Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6222
Operation ShadowCloud: GraphDoor cloud-service backdoor targeting government networks in Asia and Africa (Part 2)
Kaspersky GReAT describes GraphDoor, a backdoor that uses Microsoft SharePoint via the Microsoft Graph API (Entra ID client-credentials OAuth) for plug-in retrieval, tasking and data upload, alongside the GitHub-based GitDoor variant and Ably-based relay/SOCKS5 proxy channels. Victims are mainly government networks in Asia and Africa; attribution is not definitive, with overlaps to the Chinese-speaking groups FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6222 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Operation ShadowCloud, GraphDoor, GitDoor |
| Severity | HIGH |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (victim endpoints); SharePoint Online / Microsoft Graph / Entra ID abused as C2; GitHub GitHub repositories and issues (abused as C2 by GitDoor); Ably Ably realtime messaging (abused for relay and SOCKS5 proxying) |
| Attribution | Salt Typhoon - G1045 (low confidence) |
| Malware | Cobalt Strike, MimiKatz, PLEAD - S0435 |
| Tools | FRP - S1144, MeshCentral |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, T1003.002 OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.007 Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1055 Process Injection, T1055.003 Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking, T1055.004 Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call and 30 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government administration |
| Target regions | Asia, Africa, taiwan |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 6 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6222 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 64 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: GraphDoor Host Artifacts — Intel_Log Staging Folder, logs.dat Keylogger Output, log.lock — Post-Exploitation
Detects file creation of GraphDoor (client_version 1.2.7, MD5 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952) on-disk artifacts: the staging folder C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log\<GUID> holding AES/Base64-encrypted host and network reconnaissance, the XOR-masked keylogger output %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat written by the kl.ts plug-in (T1056.001), and the %APPDATA%\log.lock marker. Staging indicates reconnaissance (T1082, T1057) and screenshot/keylogger collection (T1113) in progress.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1056.001, T1113, T1082, T1057
- Data sources: sysmon:EventCode=11 (index=sysmon), microsoft_defender_xdr:DeviceFileEvents, sigma:windows/file_event
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11 earliest=-24h (TargetFilename="*ProgramData*Intel_Log*" OR TargetFilename="*SystemCertificates*Cache*logs.dat" OR TargetFilename="*AppData*Roaming*log.lock")
| eval artifact=case(like(TargetFilename,"%Intel_Log%"),"graphdoor_staging_folder",like(lower(TargetFilename),"%logs.dat"),"graphdoor_keylogger_output",true(),"graphdoor_log_lock")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(TargetFilename) as files values(artifact) as artifact values(User) as user by Computer, ImageMicrosoft KQL
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where FolderPath has @"\ProgramData\Intel_Log\" or (FolderPath has @"\SystemCertificates\Cache\" and FileName =~ "logs.dat") or (FolderPath has @"\AppData\Roaming\" and FileName =~ "log.lock")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName, WriterProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName, WriterPath = InitiatingProcessFolderPath, FolderPath, FileName
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: GraphDoor Staging Folder and Keylogger Artifacts
id: 5e9b2f08-a7c4-4d16-9b3e-0c8d1f4a6e04
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of GraphDoor artifacts - the Intel_Log staging folder under ProgramData, the SystemCertificates Cache logs.dat keylogger output and the log.lock marker in the roaming profile.
references:
- https://securelist.com/operation-shadowcloud-graphdoor/122005/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/17
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.credential-access
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1056.001
- attack.t1113
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1057
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection_staging:
TargetFilename|contains: '\ProgramData\Intel_Log\'
selection_keylog:
TargetFilename|endswith: '\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat'
selection_lock:
TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Roaming\log.lock'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Third-party software that legitimately creates an Intel_Log directory under ProgramData
level: highKnown false positives:
- Vendor diagnostic tooling that happens to create a folder named Intel_Log under ProgramData
- Software that stores a log.lock file in the roaming profile
Tuning notes: Treat the logs.dat path under SystemCertificates\Cache and the Intel_Log folder as high fidelity; log.lock alone is low fidelity, so require it alongside another artifact on the same host. Companion hunt not covered by these rules (single log source per Sigma rule): GraphDoor plug-ins report over the named pipe \\.\pipe\p<PID> (Sysmon EventCode 17/18) and use the named objects Global\ExitEvent and Local\sm<PID>. Confirm Sysmon FileCreate (EventCode 11) is not excluding ProgramData.
- Unauthorized MeshCentral Agent Foothold and C2 to [indicator] — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- Mimikatz/CookieKatz Credential and Cookie Theft from Sideloaded Hosts — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Operation ShadowCloud Proxy C2 Infrastructure Connections (Reverse-Proxy and Cobalt Strike Hosts) — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- MeshAgent Dropping Loader DLLs and Encrypted Config in Sideloading Staging Directories — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- Sideloaded Host Process Spawning cmd.exe /C (GraphDoor 'shell' Command) — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
- Cobalt Strike, Ably Relay, gofile Exfiltration and GitHub C2 Name Resolution by Non-Browser Processes — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
- GraphDoor/GitDoor DLL Sideloading Loader (sbiedll.dll, jli.dll, WINMM.dll) from User-Writable Paths — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
- GraphDoor SharePoint/Graph OAuth C2 — Attacker Tenants and Non-Browser Entra/Graph Access — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 64 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6222.
Sample indicators (3 of 64)
- IP address:
27.102.66[.]162 - Domain:
twnic[.]top - URL:
hxxps://login[.]microsoftonline[.]com/8f50c589-a4d6-4df4-95bb-2fb7f5983fe5/oauth2/v2.0/token
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 64 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Operation ShadowCloud is a campaign, identified in early 2026 and publicly documented by Kaspersky GReAT on 17 November 2026 in two parts, that abuses legitimate cloud services as command-and-control. Part 1 covers GitDoor, which uses GitHub repositories and issues plus Ably messaging. Part 2 covers GraphDoor, its plug-ins and attribution. Victims were found in Asia and Africa, primarily in the government sector, including a Taiwanese organization.
Initial access is not known. In Part 1, the operators appear to have reused an existing foothold: two MeshCentral Agent instances found in a Taiwanese organization were hard-coded to a C2 at 27.102.66.162:443. Through the agent the operator dropped a legitimate signed binary, a malicious loader DLL for DLL sideloading, and an encrypted payload (config.ini or similarly named file). Observed sideloading pairs include start.exe (Sandboxie) with sbiedll.dll, a renamed Python app with python39.dll, javaw.exe with jli.dll, zoomit.exe with WINMM.dll, and libcef.dll. Type 1 loaders (e.g. jli.dll) decode the config with a custom Base64 alphabet, RC4 and XOR, abuse RtlEthernetAddressToStringA/RtlEthernetStringToAddressA for byte transformation, resolve APIs by CRC32 or FNV-1 hash, and reflectively load GraphDoor or Go binaries. Type 2 loaders use a vectored exception handler, clear DR7 and decrypt GitDoor.
GraphDoor (MD5 14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952, client_version 1.2.7) resolves APIs at runtime with DJB2 hashing and performs API calls indirectly through a vectored exception handler. It creates the named pipe \\.\pipe\p<PID> and the staging folder C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log\<GUID>, collects host and network reconnaissance, and encrypts it with AES plus Base64. It has no hard-coded C2 domain. It authenticates to login.microsoftonline.com with an OAuth client-credentials grant (scope https://graph.microsoft.com/.default), using an application ID and secret decrypted from embedded strings against tenant 8f50c589-a4d6-4df4-95bb-2fb7f5983fe5. Victim data is uploaded through Graph PUT as main.<8-char-code>.js.map on a SharePoint document library, disguised as a JavaScript source map. Plug-ins scr.ts, pr.ts and kl.ts are fetched from a SharePoint list, and commands are polled from a list for items whose Title starts with main.<code> and whose extension is .js, .swp, .tmp, .kmap, .pmap or .apmap. Commands mirror GitDoor, with added 'shell' (cmd.exe /C) and 'adsmload' (MAC-address-encoded shellcode injected via RtlEthernetStringToAddressA, arguments passed through Local\sm<PID> shared memory).
The COFF/reflective plug-ins include a keylogger (output to %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat, XOR-masked), process listing (SeDebugPrivilege), screenshot capture, moveDir.ts (relocates a legitimate executable, loader DLL and encrypted config, then kills the old instance via Global\ExitEvent), and proxy channels: channel.ts (Go reverse proxy derived from the open-source Erfrp/frp code), abchannel.ts (Ably Go SDK TCP relay) and ab2channel.ts (SOCKS5 over Ably's Pusher-compatible WebSocket, wss://main.pusher.ably.net/app/<APP_KEY>). The C2 hostname and port are delivered through the proxy channel or an Ably channel. GitDoor shellcode modules add process injection (CreateRemoteThread, SetThreadContext, NtQueueApcThread, KernelCallbackTable), service and scheduled-task management, registry operations, account manipulation, Mimikatz (sekurlsa::logonpasswords, lsadump::sam), CookieKatz browser cookie theft, WhatsApp key extraction, PetitPotam-style EFSRPC coercion, and upload to gofile.io. The operators also deployed Cobalt Strike beacons on GraphDoor-infected machines, using the domains twnic.top and ekmt.tw.
Kaspersky does not attribute the activity definitively. Several victims shared staging directories with GitDoor, and implants were deployed within a day of GitDoor deployment, in cases linked to FamousSparrow (excint.exe side-loading wtsapi32.dll, RC4 key iotrh^%4CFGTj) and CopperTurtle (pdfset.exe injecting PLEAD). The authors say this suggests, but does not prove, that a Chinese-speaking group develops or uses GitDoor and GraphDoor. GitHub infrastructure was created between 3 September 2024 and 5 December 2025, which suggests preparation began by the end of 2024. Severity is the analyst's assessment; the source does not state one.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory; T1003.002 OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager; T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging; T1187 Forced Authentication; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
Discovery
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.007 Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution; T1036 Masquerading; T1055 Process Injection; T1055.003 Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking; T1055.004 Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1562.004 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall; T1574.001 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL; T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading; T1620 Reflective Code Loading; T1622 Debugger Evasion
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service; T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Persistence
T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task; T1136.001 Create Account: Local Account; T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Execution
T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell; T1106 Native API; T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1090 Proxy; T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1572 Protocol Tunneling; T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
Collection
Resource Development
T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Hunt for outbound HTTPS to login.microsoftonline.com and graph.microsoft.com from non-browser, non-Microsoft processes (javaw.exe, python*.exe, zoomit.exe, start.exe, renamed Avast/PDF24 binaries) and for SharePoint Graph PUT requests creating main.*.js.map files
- Block or alert on the listed proxy C2 IPs, the Cobalt Strike domains twnic.top and ekmt.tw, and the SharePoint tenants buildersemp.sharepoint.com and cskautogo.sharepoint.com where not business-required
- Hunt for C:\ProgramData\Intel_Log\, %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat, %APPDATA%\log.lock and the named objects \\.\pipe\p<PID>, Global\ExitEvent and Local\sm<PID>/pc<PID>/pcs<PID>
- Treat any unexpected MeshCentral Agent as suspicious; inventory and remove unauthorized instances and block 27.102.66.162
- Review access to GitHub (api.github.com, raw/commit traffic) and Ably (rest.ably.io, main.pusher.ably.net, wss) from servers and workstations that have no business need, and block the listed GitHub accounts
Workarounds
- No CVE is involved; no vendor patch applies. Mitigation is detection and egress control
- Reimage hosts confirmed compromised and rotate credentials exposed to Mimikatz or browser-cookie theft
Longer-term hardening
- Restrict SharePoint/Graph access with tenant restrictions (v2) so endpoints can reach only your own tenant
- Enable application-control (WDAC/AppLocker) to prevent DLL sideloading from user-writable and ProgramData paths
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection of vectored-exception-handler indirect API calls, reflective loading and unbacked-memory execution
- Monitor egress to cloud collaboration, code-hosting and real-time messaging services, and baseline per-host usage
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (victim endpoints); SharePoint Online / Microsoft Graph / Entra ID abused as C2
Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific; abuse of legitimate cloud services - GitHub — GitHub repositories and issues (abused as C2 by GitDoor)
Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific; service abuse - Ably — Ably realtime messaging (abused for relay and SOCKS5 proxying)
Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific; service abuse
Timeline
Last updated · 3 updates · revalidated 3× · latest source
- Earliest GitHub account used for GitDoor infrastructure (StevenDFournier) created, indicating preparation began by end of 2024
- GitHub C2 account JeneLeo (repos silverPot / laughbot) is created.
