Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6207
ClearFake ClickFix Pushes Essential macOS Stealer
Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net (2026-11-12) published a PCAP, notes and sample archive showing a ClearFake-served ClickFix lure delivering a macOS stealer it calls 'Essential'. The page has no written analysis, IOCs or attribution; the delivery chain below is inferred from corroborating public reporting on macOS ClickFix campaigns and is not confirmed for this sample.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-6207 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Essential macOS Stealer |
| Severity | MEDIUM |
| First disclosed | |
| Affected products | Apple macOS |
| Malware | AMOS, ClearFake, Essential macOS Stealer |
| Tools | ClickFix |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol, T1059.002 Command and Scripting Interpreter: AppleScript, T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste, T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1555.001 Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain, T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | technology, finance, cryptocurrency, general |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6207 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 12 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: macOS Stealer Password Prompt, Keychain and Browser Data Collection [Splunk SPL]
Detects post-execution stealer behaviour reported for macOS ClickFix chains: an osascript hidden-answer password dialog, dscl authonly validation of the captured password, security keychain reads, copy or archive of browser credential and cookie stores, and the /tmp/osalogging.zip staging archive reported for the related MacSync family. Requires two or more signals in five minutes, or the staging archive on its own.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1059.002, T1555.001, T1539, T1560.001
- Data sources: crowdstrike_falcon:ProcessRollup2 (index=crowdstrike, sourcetype=CrowdStrike:Event:Streams:JSON), microsoft_defender_for_endpoint:DeviceProcessEvents, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint:DeviceInfo, sigma:macos/process_creation
- Severity: high
- Confidence: medium
Splunk SPL
index=crowdstrike sourcetype="CrowdStrike:Event:Streams:JSON" event_platform=Mac event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| eval cmd=lower(CommandLine)
| eval pw_prompt=if(FileName="osascript" AND match(cmd, "display dialog") AND match(cmd, "hidden answer"), 1, 0)
| eval dscl_auth=if(FileName="dscl" AND match(cmd, "authonly"), 1, 0)
| eval keychain=if(FileName="security" AND match(cmd, "(find-generic-password|find-internet-password|dump-keychain)"), 1, 0)
| eval browser_data=if(match(FileName, "^(cp|ditto|sqlite3|zip|tar|cat)$") AND match(cmd, "(login data|cookies[.]sqlite|cookies[.]binarycookies|login[.]keychain-db|key4[.]db|logins[.]json)"), 1, 0)
| eval staged=if(match(cmd, "/tmp/osalogging[.]zip"), 1, 0)
| bin _time span=5m
| stats sum(pw_prompt) as pw_prompt sum(dscl_auth) as dscl_auth sum(keychain) as keychain sum(browser_data) as browser_data sum(staged) as staged values(CommandLine) as command_lines by ComputerName UserName _time
| eval signals=if(pw_prompt>0,1,0)+if(dscl_auth>0,1,0)+if(keychain>0,1,0)+if(browser_data>0,1,0)+if(staged>0,1,0)
| where signals>=2 OR staged>0
| table _time ComputerName UserName signals pw_prompt dscl_auth keychain browser_data staged command_linesMicrosoft KQL
let macDevices = DeviceInfo
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where OSPlatform =~ "macOS"
| distinct DeviceId;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where DeviceId in (macDevices)
| extend cmd = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend f_prompt = (FileName =~ "osascript" and cmd contains "display dialog" and cmd contains "hidden answer"),
f_dscl = (FileName =~ "dscl" and cmd contains "authonly"),
f_keychain = (FileName =~ "security" and cmd has_any ("find-generic-password", "find-internet-password", "dump-keychain")),
f_browser = (FileName in~ ("cp", "ditto", "sqlite3", "zip", "tar", "cat") and cmd has_any ("login data", "cookies.sqlite", "cookies.binarycookies", "login.keychain-db", "key4.db", "logins.json")),
f_staged = (cmd contains "/tmp/osalogging.zip")
| where f_prompt or f_dscl or f_keychain or f_browser or f_staged
| summarize Prompt = countif(f_prompt), DsclAuth = countif(f_dscl), Keychain = countif(f_keychain), BrowserData = countif(f_browser), Staged = countif(f_staged), Commands = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 10) by DeviceName, AccountName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| extend Signals = iff(Prompt > 0, 1, 0) + iff(DsclAuth > 0, 1, 0) + iff(Keychain > 0, 1, 0) + iff(BrowserData > 0, 1, 0) + iff(Staged > 0, 1, 0)
| where Signals >= 2 or Staged > 0
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, Signals, Prompt, DsclAuth, Keychain, BrowserData, Staged, CommandsSigma
title: macOS Stealer Password Prompt, Keychain Access and Staging Archive (TL-2026-6207)
id: 1b7e4a90-3c52-4d68-8f11-6207a0000004
status: experimental
description: Detects post-execution behaviour of macOS ClickFix stealers (Essential macOS Stealer, MacSync, AMOS-style AppleScript stealers) - an osascript hidden-answer password dialog, dscl authonly password validation, security keychain reads, and the /tmp/osalogging.zip staging archive reported for the related MacSync family.
references:
- https://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2026/11/12/index2.html
- https://www.seqrite.com/blog/?p=11215
- https://www.netskope.com/blog/macos-clickfix-campaign-applescript-stealers-new-terminal-protections
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/11/17
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.002
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1555.001
- attack.t1539
- attack.collection
- attack.t1560.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: macos
detection:
selection_prompt:
Image|endswith: '/osascript'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'display dialog'
- 'hidden answer'
selection_dscl:
Image|endswith: '/dscl'
CommandLine|contains: 'authonly'
selection_keychain:
Image|endswith: '/security'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'find-generic-password'
- 'find-internet-password'
- 'dump-keychain'
selection_stage:
CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/osalogging.zip'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate admin or developer scripts that read keychain items with the security utility
- Enterprise tools that prompt for a password through osascript with a hidden answer
level: highKnown false positives:
- Administrator or developer scripts that read keychain items with the security utility
- Enterprise tools that prompt for a password through osascript with a hidden answer
Tuning notes: Raise the signal threshold or exclude signed management tooling (MDM agents, backup clients) by parent process. The staging path /tmp/osalogging.zip is a related-family indicator and may differ for the Essential sample, so update it from the PCAP and files archive when available.
- ClickFix macOS Terminal Pipe-to-Shell Download and Execute [Microsoft Sentinel KQL] · unlock with TL Creds
- macOS Stealer Password Prompt, Keychain and Browser Data Collection [Microsoft Sentinel KQL] · unlock with TL Creds
- macOS Stealer C2 Domains and Curl Archive Upload Exfiltration [Microsoft Sentinel KQL] · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix macOS Terminal Pipe-to-Shell Download and Execute [Sigma] · unlock with TL Creds
- macOS Stealer Password Prompt, Keychain and Browser Data Collection [Sigma] · unlock with TL Creds
- macOS Stealer C2 Domains and Curl Archive Upload Exfiltration [Sigma] · unlock with TL Creds
- ClickFix macOS Terminal Pipe-to-Shell Download and Execute [Splunk SPL] · unlock with TL Creds
- macOS Stealer C2 Domains and Curl Archive Upload Exfiltration [Splunk SPL] · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 12 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6207.
Sample indicators (3 of 12)
- Domain:
drivinguber[.]com - File hash:
9ff32f7c0108e9d27a3b491edf04827b6ca025f44db68aeadc44eeb97c9aab11 - Domain:
newsinweb[.]com
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 12 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Primary source: Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net entry dated 2026-11-12 titled 'ClearFake ClickFix Pushes Essential macOS Stealer'. The entry offers three password-protected archives (notes.txt.zip 1.1 kB, a PCAP zip of 18.7 MB, and a files.zip of 13.9 kB) plus four screenshots. The page text names no domains, IPs, hashes, malware internals or attribution, and the archive contents were not accessible during this research. The name 'Essential macOS Stealer' could not be matched to any other public report, so no family-specific behaviour is asserted here.
Corroborating context (not specific to this sample): ClearFake is a compromised-website injection and fake-verification ecosystem whose affiliates, per Seqrite (2026-09-08), use traffic distribution systems such as Keitaro TDS to route visitors by User-Agent. Windows visitors go to LummaC2, Stealc or Vidar chains, and macOS visitors go to ClickFix funnels that deliver macOS stealers such as MacSync. Seqrite states that current evidence does not show that all MacSync ClickFix campaigns belong to one actor, or that MacSync infrastructure runs directly under ClearFake. ClickFix on macOS tells the victim to paste a command into Terminal, typically a curl-to-shell one-liner, which fetches a loader. The loader then runs AppleScript or a Mach-O stager. The stealer prompts for the user's password and collects Keychain data, browser data and cookies, SSH keys, Telegram sessions and crypto wallets. It then archives and uploads them over HTTP. Microsoft, Malwarebytes, Huntress, Netskope and Datadog reported similar macOS ClickFix chains during 2026 delivering MacSync, AMOS, Infiniti Stealer and a Go-based wallet drainer. Apple added a Terminal paste warning in macOS 26.4 and updated XProtect signatures.
Analyst caveat: severity and status are analyst defaults. The IOCs marked 'RELATED (unconfirmed)' come from the Seqrite MacSync report and are included for hunting context only. They are NOT confirmed to belong to the Essential sample. Analysts with the PCAP should replace or confirm them with the real indicators from the archives.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Exfiltration
T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Execution
T1059.002 Command and Scripting Interpreter: AppleScript; T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell; T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
Credential Access
T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.001 Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain
Collection
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block and monitor the related-campaign domains listed in the IOCs at DNS and proxy until the sample's real indicators are confirmed
- Hunt for Terminal sessions that pipe curl output to zsh or bash, or to osascript, shortly after a browser session
- Check for unexpected LaunchAgents plists and for /tmp/osalogging.zip
- If a user ran a pasted command, rotate passwords, browser sessions, SSH keys and crypto wallet secrets from a clean device
Workarounds
- Restrict Terminal use on non-developer endpoints via MDM
- Egress-filter newly registered and lookalike domains
Longer-term hardening
- Train users never to paste commands from a web page into Terminal
- Keep macOS at 26.4 or later for the Terminal paste warning, and keep XProtect updates enabled
- Deploy macOS EDR with process-lineage detection for browser to Terminal to curl to shell chains
- Monitor compromised or injected sites that serve fake verification prompts
Affected and fixed versions
- Apple — macOS
Vulnerable versions: Users who paste ClickFix commands into Terminal; no software vulnerability is exploited
Fixed in: macOS 26.4 adds a Terminal paste warning (mitigation, not a fix)
Timeline
- Seqrite reports the MacSync macOS stealer (MaaS), linked to Mac.C Stealer, emerged during 2025 (related ecosystem, not confirmed same as Essential)
- Malwarebytes documents Infiniti Stealer, a macOS ClickFix campaign using a Nuitka-compiled Python stealer and a fake Cloudflare check
- Microsoft publishes on a macOS ClickFix campaign using fake utility lures to deliver AppleScript infostealers, tracked since at least January 2026
- Huntress-sourced reporting describes a Go-based macOS ClickFix stealer with a crypto 'DRAIN' routine
- Seqrite publishes MacSync analysis describing ClearFake-affiliate TDS routing of macOS visitors to ClickFix funnels
- Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net publishes 'ClearFake ClickFix Pushes Essential macOS Stealer' with a PCAP (18.7 MB), notes and files archive
Sources cited
- ClearFake ClickFix Pushes Essential macOS Stealer malware-traffic-analysis.net · Research · 2026-11-12
- MacSync Stealer (Seqrite) seqrite.com · Vendor report · 2026-09-08
- ClickFix campaign uses fake macOS utilities lures to deliver infostealers (Microsoft) Microsoft · Vendor report · 2026-05-06
- Infiniti Stealer: a new macOS infostealer using ClickFix and Python/Nuitka (Malwarebytes) malwarebytes.com · Vendor report · 2026-03-01
- macOS ClickFix Campaign: AppleScript Stealers & New Terminal Protections (Netskope) netskope.com · Vendor report
- ClickFix attacks deliver macOS stealer (The Hacker News, Huntress Go-based stealer) The Hacker News · News · 2026-08-07
- Over 250 ClickFix domains use browser fingerprinting to hide macOS malware lures (The Hacker News) The Hacker News · News
- ClickFix campaigns spread MacSync macOS infostealer (The Hacker News) The Hacker News · News · 2026-03-01
Previous and next in malware
Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.