
- BubbleLoader Sample SHA256 Seen as File, Loaded Module or Process · unlock with TL Creds
- BubbleLoader Host Utility Spawning Script Interpreter or LOLBin · unlock with TL Creds
- BubbleLoader Signed Host Utility with Invalid or Stripped Signature · unlock with TL Creds
- BubbleLoader Host Binary Overwritten in Program Files by Non-Installer Process · unlock with TL Creds
- BubbleLoader Host Utility Making Unexpected Outbound Network Connection · unlock with TL Creds
- BubbleLoader Host Utility Process Access from Unbacked Memory · unlock with TL Creds
- BubbleLoader Host Utility Launched by Script Interpreter or from Temp/Archive Staging Path · unlock with TL Creds
- BubbleLoader RWX Allocation and Protection Change Inside Host Utility Process · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6248.
Sample indicators (3 of 26)
- File hash:
4987af027009d572c26f6d009c5e53e237cb2e3ab9d52094c14dc0b8b6f40b14 - File hash:
3bde84b2ba4c53ace15695770779383ff788d850cea38d21cb0c6d80e650d710 - File hash:
a347e678626686a9bb27120df1e92ce98561f60f0f54e2501bcb4648cc41566a
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
ReversingLabs (Threat Researcher's Notebook, 2026-11-17) describes BubbleLoader, a loader/packer that hijacks benign host PE files. Host programs named in the report are WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, a Firefox launcher and virtiofs. The first stage is a patch to the host's entry point, plus two PNG files added to the host. The report analyzes the most recent variant and notes that the entry point patch has changed over time. The final payload differs by sample and the report names no payload families.
Stage 1 (entry point patch): the host prologue is obfuscated with non-standard instructions standing in for push rbp, plus junk push/pop code. The image base is computed with a GetPC-style technique (0x400000 in the example sample). Obfuscated calls to GetModuleHandleW and GetProcAddress are built with a call/pop trick, a fabricated return address and a jump, reusing the host's IAT entries. The shellcode tries an ASCII 'kernel32' string first and falls back to a wide string, so one snippet works with hosts importing GetModuleHandleA or GetModuleHandleW. It then calls VirtualAlloc for executable memory, copies the next stage there and jumps to an offset inside the second PNG.
Stage 2 (PNG files): the first PNG is a valid, variably sized red-to-blue gradient image used as an XOR key. The second 'fake' PNG has valid magic bytes followed by a truncated IHDR chunk, and encrypted data begins where the width field should be; the width's most significant byte is 0x55 instead of the 0x00 a valid PNG would have, which is a detection opportunity. Position-independent shellcode in the fake PNG compares the magic bytes of both PNGs; if they match it decrypts with the key PNG's bytes as a rolling XOR key, otherwise it tries to run the next stage without decryption. Opaque predicates in the decryption loop always jump over an 'in' instruction that would raise a privileged-instruction exception in user mode, hindering analysis. Because the gradient key is sparse with long null runs, some third-stage strings remain unencrypted.
Stage 3 (loader): a reentry guard stores the payload entry point after loading and skips loading if already set, supporting DLL payloads that may be invoked repeatedly; it also appears in an EXE-payload sample, suggesting one codebase serves both payload types. The host image base is read from gs:0x60 (PEB). LoadLibraryA and GetProcAddress are stored by overwriting the placeholder 0xfafafafafafafafa, and a generic resolver resolves ExitProcess, RtlAddFunctionTable, RtlPcToFileHeader, VirtualAlloc and VirtualProtect. For runtime polymorphism the loader finds compiler padding bytes between functions and overwrites them with rdtsc-derived randomness (leaving the leftmost 0xCC byte intact), so the unpacked payload hash changes on every execution unless the loop is patched out. The reflective PE loader parses headers, allocates memory, copies headers and sections, applies base relocations, runs TLS callbacks, resolves imports and sets section protections with VirtualProtect. For structured exception handling it calls RtlAddFunctionTable on the payload's .pdata (size divided by 0xC) and patches the start of RtlPcToFileHeader in the loaded ntdll.dll with an inline hook stub containing the payload image base. It then calls the payload entry point with DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH semantics and calls ExitProcess on return.
Not stated in the source: attribution, CVEs, payload malware families, delivery vector, and domain/IP infrastructure. Severity HIGH is the analyst's assessment rather than a source rating. ReversingLabs lists 24 SHA256 hashes.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing; T1027.007 Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution; T1027.009 Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads; T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File; T1036.008 Masquerading: Masquerade File Type; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1620 Reflective Code Loading; T1622 Debugger Evasion
Execution
Persistence
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Hunt for the 24 listed SHA256 hashes across endpoints and file stores
- Verify code signatures and integrity of third-party utilities such as WinRAR, x64dbg, Windows Media Player, Firefox launcher and virtiofs binaries; reinstall from trusted sources if tampered
- Alert on RWX VirtualAlloc allocations and VirtualProtect calls targeting RtlPcToFileHeader in ntdll.dll
Workarounds
- Restrict execution of unsigned or modified copies of common utilities via allowlisting
Longer-term hardening
- Enforce application allowlisting and code-signing verification
- Deploy static rules for structurally anomalous embedded images such as PNGs with a truncated IHDR
- Use behavioral memory analysis and entry-point integrity checks rather than relying only on payload signatures, since the unpacked payload hash changes on every execution
Affected and fixed versions
Timeline
- Earliest BubbleLoader examples appear (February 2026; exact day not stated by ReversingLabs, first of month used as placeholder).
- First distinctive activity cluster observed in mid-September 2026 (exact day not stated).
- Second distinctive activity cluster observed in early October 2026 (exact day not stated).
- Threadlinqs opens TL-2026-6248 tracking BubbleLoader as an active malware technique.
- ReversingLabs recommends allowlisting/code-signing checks, EDR alerts on RWX VirtualAlloc and VirtualProtect against ntdll RtlPcToFileHeader, static rules for PNGs with truncated IHDR (width MSB 0x55), and entry-point integrity checks; no YARA rules published.
- ReversingLabs analyzes the most recent variant and notes the entry point patch has changed over time; the same loader codebase appears in both DLL-payload and EXE-payload samples (reentry guard present in an EXE sample).
- ReversingLabs publishes its Threat Researcher's Notebook on BubbleLoader with technical analysis of the latest variant and 24 SHA256 hashes.
Sources cited
- Threat Researcher's Notebook: BubbleLoader reversinglabs.com · Research · 2026-11-17
- ReversingLabs: The Patch Is the Attack Payload reversinglabs.com · Research · 2026-11-17
- MITRE ATT&CK T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary MITRE · Research · 2026-11-17
- MITRE ATT&CK T1620 Reflective Code Loading MITRE · Research · 2026-11-17
- MITRE ATT&CK T1036.008 Masquerade File Type MITRE · Research · 2026-11-17
- ReversingLabs Blog reversinglabs.com · Blog · 2026-11-17
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.