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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0887

ClickFix Campaign Delivers GULoader via EtherHiding Blockchain Payload Retrieval (BNB Smart Chain Testnet)

highACTIVE

A ClickFix social-engineering campaign first observed in April 2026 abuses compromised European small-business WordPress/WooCommerce sites to serve fake reCAPTCHA overlays that trick Windows users into a Win+R → Ctrl+V → Enter clipboard-paste sequence. The pasted command invokes the Microsoft-signed rundll32.exe against a remote WebDAV UNC path to load GULoader shellcode entirely in memory.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0887
Also known asClickFix EtherHiding GULoader campaign
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (desktop); Automattic / WordPress WordPress / WooCommerce (compromised hosting sites, not a product vuln)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-829, CWE-494, CWE-451
MalwareAgent Tesla, GuLoader - S0561, Lumma, Remcos, Vidar
ToolsEtherHiding (BNB Smart Chain Testnet smart contract), Traffic Direction System (TDS)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1090 Proxy, T1102 Web Service, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1189 Drive-by Compromise, T1204 User Execution, T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution and 9 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorssmall-business, retail, e-commerce
Target regionsEurope
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0887 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 22 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: ClickFix rundll32 Proxy Execution Against Remote WebDAV UNC Path — Exploitation

Detects the core ClickFix/GULoader execution primitive: Microsoft-signed rundll32.exe launched with a remote UNC/WebDAV path argument (\\host\...) and an ordinal/named export (e.g. ,#1 or ,ck-3d). The campaign uses rundll32 as a signed LOLBin to load GULoader shellcode directly from a remote share into memory, bypassing SmartScreen, browser download warnings, and file-based AV. Legitimate rundll32 usage references local DLLs on C:\ or known system DLLs, not internet UNC paths.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1218.011, T1204.004, T1036
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_events
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\rundll32.exe"
| eval cmd=lower(CommandLine)
| where like(cmd,"%\\\\%") AND NOT (like(cmd,"%c:\\%") OR like(cmd,"%shell32.dll%") OR like(cmd,"%\\\\.\\pipe%"))
| rex field=CommandLine "(?i)(?<unc_path>\\\\\\\\[^,\"\s]+)"
| rex field=CommandLine "(?i),(?<export>#\d+|[a-z0-9\-]+)\s*$"
| eval webdav_ssl=if(like(cmd,"%@ssl%"),"yes","no")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(unc_path) as unc_path values(export) as export values(webdav_ssl) as webdav_ssl values(ParentImage) as parent by host, User, CommandLine
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| where count > 0

Microsoft KQL

// Primary flavor is SPL; KQL provided for cross-platform coverage
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "rundll32.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "\\\\"
| where ProcessCommandLine !contains "C:\\" and ProcessCommandLine !contains "shell32.dll"
| extend WebDavSsl = iff(ProcessCommandLine contains "@SSL", "yes", "no")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, WebDavSsl

Sigma

title: Rundll32 Proxy Execution Against Remote WebDAV UNC Path (ClickFix/GULoader)
id: 7c1b9a42-0887-4a11-9e21-1a0c1d2e3f01
status: experimental
description: Detects Microsoft-signed rundll32.exe invoked with a remote UNC/WebDAV path and an ordinal/named export, used by the ClickFix/EtherHiding GULoader campaign to load shellcode from a remote share into memory and bypass SmartScreen and file-based AV.
references:
    - https://cybersecuritynews.com/clickfix-campaign-uses-etherhiding-and-guloader/
    - https://cyberpress.org/clickfix-evades-powershell-detection/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/20
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1218.011
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1036
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '\\\\'
    filter_local:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'C:\'
            - 'shell32.dll'
            - '\\.\pipe'
    condition: selection and not filter_local
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative scripts loading DLLs from trusted internal file shares
    - Software deployment tools invoking rundll32 against internal UNC paths
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate admin scripts loading DLLs from trusted internal file shares
  • Software deployment tooling invoking rundll32 against internal UNC paths

Tuning notes: Allow-list known-good internal file-share hosts and deployment service accounts. Tighten by alerting only when the UNC host is internet-routable or resolves to Cloudflare edge IPs (188.114.96.7, 188.114.97.7), or when the export is an ordinal (#N) or matches 'ck-3d'.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Rundll32 Loading Remote WebDAV UNC Payload — Exploitation (Defender) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Explorer-Spawned rundll32 With Fileless Module Load — Post-Exploitation (Defender) · unlock with TL Creds
  • EtherHiding Blockchain JSON-RPC eth_call From Browser Process — C2 Retrieval (Defender) · unlock with TL Creds
  • GULoader Payload Hash and C2 Domain Indicator Match — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • WebClient Service Enabled via Run-Dialog Followed by rundll32 UNC Load — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • ClickFix Fake-CAPTCHA Web Lure: Clipboard Write Then Run-Dialog Execution — C2/Delivery · unlock with TL Creds
  • ClickFix Run-Dialog Chain: Explorer Spawns rundll32 After RunMRU Write — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • WebDAV/WebClient Outbound to Internet UNC Host With In-Memory Loader — C2/Staging · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-20, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 22 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0887.

Sample indicators (3 of 22)

  • IP address: 188.114.96[.]7
  • Domain: vo8xalon[.]in[.]net
  • File hash: 172a25a9ed8b798d8baeec29424b46627b5b39723b37c787f928d3700509001e

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 22 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

22 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Second-stage payloads are staged in smart contracts on the BNB Smart Chain Testnet using the EtherHiding technique, evading SmartScreen and takedowns; GULoader is a staging loader for infostealers (Lumma, Vidar) and RATs (Remcos, AgentTesla).

This campaign chains three modern delivery primitives — ClickFix social engineering, EtherHiding blockchain payload hosting, and the GULoader memory-resident shellcode loader — into a fileless infection path that targets Windows desktop browser users in Europe.

Initial access is achieved by compromising legitimate small-business WordPress/WooCommerce sites (an ErrTraffic-style web backdoor) while preserving normal site functionality. Attacker-injected JavaScript fingerprints each visitor (browser, OS, screen resolution, referrer, IP metadata) and forwards the data to a Traffic Direction System (TDS). The TDS serves the malicious chain only to Windows desktop users and shows clean content to mobile devices, crawlers, and analysis sandboxes — a built-in anti-analysis gate. Yandex Metrika tracking was observed, suggesting the operators monitor victim interaction.

Approximately two seconds after page load, the injected script connects to the BNB Smart Chain Testnet over public JSON-RPC endpoints (bsc-testnet.drpc.org, with data-seed-prebsc-1-s1.bnbchain.org as a fallback node on port 8545) and performs read-only eth_call queries to retrieve the second-stage payload stored inside a smart contract. This EtherHiding approach replaces a centralized C2 with immutable, decentralized blockchain storage that resists takedown and permits silent payload rotation. The retrieved JavaScript is Base64-decoded/decompressed and executed in the browser, rendering a counterfeit reCAPTCHA "verification" overlay.

The overlay instructs the victim to press Win+R, Ctrl+V, and Enter. Malicious JavaScript has already written the attack command to the clipboard (a 'malicious copy and paste' / ClickFix lure), so the victim unknowingly executes it. The command launches rundll32.exe against a remote WebDAV UNC path (\\autum-path.vo8xalon.in.net\05fe317c-0981-4de2-bc8a-930d369db441\ck-3d) with an ordinal-based export call. Because rundll32.exe is a Microsoft-signed living-off-the-land binary and the payload is loaded directly from the remote share into memory, the chain bypasses SmartScreen reputation checks, browser download warnings, and file-based antivirus — no payload touches disk. The loaded DLL is GULoader, a shellcode-based loader that runs entirely in memory and is a known staging vector for infostealers (Lumma, Vidar) and RATs (Remcos, AgentTesla), enabling credential theft and full system compromise.

In the observed corporate incident, behavioral endpoint protection blocked the rundll32.exe execution in under 300 milliseconds, preventing final GULoader delivery; the family was confirmed via ANY.RUN sandbox detonation and endpoint telemetry correlation. The campaign demonstrates a notable convergence of new TTPs: blockchain-hosted payload staging plus rundll32/WebDAV UNC SmartScreen bypass, with the front-end C2 domain fronted by Cloudflare reverse-proxy IPs (188.114.96.7, 188.114.97.7).

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion; T1620 Reflective Code Loading

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1102 Web Service; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

Initial Access

T1189 Drive-by Compromise; T1566 Phishing

stealth

T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution

credential-access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie

Credential Access

T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

Lateral Movement

T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1584 Compromise Infrastructure

Reconnaissance

T1592 Gather Victim Host Information

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block the C2 domain autum-path.vo8xalon.in.net and parent domain vo8xalon.in.net at DNS/perimeter
  • Block outbound SMB/WebDAV (TCP 445/WebClient) to internet and untrusted UNC paths
  • Block public blockchain JSON-RPC endpoints (bsc-testnet.drpc.org, data-seed-prebsc-1-s1.bnbchain.org:8545) from user endpoints
  • Hunt for rundll32.exe spawning with a remote UNC/WebDAV path argument
  • Quarantine hosts matching GULoader SHA-256 172a25a9ed8b798d8baeec29424b46627b5b39723b37c787f928d3700509001e

Workarounds

  • Disable the Windows Run dialog via GPO (NoRun) for non-admin users where feasible
  • Egress-filter all blockchain RPC and WebDAV traffic from corporate endpoints

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for LOLBin proxy execution (rundll32 with network paths)
  • Disable the WebClient (WebDAV) service on endpoints that do not require it
  • Implement application allow-listing (WDAC/AppLocker) constraining rundll32.exe usage
  • Restrict clipboard-driven execution via Run-dialog hardening and user awareness training on fake-CAPTCHA ClickFix lures

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (desktop)
    Vulnerable versions: 10; 11
  • Automattic / WordPress — WordPress / WooCommerce (compromised hosting sites, not a product vuln)
    Vulnerable versions: unspecified

Timeline

  • Guardio Labs first publicly documents EtherHiding: malicious payloads hosted inside BNB Smart Chain (BSC) smart contracts and retrieved via read-only blockchain reads, establishing the takedown-resistant Web3 staging technique later reused by this campaign.
  • The ClickFix / fake-CAPTCHA social-engineering lure (Win+R → Ctrl+V → Enter clipboard paste) emerges and proliferates across commodity and targeted intrusion sets, becoming a mainstream initial-execution primitive.
  • Splunk publishes 'Beyond The Click: Unveiling Fake CAPTCHA Campaigns,' detailing the clipboard-injection mechanics and detection opportunities for ClickFix-style lures.
  • Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) publishes the UNC5142 report, observing the actor leveraging EtherHiding on BNB Smart Chain to distribute malware — the TTP cluster this campaign overlaps with.
  • Barracuda reports that EtherHiding gives cybercriminals access to blockchain networks impervious to takedowns, underscoring the durability of smart-contract payload staging.
  • Picus Security analyzes how Web3 infrastructure (public JSON-RPC, immutable contracts) enables stealthy, rotation-friendly malware distribution that resists conventional infrastructure disruption.
  • GULoader family confirmed via ANY.RUN sandbox detonation and endpoint telemetry correlation; Suricata flags the EtherHiding-related blockchain connections.
  • Behavioral endpoint protection blocks the rundll32.exe remote-UNC execution in under 300 milliseconds, preventing final GULoader delivery in an observed corporate incident.
  • Victim-pasted command launches Microsoft-signed rundll32.exe against the remote WebDAV UNC path \\locked-ioc-5\locked-ioc-2, loading GULoader shellcode directly into memory and bypassing SmartScreen, browser download warnings, and file-based AV.
  • Injected JavaScript connects to BNB Smart Chain Testnet ~2 seconds after page load (locked-ioc-6, fallback locked-ioc-3:8545) to retrieve the second-stage payload via read-only eth_call queries.
  • ClickFix campaign first observed: compromised European small-business WordPress/WooCommerce sites serve fake reCAPTCHA overlays; a Traffic Direction System gates the chain to Windows desktop users while showing clean content to mobile/crawlers/sandboxes.
  • Public reporting (Cyber Security News, CyberPress) of the ClickFix + EtherHiding + GULoader campaign, releasing concrete IOCs (C2 domain, WebDAV UNC path, GULoader SHA-256/MD5).

Sources cited

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Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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