- GitHub C2 account VenoraKlanimU (repos logdata / appdb) is created.
- GitHub C2 accounts AlexandaJazzmynwC (PulseHub / QuantumVault) and FloraineSuvitC (NexaCore / DataFlowX) are created.
- GitHub C2 accounts bvgarciajocelynxccZ (DataSphere / CodeForge) and Eclemensadolph1n (DataCore / alpha) are created.
- Latest GitHub account in the GitDoor infrastructure set (aYulysseserinYtas) created; accounts were created between Sep 2024 and Dec 2025
- GitDoor staging observed in %ProgramData%\excInt\sg\ (zoomit.exe / WINMM.dll), one day before FamousSparrow-linked staging
- FamousSparrow-linked staging of excint.exe and side-loaded wtsapi32.dll in %ProgramData%\excint\
- CopperTurtle-linked pdfset.exe (PLEAD RAT injector) created in C:\Program Files\PDF24\
- GitDoor staging of pdf.exe and SbieDll.dll in the PDF24 directory, one day after the CopperTurtle-linked file
- Sophos published research on Bronze Sandcastle (Sandboxie DLL sideloading, config.ini payloads), a partially overlapping activity cluster.
- Kaspersky GReAT publishes Operation ShadowCloud Part 1 (GitDoor) and Part 2 (GraphDoor, plug-ins, attribution)
Update history
- 2026-11-17 — GraphDoor Backdoor Abuses Microsoft SharePoint/Graph API (and GitDoor, Ably) for C2 Against Government Networks in Asia and Africa (Operation ShadowCloud Part 2): What changed No severity, exploitability, status or attribution change; the record already reflects HIGH / ACTIVE / LOW-confidence attribution. New indicators (4) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-11-17 — Operation ShadowCloud: GitDoor and GraphDoor Backdoors Abuse GitHub and SharePoint (Microsoft Graph) as C2 Against Government Networks in Asia and Africa: What changed No change to severity (HIGH), exploitability (ACTIVE), status (ACTIVE) or attribution confidence (LOW). Additive detail only. New indicators (4) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-11-17 — Operation ShadowCloud: GitDoor and GraphDoor cloud-based backdoors delivered via abused MeshAgent against government networks in Asia and Africa: What changed No change to severity (HIGH), exploitability (ACTIVE), status or attribution fields. The update adds supporting detail from Part 1 of the Kaspersky series. New indicators (18) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- Operation ShadowCloud: GraphDoor backdoor, plug-ins and attribution (Part 2) Kaspersky Securelist · Research · 2026-11-17
- Operation ShadowCloud: GitDoor (Part 1) Kaspersky Securelist · Research · 2026-11-17
- Microsoft identity platform: OAuth 2.0 client credentials grant flow Microsoft · Vendor report
- MITRE ATT&CK T1102 Web Service MITRE · Research
- MITRE ATT&CK T1574.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking MITRE · Research
- MITRE ATT&CK T1620 Reflective Code Loading MITRE · Research
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- SparrowDoor Backdoor: NCSC Malware Analysis Report on a Persistent Loader with Clipboard Logging, AV Detection, API Hooking, and Token Impersonation
- FamousSparrow APT Targets Azerbaijani Oil & Gas Sector via ProxyShell/ProxyNotShell Exchange Exploitation
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated .