Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6391
EggStreme Malware Rebuilt After Disclosure: Suspected Chinese APT Revises Toolkit Targeting Philippine Government
Bitdefender reports that a suspected Chinese APT group re-engineered its EggStreme malware framework and infrastructure after the September 2025 disclosure, continuing to target Philippine government organizations (high confidence) and possibly Taiwan (low to medium confidence). Changes include a raw-TCP mutual-TLS agent transport with inner AES-256-CBC, an expanded command set, a passive listening agent variant, new loader ciphers and campaign-specific certificate authorities.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6391 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | EggStreme v2, RawCookie (EggStremeFuel), Gorem RAT (EggStremeAgent) |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (endpoints and domain/file-share environments) |
| Nation-state nexus | China |
| Malware | EggStreme |
| Tools | Stowaway |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1018 Remote System Discovery, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1055 Process Injection, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1059.005 Visual Basic, T1069.002 Domain Groups, T1078.002 Domain Accounts, T1087.002 Domain Account and 17 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government administration, defense |
| Target regions | philippines, taiwan |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6391 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 45 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: EggStreme v2 - Script Interpreter Running Staged prncnfg.vbs / Officelog.bat From Users\Public
Detects wscript, cscript or cmd executing prncnfg.vbs, Officelog.bat or any .vbs/.bat located in C:\Users\Public. Bitdefender reports EggStreme v2 stages a legitimate executable, a sideloading DLL and a config file on an unmanaged host and then runs VBS/batch files from C:\Users\Public remotely over SMB with WScript to launch EggStremeFuel. Behaviour-first logic that survives hash, domain and IP rotation.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1059.005, T1059.003, T1021.002, T1570
- Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint:DeviceProcessEvents, windows_process_creation
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe", "*\\cmd.exe") (CommandLine="*\\Users\\Public\\prncnfg.vbs*" OR CommandLine="*\\Users\\Public\\Officelog.bat*" OR (CommandLine="*\\Users\\Public\\*" CommandLine IN ("*.vbs*", "*.bat*")))
| stats count min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen values(CommandLine) AS command_lines values(ParentImage) AS parent_images BY host, User, Image
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)Microsoft KQL
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ('wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe', 'cmd.exe')
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (@'\Users\Public\prncnfg.vbs', @'\Users\Public\Officelog.bat') or (ProcessCommandLine has @'\Users\Public\' and ProcessCommandLine has_any ('.vbs', '.bat'))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLineSigma
title: EggStreme Script Interpreter Running Staged Script From Users Public
id: c6391a01-4e1b-4c5a-9d3f-6a2b7e8f1001
status: experimental
description: Detects wscript, cscript or cmd executing prncnfg.vbs, Officelog.bat or other scripts from C:\Users\Public, the pattern used by EggStreme v2 to run the staged sideloading package over SMB.
references:
- https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/eggstreme-malware-revises-architecture-infrastructure
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/19
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.t1570
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
selection_ioc:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Users\Public\prncnfg.vbs'
- '\Users\Public\Officelog.bat'
selection_generic:
CommandLine|contains: '\Users\Public\'
selection_ext:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.vbs'
- '.bat'
condition: selection_img and (selection_ioc or (selection_generic and selection_ext))
falsepositives:
- Administrators or software deployment tools that stage legitimate scripts in C:\Users\Public
level: highKnown false positives:
- Administrators or software deployment tooling that legitimately stages .vbs/.bat scripts in C:\Users\Public
- Legacy logon or inventory scripts run from the Public profile
Tuning notes: Adjust index/sourcetype to your Sysmon ingestion. Exclude known deployment accounts and parent processes after a baseline period. The two named files (prncnfg.vbs, Officelog.bat) are high fidelity; the generic Users\Public branch is broader and can be split into a lower-severity hunt.
- EggStreme - System-Named DLL Sideloaded From User-Writable Path · unlock with TL Creds
- EggStreme - Encrypted Payload Written To Innocuous Payload-Hiding Files · unlock with TL Creds
- EggStreme Passive Agent - [indicator] Firewall Rule and TCP 5060 Listener · unlock with TL Creds
- EggStreme - Staged Package and Config Files Created On Endpoint · unlock with TL Creds
- EggStreme - CLR or System.Management.Automation Loaded By Non-.NET Process · unlock with TL Creds
- EggStreme - Staging Package Files Accessed On Network Share (SMB Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
- EggStreme - HKCU Run Key StandaloneUpdater Pointing Into OneDrive setup\logs · unlock with TL Creds
- EggStreme - Connections or DNS Lookups To Known C2 and Staging Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 45 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6391.
Sample indicators (3 of 45)
- IP address:
45.115.225[.]73 - Domain:
mepintei[.]com - File hash:
0f2404810a20ad1c265a94cf7643e38f
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 45 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
EggStreme is a multi-stage, largely fileless Windows espionage framework first documented by Bitdefender in September 2025 (v1) following an intrusion at a Philippine military company. Its chain consists of EggStremeFuel (stage-1 sideloaded DLL that profiles the host and deploys the loader), EggStremeLoader (persistence; decrypts and runs the next stage), EggStremeReflectiveLoader, EggStremeAgent (core backdoor, also tracked as Gorem RAT; Fuel is also tracked as RawCookie), EggStremeKeylogger and EggStremeWizard (secondary reverse-shell/file-transfer backdoor). Palo Alto Networks tracks CL-STA-1048, which used some components (Fuel, Loader) from March to September 2025; Bitdefender notes the tools may be shared by more than one actor and has not confirmed that it is the same cluster.
On 2026-11-18 Bitdefender published an update describing a v2 generation built after disclosure. Rotated hashes, domains and IPs are the cheap changes; the substantive ones are: (1) the agent transport moved from gRPC over mutual TLS to raw TCP with mutual TLS (wolfSSL) plus an inner AES-256-CBC layer with hardcoded keys/IVs and embedded certificates; (2) Fuel configuration protection moved from RC4 (filename key) to AES-256-CBC, with the config stored at %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Notifications\wpndatabase.dat imitating wpndatabase.db; (3) loader cryptography progressed from XOR/RC4 to RC5-32 CBC and then to two custom CBC ciphers (variants A and B) with the hardcoded string KERNEL32 as key/IV, with the payload file carrying its own 8-byte key (so protection is weak); (4) new agent commands for Active Directory recon (24-26), TCP forwarding (76/77), WMI queries with supplied credentials (79), token impersonation (80), loading embedded .NET assemblies (83), in-memory PowerShell (84/85) and reflective PE execution (86-88); (5) a passive-mode agent that listens on TCP 5060 and adds an inbound firewall rule named 'Core Networking - SIP' via the COM firewall API (edge traversal enabled), instead of beaconing; (6) removal of the keylogger from all observed post-disclosure agent builds (EggStremeWizard has not been retired); and (7) a shift from a single 2019 certificate authority to apparently campaign-specific CAs.
Initial access remains unknown. Bitdefender's first investigation began with a logon script on a network share of unclear origin; in later incidents valid domain credentials and a reachable share were sufficient. Lateral movement now uses an unmanaged host outside endpoint management to stage a package (legitimate executable, malicious sideloading DLL, config file) plus VBS/batch files, which are run remotely over SMB with WScript. Persistence is a HKCU Run value (StandaloneUpdater) pointing into the OneDrive setup\logs directory. Encrypted payloads are hidden in files with innocuous names such as Alarm00.wav, Feeds.tmp, msinfo32.dll, appmain.sdb and systemZones.res. Sideloading DLL names include advapi32.dll, dbghelp.dll, dwmapi.dll, iscsiexe.dll, DevicesPlatform.dll and xwizards.dll.
Defensive takeaways from Bitdefender: hash, domain and CA pivots are weakening, but development hosts serving certificates for several unrelated domains on ports 8443-8445 can reveal staged domains. Recommended detections cover WScript/cmd running scripts from C:\Users\Public\, Run keys pointing into OneDrive setup\logs, reads of the listed payload paths by non-Windows processes, creation of the 'Core Networking - SIP' rule, listeners on TCP 5060, and CLR or System.Management.Automation loads in non-.NET processes. No CVEs are involved. Attribution is a technical assessment of a suspected Chinese APT, not a statement about any government.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Discovery
T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1069.002 Domain Groups; T1087.002 Domain Account
Lateral Movement
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories; T1574.001 DLL; T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow; T1620 Reflective Code Loading
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1059.005 Visual Basic
Privilege Escalation
T1055 Process Injection; T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft
Initial Access
Command and Control
T1090.001 Internal Proxy; T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography; T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography
Persistence
T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process; T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Resource Development
T1583.001 Domains; T1587.003 Digital Certificates
defense-impairment
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Hunt for and block the published EggStreme IOCs (C2 IPs, domains, loader and payload-file hashes) from the Bitdefender malware-ioc repository (2026_11-eggstreme-iocs.csv)
- Alert on WScript/cmd executing scripts from C:\Users\Public\ (Officelog.bat, prncnfg.vbs) and on hidden .tmp / StandaloneUpdater.exe files on network shares
- Alert on creation of the Windows Firewall rule 'Core Networking - SIP' and on listeners on TCP 5060 on hosts that do not run SIP software
- Audit HKCU Run values pointing into %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\OneDrive\setup\logs
- Identify unmanaged hosts that hold valid domain credentials or write to shared folders and bring them under endpoint management
Workarounds
- Block outbound connections to listed C2 IPs/domains at the perimeter
- Restrict inbound firewall rule creation to administrators via Group Policy
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with detection for DLL sideloading of system-named libraries (advapi32.dll, dbghelp.dll, dwmapi.dll, iscsiexe.dll, xwizards.dll) loaded from user-writable paths
- Monitor CLR and System.Management.Automation module loads in non-.NET processes
- Monitor non-Windows processes reading the known payload-hiding paths (Alarm00.wav, Feeds.tmp, msinfo32.dll in Microsoft Shared\msinfo, appmain.sdb, systemZones.res, Crypto.db, Unistore.db)
- Restrict SMB write access to shares and logon-script locations; enforce least privilege and credential hygiene for domain accounts
- Pivot on TLS certificates served on ports 8443-8445 that cover multiple unrelated domains to discover staged infrastructure
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (endpoints and domain/file-share environments)
Vulnerable versions: Not version-specific; abuses legitimate binaries, DLL search order, SMB shares and valid credentials
Timeline
Last updated · 2 updates · revalidated 2× · latest source
- Not Before date of the legacy certificate authority (key identifier 51655e8e97fc7265b1aaa4265d94e2f7cae9c913) that later links 32 EggStreme domains.
- Earliest listed EggStremeLoader build (iscsiexe.dll, RC4 key 'google') compiled.
- Palo Alto Networks' CL-STA-1048 begins using EggStremeFuel/EggStremeLoader components (March-September 2025, month-level precision); Bitdefender has not confirmed this is the same cluster.
- Compile date of the first passive-mode EggStremeAgent build listening on TCP 5060.
- Bitdefender publishes the first EggStreme report (v1) covering a Philippine military company intrusion.
- First EggStremeFuel build with the new configuration format, 12 days after the first report.
- First newer-format loader (advapi32.dll) using RC5-32 CBC compiled; seen in the wild the next day.
- Three custom-cipher (variant A) loader builds compiled within roughly 95 minutes.
- Second passive-mode EggStremeAgent build (listening on TCP 5060) is stamped; a variant A loader (dbghelp.dll) is compiled the same day.
- RC4 loader with host-bound key (dwmapi.dll) compiled; a second passive-mode agent build was seen on 2025-11-05.
- First custom cipher variant B loader build compiled.
- Development IP locked-ioc-26 observed (February 2026, month-level precision), serving ports 8443-8445.
- Latest observed loader build (advapi32.dll, custom variant B) compiled, containing debug strings.
- Second development IP locked-ioc-24 and three more staged domains (locked-ioc-29, locked-ioc-21, locked-ioc-40) observed (June 2026, month-level precision).
- Bitdefender publishes the EggStreme v2 update; The Hacker News covers it the same day.
Update history
- 2026-11-19 — Suspected Chinese APT Uses Passive 'Silent' EggStreme/EggStremeAgent Backdoor Against Philippine Government Networks: What changed No severity, exploitability, status or attribution change; existing values (HIGH / ACTIVE / MEDIUM) are unchanged and consistent with the newer report. New indicators (6) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
- 2026-11-19 — EggStreme Malware Framework Rebuilt (v2): New Ciphers, Raw TCP mTLS Agent and Infrastructure Shift — Suspected Chinese APT Targeting Philippine Government: What changed No severity, exploitability, status or attribution change. Additive enrichment only. New indicators (5) Indicator values are withheld at this access level.
Sources cited
- EggStreme Malware: Rebuilt Under Scrutiny (Bitdefender) bitdefender.com · Vendor report · 2026-11-18
- EggStreme Malware: Unpacking a New APT Framework Targeting a Philippine Military Company (Bitdefender, v1) bitdefender.com · Vendor report · 2025-09-17
- Custom RATs Target Southeast Asia Governments (Unit 42; related Earth Alux activity cited by The Hacker News, not linked to EggStreme) Unit 42 · Research · 2026-11-18
- Bitdefender malware-ioc repository (2026_11-eggstreme-iocs.csv, 2025_09_10-eggstreme-iocs.csv) GitHub · Code repository · 2026-11-18
- New EggStreme Malware Variant Goes Silent to Evade Security Tools in Government Attacks (The Hacker News) The Hacker News · News · 2026-11-18
- Chinese APT Deploys EggStreme Fileless Malware (The Hacker News, 2025) The Hacker News · News · 2025-09-17
- Chinese APT Actor Compromises Military Firm with Novel Fileless Malware Toolset (Infosecurity Magazine) infosecurity-magazine.com · News · 2025-09-17
- Three China-linked clusters target ... (CL-STA-1048 coverage, The Hacker News) The Hacker News · News · 2026-03-01
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated .